JUDGMENT : 1. This is a defendant's first appeal in a suit for ejectment. The facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated are that the present appellant the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., is a tenant of the respondent Shri Hukam Chand Jain in respect of the floor of the building owned by the respondent. The apartments with the appellant are a hall, a verandah, a room known as manager's rooms known as record rooms and one more small room. These premises were let out to the appellant on 8.3.1975 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- and initially the period of tenancy was two years and eleven months. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that he requires these premises for his personal, reasonable and bonafide necessity inasmuch as he has a large family. He is the karta of Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself and his four sons, who are all married. It is also stated that he has four daughters who also are all married. In all he has eighteen grandchildren. Three of his sons are residing at Delhi but they and their families off and on come to Jodhpur and stay with the plaintiff who has unfortunately lost his wife and, therefore, require the attendance of his children. His daughters, and their husbands and children also frequently visit him. Apart from them, other friends and relations who visit Jodhpur on their way to pilgrimage to Nakoda, Jaisalmer etc. also stay with him. He requires accommodation for their stay. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff's youngest son Shri Hans Raj wants to establish his own business and has negotiation in this respect with many firms, who have assured him to co-operate and to give loan etc. The business would also be set up in a part of the premises sought to be vacated. The plaintiff himself is an Advocate of long standing and is now seventy three years old. His present residence and office which is in the second floor at height of 30, is inconvenient for him and also for his old clients and for all these reasons, he requires the premises, which are at present in the possession of the defendant appellant. His present residence and office which is in the second floor at height of 30, is inconvenient for him and also for his old clients and for all these reasons, he requires the premises, which are at present in the possession of the defendant appellant. It may be stated here that the present accommodation in possession of the plaintiff himself in the same building in the second floor is in the mardana apartment - the office, bed room and a store, in the janana apartment the bed room, kitchen, store and a chowk and in the third floor, there are two small store rooms. This accommodation is wholly inadequate for the plaintiff and the members of his family in view of what has been stated above. 2. The present suit was filed on 15.5.1980. The defendant contested the suit. It was not specifically denied that the plaintiff has joint Hindu Family consisting of four sons and their wives and children, only ignorance was pleaded in this respect. The requirement of the plaintiff for the suit premises for his personal reasonable and bonafide necessity was denied. It was alleged that the three sons and daughters of the plaintiff do not reside with him and only causally visit him only his youngest son Hans Raj of course stays with him. The fact that Hans Raj wants to put up his own business was also not specifically denied but it was alleged that the premises already in possession of the plaintiff are sufficient and suitable for that purpose. It was also alleged that the plaintiff can add more apartments on the third floor if in fact he requires more accommodation. It may be mentioned here that in the plaint, the plaintiff had further stated that he had tried to help the defendant in getting other accommodation and had shown them certain apartments belonging to other persons so that the defendant could conveniently shift to those premises and vacate the plaintiff's premises but this fact also was not specifically denied. After framing the necessary issues and taking the evidence of the parties, the learned Addl. District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur by his judgment and decree date 29.5.82 decreed the plaintiff's suit and granted six months' time to the defendant to hand over vacant possession of the premises. It is against this judgment and decree that the defendant has come up in appeal. 3. District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur by his judgment and decree date 29.5.82 decreed the plaintiff's suit and granted six months' time to the defendant to hand over vacant possession of the premises. It is against this judgment and decree that the defendant has come up in appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently challenged the finding of the Court below that the plaintiff has reasonable and bonafide necessity of the premises in dispute. The challenge to that finding has been two fold. The first attack was to the effect that as a matter of fact the plaintiff does not require any accommodation in addition to or in exchange of the premises already in his possession and the second ground of attack was that in any case, his requirement for the suit premises is neither reasonable nor bonafide. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has supported these findings of the learned Addl. District Judge, I have already set out the details of the premises which are in possession of the plaintiff in the second floor as also the third floor of the same building. The evidence of the plaintiff Shri Hukam Chand PW3 and his son Shri Jinendra Kumar PW5 as also his other son Shri Hans Raj PW7 leave no room for doubt that the Joint Hindu Family of the plaintiff consists of the plaintiff, his four married sons and their children. Looking to this the size of the family, leaving apart the daughters and their husbands and children, the present accommodation in possession of the plaintiff is wholly insufficient, and, therefore, if he wants the premises in dispute for his occupation, the necessity cannot be said to be unreasonable. The fact that the plaintiff has been residing in the premises for the last many years since the present premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant, is no ground to hold that his requirement is not reasonable looking to the size of the family and the status of the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff has been residing in the premises for the last many years since the present premises in dispute had been let out to the defendant, is no ground to hold that his requirement is not reasonable looking to the size of the family and the status of the plaintiff. It was, of course, contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is nothing to show that the plaintiff's family is a joint Hindu family and in any case further to show that three sons, who are residing at Delhi, are defendant upon the plaintiff and therefore, their requirement cannot be taken into consideration. I am not impressed by this argument. In the first place, in para No. 1 of the plaint itself, it was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff is the karta of joint Hindu family consisting of the members as stated above and this fact was not specifically denied. In the second place, there is a presumption that the father and sons are joint unless the contrary is alleged and proved. So far as the dependency of the son is concerned, this also was not made the bone of contention in this suit. I, however, need not go in to this question inasmuch as even if for the sake of argument, it is supposed that the three sons and their wives have separate income and reside separate from the plaintiff it cannot be said that they do not form a part of his Join Hindu Family and are not entitled to visit and stay with him. In these circumstances, the plaintiff is not only required but is perhaps bound to make proper arrangements for their stay with him when they come to visit him and the accommodation required for that purpose would certainly amount to a reasonable necessity for the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to a case reported in Smt. Prakash Kaur v. Narinder in order to support his contention that the requirement for the purpose of visitor cannot be said to be reasonable or bonafide necessity for the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to a case reported in Smt. Prakash Kaur v. Narinder in order to support his contention that the requirement for the purpose of visitor cannot be said to be reasonable or bonafide necessity for the plaintiff. In that case, it was observed as under:- "The authorities below, apart from the fact that she required the house for her personal use, accepted the need of the respondent on the ground that her relations, as well the relations of her husband come to visit her and the additional accommodation was needed for that purpose. This was again, an unwarranted approach. The personal need of the landlord includes only the need of persons dependent on the landlord. The requirement of the landlord to lodge the relations which are not dependent on him cannot be held of be the need of the landlord, as held in Sh. B. Prasad's case." In the first place, in the present case, the need is not merely for the visitors but also for the purpose of making proper accommodation available to the sons and their wives and children, who cannot be said to be mere relations and visitors. This authority is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In the second place, with all due respect to the learned Judge the view does not commend itself to me. It always depends upon the social statute and status of the landlord whether he requires any accommodation for his visitors and guests. It is not uncommon for a man of status and even a man of a well to do second class family to often receive his relations and guests for long or short visits and it is not always possible for him to make arrangements for their stay away from his house and if for that purpose, a man requires and can afford to have a guests' room in his own house, his requirement cannot be said to be otherwise than reasonable. It is wrong to say, as a matter of fact, that requirement is for a visitors or relations. That requirement is of the landlord himself because it is he who has to look after the comforts of his guest and visitors. I am, therefore perfectly in agreement with the finding of the learned Addl. It is wrong to say, as a matter of fact, that requirement is for a visitors or