JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - This petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below in civil suit decreeing a suit filed by the respondent-Trust for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages against the petitioner in respect of a shop No. 312-A, Parmarth Niketan, District Pauri-Garhwal. The respondent No. 3 is the owner and landlord of the shop and the petitioner, its tenant. 2. The disputed shop lies in the district of Pauri Garhwal and is within three Kilometers of a Notified Area called Muni-Ki-Reti which notified area falls within another adjoining district, namely, Tehri Garhwal. This being the situation of the disputed shop the sole question which was debuted before the lower revisional court as well as before this Court was whether the disputed shop is covered by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, for short) Under Section 1(2) of the said Act the same was extended to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. Under sub section (3) of section 1 the Act became applicable by its own force to every city, municipality, notified area and town area situate within the State, with the proviso that the State Government was empowered, if it was satisfied that the provisions of the Act ought to be applied to adhoc 1 area other than those specified above, to issue a notification applying the Act to any local area specified in the notification. 3. By a notification dated 30th April, 1973 issued in the U.P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated May, 1 1913, the State Government applied the provisions of the aforesaid act to any local area saying within three kilometers of every Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika and Notified Area. Before the lower revisional court it was conceded by the respondent-landlord that the disputed shop lies within three kilometers of Muni-Ki-Reti, the Notified Area falling in, another district, namely, Tehri-Garhwal. 4. For the tenant it was contended before the court below that in as much as the disputed shop conceededly lie, within three kilometer, of a notified area, namely, Muni-Ki-Reti the Act clearly applied to the accommodation by virtue of the notification mentioned above read with the applicable provisions of the Act. 4. For the tenant it was contended before the court below that in as much as the disputed shop conceededly lie, within three kilometer, of a notified area, namely, Muni-Ki-Reti the Act clearly applied to the accommodation by virtue of the notification mentioned above read with the applicable provisions of the Act. Both the courts below, however, over ruled this contention on the short ground that in order to attract the application of the aforesaid notification it is essential that three kilometer limit must be in respect of a notified area of the same district where the disputed accommodation is situated. The courts below have taken the view that as the shop is situate in the district of Pauri-Garhwal, whereas Muni-Ki-Reti is in another district, namely, Tehri Garhwal, the petitioner cannot claim the protection of the Act. 5. For the petitioner it was vehemently contended before me that both the courts below have committed a patent illegality in taking the view that the proviso to section 1(3)(d) of the Act as well as notification issue thereunder in 1973 must be read down so as to restrict it, application only to those cases where the disputed accommodation lies within three kilometers limit of a notified area falling in the same district in which the accommodation may be situate. It was urged that there is absolutely no warrant for reading down the aforesaid proviso in the narrow and restricted way in which it has been done by the courts below. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and having given the submissions made by counsel on both sides a careful consideration, I am clearly of the opinion that on the undisputed fact that the disputed shop lies within three kilometers of the Notified area called Muni-Ki-Reti, the provisions of the aforesaid Act became applicable to the shop and the petitioner was protected against eviction by virtue of the said Act, notwithsanding the fact that the Notified Area Muni-Ki-Reti happens to fall within another district, namely, Tehri-Garhwal. 7. In order to resolve the controvery the applicable provisions may be extracted here. Section 1, in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads thus : "(1). This Act may be called the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. (2) It extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. (3) It shall apply to. In order to resolve the controvery the applicable provisions may be extracted here. Section 1, in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads thus : "(1). This Act may be called the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. (2) It extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. (3) It shall apply to. (a) every city as defined in the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 U.P. Act 2 of 1959). (b) every municipality as defined in the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. Act 2 of 1916). (c) every notified area constituted under the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. Act No. II of 1916 ; and (d) every town area constituted under the United provinces Town Areas Act, 1914 (U.P. Act No. II of 1914). Provided that the State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the general public residing in any other local area, may by notification in the Gazette declare that this Act or any part thereof shall apply to such area, and thereupon this Act or part shall apply to such area." 8. Purporting to exercise powers under the first proviso to clause (d) of sub section (3) of section 1, the State Government issued a notification dated 