Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 287/1975 of the Munsiff's Court,Palghat is the appellant herein. The defendant in the case is the respondent. The suit was filed for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to the plaint property and for injunction and in the alternative for recovery of the plaint property on the strength of title. The suit property is, R. S. No. 54/4A and 51/10, about 10 cents of land. It belonged in kanam right to one Chami, as evidenced by Ext. A4 dated 13-5-1944. Chami had two sons, Arumughan and Poosandi. As per partition in the family evidenced by Ext- A1 dated 10-5-1952 the plaint property was set apart for Arumughan. Arumughan had a son by name Andi. The plaintiff is the widow of Andi. By Ext. B1 dated 17-5-1965 Arumughan sold the plaint property to the defendant. Later by Ext. A2 dated 2-12-1966 Andi executed a deed of gift to the plaintiff. The defendant in the suit filed O.S. No, 871/1966 against Andi and prayed for injunction from entering into the property. Andi disputed the sale deed executed by his father Arumughan. The suit was disposed of finally in S.A.1303/1972 evidenced by Ext. B2. This Court decreed the suit on the basis of the recital in the sale deed Ext. BI, Since it was recited that possession was given, an order of injunction was granted against Andi. The plaintiff is not a party to this said suit. So she has laid the present suit for declaration of title, for injunction and for recovery of possession. The plaintiff also attacked Ext. BI on the ground that Arumughan was senile and there is no legal necessity to execute Ext. B1. By judgment dated 31st of July, 1966 the trial court dismissed the suit. In appeal the District Judge found that the sale was not supported by legal necessity and consideration and so half of the property will go to Andi and that such property will enure to the benefit of the plaintiff as per Ext. A2. The lower appellate court observed as follows: "Normally when the transaction is found to be bad as not supported by valid and binding necessity, the transferee is to move the court for partition and separate possession of the share of the transferor in whose shoes he has stepped into. A2. The lower appellate court observed as follows: "Normally when the transaction is found to be bad as not supported by valid and binding necessity, the transferee is to move the court for partition and separate possession of the share of the transferor in whose shoes he has stepped into. There it is seen that the transferee is in possession and I consider this to be a ground to direct the plaintiff to ask for a general partition of the assets of Arumughan and in such partition equity can be considered." The lower appellate court modified the judgment of the trial court and held that the plaintiff is declared to be entitled to a half share in the plaint schedule property and the said right will be worked out in a suit for partition. 2. The plaintiff has filed the second appeal from the judgments of the courts below. While admitting the Second Appeal, this Court has formulated the substantial question of law as follows: "Whether in the circumstances of this case, when the suit is filed by a non-alienating co-parcener, a preliminary decree for partition could not be passed?" Mr. T. R. Govinda Wariyar, counsel for the appellant, raised before me only one aspect arising in the case - the result flowing from the declaration granted by the lower appellate court. Counsel submitted that this aspect of the judgment has become final and the defendant-respondent (alienee) has not filed an appeal or cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment. As it is, the declaration granted by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the plaint schedule property stands. True, the transferee is in possession. It is further true that normally the half share of the plaintiff will be worked out in a suit filed for general partition and equity adjusted. But counsel pleads that this general rule is not an absolute one and there are exceptional circumstances in which the relief may be given in this suit itself. Counsel brought to my notice the following passage occurring in Hindu Law by S. V. Gupta, 3rd edition, wherein at page 267 it is observed: "Where the purchaser has obtained possession, the non-alienating co-parceners are entitled to sue for and recover possession of the whole of the property for the benefit of the family including the vendor. Counsel brought to my notice the following passage occurring in Hindu Law by S. V. Gupta, 3rd edition, wherein at page 267 it is observed: "Where the purchaser has obtained possession, the non-alienating co-parceners are entitled to sue for and recover possession of the whole of the property for the benefit of the family including the vendor. The purchaser is not entitled in such a suit to ask for and claim partition either of the specific property concerned or the joint properties in general except where relief by way of general partition may conveniently be given to him in that very suit." Counsel brought to my notice the decisions reported in Ramaswami v. Venkatarama (AIR. 1924 Madras 81) and Krishnamoorthy Iyer v. Nataraja Iyer (AIR. 1949 Madras 67) wherein this aspect has been fully dealt with The following passages occurring in AIR. 1924 Madras 81 are relevant: "No doubt in many cases it would not be easy to enforce the alienee's equitable right in a suit