JUDGMENT N.N. Mittal, J. - This revision by the defendants-tenants raises two legal questions which have cropped up in the following circumstances : 2. The plaintiff-opp. party, being the owner of the premises in dispute, had applied for fixation of rent tinder Section 21(8) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972, On 2-9-1979 the concerned authority fixed a sum of Rs. 3,333.33 per month as the rent for the premises being 1/12th of the 10% of the market value of the property. The rate agreed between the parties earlier was Rs. 475/- per month. 3. After serving a notice demanding arrears with effect from 1-3-1979 coupled with a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure , the plaintiff demanded delivery of possession etc. This notice was admittedly served on 12-9.1979 and on defendants' failure to comply, a suit was instituted on 22-3-1980. 4. In the defence, it was admitted that an application for fixation of rent had been moved but the matter was pending before the court in appeal and the same had not become final. It was also urged that the notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code as not valid. After a formal evidence by the plaintiff, the defendants gave a statement that no oral evidence is to be adduced on their behalf. The suit was ultimately decreed on 23-9-1980, aggrieved against which, the present revision under Section 25 of the provincial Small Causes Court Act has been preferred. 5. The two contentions raised before me are about the validity of the notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code and that the property in dispute was not a public building within the meaning of Section 3(o) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. On the first question Sri Mathur, Learned counsel appearing for the applicants, has urged that the persons to whom the notice had been given and those against whom the suit was filed are not identical. The second ground for questioning the validity of the notice is that the relief claimed in the notice and in the suit based upon it was different and lastly it was urged that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of' Property Act could not be combined with a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code. The second ground for questioning the validity of the notice is that the relief claimed in the notice and in the suit based upon it was different and lastly it was urged that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of' Property Act could not be combined with a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code. For all these reasons, the validity of the notice has been challenged. 6. As to the first ground of invalidity, it would be seen that the notice was addressed to (1) The State of U.P. through the Secretary, Ministry of Education (2) Director of Education, U.P. and (3) Registrar of Departmental Examination, Allahabad. Emphasis has been laid by the counsel on the following words used in para 1 of the notice. "or occupied by you, the State of U.P., as a tenant of my client and there is the office of the Registrar of Departmental Examination in it." 7. It is urged that in the notice the only person who was addressed as a tenant was the State of U.P. and the other two persons to whom the same was addressed were not considered to be tenants by the plaintiff. In the plaint the allegation, however, is that the defendants had occupied the premises in suit as plaintiff's tenants. It is sought to be made out that there is a great variance between the identity of the persons in the notice and in the suit and as such the notice cannot be sustained. 8. The argument on the face of it appears to be fallacious. The two other persons to whom she notices were addressed are persons holding possession under the State of U.P. and are covered under the concept of the State of U.P. A notice in this case would have sufficed if the same had been addressed to the State of U.P. and the suit was filed only against it. In fact the plaintiff, by addressing the notices to the Director of Education and the Registrar of Departmental Examinations, has only tried to help the Government in finalising the claim of the plaintiff made in that notice and in that sense it has served the purpose for which a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code is intended to be given. If some thing more than what was required is done in the interest of the party, who would suffer if the same had not been done, then it does not lie for such a party to claim that the notice, on that ground, had become invalid. The argument, therefore, has no merit and is rejected. 9. I he second point on which objection has been taken was about the relief as claimed in the notice and asked for in the plaint. In the notice, the plaintiff had demanded arrears at the rate of Rs. 3333.33 with effect from 1-10-1976 and prior to that period at the rate of Rs. 475.00 per month. While filing the suit, this claim was reduced and the plaintiff demanded arrears calculated at the rate of Rs. 475.00 per month which was the earlier agreed rent. A mention was made in the notice that the plaintiff would be entitled to claim arrears at the enhanced amount if the same was revised upwards in appeal pending before the Additional District Judge. This argument also has no sound basis. If the plaintiff demands a higher amount in the notice and claims only lesser amount in the suit, that cannot prejudice the defendants in any manner and on that ground a notice can not be invalidated. It is always open for a party to reduce the claim but the position will be different if the scope of the claim is enlarged. In fact the Supreme Court in Dhain Singh Sabha Singh and another v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 274 went a step further. In that case also, the validity of the notice was challenged. There the appellants had entered into an agreement for hiring out two of their trucks to the Union of India for