30th April, 1973 which is extracted below : "No. 7352/29-E-55-73-Whereas, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of general Public residing in the area situated within 3 kilometers of every Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika and notified area to apply the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972), to the said area : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers under the first proviso to sub section (3) of section 1 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), the Governor is pleased to declare that the whole Act shall apply to the said areas situated within 3 kilometers of every Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika and Notified Area." 9. It will thus be seen that sub section (2) of section 1, whereas the Act extends to the whole of the U.P. and applies in the first instance to every city, municipality notified area and town area, the Legislature left it to the discretion to the State Government to extend the application of the Act subsequently to "any other local area" on the State Government being satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of general public residing in that local area. In my considered view the words "any other local area" are words of wide amplitude and I see no legitimate ground for restricting the import of these words to a local area ground notified area falling within the same district in which the accommodation may be situate. The fact that the property lies within three kilometers of a notified area situate in another district, to my mind, ought to make no difference to the applicability of the Act to the local area falling within three kilometers of the notified area. I do venture to think on the plain language of the statute that the words "any other local area" mean any local area which may be specified in the notification and that they are not restricted in their meaning to a local area within a specified district. The Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted for protecting tenants of buildings from eviction otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the same. That being so, it ought to be construed in a manner which advances the avowed object of the same. As noticed above under section 1 (2), the Act extents to the whole of Uttar Pradesh. Its enforceability has, however, been split into two stages : in the first instance it applies to every city, municipality and notified area, whereas in regard to any other local area the applicability of the Act has ben postponed to a future date on the State Government being satisfied that it is expedient in the interest of general public to apply the Act to those other areas also. 10. 10. Somewhat similar problem has arisen in the past in regard to the construction of the words "in any local area" in the context of section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code (5 of 1898) Under that provision the Government was empowered to confer upon any person powers conferable by or under the said code on a magistrate or in regard to cases generally in any local area outside the Presidency towns. A similar argument such as that raised in this case was raised before several High Court in regard to the true import of the words "local Area" and in each case the High Courts repelled the contention that the words "in any local area" should be read in a restricted sense so as to limit their application to the local area falling within any particular district. The earliest case was that reported in Laxmi Chand v. Emperor, (1901) 24 Punjab Reporter 190. This was consistently followed by various High Courts. See Hiralal v. Emperor, AIR 1918 Lahore 196 , Lalta Prasad v. State, AIR 1959 Allahabad 70 @ 71 , Hari Das Mundhra v. The State. AIR 1959 Allahabad 82 @ 91 , P.M. Deshpandey v. Fermo Alloys Corporation, AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 471. In each of these cases it was unreservedly held that the words "in any local area" were wide enough to include any area specified in the notification and that they were not confined to any area falling within any particular or specified district. I am in respectful agreement with the statement of law contained in these decisions which, thought rendered in the context of another statute, embody a rational which applies on all fours to the present situation also, being in Pari materia. Even apart from the width of amplitude of the words "any other local area" I see no difficulty in the application of the Act to a local area lying within three kilometers of a notified area situate in another district. For, the object behind the notification of 1973 seems to regulate the letting and eviction of tenants of buildings situate within three kilometers of every Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika and Notified area throughout the State ostensibly because of phenomenal growth in settlement of people around the periphery of cities and notified areas and the consequent pressures on the availability of the accommodation in those outlying areas. That being so, there does not appear to be any valid ground for not making available the protection of the Act to tenants of the buildings lying within three kilometers of any notified area whatsoever even if the same happens to lie in another district. 11. My conclusion, therefore, is that the courts below were in error in thinking that the Act would not apply to the disputed shop because it falls within three kilometers of a notified area which is situate in another district, namely. Tehri Garhwal. In my considered opinion so long as the local area falls within the State of U.P. the notification referred to above would apply if the property falls within three kilometers of a Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika or Notified Area established within the State. I do not agree with the courts below that the proviso to section 1(3)(d) should be read down to apply only to those cases where the notified area falls in the same district in which the property may be situated. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, however, sought to support the decisions of the courts below on a number of grounds other than those upon which the courts below overruled the above contention of the tenant. 13. The first contention raised on behalf of the landlord was that the area where the disputed shop is situate is a village the administration of which is regulated by a Goan Sabha constituted under section 3 of the Panchayat Raj Act. The area does not have any problems such as those existing in a heavily populated urban area so as to justify the application of the Act to that area. It was urged that on one side of the building in question and mountains and is largely uninhabited. It was further urged that the entire area in question consists only of buildings owned by a few charitable and religious institutions used for purposes connected therewith and there are no constructions belonging to private persons. This being the position of the area, it was urged, the notification had obviously been issued without any application of mind. 14. I, however, find no merit in the above contention. In the first place the point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent landlord is one which undeniably depends on investigation of facts. It was not raised before the courts below. 14. I, however, find no merit in the above contention. In the first place the point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent landlord is one which undeniably depends on investigation of facts. It was not raised before the courts below. Nor was it made the subject of an issue in the suit giving rise to this petition. Whether the State Government had sufficient justification or material for applying the provisions of the Act to be raised for the first time in the course of oral submissions in a writ petition. No attempt was made by the plaintiff-respondent at any stage to call upon the State Government to produce before the court the records and material on the basis of which it was imp, lied to issue the notification. Even in this court in the counter affidavit which was originally filed no such allegations were made. It was only after the conclusion of the arguments that a supplementary counter affidavit was sought to be filed making the aforesaid assertions. In any case, even the assertions made in the supplementary affidavit as regards the sufficiency of justification for applying the Act to the area in question are not, to my mind, sufficient to rebut the presumption that the State Government had valid and proper grounds and material for applying the Act to local areas extending upto three kilometers around all the notified areas in the State including the one in question. 15. As mentioned above, it is a well known facts that owing to phenomenal growth of population in urban areas including the notified areas and the matching inadequacy of available accommodation, there is in evidence a widespread spectacle of people seeking shelter in and around the periphery of cities, towns and notified areas. I am hence not satisfied on the material brought on the record that the notification was applied to the area in question, arbitrarily or without any application of mind. 16. It was next contended on behalf of the respondent-landlord that the area in question is covered by Kumaon Nayabad and waste Lands Act (U.P. Act No. 32 of 1948), the object of which was to encourage construction of buildings in that area. That being so, it was urged, the notification issued under the U.P. Act no. 16. It was next contended on behalf of the respondent-landlord that the area in question is covered by Kumaon Nayabad and waste Lands Act (U.P. Act No. 32 of 1948), the object of which was to encourage construction of buildings in that area. That being so, it was urged, the notification issued under the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 could not have been intended to be applied to the local area in question which is, according to the landlord, not a densely populated area having any problem such as those facing cities and towns. 17. I am unable to accept the above contention, I have examined the provisions of the Kumaon Nayabau and Waste Lands Act and I find nothing therein which might militate against the application of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 to the area in question. There is no conflict, apparent or otherwise, in the application of the two Acts to the area in question. Further, U.P. Act No. 13 of 112 is an enactment which is later in point of time. The former Act was passed in 1948. Much water has flown since then. The Legislature is the best judge in these matters and it may have found good reasons for extending the Act (Act No. 13 of 1972) to the whole of Uttar Pradesh, leaving it to the discretion of the State Government, whenever it found it necessary or expedient so to do, apply the Act to any local area other than the cities, municipalities, town areas and notified areas. 18. Learned counsel next attempted to challenge the validity of the notification of 1973 on the ground that the same suffers from the vice of unwarranted discrimination and hence is violative of Article 14 of the constitution. The submission is completely devoid of any merit. No foundation whatever has been laid by the landlord either in the courts below or even in this Court for enabling this Court to entertain this argument. On the material existing on the record I find no ground for holding that the impugned notification suffers from the vice of infringing Article 14. 