JUDGMENT R.P.Gupta, Member. - The following two questions are referred for opinion to this Larger Bench: 1. Whether the limitation for restitution application under Section 144, C.P.C. is one year or 3 years. 2. Whether the defendant who was dispossessed in execution of decree before cancellation operation can be put in possession after the consolidation operation under Section 144, C.P.C. though consolidation proceedings were decided against the defendant. The brief facts of the case out of which the above two questions arose, are as follows:- 1. Karim Bux the father of the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit under Section 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act on October 23, 1958 against Abdul Gafoor. The suit was dismissed on June 15, 1959 by the trial court. On appeal the judgment of the trial court was reversed and suit was decreed by the Addl. Commissioner on July 6, 1960. In pursuance of the decree, the plaintiff obtained possession on May 20, 1961. Abdul Gafoor the defendant filed second appeal No. 13 of 1960-61 before the Board of Revenue which was dismissed on July 26, 1962. Against this judgment review petition No. 21 of 1962-63 was filed which was dismissed by the Board of Revenue on July 8, 1963. Then the defendant Abdul Gafoor filed writ petition No. 4678 of 1963 in the High Court which was allowed by the Hon'ble High Court on July 27, 1966 and case was remanded to the Ist appellate court for re-hearing the appeal. In the mean-time during the pendency of the writ petition the village has come under consolidation. On April 16, 1965 consolidation Officer decided the case in favour of the plaintiff against which the appeal was dismissed by S.O.c. on August 2, 1965 and the revision was dismissed by the D.D.C. on January 28, 1966. Against the order of the D.D.C. no writ petition was filed by the defendant Abdul Gafoor. After the remand of the case by the High Court on July 27, 1966 the suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff on September 2, 1969. The present plaintiff-appellant are son of Karim Bux who were substituted in his place after his death. Against the order of the D.D.C. no writ petition was filed by the defendant Abdul Gafoor. After the remand of the case by the High Court on July 27, 1966 the suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff on September 2, 1969. The present plaintiff-appellant are son of Karim Bux who were substituted in his place after his death. Even before withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiffs the defendant Abdul Gafoor applied on July 1, 1969 for restitution of possession under Section 144, C.P.C. This application was allowed by the trial court on March 20, 1970 the appeal filed by the plaintiffs against this order was dismissed by the Addl. Commissioner on January 6, 1972 against which order the second appeal is filed by the plaintiffs Abdul Raheem etc. 2. The learned counsel for the parties argued at length and relied on various rulings in support of their contentions. According to the learned counsel for the defendant respondent Abdul Gafoor the limitation for giving restitution application under Section 144, C.P.C. was 12 years while according to the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant, it was only one year, the present case being one under Section 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. According to deliver back possession to the defendant irrespective of the fact that consolidation had taken place in village or not while according to the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant restitution is not possible after the final decisions of the title by the consolidation courts. 3. Let us examine the correct position in regard to the question involved. 4. No specific period of limitation is provided for application under Section 144 C.P.C. on which basis, it is said that the limitation will be governed by the residuary clause of Limitation Act and as such it will be 3 years. On the other hand it is said that the restitution application is nothing but execution application and as such the limitation will be the same which is provided for executing the decree for possession. 5. In Mahijibhai Mohan Bhai Baret v. Patel Mani Bhai Gokal Bhai, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1477 : 1965 A.L. 525 it was held per Majority (Sarkar, J. dissenting) "An application for execution of a decree and therefore, such application is governed by Article 182 Limitation Act and not by Article 181 of the Limitation Act which is residuary article of limitation". 6. 6. In Hanif Ahmad v. Abdul Raheem, A.I.R. 1973 Alld. 63 relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant respondent Mr. Justice K.N. Singh relying on the above case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1) held that the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 would apply. Article 128 of the Limitation Act would not apply to restitution proceedings under Section 144, C.P.Code. 7. Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act (Act 9 of 1908) was regarding the execution of decree while Article 181 was the residuary article providing limitation of 3 years for application for which no period of limitation of 2 years for application for which no period of limitation was provided else where. In the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) Article 136 is regarding the execution of the decree for which a period of 12 years limitation is provided while Article 137 is the residuary article providing a limitation of 3 years for application for which no period of limitation is provided else where. From the study of the above two rulings it is clear that the substitution application under Section 144, C.P.C. in an application for execution of decree. The period of limitation will be the same which is provided for the execution of decree. 8. Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule. Entry at Serial No. 53 of appendix III of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules prescribes a limitation for one year only for moving the execution application. This question was considered recently by Mr. Justice Deokinandhan of Allahabad High Court in K.N. Srivastava v. S.N. Rai, 1981 A.W.C. Summary of Cases 27, as S.O.C. No. 32 in second appeal No. 429 of 1965 decided on July 27, 1981. This question was considered recently by Mr. Justice Deokinandhan of Allahabad High Court in K.N. Srivastava v. S.N. Rai, 1981 A.W.C. Summary of Cases 27, as S.O.C. No. 32 in second appeal No. 429 of 1965 decided on July 27, 1981. Following observations were made in the cases:- "Under Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, wherever any special or local law prescribed a period of limitation different from that prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, the limitation prescribed by the said special or local law was to be read as the limitation prescribed for that suit by the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, and Section 3 therefore was to apply accordingly to that suit, application and appeal. This provision of the Limitation Act explains the apparent conflict between the provisions of Sec. 341 and clauses(d) and (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 344 of the Act. The Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was applied to proceedings under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act by Section 341 thereof in a much as it was considered necessary so to do in a general way. But, by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 344 of the Act, power was reserved to prescribe a period of limitation different from the prescribed by the Limitation Act, which it was competent for the State Legislature to do, as envisaged by sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act itself. The provision of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 344 of the Act was necessary for applying certain provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to suits, application, appeals and proceedings under the Act for which a different period of limitation was prescribed under the rules again in view of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 where under all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act did not automatically apply to cases where limitation was prescribed by the special or local law. In the instant case the decree under execution was passed in a suit under Section 209 of the Act and that if the entry at Serial No. 53 of Appendix II to the Rules governed the matter, the limitation for moving the execution application was only one year." 9. In the instant case the decree under execution was passed in a suit under Section 209 of the Act and that if the entry at Serial No. 53 of Appendix II to the Rules governed the matter, the limitation for moving the execution application was only one year." 9. A similar question of limitation regarding restitution application under Section 144, C.P.C. in a case under U.P.T. Act, 1939 came in Faudi v. Mahadeo Singh, 1969 A.W.R. 134 in which the division bench of Allahabad High Court held that the period of Limitation was only one year. It was a special appeal against the judgment of Single Judge, in view of the full bench decision in Parmeshar Singh and others v. Sitladin Dube and others, 1934 A.W.R. 740 the learned Single Judge held that the restitution application which was made on March 3, 1956 was barred by 3 years rule of limitation laid down in article 181 of the Limitation Act. The Bench observed as follows:- "The full bench decision in Parmeshar Singh's case (supra) on which the judgment of the learned single judge is based, has since been overruled by the Supreme Court in Mahijibhai Mohanbhai Baret v. Patel Manibhai Gokulbhai and others (supra) and it has been laid down in the majority judgment in that case that an application for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. is an application for execution of a decree and, therefore such application is governed by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act and not by the residuary Article 181. The restitution application in question was, therefore, an application for execution; but it was governed by the special provision for limitation made in the Fourth Schedule to the U.P. Tenancy Act and not by Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation prescribed at Serial No. 7 of Group 'F' in the said schedule for execution of any decree other than a money decree was one year." 10. Thus it is clear from the above discussion that the limitation for moving application for restitution of possession under Section 144, C.P.C. is the same which is for the execution of decree. This period is one year for the cases under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 11. As regards the second question, let us consider various provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This period is one year for the cases under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 11. As regards the second question, let us consider various provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. A study of the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act shows that before U.P. Consolidation of Amendment Act, 24 of 1956 all the pending suit proceedings etc. used to be stayed by the courts under