brought by one of the co-parceners to recover the property, because it would be necessary to add all the co-parceners to the suit and ascertain the amount of family property available for division, etc., and consequently it would often be simpler to refer the alienee to a separate suit; but that is not to say that, when the circumstances are favourable, the alienee must of necessity be driven to another suit. The principle originally laid down in Deen Lyal Lal v. lugleep Narain Singh, is that the purchaser has the right to compel partition and it was held that he was entitled to take proceedings to have his alienor's share ascertained by partition; This being the principle, where such share can be ascertained, without driving the parties to a separate suit, it should be done in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation The observations referred to above that the alienee has only a right to sue must be read with reference to the facts of the cases concerned, for, if an equity exists in the alienee and it can be enforced without a separate suit, there seems to me to be no reason for restricting that equity to a mere right to sue, a limitation which cannot be supported on equitable principles. As I read Ramkishore Kudarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal, that case is authority for the proposition that, in a suit by a co-parcener for recovery of the property or for partition, the alienee is entitled to claim partition, if it can conveniently be done. In the present case, the plaintiff is the only surviving member of his family and at the time of the alienation to the 1st defendant the plaintiff's grand father was entitled to one-half share in the family property, he having only one son. The family property at that time was a great deal more than double the amount sold to the defendant; for by that sale, about two Velis were sold at a time when the family properties amounted to something like 13 velis of land. There is no necessity in the present case to implead any other co-parceners; for. they do not exist, and the partition, so far as the plaint property is concerned, can be effected without any trouble at all." (emphasis supplied) So also AIR. 1949 Madras 67, the court held as follows: "...in working out the equity which had been recognised in favour of an alienee of an item of family property, the alienation being neither for necessity nor for benefit, it is open to a Court to allot that alienated item to the share of the alienating co-parcener where that could be done without prejudice to the rights of the other co-parceners. We do not regard Iburamsa Rowthen v. Theruvenkatasami Naick 34 Mad. 269 (7 I. C 559 (F. B )) as laying down an absolute rule that a Court cannot, in a suit by a coparcener to recover his share in an alienated item or items give effect to the equity in favour of the alienee even where the alienor's share in the family property is easily ascertainable and that the alienee must even in such a case, be driven to a separate suit. We are unable to see any principle behind any such absolute rule. In most cases no doubt it would not be easy in such a suit to work out the equity as there may be several other coparceners who are not parties to it and several other properties available far division. We are unable to see any principle behind any such absolute rule. In most cases no doubt it would not be easy in such a suit to work out the equity as there may be several other coparceners who are not parties to it and several other properties available far division. But where that difficulty does not exist and the facts are simple, there is no justification for compelling the alienee, nevertheless to file a suit for partition That would lead to unnecessary multiplication of litigation and further, what is in effect a rule of convenience should not be transformed into rigid rule of procedure to be enforced regardless of circumstances. We are in this matter substantially in agreement with what was said in Ramaswami Iyer v. Venkatarama Aiyar, 46 Mad. 815: (AIR (11) 1924 Mad. 81)." (emphasis supplied) The said observations apply with equal force in this case also. It appears to me that in a case where all the co-parceners entitled to a share on partition as also the entirety of the properties are evident and are before court, the court can adjust the equity in the suit filed by the non-alienating co-parcener to set aside the alienation or in a suit brought by the alienee to enforce his right against the alienating co-parcener. The person entitled to a share in the joint family property need not be driven to a separate suit It is open to the court to pass a preliminary decree for partition in the very suit filed by the non-alienating co¬parcener or in the suit filed by the alienee, provided the difficulties pointed out in AIR. 1949 Mad. 67, do not exist. So in the light of the above I hold that the half share of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property will be worked out in this suit itself. The decree passed now will be treated as a preliminary decree for partition and on that basis final decree proceedings will follow. The half share the plaintiff is entitled to in the plaint schedule property will be worked out in the final decree proceedings. Subject to the above modifications and directions the decree of the courts below are confirmed. The Second Appeal is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.