S. S. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) IN Sessions Trial No. 105 of 1979, Third Additional Sessions Judge Bhopal, by his judgment dated 6. 3. 1980 acquitted all the five accused of the charges of murder etc. Against the said acquittal State filed this appeal on 23. 6. 1980 which was admitted on 6. 8. 1980. Admittedly this appeal was filed within limitation. In the cause title of the memo of appeal names of only four accused have been mentioned, as respondents. One of these four namely Gopichand is reported to have expired during the pendency of this appeal. The name of accused Manohar alias Mannu was not mentioned in the array of respondents. ( 2 ) AFTER when (sic) this appeal was listed for final hearing applications were filed on 23. 2. 1983 on behalf of the State for permission to add the name Manohar alias Mannu in the memo of appeal as a respondent and for condonation of delay. A memo of appeal mentioning Manohar alias Mannu as the respondent was also filed. Notices of these applications were issued to Manohar who filed replies opposing the prayers made on behalf of the State. ( 3 ) IN substance, what has been stated in the applications filed on behalf of the State, is that though the instructions from the Law Department were to file the appeal against all the five accused who had been acquitted, but by mistake the name of Manohar alias Mannu stood omitted while typing the memo of appeal and this mistake could be detected only when the case came up for final hearing. In the replies there was no specific denial about instructions from the Law Department that the appeal was to be filed against all the five accused. The objections were that the appeal had been argued for admission and subsequently the case had been listed for other miscellaneous matters like exemption to respondents from appearance, death of respondent Gopichand and early hearing of the appeal. The suggestion therefore is that the omission of Manohars name should have been detected on such intermediary dates. There being bona fide mistake in the omission of Manohar's name from the array of respondents has been disputed. The suggestion therefore is that the omission of Manohars name should have been detected on such intermediary dates. There being bona fide mistake in the omission of Manohar's name from the array of respondents has been disputed. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the appellant-State it was pointed out that according to the prosecution story accused Manohar alias Mannu was the main offender inasmuch as he is alleged to have inflicted knife blows on the deceased. It was further stated that there also was direct evidence against him. Even in the memo of appeal in has specifically been mentioned that Accused Mannu caught him and gave blows by knife on the abdomen. With this the argument was that the State Government having decided to file an appeal against acquittal there was no reason for not doing it even against Manohar alias Mannu. This according to him lends support to the fact that omission of Manohar's name from the array of respondents was nothing more than a bona fide mistake. ( 5 ) AS against this the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents who appeared even for Manohar, was that owing to the lapse of time a valuable right has accrued to Manohar and his acquittal has become final. As he contended Manohars name cannot be added as a respondent after the expiry of limitation. He even pointed out that the appeal has been listed on different dates much prior to the date when the mistake is said to have been detected and the said omission could have well been noticed then. It also was urged that even prior to the making of these applications by the State, the appeal bad been fixed for final hearing. ( 6 ) AS already pointed out this appeal had earlier been listed for miscellaneous matters like exemption etc. and on those dates there was no such question which would have brought to the notice of the counsel appearing for State on the respective dates, the omission of the name of respondent Manohar. It appears from the record that the appeal was listed for final hearing on 24. 11. 1982 but it was adjourned as the counsel for respondents informed about the death of respondent Gopichand. On that day panel lawyer bad appeared for the State. It appears from the record that the appeal was listed for final hearing on 24. 11. 1982 but it was adjourned as the counsel for respondents informed about the death of respondent Gopichand. On that day panel lawyer bad appeared for the State. Two weeks time was granted to the State to verify that fact and thus the cafe stood adjourned. Thereafter the appeal was adjourned on different dates sometimes on the common request of the counsel for the parties and sometimes on the request of the counsel appearing for the State. It is thus that the applications for condonation of delay and addition of Manohars name were filed on behalf of the State on 23. 2. 1. 983. The very fact that the appeal was being adjourned for some or the other reasons during this period negatives the possibility of the mistake about Manohars omission in the array of respondents being detected. ( 7 ) THE averment of the appellant - State that the instructions from the Law Department were to file an appeal against acquittal of the accused has not been denied. Learned Dy. A. G. even during the hearing reaffirmed that fact and we find no reason to disbelieve that statement. The appeal when filed was well within limitation. There are no such circumstances on which any inference of mala fide or deliberate omission of Manohar's name may be drawn. There was no such suggestion either. ( 8 ) THE question then is whether in the circumstances the omission of Manohars name in the array of respondents is a bona fide mistake or it is something more so as to disentitle the appellant State the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We may here reproduce the following observations from a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rai Saheb Chandramull Indrakumar v. J. M. Goenka and others: And what the mistake is like has been noticed. Mr. Basu is a senior advocate whose services are in constant request. Not that he gets a brief occasionally. Hence if per chance he fails to detect the two omissions, though he supplies another (so prominent coming between No. 8 and No. 10 in the list of proforma respondents), no party should be allowed to make a capital of it. Mr. Basu is a senior advocate whose services are in constant request. Not that he gets a brief occasionally. Hence if per chance he fails to detect the two omissions, though he supplies another (so prominent coming between No. 8 and No. 10 in the list of proforma respondents), no party should be allowed to make a capital of it. And it is well to remember that a mistake like the one we see may occur in spite of the greatest care that is taken. We all know from our experience that however much we, may revise a manuscript, there are certain mistakes which have the inconvenient knack of eluding us. The mistake Mr. Basu commits is that. It is a mistake, which you and I commit and shall continue to commit from time to time, in spite of our efforts not to do so. It is not negligence. Far less it is misconduct. Why should the petitioner be then penalized for a mistake which a skilled person with all his skill and a careful person with all his care may make? It is said that the time having run out, a very valuable right has accrued to the petitioners adversaries, the successful defendants in the court of first instance. That is true. But equally true it is that this is not an absolute right. This is a right that must yield in favour of the petitioner having shown sufficient cause for the delay-which the petitioner has shown. The court always leans against a fluke. ( 9 ) THERE Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. have laid down that the proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. ( 10 ) FROM the facts and circumstances as have been stated above the conclusion-is irresistible that in spite of there being instructions from the Law Department to file an appeal against the accused including Manohar and there being averments in the memo of appeal, which have been referred to above, the name of Manohar does not find place in the array of the respondents. The circumstances clearly go to show that the said omission of the name of Manohar was a bona fide mistake. Excepting for what has been stated in the application submitted on behalf of the State, nothing further is required and the aforesaid conclusion flows out of these facts and circumstances. We are, therefore, fully satisfied that the omission of Manohars name in the array of respondents was a bona fide mistake and the appellant-State has made out a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY the applications filed by the State are allowed and the delay stands condoned. Appellant State shall add the name of Manohar in the array of respondents and the cause title be amended accordingly. Since Shri Rajendra Singh is already appearing on behalf of the respondentmanohar, no further notice to him would be necessary. All that is directed is that respondent Manohar may furnish bail bonds of Rs. 5000/- (Rs. Five thousand) with one surety in the like amount within three weeks from today for his appearance in this court on a date as may be fixed by the office. The case be listed for final hearing thereafter. Appeal allowed. .