Section 5 and after the decision of the Consolidation Authorities, these cases used to be decided in accordance with the decisions of the Consolidation Authorities. After the Amending Act, 1956, these cases are abated under Section 5(2)(a) of U.P.C.H. Act. The titles of the parties are to be decided by the Consolidation Authorities under various provisions of Consolidation Act. Persons having rights in the old holdings are allotted Chaks as Bhumidhar Asami etc. Under Section 23 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, these Chaks become final and the parties are put to possession under Section 28 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even if a Chak holder does not take possession through court in consolidation proceedings through an execution, still after the expiry of 6 months period, it will be deemed that he has entered into actual physical possession of the allotted Chak or land. Thus it is clear that after finalisation of Chaks, Chak holder enter into fresh possession by virtue of the allotment of Chak to him by the Consolidation Authorities. Under Section 30 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act Chak holder looses all the rights in the old plots and becomes Bhumidhar or Asami of his Chak from that date. 12. Doctrine of restitution is based on the principle of enquiry and justice that the acts of courts should not be allowed to work injury on the suitors. These principles are embodied in Section 144, C.P.C. 13. Relying on L. Guran Dutta v. T.R. Dutta, A.I.R. 1935 Privy Council 12 and S.O.C. v. M.M.C., A.I.R. 1972 Delhi 212 it was argued that the court is bound to restore possession under Section 144, C.P.C. in every case. This is not the correct position. There may be cases where restitution will result into great injustice and it will be against the principle of enquiry, or it will be impossible to allow restitution for other reasons. Having regard to these facts in Section 144, C.P.C. the words "so far as may be" are used. This is not the correct position. There may be cases where restitution will result into great injustice and it will be against the principle of enquiry, or it will be impossible to allow restitution for other reasons. Having regard to these facts in Section 144, C.P.C. the words "so far as may be" are used. In Atchuthan v. Gopalan, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 199 where plaintiff lost possession of property to the person with title superior to him and defendant it was held that the defendant cannot get restitution. 14. In Bhagwan Singh v. Sri Kishan Dass, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 136, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record, who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and it is the duty of the court to enforce that obligation unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the interests of justice." 15. The general principle of restitution is that court should put the parties to the same original position i.e. status quo ante which was disturbed under erroneous decree of the court. Only exception is that it is not be done if it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case. Status quo ante means that the party should be put to the same position in which they were before the execution of the erroneous decree. Status quo ante in the present case means that the defendant who was dis-possessed under court's decree before consolidation operation, would be deemed to be in possession of the disputed land at the start of the consolidation operations. As defendant lost his title and right to remain in possession during consolidation proceedings, he cannot now be put to possession under Section 144, C.P.C. as it will result to great injustice to the real owner who was allotted Chak under Consolidation operations and was put in possession of the Chak during the consolidation operations or was deemed to be in possession under Section 28 of U.P.C.H. Act. In such a case restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. cannot be allowed, as it will be clearly contrary to the interests of justice. 16. In such a case restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. cannot be allowed, as it will be clearly contrary to the interests of justice. 16. On the basis of application under Section 144, C.P.C. of a person who is adjudged as trespasser in consolidation proceedings it will not be fair and just to dispose a person, who is held as a tenure holder of the holding in consolidation proceedings. It will be clearly contrary to the interest of justice. As held by Allahabad High Court in Madhai Lal v. Board of Revenue, 1983 R.D. 11 after finalisation of the consolidation of holding proceedings a person can claim title to any land only when he has been allotted land during the consolidation of holding proceedings as Bhumidhar or Asami. A person who has not been allotted land by the consolidation authorities in any of the capacities have no title. The status of such person cannot be other than that of a trespasser. A trespasser after the close of consolidation operation cannot be allowed to say that the real owner should be dispossessed and in his place he should be put in possession, simply because he was dispossessed and the real owner was put in possession before consolidation operation in execution of a decree which no longer existed due to abatement of the suit etc. under Section 5(2)(a) of C.H. Act or for like reasons. It will be nothing but great in justice to the real owner. 