relations. That requirement is of the landlord himself because it is he who has to look after the comforts of his guest and visitors. I am, therefore perfectly in agreement with the finding of the learned Addl. District Judge that looking to the size of the family of the respondent, the accommodation at present in his possession is wholly insufficient and, therefore, if he requires the present premises in possession of the appellant, his requirement cannot be said to be unreasonable. In this view of the matter, I need not further go into to the question in respect of the premises for the business of his son and his own office as an Advocate in detail because there is no denial of the fact that the respondent is an Advocate by profession and requires an office and a record room or a store room etc for that purpose. As already stated above, the fact that his son Hans Raj wants to set up a business in medicine, has also not been specifically denied and, therefore, for that purpose also, his need cannot be said to be unreasonable. 5. Now the other question which arises for consideration is whether this necessity or requirement is bonafide or not. I need not discuss this question in great detail because now it is well settled that the requirement under the laws of ejectment should not merely be a mere desire but must be a need and in this connection, I would only refer to Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmed Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 . From what I have stated above, it clearly appears that the requirement of the respondent does not appear merely to be a desire to have the accommodation in possession of the appellant but he does require and really need these premises. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the so-called requirement of the respondent is not at all bonafide and he has an oblique motive to dispossess the appellant. Before I deal with his aspect of the matter, I may dispose of some applications, which have been filed by both the parties bearing upon this question. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the so-called requirement of the respondent is not at all bonafide and he has an oblique motive to dispossess the appellant. Before I deal with his aspect of the matter, I may dispose of some applications, which have been filed by both the parties bearing upon this question. The appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC praying that the plaint, the issues, the judgment of the trial Court, the judgment of the High Court, the decree-sheet and execution application, and order-sheet dated 2.8.77 and the application for mutual adjustments dated 4.1.82 relating to the suit filed by the plaintiff against the Punjab National Bank, who was the plaintiff's tenant in respect of the ground floor of this very building may be taken on record. There is another application by the appellant under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for permission to amend the written statement to plead the oblique motive of the respondent inasmuch as he had got the decree for that ejectment against the Punjab National Bank even prior to his letting out the present premises to the appellant and did not get them vacated in pursuance of that decree and made compromises from time to time with the Punjab National Bank. Then there is an application by the respondent also under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC praying for permission to place on record the letter of the Punjab National Bank dated 8.3.1983 an application under Sections 148 and 151 filed by the Punjab National bank; the decree-holders reply to that application the order of the Court dated 2.4.83. It has been agreed by the learned counsel for the parties on both the sides these documents may be taken on record. It has further been agreed by them that they do not want to file any documentary evidence in rebuttal of the documents filed by either of the parties. I, accordingly, allow these documents of both the parties to be taken on record. 6. It has further been agreed by them that they do not want to file any documentary evidence in rebuttal of the documents filed by either of the parties. I, accordingly, allow these documents of both the parties to be taken on record. 6. So far as the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is concerned the learned counsel for the respondent has candidly agreed that even without the formal amendment, the facts wanted to be pleaded by way of this amendment in view of the documents produced under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC may be taken into consideration and no formal amendment in the written statement would be required. Therefore, when these facts are agreed to be taken into consideration, the formal amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC in the circumstances would not be necessary. The application is, accordingly, disposed of. 7. Now when these documents have been taken on record, the learned counsel for the appellant urged that in view of these new facts, which have been brought to the notice of the Court by these documents, the matter must be remanded to the trial Court for re-deciding the question of bonafide necessity. He has placed reliance upon Miss Badlani v. A. Hoogewrafe, 1975 RLW 49 ; P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 ; Prem Lal v. Jadav Chand, 1977 RLW 265; Shri Krishan Lal v. Amrit Devi and Hansmat Raj v. Raghunath Prasad, (1982) 1 RCJ 499) and has urged that subsequent events and additional ground for or against the question of ejectment on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity can be taken into consideration and evidence can be allowed to be adduced in that respect. He also placed reliance upon Hazarilal v. Nagar Parishad, Alwar, 1975 RLW 561 and City Improvement Trust, Bangalore v. H. Naravamiah, AIR 1976 SC 2403 and urged that when documents are produced under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC the opposite party has to be given an opportunity to rebuted them and if such an opportunity is not allowed, the party would be prejudiced, I have given my careful consideration to these contentions and in the circumstances of the case, I do not find force in them. As I have already mentioned above, the documents under Order 41 Rule 27 produced by either party have been admitted with the agreement of the parties and it has been stated by the learned counsel on both sides that they do not propose to produce any documentary evidence in rebuttal of these documents. Further the facts emerging from these documents are not at all disputed or denied by either of the parties. Not only this, the facts sought to be pleaded by amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC have been allowed to be taken into consideration with the consent of the respondent. In these circumstances, no further evidence would be necessary and therefore the matter can be disposed of on the basis of the material already on record. In this view of matter, neither any oral evidence in rebuttal of any of these documents is necessary nor a remand of the case for decision by the lower Courts is called for. 8. The bonafides of the plaintiff in respect of the necessity of the premises in dispute has been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant on various grounds. I shall now deal with those grounds one by one. Before I come to them, it may at once be stated that all these grounds, are based mainly on the decree, which the plaintiff had obtained against the Punjab National Bank for ejectment in respect of the ground floor of the building in which the suit premises are situated. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit against the Punjab National Bank had been filed on almost identical grounds of necessity while the only difference that in the suit, it was also pleaded that the plaintiff required the ground floor of the premises on account of the fact that the plaintiff's wife, who was then living, was suffering from asthma and had difficulty in climbing stairs in the first floor in which the plaintiff was then residing. That suit was filed on 1.3.68 and it was decreed on 26.8.69 by the trial Court. The appeal of the Punjab National Bank against the decree of ejectment had also been dismissed on 11.5.70. The matter was then taken to the High Court and the decree was modified on 27.11.1970. That suit was filed on 1.3.68 and it was decreed on 26.8.69 by the trial Court. The appeal of the Punjab National Bank against the decree of ejectment had also been dismissed on 11.5.70. The matter was then taken to the High Court and the decree was modified on 27.11.1970. In pursuance of the compromise between the parties by which the Punjab National Bank was allowed to continue in possession for a period of five years and the mesne profits which were decreed at the rate of Rs. 1500/- p.m. were settled @ Rs. 1200/- p.m. Therefore on 8.3.1975, the plaintiff who was residing in the premises which are in dispute in this case, leased the same to the present appellant. Even after the lease of the present premises in favour of the appellant, the respondent did not take effective steps to get the premises vacated from the Punjab National Bank and Gain on 2.8.77, he entered into yet another compromise with the Punjab National Bank giving it time upto 31.12.81 and increased the mesne profit from Rs. 1200/- p.m. To Rs. 2500/- p.m. The matter, according to the learned counsel for the appellant does not rest here. There after he filed the present suit on 15.5.1980 and again on 4.1.82, entered into yet another compromise with the Punjab National Bank by which one year's time was again allowed upto 31.12.82 to the Punjab National Bank and the mesne profits were raised from Rs. 2500/- p.m. to Rs. 4500/- p.m. The learned counsel further pointed but that even thereafter on 2.4.83, the respondent obtained an order from the Court by which again five years time was granted to the Punjab National Bank and the mesne profits were raised from Rs. 4500/- Rs. 9000/- p.m. This all urges the learned counsel, goes to show that as a matter of fact, the plaintiff did not have any reasonable or bonafide necessity of the premises and his main purpose was to get the rent increased and in this view of the matter, it clearly appears that in the present case also, he had an oblique motive to get the rent increased by the present appellants also. The learned counsel supported his contention by placing reliance upon Ashok Kumar Bagga v. Prithvi Nath Kaul, (1980) 1 RCJ 499). The learned counsel supported his contention by placing reliance upon Ashok