JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as `the Corporation') and the Regional Manager of the Jodhpur Region of the Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Regional Manager") have prayed for the issuance of a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash the award (Ex. 13) dated September 5, 1974 passed by the Judge, labour Court, Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Labour Court') in Case No. LC. 161/73. 2. Yad Ram Yadav respondent No. 2, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent workman') was employed as Conductor with the Corporation. A disciplinary inquiry was conducted against the respondent workman on the basis of a charge-sheet (Ex-4) dated September 9, 1971 issued by the Regional Manager. In the said disciplinary enquiry, which was conducted by the Asstt. Depot Manager (Enquiry), it was found that the charge levelled against the respondent workman was proved. Thereafter, the Regional Manager after taking into consideration the report of the enquiry officer issued a show-cause notice (Ex. 7) dated February 15, 1972 whereby the respondent workman was inforrued that it was proposed to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on him and he was asked to submit his explanation against the same. The respondent workman gave his reply to the said show-cause notice and after considering the said reply, the Regional Manager passed the order (Ex. 8) dated June 20, 1972 whereby the services of the workman were terminated and his pay for the period of suspension was forfeited. Thereafter, the Rajasthan State Roadways Employees Union, Beawar (herein respondent No.3) raised an industrial dispute with regard to the termination of service of the respondent workman and by order dated September 19, 1973 the State Government referred. for adjudication to the Labour Court. the dispute as to whether the termination of the services of the respondent workman by the Regional Manager was valid and proper and if not to what relief was the respondent workman entitled. In the said reference the statement of' claim (Ex.9) was filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 and reply (Ex. 10) to the statement of claim was filed on behalf of the Corporation The Labour Court gave its Award (Ex. 13) on September 6, 1974. In the said reference the statement of' claim (Ex.9) was filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 and reply (Ex. 10) to the statement of claim was filed on behalf of the Corporation The Labour Court gave its Award (Ex. 13) on September 6, 1974. By the said Award the Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Corporation into the charges of misconduct levelled against the respondent workman was vitiated on account of the fact that in the charge-sheet that was served on the respondent workman the punishment of removal from service was also proposed which indicated that the issue had already been prejudged. The Labour Court also held that the impugned order terminating the services of the respondent workman was also passed in disregard of the provisions of Standing order No. 3 (Sic. No. 13) framed by the Corporation inasmuch as no notice was given to the respondent workman before terminating his services as required under the aforesaid standing Order and the wages and other dues were also not paid to the respondent workman on the consequent working day after the termination In view of the findings aforesaid, the Labour Court held that the termination of the services of the respondent workman was illegal and the respondent workman was entitled to re-instatement in service with full back wages and he answered the reference accordingly. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award of the Labour Court, the petitioners have filed this writ petition. 3. I have heard Mr. R. N. Munshi for the petitioners and M. R. Calla, learned counsel for the respondent No, 1. As noticed earlier, the Labour Court has given the following two reasons for holding that the order passed by the Regional Manager terminating the services of the respondent workman was illegal and invalid; (i) the domestic enquiry was vitiated on account of the fact that the proposed punishment of removal from services was also mentioned in the charge-sheet served on the respondent workman and (ii) the order terminating the services of the respondent workman was passed in disregard of the provisions of Standing Order No. 13 of the Standing Orders of the Corporation. 4. As regards the second ground given by the Labour Court, namely, contravention of the provision of Standing Order No. 13, Mr. 4. As regards the second ground given by the Labour Court, namely, contravention of the provision of Standing Order No. 13, Mr. Munshi has submitted that the Standing Orders framed by the Corporation postulate two forms for the termination of the services of the employee, one is termination simplicitur and the other is termination by way of punishment for misconduct. The submission of Mr. Munshi was that Standing order No. 13 deals with a termination simplicitor whereas Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36. which deal with inquires and penalties to be imposed for misconduct, provide for imposition of punishment of termination for misconduct. Mr. Munshi has contended that in he present case the termination of the services of the respondent workman was done by way of punishment for misconduct in exercise of powers conferred by Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36 and it was not a termination simplicitur and, therefore, the provisions of Standing Order No. 13 had no application to this case and the Labour Court has erred in holding that Standing Order No. 13 was applicable and ought to have been complied with by the Corporation before terminating the services of the respondent workman. In my view the aforesaid contention urged by Mr. Munshi must be accepted. A perusal of the Standing Orders of the Corporation shows that termination of the services of a workman is one of the penalties mentioned in Standing Order No. 36. The said penalty can be imposed on a workman if he is found guilty of misconduct after following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 35 Apart from the aforesaid provision contained in Standing orders Nos. 35 and 36. provision for terminating the services of a permanent workman is also contained in Standing Order No 13. Standing Order No. 13 requires that a written notice of the prescribed duration must be given to the workman concerned and that wages earned by him and