17. No doubt in Shitla Prasad v. Thakur Prasad, 1971 R.D. 177 Sri P.P. Bhatnagar, member, Board of Revenue allowed restitution in spite of consolidation proceedings but in that case Hon'ble High Court decided title of the parties subsequent to the consolidation of holding proceedings and also adjudged winning party as Adhivasi and Sirdar of the land in suit. In such circumstances having regard to the interest of justice, the learned Member allowed restitution. This case cannot be taken as a ruling for the proposition by dispossessing real owner simple because real owner was put to possession before consolidation operation by dis-possession trespasser in execution of a decree which no longer existed. In such circumstances having regard to the interest of justice, the learned Member allowed restitution. This case cannot be taken as a ruling for the proposition by dispossessing real owner simple because real owner was put to possession before consolidation operation by dis-possession trespasser in execution of a decree which no longer existed. In Yadram v. Bhoop Singh, 1959 A.L.J. 85(R.) where disputed land was allotted by the courts in consolidation proceedings in the appellant's Chak and he had taken possession of his Chak and the respondent's objections were rejected by the consolidation officer, it was held that the Addl. Commissioner had no jurisdiction to order restoration of the possession to the respondent. In Khajan Singh v. Antkali, 1970 R.D. 325 the restitution under Section 144 was refused due to the decision of the consolidation authorities. 18. It was argued on behalf of the respondent defendant that the judgment of consolidation authorities were based on the judgment passed by the Board of Revenue in second appeal and as such there is no justification to refuse restitution on the basis of this judgment. It is not the correct position as this court cannot look into the merit of the decision of consolidation authorities. The decision of consolidation authorities is final. This court cannot examine on merit the correctness of decision of Consolidation Authorities. The defendant respondent should have gone in writ petition to the High Court against the order of D.D.C. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent defendant argued that the plaintiff appellant should have taken the plea of the finalization of consolidation proceedings before the High Court in the writ petition so that writ petition would have become infructuous. It was not for the respondent to take this plea. It is also not the correct position. The order of the Consolidation authorities was against respondent defendant. It was in his interest to get it set aside. He should have requested Hon'ble High Court to get order of the D.D.C. set aside. In fact High Court had not decided rights of the parties in the writ petition which rights were decided by the consolidation authorities. Hon'ble High Court simply remanded the case to the Addl. It was in his interest to get it set aside. He should have requested Hon'ble High Court to get order of the D.D.C. set aside. In fact High Court had not decided rights of the parties in the writ petition which rights were decided by the consolidation authorities. Hon'ble High Court simply remanded the case to the Addl. Commissioner whose jurisdiction to decide appeal on merit ceased due to provision of Section 5(2)(a) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act under which it was obligatory on his part to abate the appeal along with original suit etc. 20. The correct position is that the person who was dispossessed in execution of the decree before consolidation operations cannot be put in possession after close of consolidation operation under Section 144 C.P.C. if consolidation proceedings were finally decided against him. 21. Both the questions referred are answered as follows:- 1. The application for restitution of possession under Section 144 C.P.C. is an execution application, the limitation for which in cases under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is one year as provided at Sl. No. 53 appendix III of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules. 2. The person who was dispossessed in execution of decree before consolidation operations cannot be put in possession under Section 144 C.P.C. after the close of consolidation operations if the consolidation proceedings were finally decided against him." Kaushal Kishore, Member. - The questions answered by our learned colleague Sri R.P. Gupta, Member for the larger Bench should better be taken in reverse order for the answer to the question relating to limitation depends on whether the restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. is a result to execution of a decree or not. We also find that he has considered various aspects and case-law for only one alternative and to our mind, another alternative that restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. may not be equivalent to execution proceedings for a reversed or modified decree has been left out. We will deal with this question in the following paragraphs. 