Kumar Bagga v. Prithvi Nath Kaul, (1980) 1 RCJ 499). It was also contended by him that the plaintiff did not make any reference to the decree obtained by him against the Punjab National Bank in his plaint in the present suit. It was also contended by the learned counsel that in the present suit, the plaintiff has also pleaded that he is seventy three years old and feels difficulty in climbing the second floor at the height of thirty feet and has also led evidence to that, effect. His son-in-law Dr. Mahendra Jain P.W. 4 has stated that he had suggested to the plaintiff that he should reside in the ground floor looking to his ailment and still when the ground floor could have easily been got vacated by execution of the decree, the plaintiff failed to get the possession of the same. This also clearly indicates the oblique motive. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the decree of the Court below. 10. I have given my careful consideration to these contentions. The facts of the decree against the Punjab National Bank and the various compromises and the orders of the Court in respect thereof are not in dispute I have only to examine these documents and facts with a view to ascertain whether on account of the fact that the plaintiff had obtained a decree for ejectment against the Punjab National Bank for his personal bonafide necessity and did not execute the same but had been going on granting time to the Punjab National Bank, his need for the premises in dispute cannot be said to be bonafide and he should be held guilty of an oblique motive. Now in these respects, a few facts need mention here. As already stated above and which fact is not in dispute : the suit against the Punjab National Bank was based on the necessity, apart from the other necessities, or the wife of the respondent. Admittedly his wife died in 1971 and, therefore, that necessity had come to an end. The other necessities which were pleaded in the case against the Punjab National Bank and which have been pleaded in the present case are almost the same. Admittedly his wife died in 1971 and, therefore, that necessity had come to an end. The other necessities which were pleaded in the case against the Punjab National Bank and which have been pleaded in the present case are almost the same. Therefore, the question immediately arises whether in these circumstances, was it necessary for the plaintiff to have insisted upon the execution of the decree against the Punjab National Bank or he could have asked for the premises in dispute for his own occupation. According to the suit filed against the Punjab National Bank, the need of the plaintiff as stated above, was also for the residence of his wife and when in 1971, his wife passed away, the plaintiff did not require the premises for the particular purpose. Now the need which was left was on account of the shortage of accommodation for the members of the family, the office of the plaintiff and the business requirements of his son Hans Raj. The decree against the Punjab National Bank had, of course, been passed and when bank had gone up in appeal, ma compromise was, of course, arrived at. That compromise was to the effect that the Punjab National Bank was allowed five years period to vacate the premises but at the same time, the mesne profits were reduced from Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 1200/-. It is a well known fact that the difficulties of the plaintiff as a matter of fact arise after the decree is passed in his favour and the execution thereof is very difficult. In these circumstances, when the plaintiff found that the litigation with the Punjab National Bank may consume a long time and he may not get the premises vacated, it was better to enter into a compromise and allow some reasonable time to the Punjab National Bank to vacate the premises. It is needless saying that the tenant in that case was a nationalised bank and one can easily understand that it would have been really difficult for that bank to immediately vacate the premises. The plaintiff himself also must have realised that difficulty of the Bank and that may have also been one of the reasons for the compromise. Again by this compromises the mesne profits had been reduced from Rs. 1500/- to Rs. The plaintiff himself also must have realised that difficulty of the Bank and that may have also been one of the reasons for the compromise. Again by this compromises the mesne profits had been reduced from Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 1200/- and that also indicates that the plaintiff must have come to this compromise by force of circumstances otherwise having obtained a decree for mesne profits at a higher rate, he would not have agreed to reduce the same. In these circumstances, when the main necessity on account of the ill-health of his wife had come to an end and the premises were required only for the other purposes, as stated above, he may have thought it proper to enter into this compromise. Such a compromise, in these circumstances, cannot be said to be with any oblique motive. Thereafter when the premises of the Punjab National Bank were not available to him for five years, he may have thought it fit to lease out the present premises to the appellant on 8.3.1975 for a period of two years and element months. The case of