other dues, if any, should be paid to the workman before the expiry of the second working day from the day on which his employment is terminated. Standing Order No. 13 requires that a written notice of the prescribed duration must be given to the workman concerned and that wages earned by him and other dues, if any, should be paid to the workman before the expiry of the second working day from the day on which his employment is terminated. On a harmonious construction of standing order No. 13 and Standing Order No. 35 and 36 it must be held that while Standing Order No. 13 deals with a case of termination simplictor otherwise by way of punishment, a case of termination by way of punishment for misconduct falls within the ambit of Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36. In other words in a case where the services of a workman are sought to be terminated by way of punishment on the ground of misconduct after following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 35 it is no longer necessary to further comply with the provision of Standing order No. 13 and in such a corse Standing Order No. 13 would have no application. The Labour Court was, therefore not right in holding that the provisions of Standing Order No. 13 were attracted to the present case and the order terminating the services of the respondent workman was vitiated on account of non compliance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 13. 5. With regard to the other reason given by the Labour Court for holding that the order terminating the services of respondent workman was illegal and invalid, namely, that proposed punishment of removal from service was set out in the charge-sheet that was served on the respondent workman, the submission of Mr. Munshi was that the mere mention of the proposed punishment in the charge sheet does not vitiate the inquiry that was conducted into the charge. Mr. Munshi was that the mere mention of the proposed punishment in the charge sheet does not vitiate the inquiry that was conducted into the charge. Mr. Munshi has submitted that in the present case, in spite of the fact that the proposed punishment was mentioned in the charge-sheet, a regular inquiry was held in which the respondent workman was afforded full opportunity of establishing his innocence and after the enquiry was concluded and the charge was found to have been proved, the respondent workman was afforded another opportunity of making his submissions against the proposed punishment and that after considering the explanation of the respondent workman, the disciplinary authority, instead of imposing the proposed punishment of removal from service, imposed the lesser punishment of termination of service with forfeiture of the wages for the period of suspension. According to Mr. Munshi, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, a proper enquiry was conduced into the charges that were levelled against the respondent workman and the order of punishment that was passed on the basis of the said inquiry does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 6. Mr. Calla, on the other hand, has submitted that the fact that the disciplinary authority, while issuing the charge-sheet, had also indicated the punishment which was to be imposed on the petitioner, shows that the disciplinary authority had already pre judged the matter and the holding of an enquiry into the charge was only an empty formality inasmuch as the said enquiry was conducted by the Asstt. Depot Manager who is subordinate to the Regional Manager who had issued the charge-sheet. Mr. Calla has also submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the enquiry as well as the order of punishment passed on the basis of the said enquiry must be held to be vitiated on account of bias and the Labour Court has rightly taken the said view and that no ground is made out for interference with the Award made by the Labour Court. 7. The question as to whether the mentioning of the proposed punishment in the charge-sheet vitiates the enquiry and the order of the punishment passed on the basis of the inquiry has come up for consideration before the courts in number of cases. 7. The question as to whether the mentioning of the proposed punishment in the charge-sheet vitiates the enquiry and the order of the punishment passed on the basis of the inquiry has come up for consideration before the courts in number of cases. Although the said question has not directly arisen in any case before the Supreme Court, but in (1) Khem Chand v. Union of India and others (AIR 1953 S. C. 300) , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the extent and ambit of the second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment that was contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, as it stood at that time, has observed:- "If the competent authority were to determine, before the charges were proved, that a particular punishment would be meted out to the Government servant concerned that the latter may well fell that the competent authority had formed an opinion against him, generally on the subject-matter of the charge or, at any rate, as regards the punishment itself." 8. The Calcutta High Court has dealt with this question in number of cases. In (2) Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v. State of West Bengal and another (AIR 1951 Cal. 626) , a combined notice was sent to the Government servant asking him to show cause against the charge as well as the proposed punishment of dismissal. In that case however a second opportunity was not afforded to the Government servant to show cause against the proposed punishment after the charges were found to have been established and a division bench of the Calcutta High Court held that most fundamental principles of natural justice were violated in the matter of conducting the disciplinary proceeding against the Government servant and the order of dismissal passed against him was bad in law. 9. In (3) Bibhuti Bhusan Paul v. State of West Bengal and others ( AIR 1967 Cal. 29 ), the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant, also required him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service or otherwise suitably punished. 