23. In the ruling Mahajibhai Mohanbhai Barot v. Patel Manibhai Kukalbhai and others (supra) it was held that an application for restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. is an application for execution of a decree, under the general understanding that usually the restitution occurs in execution of a decree which reverses or varies an earlier decree. The observation of the Hon'ble Mr. In the ruling Mahajibhai Mohanbhai Barot v. Patel Manibhai Kukalbhai and others (supra) it was held that an application for restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. is an application for execution of a decree, under the general understanding that usually the restitution occurs in execution of a decree which reverses or varies an earlier decree. The observation of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Subba Rao (page 1484) may be quoted, for a better understanding : "It (Section 144) does not say that an application for restitution, which till the new procedure code was enacted, was an application for execution, should be treated as an original petition. Whether an application for execution, should be treated as an original petition. Whether an application is one for execution of a decree or is an original application depends upon the nature of application and the relief asked for. When a party who lost his property in execution of a decree seeks to recover the same by reasons of the appellate decree in his favour, he is not initiating any original proceeding but he is only concerned with the working out of the appellate decree in his favour. The application flows from the appellate decree and is filed to implement or enforce the same. He is entitled to the relief of restitution because the appellate decree enables him to obtain that relief either expressly or by necessary implication. He is recovering the fruits of the appellate decree. Prima facie, therefore, having regard to the history of the section, there is no reason why such an application shall not be treated as one for the execution of the appellate decree." In the present case, the decree in favour of the appellant was set aside by the Hon'ble High Court on July 27, 1966 and the first appeal became pending but the plaintiff Abdul Rahim instead of perusing his appeal chase to withdraw his suit in September 2, 1969 and with this withdrawal the suit and the decree both were wiped out. Since the situation is that by the plaintiff's own voluntary action the suit and decree now do not exist, the application under Section 144 C.P.C. cannot be deemed to be made in pursuance of any appellate decree. Therefore this ruling will not be applicable in the peculiar circumstances of this case, providing an alternative situation and alternative answers. 24. Since the situation is that by the plaintiff's own voluntary action the suit and decree now do not exist, the application under Section 144 C.P.C. cannot be deemed to be made in pursuance of any appellate decree. Therefore this ruling will not be applicable in the peculiar circumstances of this case, providing an alternative situation and alternative answers. 24. In other case Nafis Ahmad v. Abdul Rahim, A.I.R. 1979 Alld. 63, the above ruling by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was followed to rule that the limitation period was 12 years as under 136 and not 30 days under Article 128. In both the above cases, one similar feature can be detected that the final order of the court resulted in allowing he restitution and in the promotion of justice. But in the instant case, denial of restitution of possession would amount to protection of a mischief on technical basis resulting in evidence injustice as shown by the facts of the case below. 25. The original suit under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was dismissed by the trial court, but the first appellate court had decreed the suit on September 6, 1960. In pursuance of this decree, the plaintiff obtained possession on May 20, 1961. Abdul Gafoor lost the second appeal before the Board of Revenue on July 26, 1962 and the review petition on July 8, 1963 but won the writ petition in the Hon'ble High Court on July 27, 1966 when the judgments by the Board and the Additional Commissioner were set aside and the first appeal was remanded. However, consolidation proceedings had set in during this period and following the decree by the Board dated July 26, 1962, the consolidation officer decided in favour of the plaintiff on April 16, 1965 and this was maintained by the S.O.C. on August 2, 1965 and D.D.C. on January 28, 1966 for obvious reasons. 26. However, consolidation proceedings had set in during this period and following the decree by the Board dated July 26, 1962, the consolidation officer decided in favour of the plaintiff on April 16, 1965 and this was maintained by the S.O.C. on August 2, 1965 and D.D.C. on January 28, 1966 for obvious reasons. 26. The order dated April 16, 1965 was not independent adjudication by the consolidation officer but a mere reiteration of the order of the Board of Revenue as can be seen by the relevant extracts from this order dated April 16, 1965, reproduced below: ".......Abdul Gafoor son of Kalooo objected under Section 9 that the order of the Hon'ble Board of Revenue is not final as a writ is pending and that he is in possession the names of the recorded tenants be expunged and that his name be recorded..........It is neither a material writ which could make order of the Hon'ble Board of Revenue as non-res judicata for there is any proof of the writ. So this order of the Hon'ble Board is final and will operate as res judicata. So I dismiss the objection of Abdul Gafoor....." It shows that no adjudication of title was attempted by the consolidation authorities and that the order of the Board of Revenue was held final and res judicata, and this same order of Board ultimately fell by the order of the Hon'ble High Court. It can easily be seen that the sole basis of the so called decision of title by the consolidation authorities having been struck down by the Hon'ble High Court, the question of any bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act cannot arise. 