JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava, J. - This is Decreeholders second Execution Decree Appeal against the judgment and order passed by the court of civil judge, Sultanpur, dismissing the decreeholder's appeal against the judgment and order passed by the court of 1st Additional Munsif, Sultanpur allowing the respondent judgmentdebtors' application under section 144, CPC. The respondent obtained a foreclosure decree on the basis of the mortgage executed by Ram Prasad and Hubraji and on the basis of the said decree he took possession over the house in dispute. Again he filed a suit in the year 1966 which was decreed and possession was delivered. A case under section 145, Cr.PC took place and thereafter the house was released in favour of the respondent, who was found to be in possession. The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction, claiming right and title over the land in dispute, alleging that the house had fallen down in the year 1945 and he being Zamindar, the site reverted to him. The suit for injunction was decreed by the court of Additional Munsif and the respondent was restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the property in dispute. The appeal was also dismissed. The matter came in second appeal. In the second appeal this court came to the conclusion that as a matter of fact the house existed at the site and that is why decree in respect of the same was passed and that the respondent was in possession and the appeal was consequently allowed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed and the respondent decreeholder was dispossessed from the property in dispute on 18567, after passing of the order passed by the trial court and on the basis of the said judgment the judgmentdebtor took possession over the property in dispute. Thereafter he moved an application under Section 144, CPC, for restoration of the possession. The.trial court allowed the application and against the same, first appeal was dismissed, whereafter the judgmentdebtor has come in second appeal. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Thereafter he moved an application under Section 144, CPC, for restoration of the possession. The.trial court allowed the application and against the same, first appeal was dismissed, whereafter the judgmentdebtor has come in second appeal. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the decree passed by this court had been misinterpreted and the suit was only for prohibitory injunction and the said decree was not capable of execution and, as a matter of fact, the decree was not executed for obtaining possession as he was already in possession and the application under Section 144, CPC, was not legally maintainable. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the finding of fact recorded by the two courts below earlier was not revised by this court in second appeal, and as such, it was not open to the respondent to say that he had been dispossessed on 18th May, 1967 after the decree was passed and, further, the court erred in holding that the plaintiffrespondent no. 2, having transferred the land in favour of the appellants, was disinterested person. 3. From the record it is clear that the suit was filed by Wajahat Hussain, respondent no. 2, and the present appellant was subsequent transferee. From the record it is also clear that the High Court, in second appeal held that there was a house at the spot and that the respondent who moved application under section 144 CPC, was not only in possession over the house in dispute, but the same was also repeatedly recognised by the courts and that the court's officials, in execution of the decree, delivered actual possession to the defendantappellant. Thus it was held that the respondent was in actual possession. It is true that the decree was for permanent injunction but the lower appellate court, after analysing the facts, found that the appellant entered into possession after the suit was decreed by the trial court and this was also clear from the affidavit which was filed by the respondent who stated that he was dispossessed after the decree of 1967 was passed by the court of Munsif and the averments were not controverted by the appellants. The lower appellate court also recorded a finding that the averments made by the appellants that they were in possession or that their predecessor was in possession was not correct and the respondent no. 2 was the only person who could ha e deposed or stated about it, but he did not say anything. The finding which has been recorded by the lower appellate court is obviously a finding of fact and this finding cannot be disturbed in second appeal. Thus the position is that after the suit for injunction was decreed by the trial court, taking advantage of the decree, the predecessor of the appellant who was held to be in possession, dispossessed the respondent and entered into possession and since then he continued to be in possession. 4. Section 144, CPC reads as under: , S. 144, (1) where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal or revision or other proceedings or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order, or such part thereof as has been varied, set aside or modified; and for this purpose, the court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under subsec. (1). 5. The object of Section 144 CPC is to restore status quo ante. It provides for placing of the parties in a position in which they were placed before passing of any decree or order, which is subsequently reversed, set aside, modified or varied. 6. (1). 5. The object of Section 144 CPC is to restore status quo ante. It provides for placing of the parties in a position in which they were placed before passing of any decree or order, which is subsequently reversed, set aside, modified or varied. 6. In Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra (AIR 1966 Supreme court 948) it was held that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree, to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. This obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree; and the court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the same position they were in at the time when the court by its erroneous action had displaced them from. 7. The question in this case is, whether the same equitable principle and procedure will apply in case where possession is taken not in execution of decree which is not for possession, but after the suit for injunction is decreed. 8. In the instant case the trial court decreed the suit for injunction and held the plaintiffappellant to be in possession. Section 144 CPC does not speak of delivery or redelivery of possession only when it is taken through execution. It would apply even if possession is taken not in execution but under colour of decree, as has been held in a number of cases. (See Sheodilal Sahu v. Banwari, (AIR 1929 Alld. 348), Surya Dutt v. Jamuna Dutt, (AIR 1920 Alld. 190), Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. Chhotey Lal and others, (AIR 1937 Alld. 728), Salohon Shah v. Zawar Hussain Shah and another, (AIR 1941 Lah. 343), Mohammad Hanif and another v. Khairat Ali and others, (AIR 1941 Pat. 577), Jacob Syriac Nidhiri and others v. Nagendra Prabhu Krishna Prabhu and another, (AIR 1951 Travancore cochin, 226). Even if it could be accepted that such a case in which possession was taken after decree for injunction was passed without intervention of court by execution, which is not strictly within the ambit of Section 144 CPC, that the court can restore back the status quo ante in execution of its inherent powers. Even if it could be accepted that such a case in which possession was taken after decree for injunction was passed without intervention of court by execution, which is not strictly within the ambit of Section 144 CPC, that the court can restore back the status quo ante in execution of its inherent powers. It is settled law that when there is no specific provision of law, the court can exercise inherent power for preventing miscarriage of justice or for ends of justice. In exercise of its inherent power the court can restore back possession which was taken by a party under cover of a decree which was subsequently set aside. This has also been held in Salohon Shah (Supra), Jacob (Supra), Dr. Martand Ramchandra Potdar v. Dr. Dattatraya Ramchandra Potdar (AIR 1975 Bombay 237). 9. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that Section 144 CPC does not apply in this case and remedy by way of suit alone could be open, relied on two cases, Periyasamy Thevan and others v. Karuthiab Thevan and another (AIR 1918 Madras 1293) and K. Gavinda Chettiar and others v. A.N. Muniswami Chettiar and others (AIR 1937 Madras 315). In these cases, possession was taken independent of and opposite to decree. Those two cases have been distinguished in Solehon Shah case (Supra) and Jacob case (Supra) referred to above. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant thus fails. 10. The appeal has, thus, got no force and deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed. No order as to costs. (Appeal dismissed)