JUDGMENT 1. - The five petitioners against whom a case under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149 I.P.C. has been committed for trial, have applied for bail. The case against them is that these petitioners along with one Shiv Karan surrounded the deceased Birbal Ram and gave him bearing with deadly weapons resulting into the death of Birbal Ram. The present petitioners were arrested on 2-2-83 Shiv Karan is said to be absconding. The police after investigations, put up a challan against these five petitioners on 30-4-83 in the Court of Judl. Magistrate No. 1, Hanumangarh. That Magistrate was on leave on that day and the link Magistrate passed an order registering the case and also directing that the matter may be put up before the concerned Magistrate on 12-5-83. 2. The petitioners applied for bail before the link Magistrate but the same was referred on 9-6-83 on the ground that the case was triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. Their application before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge also failed on 8-8-83. They have therefore, come up to this Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor at some length and have also gone through the record. 4. The learned counsel prays for bail of the petitioners on two grounds. The first ground is that on the met its, the case against the petitioners is such as may not fall under section 302 I. P. C inasmuch as none of them is said to have inflicted the fatal blow. The fatal blow is alleged to have been inflicted by Shiv Karan, who has not yet been arrested. There is only omnibus evidence regarding the presence or participation of the petitioners in the incident. His second ground for bail is that the complete challan had not been filed within 90 days of the date of the arrest of the petitioners nor cognizance had been taken within that period and, therefore, under section 167 (2) Cr. P. C., they are entitled to be released on bail. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor, I am clearly of the view that looking to all the circumstances of the case and the number and nature of injuries received by the deceased, this is not a fit case for grant of bail. P. C., they are entitled to be released on bail. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor, I am clearly of the view that looking to all the circumstances of the case and the number and nature of injuries received by the deceased, this is not a fit case for grant of bail. The deceased is said to have received as many as 31 injuries by different weapons on different parts of the body. 6. So far as the second contention goes, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that in the first place, the challan filed in the present case on 30-4-83 goes, it was not a complete challan as required by section 173 Criminal Procedure Code inasmuch as the investigations were still going on and the sixth accused had not been arrested. It was mentioned in the challan itself that investigations in respect of accused no 6, namely Shiv Karan were still going on and a further challan shall be submitted under section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. In the second place, the learned Magistrate who registered the case, cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence nor was he competent to take cognizance and, therefore also the investigations cannot be said to have been complete and the mandate of section 167 (2), Cr.P.C. entitled the petitioners to bail. Section 167. Cr. P.C, reads as under:- ***** It is on the basis of proviso to sub-section (2), that the petitioners claim to be released on bail. It would be useful to point out that the proviso makes it clear that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding ninety days where the investigations relate to the offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. A bare reading of this section 167 would make it clear that it relates to the authorisation of the detention of an accused person during investigation. Therefore, if the investigations are over within the prescribed period, the proviso to section 167(2) in respect of grant of bail would not apply. A bare reading of this section 167 would make it clear that it relates to the authorisation of the detention of an accused person during investigation. Therefore, if the investigations are over within the prescribed period, the proviso to section 167(2) in respect of grant of bail would not apply. Therefore, the question for consideration in this case is whether in the present case, the investigations would be deemed to be over or net by the time the challan against the petitioners was filed on 30-4-83. 7. Now so far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned link Magistrate did not have power to take cognizance of the offence goes, in my opinion, this dues not deserve to be accepted. A Magistrate is appointed under section I I for the district. Under section 14, the Chief Judl. Magistrate subject to the control of the High Court may from time to time, define the local limits of the areas within which the Magistrates appointed under section 11 may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) of section 14 further provides that except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend throughout the district. Then sub section (2) of section 15 provides that the Chief judl Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among the judicial Magistrates subordinate to him. Now in this case, there is no dispute that the Chief Jude. Magistrate had passed the order under section 15(2) authorising the Judi. Magistrate No. 2 to look of the work of the Court of Judi. Magistrate No. 1 in the absence of the latter. Such an order cannot be said to be inconsistent with the provisions of section 14 and, therefore, the link Magistrate could have taken cognizance of the offence when the police report had been filed. The learned counsel placed reliance upon an authority reported in (1) V. R. Rantaigoudar v. V.P. Angadi (1976 Cri. L J. 572), but that authority, in my opinion, is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as no order under section 15(2) had been passed by the Chief Judl. The learned counsel placed reliance upon an authority reported in (1) V. R. Rantaigoudar v. V.P. Angadi (1976 Cri. L J. 572), but that authority, in my