27. After the plaintiff had withdrawn the suit itself, which he had lost in the trial court, and a decree in his favour obtained at the level of the Board of Revenue on July 26, 1962 was struck down by the Hon'ble High Court, all the decisions by the consolidation authorities must be deemed nullity either because their grounds stood lost or because the plaintiff's cunningness in litigation tactics was a disguised and concealed fraud played on the consolidation authorities. In the circumstances, the so-called adjudication by the consolidation authorities could not stand in the way of restitution of possession under Section 144 C.P.C. If on technical grounds, the restitution is refused it will amount to manipulation by the plaintiff resulting into gross injustice to the defendant. 28. In the ruling in Shitla Prasad v. Thakur Prasad, 1971 R.D. 177, it was held that where the orders of the Revenue Courts had been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court, the winning party is entitled to make an application under Section 144 C.P.C. for delivering back possession to him by way of restitution and in that instant case the courts below were justified in ordering the winning party to be put in possession of the plot which the losing party got for the original plots in consolidation proceedings. The same considerations will be applicable in the present case also because the Hon'ble High Court quashed the Board's order which was held as res judicata and basis by the consolidation courts and the effect of the Hon'ble High Court's judgment must extend to the title decided by the consolidation courts and the effect of the Hon'ble High Court's judgment must extend to the title decided by the consolidation courts, rendering the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act as inapplicable. 29. It also appears desirable to quote from the last but one para of the Hon'ble High Court's judgment in writ petition No. 4678 of 1963 relating to this very case: "In view of the decision of this court reported in Unchan Singh and another v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and others, 1962 A.L.J. 229 this petition has to be allowed. Admittedly, there was an order under Section 27 of Act I of 1947 and after the expiry of three years no suit had been instituted for the ejectment of the defendant petitioner. The present suit was instituted in the year 1958. If really the defendant was in possession on the suit according to the view expressed on the above noted case, was barred by time and the defendant-petitioner acquired right of a Sirdar under Section 204. It has been argued on behalf of the contesting respondent that the Additional Commissioner has given no finding one way or the other about possession. He has assumed the possession of the defendant and even then has passed the decree. It has been argued on behalf of the contesting respondent that the Additional Commissioner has given no finding one way or the other about possession. He has assumed the possession of the defendant and even then has passed the decree. The submission is that the case of the plaintiff that after the expiry of three years the plaintiffs had entered into possession has not been enquired into. This contention of the learned counsel appears to be correct. There does not appear to be correct. There does not appear to be any categorical finding by the first appellate court or the second appellate court about the possession of the defendant petitioner although the trial court had definitely found that the petitioner was in possession and that the plaintiffs had never obtained possession as alleged by them." The plaintiff was obviously not prepared to take chances after such decision. 30. The ruling reported in 1959 A.L.J.(Rev.) 85 is to the effect that the restitution of possession to the respondent by the Additional Commissioner is barred under Section 30 read with Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. However, as observed above, since the alleged decisions by the consolidation authorities turned out to be nullity, the question of any bar to restitution of possession by the revenue authorities does not arise. 31. The question whether the restitution of possession under Section 144, C.P.C. should be equated to the execution proceedings and whether the limitation should be the same as for the execution proceedings in a suit under Section 209 of the Act will have to be decided in the above back ground. 32. That the Limitation provided by special Acts, prevails over the general provisions and as held in the ruling reported in 1981 A.W.C. (SO No. 32 and discussed in detail by the Member Sri R.P. Gupta, that the limitation for moving the execution application for decree under Section 209 of the Act was one year, but we also find that in alternative as in the instant case, there being no execution application nor any decree in support of the application under Section 144, C.P.C. this limitation cannot be applied. The ruling is distinguishable in view of this aspect. The ruling is distinguishable in view of this aspect. For the same consideration the ruling reported in 1969 A.W.R. 134 which follows the ruling in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1477 and prescribes one year limitation for application under Section 144, C.P.C., cannot be held to apply to both the alternative since the elementary requirement that his application should be an execution application is not fulfilled. In the result, limitation in the second alternative situation will be three years by application of item 137 (Third Division Part II) of Schedule to the Limitation Act). 