imparting tuition to Military personnel at a certain rate. The Union of India gave a notice to the appellants terminating the agreement and asked them to remove the trucks on the expiry of the period of notice. When the appellants went to receive the trucks, the same were not delivered to them. The respondent neither paid the hire charges nor returned the trucks the appellants. After serving a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code the suit was filed. When the appellants went to receive the trucks, the same were not delivered to them. The respondent neither paid the hire charges nor returned the trucks the appellants. After serving a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code the suit was filed. In the notice they claimed hire money upto the period of the agreement and there-after damages at the agreed rate of hire and for the return of the trucks in question. In the alternative, they claimed a sum of Rs. 3,500.00 as price of the two trucks. When the suit was filed for hire money and for the return of their trucks on value there of, the trial court passed a decree for arrears of the hire amount together with interest. The appellants went in appeal and they claimed a higher amount including the highest market value of the truck. The High Court reduced the claim and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any thing more than Rs. 3.500.00 as claimed in the notice. In appeal to the Supreme Court, this reasoning of the High Court was rejected and after referring to certain decisions, the court observed as under. "If the terms of the notice in question be scrutinised in this manner it is abundantly clear that the relief claimed by the appellant was the redelivery of the said two trucks or in the alternative payment of Rs. 3,500/- being the value thereof. The value which was placed by the appellants on the trucks was the then value according to them a value as on August 1, 1942, the date on which the delivery of the trucks ought to have been given by the respondent to the appellants. The appellants could only have demanded that sum as on the date of that notice. They could not sensibly enough have demanded any other sum. If the respondent had complied with the terms of that notice then and there and re-delivered the trucks to the appellants, nothing Further needed to be done. If on the other hand instead of re-delivering the trucks it paid to the appellants the value there of then also it need not have paid anything more than Rs. 3,500/- to the appellants, on that alternative. If on the other hand instead of re-delivering the trucks it paid to the appellants the value there of then also it need not have paid anything more than Rs. 3,500/- to the appellants, on that alternative. If, however, the respondent failed and neglected to comply with the requisitions contained in that notice the appellants would certainly be entitled to recover from the respondent the value of the said trucks in the alternative on the failure of the respondent to re-deliver the same to the appellants in accordance with the terms of the decree ultimately passed by the court in their favour. That date could certainly not be foreseen by the appellants and it is contrary to all reason and common sense to expect the appellants to have made a claim for the alternative value of the said two trucks as of that date. The respondent was and ought to have been well aware of the situation as it would develop as a result of its non-compliance with the terms of that notice and if on January 8, 1943, the appellants in the suit which they filed for wrongful detention of the said trucks claimed re-delivery of the said trucks in the alternative Rs. 3,500/- as their value and reserved their right to claim the further appreciation in the value of the trucks by reason of the rise in prices thereof up to date of the decree by paying additional court-fee in that behalf, it could not be laid at their door that they had not made the specific demand in their notice to the respondent under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that therefore their claim to recover anything beyond Rs. 3,500/- was barred under that Section. A common sense reading of the notice under Section 80 would lead any court to the conclusion that the strict requirements of that section had been complied with and that there was no defect in the same such as to disentitle the appellants from recovering from the respondent the appreciated value of the said two trucks as at the date of the judgment. It is relevant to note that neither was this point taken by the respondent in the written statement which it filed in answer to the appellants' claim nor was pay issue framed in that behalf by the Trial Court and this may justify the inference that the objection under Section 80 had been waived. The point appears to have been taken for the first time before the High Court which negatived the claim of the appellants for the appreciated value of the said trucks." The principle laid down in the said decision clearly meets the objection raised by the learned counsel. If the court in fact grants even a higher amount than claimed in a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code because such a result automatically follows from the nature of the transaction between the parties, I see no reason why a lessor amount cannot be claimed by a claimant while filing the suit. Such a course could not invalidate the notice in any manner. 