19. Learned counsel then contended that the title of the enactment as well as its object indicate that the Act was made to provide for the regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from the buildings situate in urban areas. 19. Learned counsel then contended that the title of the enactment as well as its object indicate that the Act was made to provide for the regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from the buildings situate in urban areas. That being so, it was urged the notification cannot be deemed to have been intended to apply to buildings situate in rural areas. It was contended that the building in the present case is situate in a village and consequently this Court should hold that the notification of 1973 was not intended to apply to the local area where the building in question is situate. 20. I am unable to accept the above contention. In my view the title of the enactments is not conclusive of the matter where the language of the situate as disclosed by express provisions contained therein is explicit and unambiguous. As mentioned above under section 1(2) the Act was extended to the whole of Uttar Pradesh and under the first proviso to clause (d) of section 1(3) the State Government was empowered to apply the provisions of the Act or part thereof to any local area other than those specifically mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 1. I have already discussed above the import of the words "any other local area" and it is not necessary to repeat those comments. Suffice it to say that the words quoted immediately above are wide enough to include within their sweep any local area whatsoever even if the same happens to fall within a local area governed by a Goan Sabha, provided, of course, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of general public residing in that area. As has been laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1983(2) Supreme Court cases 235, the question of seeking external aid arises only if the statute is vague or ambiguous. That being so, reference to the title of the enactment is out of place. For the same reason the authority cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, namely. That being so, reference to the title of the enactment is out of place. For the same reason the authority cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, namely. (Ashwni Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 369 @ 371 is not of any assistance as, in my opinion, the object of the Act is not in any way defeated or impaired by the application of the same to the local area in question. 21. In support of the contention that the notification of 1973 does not apply to the local area in question, learned counsel for the landlord also argued that the Legislature did not intend that under the first proviso to clause (d) of sub section 3 of section 1 the State Government may by a notification apply the provisions of the Act to an area which forms part of a local authority other than those specifically mentioned in sub section (3) of section 1. It was urged that in the notification in question significantly town areas have been omitted. That being so, it was contended, looking at the setting in which the proviso to clause (d) appears it was apparent that the three kilometer limit was not intended to cover a local area which forms part of a local authority (Goan Sabha in this case) not mentioned in sub section (3) of section 1. Counsel submitted that the doctrine of noscitur a socits ought to be invoked in construing the proviso. In this connection learned counsel placed reliance on a few decisions, namely, (Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, AIR 1962 Allahabad 43 , SDG Pandarannsdi v. Income Tax Officer, Eranakulam and another, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1578. 22. Having given the above contention my anxious consideration, I find myself unable to agree with the same. In my opinion the mere fact that Goan Sabha have not been specifically mentioned in sub section (3) of section 1 among the local authorities to which the Act was applied in the first instance under sub section (3) of section 1 is not sufficient ground for whittling down the width of amplitude of the words "in any other local area" occurring in the first proviso to clause (d) of sub section (3). These words clearly mean that the provisions of the Act can be applied to any local area other than those specifically mentioned in sub section (3). These words clearly mean that the provisions of the Act can be applied to any local area other than those specifically mentioned in sub section (3). The concept "local area" is of wider import than "local authority". 23. As noticed above under section 1(2) the Act was extended to the whole of Uttar Pradesh and hence I see no difficulty in holding that the Legislature intended to leave it to the discretion of the State Government to apply the Act to any other local area even if the same forms part of a local authority which is other than that specifically mentioned in sub section (3). 24. The basic object of the Act was to attempt to provide a reasonable solution to the acute problem of finding accommodation for those whose needs were the greatest. The Legislature undoubtedly had the requisite competence to make such a law in regard to the regulation of letting, rent and eviction in respect of all buildings single in the State, whether in the urban areas or in the rural, and if the State Government found that there was a crisis of accommodation in and around all Naga, Mahapalikas, Nagar Palikas and Notified Areas it was free to apply the Act to those areas also notwithstanding that the areas happen to fall within the territorial jurisdiction of a Goan Sabha. 25. As regards the aforesaid authorities cited by the learned counsel as well as the principle of Noscitur A sociis, it must be borne in mind that the principle there relied on is merely a rule of construction and it cannot override the express language used by the Legislature, particularly when the words used are of the widest possible amplitude. 