33. We entirely agree with the principles stated in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the judgment by our learned colleague Sri R.P. Gupta, Member, but do not agree that a restitution application under Section 144, C.P.C. is always execution proceedings or that it is always not practicable to carry out restitution. Keeping the noble principle underlying the restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. in view, only considerations of practicability should bar such restitution. There can be no absolute bar on the basis of consolidation proceedings for their decisions may or may not be a result of adjudication and entries may or may not be rebuttable. 34. In view of the aspects and circumstances discussed above, our answers to question No. 1 and 2 taken in the reverse order, shall be different for the two alternatives. When the restitution can be equated to an execution application arising out of a decree and consolidation proceedings were decided against the defendant through an adjudication not quashed by any order of the Hon'ble High Court in a writ petition, the first set of answers will be applicable. In alternative, when the restitution cannot be equated to an execution application arising out of a decree, either because the decrees by the revenue courts have been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court and or the suit has been withdrawn and the decision in the consolidation proceedings against the defendant follows no adjudication or is a nullity, the second set of answers will apply. For the above two alternatives, the answers, therefore, are: First Alternative:- Question No. 2 - No. Question No. 1 - One year. Second Alternative:- Question No. 2 - Yes. Question No. 1 - Three years. Indra Bahadur Singh, Member. - I have perused the judgments of both learned Members Sri R.P. Gupta and Sri Kaushal Kishore. 36. For the above two alternatives, the answers, therefore, are: First Alternative:- Question No. 2 - No. Question No. 1 - One year. Second Alternative:- Question No. 2 - Yes. Question No. 1 - Three years. Indra Bahadur Singh, Member. - I have perused the judgments of both learned Members Sri R.P. Gupta and Sri Kaushal Kishore. 36. The facts of the case need no repetition. They have been elaborately dealt with by both the learned Member. 37. I agree with the answers of Mr. Kaushal Kishore, learned Member in the two alternatives to the question referred but I prefer to give my own reasons and would like to answer the questions in a different manner. 38. Both the questions referred to the Full Bench revolve around Section 144, C.P.C., therefore, it will be better to quote the section itself as amended by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad. State Amendment Uttar Pradesh-In Section 144, for sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted: "(1) Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in appeal, revision or otherwise the court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made, as will, so far as may be placed the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and for this purpose, the court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal." (Force supplied). 39. The phrase used 'or otherwise' in sub-section (1) is of very wide application. It includes cases falling in which restitution is required but they fall in the category of cases where decree or order is not varied or reversed in appeal and revision. In cases where the order or decree has been set aside by the Hon'ble High Court in writ jurisdiction or may by other proceedings or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purposes and Section 144(1) of the C.P.C. entitles a party to any benefit by way of restitution 'or otherwise'. The use of phrase 'or otherwise' at two places in the section gives widest scope for restitution. The use of phrase 'or otherwise' at two places in the section gives widest scope for restitution. Even if it may not be actually restitution but the benefit can be given to a party entitled to it. Therefore, in any considered opinion Section 144 of the C.P.C. has got at least two categories of cases :- 1. Where the order or decree has been varied or reversed in appeal and revision. 2. Where variation or reversal took place not in appeal or revision but otherwise. 40. The limitation for restitution arising out of variation or reversal in appeal or revision will be only one year in U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act cases i.e. the limitation provided for execution of a decree as has been held in A.I.R. 1965 (S.C.) 1477=1965 A.L.J. 525 but limitation for restitution arising out of cases of variation for reversal not by appeal or revision but otherwise will be 3 years as no limitation has been provided for them and the residuary Article 147 shall be applicable and not the limitation for execution of a decree. 41. In A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1477 the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself did not lay down any limitation regarding second category of cases covered by phrase 'or otherwise' used in the section which will be clear by quoting its head-note A. "Section 144 defines the powers of the court and expressly bars the maintainability of a suit in respect of a relief obtainable under this section. The section does not either expressly or by necessary implication change the nature of the proceedings. Its object is limited. It seeks to avoid the conflict and to make the scope of the restitution clear and unambiguous. It does not say that an application for restitution, which till the new Procedure Code was enacted, was an application for execution, should be treated as an original petition. Whether on application is one for execution of a decree or is an original application depends upon the nature of the application and the relief asked for. When a party who lost his property in execution of a decree seeks to recover the same by reason of the appellate decree in his