opinion, is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as no order under section 15(2) had been passed by the Chief Judl. Magistrate in that case and the High Court had not appointed the other Magistrate as a Magistrate of the district which the concerned Magistrate was appointed. Therefore, the first contention that the learned link Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance cannot be accepted. The second ground of attack was that the challan filed was not a complete challan and, therefore, also the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence. In my opinion, this contention also cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of this case. The challan filed against the present live petitioners on 30-4-83 was a complete challan in all respects. The only ground on which the challan is said to be incomplete is that the accused Shiv Karan had not been arrested by then and the police reserved its right to investigate the case against him and file a supplementary challan under section 173 (8) Criminal Procedure Code. In my opinion, in these circumstances, the challan against the petitioners cannot be said to be incomplete. Whether the prosecution could take resort to sub-section (8) to Section 173 in the circumstances of the case, does not call for determination. The learned counsel brought to my notice the authority reported in (2) T. V. Sarma v. Turgakamla Devi (1976 Cri L J. 1247) and (3) Nandi Kotayya v. State (AIR .966 AP. 377), but these cases do not appear to have any bearing on the present case inasmuch as in both these cases, the challans filed were incomplete challans or preliminary challans as have been mentioned in these cases. The investigations against the accused persons against whom the challan had been filed had not yet been completed and only preliminary reports had been submitted. This is not the case here. As already stated above the challan filed against the present five petitioners was a complete challan and cognizance could have been taken on its basis. The investigations against the accused persons against whom the challan had been filed had not yet been completed and only preliminary reports had been submitted. This is not the case here. As already stated above the challan filed against the present five petitioners was a complete challan and cognizance could have been taken on its basis. It was also contended that the learned Magistrate by merely registering the case and posting it for orders before the concerned Magistrate, cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, also the investigations must be deemed to be incomplete. Reference in this connection has been made to (4) Beni Madhava v. The State of Rajasthan (1982 Rajasthan Cr. Cases 145), (5) H. R. Chari v. State ( AIR 1950 All. 626 ), (6) H. R. Chari v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1951 SC 207 ). (7) Parshottam v. State (A.I.R. 1954 SC 700), (8) Jamuna Singh v. Shadul Shah ( AIR 1964 SC 1541 ) and (9) Gopal Das v. State of Assam ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ). I, however, do not feel called upon to decide whether in the circumstances of this case. cognizance can be raid to have been taken by the Magistrate or not because, in my opinion, the provision to section 167 referred to above does not lay down that the accused would be entitled to bail if cognizance is not taken within the prescribed period. As already stated above, this section 167 relates to the completion of the investigation and not to the taking of the cognizance. In (10) State of U P. v. Lakshmi (1983 Cri. L.J. 839), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have Laid down in clear terms as under : "Section 167 envisages a stage when a suspect is arrested and the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. The investigation would come to an end the moment charge-sheet is submitted as required under Section 170 unless the Magistrate directs further investigation." Now it is no body's case here that in the present case, after the challan had been filed on 30-4-83, the Magistrate had ordered any further investigations and, there- fore, it must be deemed that the investigations had been completed by 30-4-83, which was well within 90 days of the arrest of the accused persons. In these circumstances, the accused petitioners cannot claim the benefit of bail under section 167(2) Cr P. C. I may, of course, mention here that there are some authorities, which have taken the view that the investigations cannot be said to be complete till cognizance is taken by the Court put in view of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that view does not seem to be correct. 8. It would also not be out of place to mention here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in State of U P.'s case (supra) have further laid down that the High Court after examining the scheme of Section 167(1) and (2) with the proviso rightly concluded that, on the expiry of 60 days from the date of the arrest of the accused, his further detention does not become ipso facto illegal or void, but if the charge-sheet is not submitted within the period of 60 days, then notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Section 437(1), the accused would be entitled to an order for being released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that as cognizance was not taken within 90 days of the arrest of the accused, their detention had become invalid and illegal ipso facto, cannot be accepted. 9. I may also refer to two more cases. In (11) Pandi v. State (1979 Cri. L. J. 1503) , the challan had not been filed within the prescribed time and the accused applied for bail under section 167(2) Cr. P. C. A notice of this application was given to the Public Prosecutor and on the same day, after the expiry of the prescribed period, the challan was filed and it was held that after the challan had been filed, the Magistrate could not have released the accused under section 167(2). Then in (12) Pulandar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1979 Cri. L. J NOC 155), it was held that the mere fact that the challan was filed before the Court which was not the court concerned, is not a good ground for asking bail under section 167(2) Cr. P.C. 10. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to bail. The bail application is, accordingly, rejected. *******