JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, M. - This revision petition has been filed against the judgment petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated November 6, 1979 by the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, remanding the case under Section 229-B 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for fresh trial after framing two issues and for giving findings and deciding the case. The learned trial court had decreed the suit on April 7, 1973 which was set aside on November 6, 1979 by the learned first appellate court and the case was remanded to the trial court. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. The learned Additional Commissioner has held that in view of the written statement by the Conservator of Forests denying any notice under Section 80, C.P.C. to the State and to the forest department the trial court should frame an issue whether the notice under Section 80, C.P.C. was sent to the forest department and whether such notice is necessary and another issue whether the notice under Section 80, C.P.C. was served on the State. 3. The learned counsel for the application Sri S.D. Pathak, argued that a suit is filed only by a legal entity, that the forest department is not a legal entity and as the first appeal could not be filed by the forest department and had to be dismissed. In support, he cited a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2538, that the State and the Gaon Sabha were sent notice vide statement in para 5 of the plaint and written statement by the State saying that it had no objection as regards this para, so implicitly admitting the notice being sent, that no third party could raise objection when the State itself had admitted, in support he cited rulings reported in 1976 R.D. 244 and 1980 R.D. 307, that a notice can be waived by the person for whose benefit notice is required to be sent and in the instant case such plea is deemed waived by the State in view of its written statement, in support he cited ruling reported in A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 471, and that the trial court did not discuss this point which leads to the presumption that no such point was raised before the trial court by the forest department and so this point could not be raised in appeal. Sri Pathak further argued that since the first appellate court had not reversed any finding of the learned trial court on merits and sufficient evidence was there on record to enable decision of the second appeal even on merits, there would be no need to remand the case and the appeal can be finally decided by this court. In support, he cited rulings reported in 1974 R.D. 237 and 1983 R.D. (Summary) 14. In these rulings, it has been held that Section 103 C.P.C. is applicable to the suits under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and empowers the second appellate court to determine the fact necessary for the disposal of the appeal which has not been determined by the lower appellate court if the evidence on record is sufficient. On the point that these rulings applicable to appeals will also apply to the present revision, Sri Pathak cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1973 Alld. 411 and A.I.R. 1973 Alld. (F.B.) 390. It has been held that there is no basic difference between the appellate and revisional powers. The learned counsel further referred to Khewat entries 1346F and 1357F and Khasra entries 1346F and 1361F as well as the commissioner's report dated May 22, 1965 which proved that the plot was in the shape of a grove having 700 Mahua trees and only 7 or 8 more trees of other varieties. He argued that all other evidence duly discussed by the learned trial court supported the conclusions arrived at by it and no mistake in appreciation or findings was made out. 4. The learned D.G.C.(R.) has argued that Section 80 C.P.C. requires notice to various departments and officers, that the Conservator of forest was party so notice was necessary to him under Section 80, C.P.C., that notice to State as well as notice to the forest department was necessary, and in support, he cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 402, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 227 and A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 148. 402, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 227 and A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 148. The learned counsel for the applicant in turn argued that it was not a suit against a public officer and so the question of any departmental officer being sent notice did not arise. 5. As regards the position of the forest department ruling in A.I.R. 1976 2538 makes it clear that only the State is a legal entity and not even the railway department of the Central Government. It was held that the demarcation of the different State-owned railways as distinct units for administrative and fiscal purposes cannot have the effect of conferring the status of juridical person upon the respective railway administrations or their General Managers for the purpose of civil suits. Even Section 79 C.P.C. makes it very clear that only the Union of India in matters by or against the Central Government and the State in case of matters by or against a State Government are to be made parties and in such cases the provisions of Section 80, C.P.C. will apply. Various authorities named authorised to receive the notice cannot become the juridical person to be made a party to the suit. Since the necessary parties being the Gaon Sabha and the State were duly made parties and were also sent notice as per para 5 of the plaint, the suit could not become bad for no notice served on the forest department. In fact, an additional care was taken to implead the forest department through the D.F.O. as a party and later the forest department through the Conservator of Forest was amended on May 5, 1972. The conservator could only peruse the case on behalf of the State but not as independent legal entity. The State had already filed the writ on statement saying that it had no objection as regards notice, so the fact of notice having been sent was also admitted by the State. In the written statement by the forest department which must be deemed as a written statement on behalf of the State, the earlier admission could not be challenged by the forest department. 6. As regards a notice to the forest department, it may be said that the learned first appellate court had relied upon certain amended rules of the department but it has nowhere been shown that Section 80 C.P.C. has also been amended accordingly. 6. As regards a notice to the forest department, it may be said that the learned first appellate court had relied upon certain amended rules of the department but it has nowhere been shown that Section 80 C.P.C. has also been amended accordingly. The basic requirements exist under Section 80 C.P.C. and so even against certain rules of the department the provision of law must prevail. Since no notice to the Conservator is required under Section 80 C.P.C. this objection losses all force. It is further observed that the Conservator of Forest is not the only person who could claim to be sent notice under Section 80 C.P.C. for such provision was there for the section provides several alternatives as the Collector of the district or one of several secretaries to the State Government, under Section 80(1)(c) C.P.C. The requirement is fulfilled when a notice is sent to anyone of these various authorities. It is the only internal arrangement that whichever authority receives a notice forwards it to the authority who is to put up the actual contest. 