favour, he is not initiating any original proceeding, but he is only concerned with the working out of the appellate decree in his favour. When a party who lost his property in execution of a decree seeks to recover the same by reason of the appellate decree in his favour, he is not initiating any original proceeding, but he is only concerned with the working out of the appellate decree in his favour. The application flows from the appellate decree and is filed to implement or enforce the same. He is entitled to the relief of restitution, because the appellate decree enables him to obtain that relief, either expressly or by necessary implication. He is recovering the fruits of the appellate decree. Prima facie, therefore having regard to the history of the section, there is no reason why such an application shall not be treated as one for the execution of the appellate decree. Section 144 may have been placed in Part XI under the heading 'Miscellaneous' as relief of restitution may cover cases other than those arising in execution of a decree of an appellate court setting aside the decree of a court under appeal. The placing of a particular section in a part of the Code dealing with a specific subject matter may support the contention that section deals with a part of the subject deals with by that part, but that cannot be said when a particular section appears under a part dealing with miscellaneous manners. The part under the heading 'Miscellaneous manner' is that the sections in that part cannot be allotted wholly to a part dealing with a specific subject, for the reason that the sections entirely fall outside the order parts or for the reason that they cannot entirely fall within a particular part". (Force supplied). 42. It is thus clear that Section 144 of the C.P.C. envisages two types of applications one for execution of a decree varied or reversed in appeal or revision and two covered by phrase 'or otherwise' used in the section, therefore, question No. 1 should be answered accordingly. 43. In Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal, 1976 R.D. 91(H.C., F.B.). It has been held as follows:- "It is really the duty of the court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person has been deprived of his property due to an order of court which has subsequently been varied or reversed as being erroneous. 43. In Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal, 1976 R.D. 91(H.C., F.B.). It has been held as follows:- "It is really the duty of the court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person has been deprived of his property due to an order of court which has subsequently been varied or reversed as being erroneous. Hence even if one could not invoke the powers of the court to grant restitution under Section 144 C.P.C. he could certainly do so under Section 151 C.P.C." 44. The use of word so far as may be has been used in a restrictive sense and connotes as far as possible. 45. Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act is no hindrance to the writ jurisdiction of Hon'ble High Court. The orders passed in writ jurisdiction are binding on subordinate courts including consolidation courts. 46. Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act bars restitution only in cases when the question of title has been adjudicated by the consolidation courts and restitution was sought by a trespasser as was sone in 1983 R.D. 11, 1959 A.L.J. 85 (Rev.), 1970 R.D. 325 but restitution cannot be refused where either no adjudication was made by the consolidation courts or if made on the basis previous judgments and decree which themselves were set aside either by Hon'ble High Court in writ jurisdiction or by the result of suit instituted for the purpose. In such cases restitution shall be granted and cannot be refused as was done in 1971 R.D. 71 so in my considered opinion to answer to the second question should be accordingly. 47. So my considered answer to question No. 1 is as follows:- "Limitation under Section 144 of the C.P.C. in Z.A. and L.R. Act cases is one year in cases of variation or reversal of a decree or order by appeal or revision but it shall be 3 years in cases covered by phrase 'or otherwise' of the section." 48. 47. So my considered answer to question No. 1 is as follows:- "Limitation under Section 144 of the C.P.C. in Z.A. and L.R. Act cases is one year in cases of variation or reversal of a decree or order by appeal or revision but it shall be 3 years in cases covered by phrase 'or otherwise' of the section." 48. And my considered answer to question No. 2 is as follows:- "Restitution shall not be granted to the defendant if he is a trespasser if the question of title by consolidation courts has been adjudicated against him but restitution shall not be refused to him if the question of title had not been adjudicated upon by the consolidation courts or if adjudicated upon was based on previous judgment which have been set aside either in writ or otherwise." 49. According to majority view we answer question Nos. 1 and 2 as follows: Answer to Question No. 1:- "Limitation under Section 144 of the C.P.C. in Z.A. and L.R. Act cases is one year in cases of variation or reversal of a decree or order by appeal or revision but it shall be 3 years in cases covered by phrase 'or otherwise' of the section. Answer to Question No. 2:- "Restitution shall not be granted to the defendant if he is a trespasser if the question of title by consolidation courts has been adjudicated against him; but restitution shall not be refused to him if the question of title had not been adjudicated upon was based on previous judgments which have been set aside either in writ or otherwise."