the plaintiff in this connection is that at that time, he intended to raise construction in the third floor and as a matter of fact after renting out the premises to the appellant, he had proceeded in this connection but the construction in the third floor could not be feasible. The 'dase' and the 'chhabaha' gave way and the engineers advised him not to proceed with the construction in the third floor. In these circumstances, the letting out of the premises in the first floor to the present appellant cannot be said to be with any ulterior motive. So far as the latter compromises are concerned, it appears that the plaintiff changed his mind of shifting to the ground floor. It has come in the evidence of both the parties that just near the building, in which the suit premises are situated, there is a lot of rush on account of taxies and tongas standing there, that these premises are just near the road, there is a lot of noise. I shall only refer to defendant's own evidence in this respect leaving aside that of the plaintiff and his witnesses D.W. 2 Shri Jaswant Singh has stated that scooters, tempos and tongas keep standing outside the Punjab National Bank. I shall only refer to defendant's own evidence in this respect leaving aside that of the plaintiff and his witnesses D.W. 2 Shri Jaswant Singh has stated that scooters, tempos and tongas keep standing outside the Punjab National Bank. City bus and the three-wheelers also stand a short distance away. He has also admitted that there is lot of noise on account of the passing of the vehicles. D.W. 4 Shri Sajjan Singh states that although he does not know whether there is any stand for the scooters near the Punjab National Bank or not, five to ten scooters and three wheelers keep standing there and buses also pass after every two or five minutes. He also admits that there is a lot of traffic nearby and there are sounds of horn etc. Similarly D. W. 7 Shri Bhurmal has also stated that near to the premises with the Punjab National Bank, in one side, there is a scooter stand where five to seven three-wheelers keep standing. The city buses also stand nearby although there is no stand there. It is, therefore, clear from this evidence that the ground floor cannot be conveniently and properly used for residential purpose and also for the office of the respondent. On account of the rush and the noise, there would be a regular nuisance for the family as well as the respondent, who is an Advocate by profession. In these circumstances, if the appellant changed his view in respect of the residence in the ground floor, he cannot be imputed any oblique motive. Not only this, it also appears that the later compromises with the Punjab National Bank were on so attractive terms that any reasonable and prudent man would have entered into them. The Punjab National Bank initially was paying Rs. 300/- only as rent and the Court had decreed the mesne profits @ Rs. 900/- whereas on account of these compromises the plaintiff was able to get as big an amount of mesne profits as Rs. 900/- p.m. The plaintiff would naturally not have refused such a compromise specially when, as already stated above, the execution of the decree would in itself have consumed a lot of time and money. It would not be out of place to mention here that there is no evidence whatsoever, that the plaintiff had ever asked the present appellant to increase the rent. It would not be out of place to mention here that there is no evidence whatsoever, that the plaintiff had ever asked the present appellant to increase the rent. If the motive of the plaintiff had been to increase the rent, then even before filing the suit, he must have asked the defendant to increase the rent or in any case in such a prolonged litigation at some stage such a suggestion would have come forth from him. 11. So far as the suggestion of Dr. Mahendra Jain regarding the plaintiff's shifting to the ground floor goes, it may at once be stated that although in the old age, it would be convenient for the plaintiff so stay in the ground floor, the condition in the ground floor must be congenial for his stay and from what has been stated above, in view of the nuisance, it would not at all be in the interest of the health of the plaintiff to stay in the ground floor and, therefore, merely on account of the doctor, it cannot be said that the plaintiff should have occupied or tried to occupy the ground floor premises by getting it immediately vacated from the Punjab National Bank. 12. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, Ashok Kumar Bagga's case (supra), in my opinion, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, the landlord was occupying the ground floor containing four rooms and he applied for ejectment of the tenant petitioner from the second floor containing two rooms. During the pendency of the eviction petition, the first floor when continued same accommodation as the ground floor and which was in occupation of three tenants fell vacant but the landlord let them out to other tenants. It was, in these circumstances, that the need of the landlord was not held to be bonafide and the landlord was held guilty of an oblique motive. It was held by the Court that the plaintiff could have easily occupied the premises which had fallen vacant or could have offered the same to the tenant defendant. In the present case, this is not the situation. It was held by the Court that the plaintiff could have easily occupied the premises which had fallen vacant or could have offered the same to the tenant defendant. In the present case, this is not the situation. As already stated above, the ground floor premises were not suitable for the plaintiff for his own residence and office and the compromise with the Punjab National Bank was of great advantage to the plaintiff. 