JUDGMENT : B.N. Misra, J. - This appeal has been filed by the State Government against the judgment of acquittal dated 16-7-1979 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Puri in Sessions Trial No. 2/5 of 1979. 2. The facts may be briefly stated. During the night between 7th and 8th February, 1978 a dacoity was committed in the house of P.W. 3 In course of the dacoity P.W. 3 was injured and gold ornaments were removed from the person of P.W. 4, wife of P.W. 3 and cash of about Rs. 1970/- was also stolen. On hearing hulla of the inmates of P.W. 3's house, some villagers including P.W. 2 came to the spot, but the miscreants decamped with the booty after exploding some crackers to keep the villagers away. On the following morning (8-2-1978) P.W. 3 lodged F.I.R. at the police station with P.W. 12, the Officer-in-charge, Ext. 1 is the F.I.R. A case u/s 395, I.P.C. was registered against seven unknown persons and P.W. 12 started investigation. Later in the day the present Respondent and the other five accused persons were detained on suspicion by the villagers of Kusumati near Retang colony Constable P.W. 5 and Sub Inspector P.W. 14 of Jatm Police Station came to the spot and arrested the Respondent and the other accused persons. All of them were taken to Jatni Police Station. The Respondent was reached by P.W. 14 and it was found that he had hidden M.O. V, five golden Khasus, and M.O. VI, four golden Khasus, in his under-garment. These golden ornaments were seized, and in the test-identification parade conducted by P.W. 11 on 8-5-1978 both P.Ws. 3 and 4 identified M.Os. V and VI as belonging to them. After completion of investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the Respondent and the remaining five accused persons. All of them were charged u/s 395, I.P.C. and put on trial. 3. Fourteen witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution in the trial court. No defence witness has been examined. The defence plea is one of denial. In his statement recorded u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure the Respondent denied to have committed dacoity in the night of occurrence and as regards M.Os. V and VI, he has stated that the necklace was his and that the necklace was in one piece and not in two pieces. The defence plea is one of denial. In his statement recorded u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure the Respondent denied to have committed dacoity in the night of occurrence and as regards M.Os. V and VI, he has stated that the necklace was his and that the necklace was in one piece and not in two pieces. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge who tried the case found the Respondent and the other accused persons not guilty and acquitted them. The State Government came up in appeal to this Court and the appeal has been admitted only in respect of the present Respondent. 4. Law is settled that a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with unless the assessment of evidence and conclusion drawn by the trial court are unreasonable. Reversal of a judgment of acquittal will not be justified' merely on the ground that the appellate court's view on the evidence on record is different from that of the trial court. See Chowdikodlu Asuralli Dyavappa and Another Vs. State of Mysore Kanbi Purshottam Ladha Vs. State of Gujarat Hasan Ahmad Mai Isha and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, and Marudanal Augusti Vs. State of Kerala, . 5. Now I would turn to the evidence. The statements of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 clearly establish that there was a dacoity in the house of P.W. 3 during the night between 7th and 8th February, 1978 and that in course of that dacoity gold and cash were removed from the house and P.W. 3 was injured. The injuries on P.W. 3 have been proved by P.W. 13, the doctor. 6. There are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The inmates of the house who were present during the dacoity have not been able to identify any of the accused persons including the Respondent. The prosecution case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that when a case rests on circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests: (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (ii) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. (See Sarkar on Evidence, 13th Edition, page 37). 7. In the present case the only circumstance which is sought to be used against the Respondent is that M.Os. V and VI were recovered from his person on search by P.W. 14 and these ornaments have been identified by P.Ws. 3 and 4 as belonging to them. In his evidence P.W. 14 has stated that on 8-2-1978 he brought the accused persons with him to the police station and took a personal search of all of them. While searching the Respondent he found M.Os. V and VI which had been kept by the Respondent in his under-garment. P.W. 14 seized M.Os. V and VI under seizure list Ext. 7. It is noted in Ext. 7 that the necklace had been broken into two pieces. Core piece contained four Khasus and five Khandis and the other contained five Khasus and five Khadis. P.W. 14 seized the above articles at the police station op 8-2-1978 at 3 p.m. in the presence of two witnesses, Binaya Kumar Jena and Ullas Sahu. As per the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 11, M.Os. V and VI were put to test identification held by P.W. 11 on 8-5-1978 i.e., three months after the seizure of the articles. At the identification parade P.Ws. 3 and 4 have identified M.Os. V and VI as belonging to them. 8. Learned Additional Standing Counsel has submitted that the seizure of M.Os. V and VI by P.W. 14 is admitted by the Respondent in his statement recorded by the trial court u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore the learned Assistant Sessions Judge should have drawn the presumption u/s 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and held that the Respondent was one of the persons who committed dacoity or at least had received the stolen property Mr. A.K. Misra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, has, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that mere recovery of M.Os. V and VI cannot be said to have established that the Respondent was either one of the dacoits or a receiver of the stolen property. On going through the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge I find that the Respondent's claim that M.Os. V and VI belonged to him has been rejected. V and VI cannot be said to have established that the Respondent was either one of the dacoits or a receiver of the stolen property. On going through the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge I find that the Respondent's claim that M.Os. V and VI belonged to him has been rejected. The learned Judge has observed that without any corroboration, the mere fact that M.Os. V and VI were recovered from the Respondent cannot bring home the charge against the Respondent. It may be noted that in the present case the two seizure witnesses in whose presence P.W. 14 had seized M.Os. V and VI from the person of the Respondent have not been examined. There is no explanation why these witnesses could not be examined to the trial. In the absence of any explanation it is not clear why P.W. 14 instead of searching the Respondent in public while he was in custody of the villagers in Retang colony decided to take him of all places to the police station and conduct the search there. According to the statement of the Respondent, the gold necklace seized from him was in one piece, but strangely M.Os. V and VI are m two pieces. Again, there is no explanation why the test-identification parade was held as late as three months after the seizure of M.Os. V and VI, on 8-2-1978 following the occurrence of the previous night. Not much reliance can be placed on the test identification held long after the event. These suspicious features attaching to the seizure and recovery of M.Os. V and VI from the Respondent and their identification by P.Ws. 3 and 4 cannot be cured by the statement of the Respondent u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act provides: 114. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to facts of the particular case. Illustration (a) under the section provides that the Court may presume that a man who is to possession of stolen goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. Illustration (a) under the section provides that the Court may presume that a man who is to possession of stolen goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. Section 114 uses the expression may presume any this expression has been defined in Section 4 of the said Act in the following manner whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it. In other words, even if such fact has not been disproved, the Court may instead of regarding it as proved, call for proof of it. This is what the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has done in the present case. The suspicious circumstances attaching to the seizure of M.Os. V and VI, non-examination of the seizure witnesses and the long delay in holding the test identification were good enough grounds for the trial court not to rely upon the presumptive doctrine. The assessment of evidence by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge cannot be said to be unreasonable nor are his conclusions perverse. On consideration I agree with the trial court that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the Respondent. 10. In the result, this appeal is dismissed and the judgment of acquittal is confirmed. The bail-bonds shall stand discharged. Final Result : Dismissed