JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - The petitioner joined the Provincial Medical Service, Uttar Pradesh, on November 18, 1950. He was confirmed with effect from July 5, 1958. His date of birth is January 2, 1924. Adverse entries for the years 1965-66, 1969-70 and 1970-71 were communicated to the petitioner in the year 1973. The petitioner represented against those entries. By the order dated October 31, 1973, he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar. Further, by the order made on January 25, 1974, he was promoted to the senior grade of Rs. 800-1,450 on the criterion of seniority-cum-merit. In the list he superseded certain officers placed above. On his promotion he was posted as Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Pauri. In December, 1975, he was transferred as Superintendent, Police Hospital, Allahabad. On April 20, 1976, he was retired compulsorily under Rule 56 by the State Government. Against this the petitioner preferred a claim before the Public Services Tribunal which was rejected on December 17, 1976. Aggrieved, the Petitioner has approached this Court. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced two-fold contentions before this Court; 1. The adverse entries preceding 1973-74 stand washed off as a result of the order dated October 31,1973 permitting him to cross the efficiency bar and, in consequence of the order dated 25th January, 1974 granting promotion to Selection Grade ; 2. The adverse entry of 1974-75 was not communicated to him at any stage. 3. The State Government has not filed counter-affidavit in reply to the writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance, however, on the written statement supported with affidavit filed for the State before the Tribunal (Annexures IV/V to the writ petition). From this written statement it is clear that in justification of the impugned order of compulsory retirement, the State referred to having made over-all assessment based on adverse entries of the years 1965-66, 1969-70, 1970-71 and also 1974-75. 4. In relation to contention No. 1, it is undisputed that the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficiency bar by the order dated October 31, 1973. The petitioner referred to this in Paragraph 4 of the Claim Petition before the Tribunal also. The written statement filed for the State did not refute this specifically and the decision given by the Tribunal is completely silent about it. The petitioner referred to this in Paragraph 4 of the Claim Petition before the Tribunal also. The written statement filed for the State did not refute this specifically and the decision given by the Tribunal is completely silent about it. Moreover, by the order dated 25th January, 1974, as mentioned above, the petitioner was promoted to selection grade of Rs. 800-1450 on the criterion of seniority-cum-merit and posted as Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Pauri. This too remains un-rebutted. The Tribunal treated this as promotion made in the ordinary routine. This it was contended for the petitioner, was without basis. Nothing of this kind is averred in the written statement filed for the State. There was no material whatsoever placed before the Tribunal to make this observation. In the writ petition the petitioner has as well specified that in the process of promotion he has superseded several officers who were senior to him. The particulars of those officers have also been given. Obviously this could not be the position, if the promotion was without selection based on the criterion of seniority-cum-merit. There is no dispute that the petitioner had represented in the year 1973, when the adverse entries above mentioned were communicated to him. The respondents did not place anything on record before this Court or the Tribunal for that matter to enable it being held that the representation was rejected. On the other hand, the fact that the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficiency bar and promoted shortly afterwards justify reasonably an inference that the said entries were not attached significance. The Department did not regard them as damaging enough to withhold efficiency bar or promotion being given to the petitioner in the ordinary course. 5. Under the Fundamental Rule 56 the power to retire compulsorily a Government servant in public interest is wide no doubt, but it is not absolute. The exercise of the power must be bona fide and shall promote public interest. 5. Under the Fundamental Rule 56 the power to retire compulsorily a Government servant in public interest is wide no doubt, but it is not absolute. The exercise of the power must be bona fide and shall promote public interest. When an order is challenged and the validity thereof depends on its being in the public interest, the State, it has been held, must disclose the material so that the Court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which to a reasonable man, reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of public interest justifying forced retirement of a public servant, vide Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 70. It was also observed in this case that confidential reports require sedulous checking since they are essentially subjective in nature. The general accepted principle moreover is that adverse entries prior to a Government servant being allowed to cross the efficiency bar may not be taken into consideration when the question arises of his promotion in the future, vide. The State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2086. In Swami Saran Saksena v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 269, the fact that the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficiency bar only a few months prior to the compulsory retirement was considered as a factor in his favour and running against the validity of the order of retirement. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention also to an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 283 of 1976 R.D Rai v. State of U.P. dated 10-12-1976 which held that it is the settled law of this Court that adverse entries prior to the date of promotion of an officer would not be taken into consideration while considering the case for premature retirement from the promoted post. 6. Reference in this connection may, however, be made also to the amendment made in the Fundamental Rule 52 with retrospective effect by Section 2 of the U. P. Fundamental Rule (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act 33 of 1976). 