13. There are cases, on the other hand, which would go to show that in circumstances, similar to the present case, the landlord cannot be held guilty of any oblique motive and is not required to occupy the premises, which may only the juridically be available to him. In P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 , their Lordships observed as under:- "But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant of the ground floor premises was reasonable and bonafide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativating the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises. The appellant could not obtain for himself the occupation of the Truth Bungalow unless he terminated the leave and licence of Dr. Bharucha and compelled him to vacate the occupation of the Truth Bungalow. That might involve a long litigation with Dr. Bharucha. As against that, a suit for eviction was already pending against the respondents in respect of the ground floor premises and it would certainly be more reasonable to pursue that litigation rather than to start a new one. Besides, the appellant chose to have possession of the ground floor premises because he wanted to be near his mother who was living on the first floor." The learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this case on the ground that in that case, the landlord would have been required to cancel the leave and licence and then file the suit for ejectment against Dr. Bharucha for the possession of those premises and, therefore, those premises could not be deemed to have been available to him immediately but here the plaintiff had already obtained a decree against the Punjab National Bank and could have obtained possession by execution of that decree if he really wanted to have those premises. In my opinion, this distinction cannot rightly be drawn inasmuch as mere obtaining of the decree would not put the plaintiff into physical possession of the premises. The decree will have to be executed and then alone possession can be obtained and this can certainly take unduly long time and, therefore, when at the time of the filing of this suit the plaintiff was not in physical possession of these premises nor the premises have come to his possession till now, the premises occupied by the Punjab National Bank cannot be said to be available to the plaintiff. The learned counsel for appellant further pointed out that during the course of the litigation with Punjab National Bank, the plaintiff has obtained possession of one small room. That in my opinion, does not in any way alter the position because that small room cannot serve any of the purpose of the plaintiff for which the suit premises are required. Again in Kailash Chander v. Mangal Singh, (1983) 1 RLR 281, the Delhi High Court found that even if some other accommodation had become available to the plaintiff pending the suit for ejectment against the defendant and the plaintiff instead of occupying the same, let it out to a third person, the plaintiff's bonafide necessity cannot be doubted nor the suit can be dismissed. In that case, the defendant's case was that the entire ground floor, comprising of three rooms set was in tenancy of a school and the landlord had obtained order of eviction and under the terms of the compromise the school was to vacate the premises in June, 1977 and it was thus asserted that if at all the landlord was in need of a separate accommodation the said accommodation would be more than enough to meet the requirement. It transpired that during the pendency of the suit, those premises had fallen vacant but the plaintiff instead of occupying them, had rented them out on more than one occasion. The rent at which the premises were sub-let out was Rs. It transpired that during the pendency of the suit, those premises had fallen vacant but the plaintiff instead of occupying them, had rented them out on more than one occasion. The rent at which the premises were sub-let out was Rs. 350/- per month at one occasion and Rs. 500/- at another. It was found by the Court that looking to the financial position of the plaintiff landlord, who was earning hardly a pension of Rs. 280/- p.m. and a further sum of Rs. 350/- by doing some other petty job from this income, was unable to pay back the loan, by which the premises in dispute were constructed and also to support his family and in these circumstances, merely because he did not occupy the premises, which had fallen vacant during the pendency of the suit, his need for the suit premises cannot be said to be mala fide. It was further observed that the choice of occupying the first floor of the premises, that is the premises in dispute, was bonafide and the landlord has the right to exercise his choice. Mr. Bhansali, the learned counsel for the appellant, tried to distinguish this case also