26. Lastly, learned counsel for the landlord relying on the supplementary counter-affidavit filed after the conclusion of arguments sought to fall back on section 2(f) of the Act which provides an exemption from the operation of the Act to those buildings which are built or held by a society registered under the societies Registration Act intended solely for its own occupation. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly vehemently protested against entertainment of this argument on the ground that in the suit itself no such defence was raised on behalf of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly vehemently protested against entertainment of this argument on the ground that in the suit itself no such defence was raised on behalf of the petitioner. Learned counsel contended that the submission raises several issues of facts which not having been raised before the courts below ought not to be permitted to be put forward in these proceedings. 27. In my opinion, the protest of the petitioner's counsel is well founded - The burden of proof that the building was exempt from the operation of the Act was undoubtedly on the landlord. See Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati, 1980 Alld. Rent Cases 466. Whether the building in question was built or held by the respondent-society solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of its officers or servants is undoubtedly a pure question of fact. The accommodation in question is a shop and no evidence was led before the courts below that the building was constructed solely for the occupation of the society or its office bearers or servants etc. Indeed this pleas was not even hinted at before the courts below. No issue was framed on this point. In this view, the petitioner's counsel rightly placed reliance on a decision reported in S.S. Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 558, in which it was observed that oral submissions raising new points for the first time tend to do grave injury to a contesting party by depriving it of the opportunity to which the principles of natural justice hold it entitled, of adequately preparing its response. In this view, I am not inclined to entertain the above plea. 28. Even if however, it be assumed as alleged in the supplementary counter affidavit filed in this Court after the conclusion of argument that the respondent-landlord is a registered society, the question still remains whether the shop was constructed by the society solely for its own use or occupation which is a fundamental requirement for the application of section 2, f ). Such a question of fact cannot be permitted to be raised now. Besides, a foundation has not been laid for entertaining this question of fact even in this court. 29. Such a question of fact cannot be permitted to be raised now. Besides, a foundation has not been laid for entertaining this question of fact even in this court. 29. Learned counsel for the landlord, however, submitted that the plea goes to the root of the matter and hence ought to be allowed to be raised and in support he placed reliance on a few decisions including that reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1578 (supra) The decisions cited by the learned counsel are of little assistance as in all those cases the plea sought to be raised was one which could be entertained and determined on the undisputed facts. In the present case, however, the plea does not spring from undisputed facts. There is controversy about basic facts. 30. Learned counsel for the landlord then faintly submitted that Muni-Ki-Reti was declared a Notified Area in 1978, whereas the notification in question was issued in 1973 and consequently the notification of 1973 could not be pressed in aid by the petitioner. 31. Apart from the fact that this submission was not raised in the original counter affidavit, it is liable to be rejected on the short ground that Muni-Ki-Beti was in fact declared a Notified Area by means of a Government Notification no. 6137-T/IX-A-39-T-64, dated February 3, 1966. This is evident from a copy of the Gazette notification produced by the petitioner's counsel What had happened was that in 1978 the limits of the local area comprising the Notified Area of Muni-Ki-Beti were slightly revised in 1978. The landlord's counsel has, however, not been able to establish that the revision of limits has in any way affected the position at hand. 32. The above discussion disposes of all the points urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 33. The position which thus emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the Act was applicable to the building in question and the petitioner could not be evicted except in accordance therewith. From the issues framed in the suit and the evidence led by the parties, however, it is obvious that none of the grounds on which the eviction of the petitioner could be ordered has bey n made out in the suit. The decree for eviction passed by the courts below is hence liable to be quashed. From the issues framed in the suit and the evidence led by the parties, however, it is obvious that none of the grounds on which the eviction of the petitioner could be ordered has bey n made out in the suit. The decree for eviction passed by the courts below is hence liable to be quashed. The rest of the claim of the landlord for money has not been disputed before me by the petitioner's counsel. 34. In the premise, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned orders passed by the courts below in so far as the decree for ejectment is concerned are hereby quashed. The decrees passed by the courts below in other respects are affirmed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs throughout.