6. Reference in this connection may, however, be made also to the amendment made in the Fundamental Rule 52 with retrospective effect by Section 2 of the U. P. Fundamental Rule (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act 33 of 1976). According to this amendment, the appointing authority is not precluded from taking into consideration any entry relating to any period before such Government servant was allowed to cross any efficiency bar or before he was promoted to any post in an officiating or substantive capacity or on an ad hoc basis. The attention of this Court does not seem to have been invited to this amendment when the Special Appeal referred to above, was decided on 10-12-1976. In face of the aforesaid amendment which is retrospective in, operation, it might be maintained with some force that the general principle with regard to the entries adverse to the Government servant concerned, being washed off on account of the efficiency bar being allowed to be crossed or a promotion being given, is not attracted where there is an order of compulsory retirement made in exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56 and such entries are as well taken into consideration. 7. The petitioner, however, stands on a sound footing in so far as the contention No. 2 is concerned. The adverse entry of 1974-75 has weighed heavily with the Tribunal as is manifest upon a perusal of its decision. The contents of other entries preceding 1973-74 are also adverted to in that judgment. On a perusal thereof along side with the entry of 1974-75, it cannot be doubted that, in case the entry of 1974-75 were excluded, the decision of the appointing authority may not have been the same. The reason is that the entries preceding 1973-74 are not such as to lead any reasonable person to decide upon retiring a Government servant in public interest. The position changes only when they are inter mixed with the entry of 1974-75. The petitioner clearly averred that this entry was not communicated to him. This was not refuted in the written statement filed for the State before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also does not controvert the same in its findings. Instead the Tribunal accepts that this entry was not communicated though it observed that the non-communication thereof is not material. With this line of reasoning, it is not possible to agree, in my view. 8. The Tribunal also does not controvert the same in its findings. Instead the Tribunal accepts that this entry was not communicated though it observed that the non-communication thereof is not material. With this line of reasoning, it is not possible to agree, in my view. 8. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the adverse entries could be considered by the appointing authority in passing the order of retirement even though not communicated to the concerned officer. In support of this strong reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India v. M.E. Reddy and another, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 563. A careful perusal of this decision of the Supreme Court dated 19-9-1979 shows that the observation relied upon by the learned counsel was made in a particular context. Their Lordships were commenting on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Chief Security Officer Eastern Railway v. A. C. Bagchy, 1975 (2) S.L.R. 660. That decision was criticised on the ground, firstly, that in matters of compulsory retirement the public servant cannot claim the opportunity to be heard and the principle of natural justice is not attracted as held also in the case of Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha, 1971 (1) S.C.R. 791 . Secondly, it was pointed at page 572 in Paragraph 27 of the reported judgment. "The High Court seemed to rely on certain adverse entries which were taken into consideration when the order of retirement was passed. We have already pointed out relying on the dictum of this Court laid down by Hidayatullah, C. J. that the confidential reports can certainly be considered by the appointing authority in passing the order of retirement even if they are not communicated to the officer concerned. Thus, the two grounds on which the Calcutta decision was based are not supportable in law. For these reasons therefore, we hold that the decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above was wrongly decided and is her bey overruled." 9. For proper appreciation of the dictum laid in this case, the above must be read alongside with what is stated by the Supreme Court in the preceding Paragraph 17 at Page 568. For these reasons therefore, we hold that the decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above was wrongly decided and is her bey overruled." 9. For proper appreciation of the dictum laid in this case, the above must be read alongside with what is stated by the Supreme Court in the preceding Paragraph 17 at Page 568. The argument advanced before their Lordships was that the order impugned was based on materials which were non-existent inasmuch as there were no adverse remarks against Reddy who had a spotless career throughout and further that if such remarks would have been made in his confidential reports, they should have been communicated to him under the Rules. This contention was repelled holding. "This argument, in our opinion, appears to be based on a serious misconception. In the first place, under the various rules on the subject it is not every adverse entry or remark that has to be communicated to the officer concerned. The superior officer may make certain remarks while assessing the work and conduct of subordinate officer based on this personal supervision or contact. Some of these remarks may be purely innocuous, or may be connected with general reputation of honesty or integrity that a particular officer enjoys. It will indeed be difficult if not impossible to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest but those who have had the opportunity to watch the performance of the said officer from close quarters are in a position to know the nature and character not only of his performance but also of the reputation that he enjoys. The High Court has also laid great stress on the fact that as adverse entries had not been communicated to Reddy, therefore, the order impugned is illegal. We find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court or the argument put forward by learned counsel for Reddy." 