JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendants' Second Appeal in a suit for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profits from a property bearing No. 5577 old, 34/339 new, of Khatipara, Loha Mandi, in the city of Agra. The property was leased out to one Murli Ram in the year 1950 on a rent note (Paper No. 49-Ka-1) which appears to have been executed by Wajid Khan and Murli Ram. The appellants were defendants Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8 respectively. The defendant No. 2 was impleaded as respondent No. 6 in this Court, and having died, his name was struck off. Defendant No. 5 is the respondent No. 2 and defendant No. 7 is respondent No. 3. Defendants Nos. 9' and 10 are respectively respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Of the said defendants, only those numbered 1 to 7 were impleaded originally. Of them defendants Nos. 1 to 5 were said to be the heirs and legal representatives of Murli Ram and defendants Nos. 6 and 7 were said to be his sub-tenants. Defendants Nos. 8, 9 and 10 were added later on by an amendment of the plaint on the objection being taken by the defendants Nos. 1 to 6 that they were also the heirs of Murli Ram and having been left out, the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. While the defendant No. 7, that is the 3rd respondent in this Court, admitted the plaintiffs claim, the defendants Nos. 1 to 6 contested it. Defendants Nos. 8 to 10 also contested it by a separate written statement filed after their impleadment. 2. The plaintiffs case was that what had been let out was land, and, as such, the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, did not apply to the property, and having terminated the defendants tenancy, he was entitled to possession by ejectment of the defendants. The amount of arrears of rent claimed was Rs. 25/-, and that of mesne profits up to the date of suit was Rs. 90/-. Pendete lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 21/- per month were also claimed. The amount of arrears of rent claimed was Rs. 25/-, and that of mesne profits up to the date of suit was Rs. 90/-. Pendete lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 21/- per month were also claimed. The main defence, which alone survives for consideration in this Second Appeal, was that the property in suit was an accommodation within the meaning of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 and the Act applied thereto, and, therefore, the suit was barred by S. 3 thereof. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit on the finding that what was let out was an open piece of land with a small Kothari for carrying on the business of a Tal which could not be said to be an accommodation in view of the law laid down by this Court in Raj Narain v. Sheo Raj Saran; 1969 All WR (HC) 70 : 1969 All LJ 358. The lower appellate Court has affirmed that finding and has, besides relying on Raj Narain's case (supra), also relied upon Abdul Sami v. Mohammad Noor, AIR 1966 All 39 . It also referred to the definition of accommodation contained in S. 2 (a) of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 and also to the rent note 49-Ka dated the 13th April, 1950. 4. The substantial question, which was raised for determination by this Court was, whether the property in suit was an accommodation within the meaning of cl. (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. The rent note shows that the property let out was a land with a Kothari and a tin shed. The evidence showed that the size of the Kothari was 5' X 8' and the area of the land was about 200 or 225 Sq. yards. The size of the tin shed was said to be 16' X 12', but it is doubtful whether the tin shed originally mentioned in the rent note was in existence. Instead there was a Khaprail, some 25' X 30', which was in existence at the time of the suit, and that was said to have been constructed some 3 or 4 years before the suit. The Kothari does not appear to have been put to any particular use and the Khaprail appears to have been occupied for residential purposes. Instead there was a Khaprail, some 25' X 30', which was in existence at the time of the suit, and that was said to have been constructed some 3 or 4 years before the suit. The Kothari does not appear to have been put to any particular use and the Khaprail appears to have been occupied for residential purposes. Some kind of a tal business appears to have been carried on on the land, but it appears to have been a tal where fire wood was sold. 5. According to the definition of accommodation as contained in cl. (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947, it means "residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes (1) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building". The rest of the definition is not material for our present purposes. From the rent note, it appears that the property let out was non-residential and was let out for the purpose of keeping a tal. The impression gathered from the rent note and the evidence on the record is that the purpose of carrying on business of tal in the present case, was such as did not need any roofed structure. It was not a case of a timber depot where timber is sawn on a sawing machine fitted in some kind of a tin shed and stored under tiled or tin sheds for purposes of sale, with a Kothari for purposes of office or some such use. It was a case of a fire wood tal