9. In (3) Bibhuti Bhusan Paul v. State of West Bengal and others ( AIR 1967 Cal. 29 ), the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant, also required him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service or otherwise suitably punished. A learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court while rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the Government servant that the disciplinary authority was determined either to remove the Government servant from service or to punish him otherwise and that the inquiry that was conducted into the charge-sheet was vitiated by mala fides, held that reference to the punishment of removal from service or other punishment in the charge-sheet merely suggested that in view of the charges levelled against the Government servant, he was to show cause why he should not be awarded any of the three modes of punishment contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution and that the reference to punishment in the charge-sheet did not vitiate the enquiry that was conducted into the charge-sheet. 10. In (4) Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal and others (1968 Lab. I. C. 735), the charge-sheet which was served on the Government servant mentioned that the penalty of dismissal was proposed to be imposed upon the Government servant. In that case after the enquiry had been held and the Government servant was found guilty of the charges, a second show-cause notice was also give it to the Government servant requiring him to show case why he should not be dismissed from service and thereafter the order dismissing him from service was passed. A learned Single judge of the High Court held that at the stage of framing of charges no question of punishment could arise and the fact that the proposed punishment was mentioned in the charge would show that even before charges were inquired into and a finding arrived at on the basis of the enquiry, the Government servant had been prejudged and, therefore, the show cause notice as well as the proceedings based thereon, including the order of dismissal. could not be sustained. could not be sustained. This learned judge rejected the contention urged on behalf of the State that a second show-cause notice had been given to the Government servant after the report of the enquiry officer and the Government servant had been afforded an opportunity of showing cause against the penalty proposed and issuance of the show-cause notice mentioning the punishment, in the charge-sheet, would not vitiate the order of punishment. The learned judge held that the principles on which the show-cause notice is required to contain only the charges and not a finding of the guilt or a proposal as to the punishment to be imposed if the guilt is proved, required that an open mind should be kept with regard to the charges levelled against the Government servant until the charges are proved and that if such an open, mind is not kept but the enquiry is held on the assumption that the Government servant is guilty of offence with which he is charged and also that he is liable to a particular punishment, such an inquiry must be held to have been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. 11. The aforesaid decision in Gouri Pr. Ghosh's case (4) was followed by another learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in (5) Meena Jahan v. The Deputy Director of Tourism (Headquarters) Home (Tourism t Department, Government of Weft Bengal and others 1974 (2) S. L. R. 466, wherein also the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant required her to submit an explanation as to why she should not be discharged from service and it was held that if from the charge-sheet it appeared that the disciplinary authority had failed to keep its mind open in regard to the alleged offence committed by the delinquent employee and such employee was liable to a particular punishment, in that event the fundamental principles governing compliance with the principles of natural justice has to he held to have been violated and the charge-sheet, that is to say, the notice itself becomes invalid. 12. The matter was considered by a division bench of the Calcutta High Court in (6) State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosed Roy 1975 S. L. W. R. 65. 12. The matter was considered by a division bench of the Calcutta High Court in (6) State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosed Roy 1975 S. L. W. R. 65. In that case the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant mentioned that it was proposed to impose penalty of dismissal from survive and the Government servant was re.tui ed to show cause as to why the said penalty should not be imposed on him. After nothing the earlier decisions of the court, the division Bench of the Calcutta High Court drew a distinction between a case where in the charge-sheet the disciplinary authority proposes several major or minor penalties and a case where the disciplinary authority indicated in the charge sheet a particular penalty only. The learned judges have held that in the first type of cane the enquiry as well as the order of punishment would not be vitiated but it would be so vitiated in the second type of case. The following observations from the aforesaid decision would be of relevance : "It the light of the consistent and uniform view taken by this Court in decisions referred to above and others, we are also of the opinion that mere proposal of several punishment: major or minor in the charge-sheet will not by itself indicate that the disciplinary authority was biased or prejudiced against the delinquent as it indicates the flexibility and openness of mind of the disciplinary proceeding where in fact the enquiry is held according to rules and principles of natural justice and the delinquent it given a second opportunity to show-cause against the proposed punishment. It is however desirable that punishment should not at all be mentioned in the charge-sheet consistent with the provisions of Article 311 (2) since proposal for punishment arises only after charges are established. The position however will be different when in the charge sheet the disciplinary authority proposes the penalty which may indicate the closed mind of the disciplinary authority and his prejudice against the delinquent. Expressions of such proposal for punishments in the charge sheet before the start of the enquiry may cause reasonable apprehensions in the mind of the delinquent, that his case has been prejudiced which will vitiate the enquiry." 13. Reference may now be made to the decisions of the other High Courts. 14. Expressions of such proposal for punishments in the charge sheet before the start of the enquiry may cause reasonable apprehensions in the mind of the delinquent, that his case has been prejudiced which will vitiate the enquiry." 