10. In support of the above their Lordships also cited the observations made by Hidayatullah, C.J. in the case of R.L Butail, 1971 (2) S.C.R. 55 . 11. From the above it follows that the adverse remarks appearing against a Government servant may vary in their character and effect. In support of the above their Lordships also cited the observations made by Hidayatullah, C.J. in the case of R.L Butail, 1971 (2) S.C.R. 55 . 11. From the above it follows that the adverse remarks appearing against a Government servant may vary in their character and effect. Some of them may be purely innocuous or connected with general reputation of integrity or as such as may serve no useful purpose on being communicated since the deficiency may not be regarded as capable of being improved upon. In that case the non-communication of the adverse remarks would be of little consequence. The Rules, it was also stressed, do not insist either upon communication of such remarks, whereas in the instant case the remarks are such, as contained in the entry of 1974-75, that they were definitely required to be communicated by them under the rules and the general principles in order that the petitioner might be rendered in a position to furnish explanation if any. In Reddy's case, the argument considered was general and on the negative said only side it was to the effect that no remarks had been communicated and hence it had to be inferred that there was nothing adverse. Their Lordships were not seized of the positive contentions of any specified remarks. This "decision cannot, therefore, be taken to lay down a general rule that irrespective of the contents or the character of the adverse remarks, the non-communication thereof is immaterial for the purpose of considering compulsory retirement. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab and others, A.I.R. 1979 SC 1622 it was held : "The principle is well settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality. Its object, partially being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified." In Brij Behari Lal Agarwal v. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pardesh and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 594, decided on November 26, 1980, Reddy's case was also taken into consideration. Its object, partially being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified." In Brij Behari Lal Agarwal v. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pardesh and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 594, decided on November 26, 1980, Reddy's case was also taken into consideration. That was also a case of compulsory retirement. The record of the High Court which made the impugned order on the administrative side included a copy of an order sheet in a criminal appeal decided by the appellant. The order sheet contained an order in which while disposing of a Criminal Appeal a Division Bench of the High Court had recorded a serious criticism of the manner in which the appellant had disposed of the Sessions case. Their Lordships remarked that it does not appear "that a copy of the remarks made in the order sheet, although placed on the personal confidential file of the appellant was ever communicated to him." This further fortifies me in the conclusion that Reddy's case is not an authority for the proposition that communication of adverse entries to the concerned officer in all circumstances stands dispensed with. Their Lordships added in Brij Bihari Lal's case that while it is desirable to make an over-all assessment of the Government servant's record, more than ordinary value should be attached to the confidential reports pertaining to the years immediately preceding such consideration. 12. Fundamental Rule 56, as amended by the U.P. Act 33 of 1976 cannot also be said to exclude the requirement of communication of adverse entries. Clause (b) of Explanation 2 says that the appointing authority may as well take into consideration any entry against which a representation is pending, provided that the representation is also taken into consideration along with the entry. This suggests too that the rule envisages communication of the entry for, in the absence thereof, there may not arise an occasion of representation being made and the consideration thereof along with the entry. This suggests too that the rule envisages communication of the entry for, in the absence thereof, there may not arise an occasion of representation being made and the consideration thereof along with the entry. In Jagdis Saran v. State of U. P. and others, 1981 L.L.T. (Services) 84 a Division Bench of this Court upheld the principle that adverse entries, if not communicated to the Government servant, cannot be taken into account while considering the question of compulsory retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 and that the State Government cannot form any opinion on the basis of adverse entries which may not have been communicated to tin Government Servant. 13. Consideration being had to the above, the impugned order of compulsory retirement passed against the petitioner dated April 28, 1976 and the decision of the Tribunal dated December 13, 1976, cannot be sustained. With the passage of time the petitioner attained the age of superannuation in the normal course having become 58 years of age on 1-1-1982. He cannot, therefore, seek reinstatement, but is entitled to the emoluments otherwise admissible to him upto the date of superannuation in the ordinary course and to the pensionary benefits accruing thereafter. 14. The petition is allowed accordingly. The order passed by the State Government dated 29-4-1976 and the decision of the Public Services Tribunal dated 13-12-1976 are quashed-The petitioner is to be treated as retired on attaining the age of superannuation in the ordinary course on January 1, 1982. He is entitled to the emoluments otherwise admissible to him upto that date and pensionary benefits accruing thereafter. There will be no order as to costs.