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1983 DIGILAW 458 (ALL)

Venkat Raman Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation

1983-07-18

K.N.MISRA

body1983
JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioners and perused the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It appears that in respect of Khata No. 9 and 226 an objection had been filed by the opposite party No. 2 Ram Narain with a prayer that the delay in filing the objection be condoned The Petitioners contested the case inter alia on the ground that the objection is time barred and delay does not deserve to be condoned. They also took various grounds touching the merits of the matter asserting that earlier in respect of the land in dispute the case was decided between the parties. That plea touches the merits, of the matter and I need not express any opinion in this regard. So far as the question of delay is concerned the consolidation officer condoned the delay vide order dated 14th August, 1980 and also proceeded to decide the case and passed another order on merits on 16th May, 1981. The Petitioners' learned Counsel contended that this order was an ex parte order and has to be set-aside. The Petitioners moved an application before the Consolidation Officer on 21st November, 1981. Learned Counsel pointed out that this application has not yet been disposed of. 2. Against the order dated 14th August, 1980 by which the Consolidation Officer had condoned the delay in filing the objection by the opposite party No. 2, the Petitioners had filed appeal as well as revision. The Petitioners' appeal was allowed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by his order dated 23rd August, 1982 and the order dated 14th August, 1980 condoning the delay was set aside. Aggrieved by this order dated 23rd August, 1982, opposite party No. 2 Ram Narain filed a revision which was heard together along with the revision filed by the Petitioners against the order dated 14th August, 1980. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, by the impugned order dated 18th April, 1983 allowed the revision filed by the opposite party No. 2 and directed the Petitioners to file appeal against the order dated 16th May, 1981 by which the Consolidation Officer had decided the case on merits after condoning the delay. Aggrieved by this order, the Petitioners have filed this writ petition. 3. Aggrieved by this order, the Petitioners have filed this writ petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally in setting aside the order dated 23rd August, 1982, in as much as there were unexplained laches on the part of the opposite party No. 2 in filing the objection. I am unable to agree with this contention. The question whether delay should or should not be condoned does not raise a question of jurisdiction as it lies within the discretion of the Court to condone the delay if sufficient cause has been shown explaining the delay. This Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution will not proceed to evaluate the findings on the question of fact regarding sufficiency or otherwise of the cause shown by the applicant seeking condonation of delay. 4. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, in the present case has upheld the order dated 14th August, 1980 by which the delay in filing the objection was condoned. During Consolidation proceedings title of the parties is to be decided on merits once for all and as such a lenient view deserves to be taken in the matter regarding condonation of delay in filing the objection unless there is evident lack of bona fide and inexcusable laches on the part of the applicant. In the present case I do not find that the Consolidation Officer had committed an error of law and jurisdiction in condoning the delay in filing the objection and as such the impugned order dated 18th April, 1983 by which the Deputy Director of Consolidation had restored the order dated 14th August, 1980, passed by the Consolidation Officer and setting aside appellate order dated 23rd August, 1982, does not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction so as to call for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has observed in the impugned order that the Petitioners may file appeal against the order dated 16th May, 1981 which was passed by the Consolidation Officer on merits after condoning the delay. The said order was passed ex parte against the Petitioners as has been asserted by the Petitioners and, therefore, they have rightly approached the Consolidation Officer for setting aside that order dated 16th May, 1981. The said order was passed ex parte against the Petitioners as has been asserted by the Petitioners and, therefore, they have rightly approached the Consolidation Officer for setting aside that order dated 16th May, 1981. The Petitioners had two fold remedies available against said ex-parte order. Firstly, the Petitioners could file restoration application before the Consolidation Officer, which they have done in this case, and secondly, they could also file an appeal against the said order. The Petitioners have already applied for setting aside the order and as such I do not think that they are further required to file an appeal against that order. The Consolidation Officer is to dispose of said application and since the case is now likely to be disposed of on merits and as such I do not find any prejudice would be caused to the Petitioners. I am therefore not inclined to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It would be appropriate if the Consolidation Officer would decide the case expeditiously on merits. 6. So far as the arguments which the learned Counsel for the Petitioners raised before me about the merits of the title in respect of the land in dispute are concerned, the same could be raised before the Consolidation Officer by the Petitioners on the case being restored and decided on merits and so I refrain from expressing any opinion on those arguments. 7. In view of what has been said above, this writ petition is dismissed in limine.