7. The forest department had further objected that no notice to the Gaon Sabha and State had been served. In this aspect of the matter, I must agree with the contention of Sri Pathak on the strength of the rulings mentioned that a third party is not entitled to raise objection when the State itself either admitted the notice being sent or have waived the requirement under Section 80 C.P.C. In the instant case, however, the requirement under Section 80 C.P.C. had been complied with. In the face of the admission by the State, the forest department was left with no authority or locus-standi to further contest the matter. In Hans Raj v. Board of Revenue 1980 R.D. 307 the Hon'ble High Court held that where notice was served on the State and here was defect in the notice, the objection could be raised by the State only and not by a third party. In Gaja and others v. Das Koiri and others A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 471, the Hon'ble High Court while appreciating the objective of a notice under Section 80 C.P.C., held that section intended to grant the authorities a special protection for their own benefit to which if they so chose, they may avail. In Gaja and others v. Das Koiri and others A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 471, the Hon'ble High Court while appreciating the objective of a notice under Section 80 C.P.C., held that section intended to grant the authorities a special protection for their own benefit to which if they so chose, they may avail. The court further observed that it was well established that the objection to the entertain ability of a suit for want of notice may be waived by the authorities concerned and that it was erroneous to consider otherwise. It was also observed by the Privy Council in Vellyan Chettiar v. Government of Madras A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 197 that: "There is no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of section are mandatory and must be enforced by the court and that they may be waived by the authority for whose benefit they are provided." Therefore, the forest department had no authority to question the fulfilment of the requirements in respect of the Gaon Sabha and the State. This question was not discussed by the learned trial court and it must be presumed that no such objection was raised before it by the forest department and so it cannot now be raised in appeal. On this aspect, reliance is placed on the ruling reported in 1974 R.D. 162(Suppl.). 8. The rulings cited by the learned D.G.C. (R.) relate to the acts done by certain officers in their official capacity and no doubt, a notice to the officer/Government is necessary as held in these rulings. But the distinction is contained in the section itself. The notice is provided under Section 80 C.P.C. either in suits against the Central or State Government or against a public office. The rulings cited relate to the latter aspect in which the suit is against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by the public officer in his official capacity. But such is not the case here for there was no act committed or committed by the Conservator of Forest. It was actually a suit against the State Government. Obviously, these rulings are not applicable to the instant case. The result of the above considerations is that the suit was not bad for notice either to the State or to the forest department which the latter was not entitled for. It was actually a suit against the State Government. Obviously, these rulings are not applicable to the instant case. The result of the above considerations is that the suit was not bad for notice either to the State or to the forest department which the latter was not entitled for. If follows that the remand of the case by the learned first appellate court remains totally unjustified. The two issues also do not arise. 9. The findings and judgment by the learned trial court being in sufficient details, they obviate any need of further reconsideration in the event of no reversal of the findings by the learned Additional Commissioner. It is sufficient to consider the relevant aspects only. The learned trial court rightly observed in its judgment that the contention of the defendant number 1 that the plaintiff's right extinguished under Section 189 and 190 of the Act on account of possession of the forest department under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act implied an admission of the forest department that the plaintiff had a right therein and in view of the order of the Forest Settlement Officer dated December 19, 1962 releasing the land and excluding it from the proposed reserved forest amounted to continuance of the plaintiff's right thereon. This position is further confirmed by the letter from the D.F.O. South Gonda dated April 3, 1976 addressed to the plaintiff-revisionist saying that his predecessor had already increased the plots in question, to quote: "Released as the area is already declared grove land and is situated at a distance of 1 miles from the forest." This letter being a valuable piece of evidence was sealed by the learned Additional commissioner on April 22, 1976 and was opened before the Board on May 24, 1983. In the face of this admission, the forest department is estopped from contesting the matter again and again. The fact of plots being a grove is also confirmed by the commission's report that the trees of one variety (Mahua) only were planted in a manner so as to exclude irregular bushes, indicates that it was not a jungle but the planted grove. I find the considerations had findings by the learned trial court giving logical conclusions without any perversity or prejudice and, therefore, they must be confirmed. 10. I find the considerations had findings by the learned trial court giving logical conclusions without any perversity or prejudice and, therefore, they must be confirmed. 10. In the result, I find that the learned Additional Commissioner exercised the jurisdiction not vested in him by setting aside the trial court's decree and remanding the case, on a basis contrary to law and, therefore, the revision petition deserves to be allowed. Further, there being nothing against the trial court's findings and the forest department being not a legal entity also not entitled to file the appeal, the first appeal deserved to be dismissed as not maintainable and also on merits if such occasion arose. 11. In the result, I allow this revision petition, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Additional Commissioner dated November 6, 1979 and confirm the judgment and decree dated April 7, 1973 by the learned trial court.