10. On the third objection, I need cite only the decision of the learned Single judge of this court State of U.P. and others v. Mst. Mohan Devi, 1977 ALJ 365 where the earlier case law on the point has been reviewed and the court has held that-notice under Section 3 of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 and a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy could be validly combined with a notice under Section 80 C P.C. In that case also the argument raised was that a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code must state the cause of action on which the claim of the plaintiff was based and unless the tenancy has been terminated, the cause of action for the suit does not accrue. If the three notices are combined, then the default as well as the termination of tenancy would take place during the two months period of notice under Section 80. This argument was repelled. A view to the contrary in Union of India v. Chandra Kishore Agarwal and another, 1981 ARC 319, has been relied upon by the applicants. With utmost respect, I am unable to agree with the reasoning given by the learned judge in that case. This argument was repelled. A view to the contrary in Union of India v. Chandra Kishore Agarwal and another, 1981 ARC 319, has been relied upon by the applicants. With utmost respect, I am unable to agree with the reasoning given by the learned judge in that case. The earlier cases on the point have not been considered at all and in these circumstances I would prefer to adhere to the earlier consistent view of this court in the matter and hold that the notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code can be validly combined with the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Also refer to a very recent decision reported in 1983 A.W.C, 458 (L.B.). This disposes of the first legal question raised in the revision. 11. Now coming to the second question, the learned counsel has urged that provisions of U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 where by definition of the word 'public building' was amended was prospective in operation and would not apply to those tenancies which were continuing from before. Section 3(o) reads as under : "(o) "Public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building be-longing to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation." The learned counsel has emphasised that the words "taken on lease" can only mean taken on lease after tho enforcement of the Act and would not apply in respect of any building which had already been in the tenancy of the Government. I cannot agree to this contention. The whole purpose of amending the definition was to keep all the premises in occupation of the Government either under the lease or under requisition or belonging to the Government of a State or Union of India out of the purview of the Act. In fact reading this definition along with Section 2(l)(a) of the Act can lead to no other conclusion. Section 2 of the Act indicates exemptions from the operation of the Act and it provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to any public building. In fact reading this definition along with Section 2(l)(a) of the Act can lead to no other conclusion. Section 2 of the Act indicates exemptions from the operation of the Act and it provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to any public building. The effect of this exemption would be that so far the public building as defined in Section 3(o) are concerned, provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 shall not apply there to. A question of a similar nature was raised in Om Kumar v. District Judge and others, 1980 (U.P.)2 R.C.C. 134 where a Division Bench of this court held as follows : "Applying the principle of harmonious construction it may be said that sub-section (8) of Section 21 is a proviso or an exception to Section 2(l)(a). Reading the two provisions in this manner the result will be that though the Act will not generally apply to a public building, yet clause (a) of sub section (1) to Section 21 will apply to buildings mentioned in clause (8) of Section 21, provided the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section (1) of Section 21 is applicable" The Court went on to observe as under : "The real problem, however, is created by the fact that by Amending Act of 1976 clause (ii) and (iv) to that Explanation to s. 21(1) have been omitted. They no longer remain in the statute. In such a situation it is not possible to apply subsection (8) as if clause (ii) or clause (iv) was hypothetically in existance." 12. In view of these observations of the Division Bench no doubt is left that so far as the public building as defined under Section 3(o) of the Act are concerned, the same are not subject to the provisions contained in U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The aforesaid decision has been followed in Zila Parishad Siksha Samiti and another v. V. Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 1981 ALJ 211 , Mahadeo Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 1981 ALJ 318 and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Second Additional District Judge, Rampur and others, 1981 ALJ 608. The aforesaid decision has been followed in Zila Parishad Siksha Samiti and another v. V. Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 1981 ALJ 211 , Mahadeo Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 1981 ALJ 318 and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Second Additional District Judge, Rampur and others, 1981 ALJ 608. In all these cases it was held that in view of the definition of a public building in Section 3(o) of the Act, the provisions of the Act were not applicable in respect there of. 13. In the result I find that the premises in suit was a public building within the meaning of Section 3(o) of the Act, and as such the same was not governed by other provisions of the Act. Apart from the above, the present suit did not arise out of proceedings under Section 21 but arose in a suit brought on the basis of failure to pay the rent and termination of tenancy. If at all the Act could be deemed to be applicable in respect of the premises in question, the applicants have failed to comply with the provisions of sub' clause (4) of Section 20 and were not entitled to be relieved against their eviction. 14. In the circumstances, I find no merit in the revision. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.