on the ground that in that cue, it was on account of the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff that his letting out the premises which had fallen vacant during the pendency of the suit was held not to affect his bonafide necessity of the suit premises. Such is not a case here. It is true that one of the circumstances taken into consideration in that case was the pecuniary status of the plaintiff but that by itself, in my opinion, would not make it different. The facts of each case would certainly differ but the principle that has to be deduced from these cases is that in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the ground that the plaintiff does not occupy some other premises, which may have fallen vacant or which could probably have been got vacated, the plaintiff cannot be held guilty or any mala fide or clique motive if he insists on the vacation of the suit premises. In the present case, I have already pointed out that the ground floor could not have been very useful and convenient to the plaintiff and at the same time, the compromise with the Punjab National Bank was also to his great advantage and in these circumstances if he did not get the decree against the Punjab National Bank executed and take over possession of those premises, it cannot be said that he does not have reasonable and bonafide necessity of the suit premises also. 14. It may also be pointed out that at one stage, the learned counsel for the appellant urged that the plaintiff's son Shri Hans Raj has admitted that the premises in possession of the Punjab National Bank, if vacated can be utilised by the plaintiff for his office and also business necessities of Shri Hans Raj himself and, therefore, it cannot be said that the premises of the Punjab National Bank would not have served the purpose of the plaintiff. It may at once be pointed out that the plaintiff requires the suit premises not only for his office and for the business purpose of Shri Hans Raj but also for the residential purpose of the joint Hindu family. Mr. Hans Raj while admitting that the said premises can be used for his business as also for residential purpose has clarified it by saying that there would be a lot of disturbance and the premises in the ground floor are not such where they can conveniently and peacefully live. 15. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff is at present occupying the second floor and if the premises occupied by the Bank are also occupied by him, then purpose the both of residence as well as office of the plaintiff and the business office of his son can be fulfilled. This also does not appear to be practicable with a tenant in between. 16. From what has been stated above, I am in agreement with the learned Addl. District Judge that the plaintiff has been able to establish his reasonable and bonafide necessity for the premises in dispute. 17. The learned Addl. District Judge also found that in case the premises are vacated the appellant would not suffer much hardship in comparison to the plaintiff if the premises are not made available to him. District Judge that the plaintiff has been able to establish his reasonable and bonafide necessity for the premises in dispute. 17. The learned Addl. District Judge also found that in case the premises are vacated the appellant would not suffer much hardship in comparison to the plaintiff if the premises are not made available to him. This finding also appears to be correct and proper. The defendant is a nationalised corporation. It has very lucrative business. It can easily afford to have other premises even at a little more rent. The plaintiff and his witnesses have clearly stated that other premises were easily available and some of them had been shown to the ex-manager of the defendant. The defendant has not rebutted this evidence and have merely pleaded ignorance in this respect. When other premises are available and also at reasonable rates, the defendant would certainly not suffer any hardship in shifting to those premises and by vacating these premises whereas the plaintiff would certainly suffer greater hardship if he does not have the premises. I would not be out of place to mention here that looking to size of the plaintiff's family, his status, his occupation and the business which his son wants to start, the plaintiff appears to have been denying himself reasonable accommodation which a person in these circumstances would certainly be entitled to and denial of these premises to the plaintiff in the circumstances would in fact amount to a denial of a reasonable necessity to him. 18. The Addl. District Judge has also considered the question of a partial ejectment and has found that neither it is feasible nor the needs of the defendant would be served by adopting such a course. The defendant's own witness Shri R.K. Kushlani and Shri Jaswant Singh have deposed to this effect and in view of this evidence, that finding of the learned Addl. District Judge also does not call for any interference and as a matter of fact, this contention was not raised even by the learned counsel for the appellant. 19. For the reasons stated above, this appeal has no force and is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, I allow the appellant six months' time to hand over vacant possession.Appeal dismissed.