which needed no cover. The Kothari was surely there at the time of letting and continues to exist, but does not seem to have been used for any purpose in connection with the business, for which the property was let out. About the tin shed mentioned in the rent note. the plaintiffs evidence has so confused things as to make the existence of the tin shed doubtful. The defendants' evidence talked of a Khaprail shed and denied the existence of any tin shed. The Khaprail appears to have been constructed recently and was, at any rate not in existence when the property was let out. the plaintiffs evidence has so confused things as to make the existence of the tin shed doubtful. The defendants' evidence talked of a Khaprail shed and denied the existence of any tin shed. The Khaprail appears to have been constructed recently and was, at any rate not in existence when the property was let out. Thus the only thing which could be said to have been proved to be in existence when the property was let out was the Kothari on the land. The size of the Kothari was too small and it is not possible to say that what was let out was not the land but the Kothari with the land appurtenant. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the property so let out was an accommodation within the meaning of the definition contained in cl. (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. Consequently, it is not possible to say that the suit was barred by S. 3 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. 1 am supported in this inference by the view expressed in Raj Narain v. Sheo Raj Saran; 1969 All WR (HC) 70 : (1969. All LJ 358) (supra). Learned counsel for the appellants, however, contended that the view of the law expressed in that case was not correct; inasmuch as while one could conceive of land being appurtenant to a building, it was not possible to conceive of a building being appurtenant to open land. Learned counsel further contended that the Kothari was indisputably a building, and was part of the property let out and the letting in respect of the land and the Kothari could not be separated or severed from each other. I do not think that the case merits any such consideration as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. The idea of residential and non-residential accommodation in the definition clause brings in the idea of the purpose for which the property is let out. Of course, the accommodation must he in any building "or" part of a building. Accommodation has reference to the space, which is let out for being used for residential or non-residential purposes. That space should not be an open- space. It must be within a building or within part of a building, that is to say, it must be within a roofed structure. Accommodation has reference to the space, which is let out for being used for residential or non-residential purposes. That space should not be an open- space. It must be within a building or within part of a building, that is to say, it must be within a roofed structure. In the present case, the purpose of the letting was the tal business. The space needed for that purpose was open space and not any covered space in any building. True the Kothari with the small space of 5' X 8' within it, existed on the land, but that was negligible and was included in the letting simply because it happened to be there. The dominant purpose of the letting was the tal business and the space or the accommodation which was needed for that dominant purpose was thus the space of the re-accommodation let out was the open space. The Kothari was an unnecessary adjunct. The evidence even showed that it was not being used at all. 6. I, am, therefore unable to hold that the property let out was accommodation within the meaning of cl. (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. 7. Reference may also be made in this connection to Nanhey Ghosi v. Firozul Hasan Khan (1978 All LJ 1290). In this case also, there was an open land measuring about 789 Sq. yards with a small Kothari thereon. It was held that it was not an accommodation. Learned counsel referred to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulja Bai; AIR 1952 Mad 413 . The question there was whether the building was residential or non- residential and not whether what had been let out was a building or not a building. The next case referred to was of Israrul Haque v. Shri Dhar Lal of which a full report was not referred to, but a summary reported at page 106 of the journal section of 1952 All LJ was referred to. That case was concerned with sub-clause (3) of clause (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947, and has little to do with the problem in hand. That case was concerned with sub-clause (3) of clause (a) of S. 2 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947, and has little to do with the problem in hand. I was referred to Sushil Chand Jain v. Govind Prakash, 1979 All LJ 356 in which it was held that a lease of house as well as land appurtenant to it could not be split up into two separate leases, one for the house and the other for the land. This is not the position in the present case. Here, the Kothari forms such a small part of the property that it could be ignored in view of the dominant purpose of the letting which was the open space of the open land and not the small covered space within the small Kothari. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.