13. Reference may now be made to the decisions of the other High Courts. 14. In (7) Abdul Khaliq Sheikh v. Deputy Commissioner, Baramulla 1974 (1) S. L. R. 14, the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant also referred to the punishment which was proposed to be imposed and no second show-cause notice was given to the Government servant before passing the order terminating his services. A learned Single Judge of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court held that the charge-sheet was a meaningless and a sham formality as it was clubbed with the punishment proposed to be inflicted on the Government servant and such a composite notice containing the charges under proposed punishment was invalid. 15. In (8) Ramsbakal Yada v. Chief Security Officer, Railway Protection Force, Bombay V.T. and others AIR 1967 M.P. 91 , the charge-sheet that was served on the Government servant mentioned the punishment proposed to be imposed on him. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the mention of the proposed punishment did not vitiate the enquiry and the order of punishment that was passed on the basis of the said inquiry because the mention of the proposed punishment in the charge-sheet did not have the effect of debarring the Enquiry Officer from finding, after the enquiry, that the charge against the applicant was not proved or preventing the disciplinary authority from absolving the petitioner or proposing another punishment in the notice to show cause. 16. In the Madras High Court two learned Single judges of the said court had taken conflicting views. In (9) S. Manickam v. Superintendent of Police, Nilgiris and others AIR 1964 Mad. 375 , Viceraswami J. had taken the view that the fact that the proposed punishment is mentioned in the charge, can only show that even before the charges were enquired into and a finding arrived at on the basis of the enquiry the Government servant had been prejudged and for that reason he quashed the order of dismissal passed after holding the enquiry into charges. A contrary view was taken by Srinivasan J, in another case wherein it was held that mere mention of the possibility of a punishment in case the delinquent workman was found guilty of the charges, would not amount to pre-judging the question of guilt. The, aforesaid conflict was resolved by a division bench of the said High Court in (10) Felix Fenandez and others v. The Deputy C M.E.; S. Integral Coach Factory, Madras and others ILR (1966) 1 Mad. 365; wherein the learned, Judges agreed with the view of Srinivasan J, and held that immediately following the charge-sheet calling upon the delinquent to show-cause why he should not be punished in case the charge is made out, would not in any way indicate that the cause has been prejudged and that mere mention of the possibility of n punishment in case the charges are made out in the enquiry, would not contravene the scheme of Article 311 of the Constitution. 17. In (11) M. Chinnappa Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others AIR 1969 A.P. 234 , a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, following the decision of Veeraswami J. in S. Manickam v. Superintendent of Police (9) as well as the earlier decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that at the initial stage when the charges are framed and served upon he delinquent officer, the punishing authority or enquiry officer should not propose what punishment ultimately is to be given because that is not the stage when any opinion as to the punishment can either be formed or expressed and it amounts to prejudging the issue which is always likely to create misapprehension in the mind of the delinquent officer and that it is only at the stage when after a proper enquiry the punishing authority forms an opinion that the accused officer has committed the offence that he could propose the punishment and ask the delinquent officer to explain as to why that punishment should not be imposed. According to the learned judge if at the initial stage the charge framed indicated the proposed punishment it vitiates the proceedings. 18. Before a reference is made to the decisions of this Court, it may be mentioned that on a consideration of the decisions of the various High Courts referred to above. According to the learned judge if at the initial stage the charge framed indicated the proposed punishment it vitiates the proceedings. 18. Before a reference is made to the decisions of this Court, it may be mentioned that on a consideration of the decisions of the various High Courts referred to above. I am inclined to agree with the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosad Roy (6) and to adopt the distinction pointed out in the said decision between a case where the charge-sheet contains a proposal of several punishments, major or minor and a case where the charge sheet mentions only one particular penalty. An examination of the decisions of this Court show that the decisions of this Court ate not inconsistent with the aforesaid view. 19. This question has come up for consideration before this Court in two cases. In (12) Lekh Ram Saini v. The Union of India and others I.L.R (1968) 18 Rajasthan 253, the charge sheet that was served on the Government servant required him to show cause why he should not be removed or punished with any other lesser penalty specified in rule 1707 of the State Railway Establishment Code, Volume I by the competent authority and an argument was raised that the said charge-sheet was not in consonance with the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution and that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the conduct of the delinquent officer. A learned Single judge of this Court (Tyagi J.,) as he then was) rejected the aforesaid contention and while doing so, the learned judge laid stress on the fact that after the enquiry had been conducted into the charge sheet, a second show-cause notice was given to the Government servant requiring him to show cause against the proposed punishment. The learned Judge also emphasised that the charge-sheet that was given to the Government servant in that case was on a prescribed form which mentioned all the penalties prescribed in the Rules. 20. The learned Judge also emphasised that the charge-sheet that was given to the Government servant in that case was on a prescribed form which mentioned all the penalties prescribed in the Rules. 20. In (13) Keshri Mal v. State of Rajasthan 1979 (3) S.L R. 1, a charge-sheet was served on the Government servant here by he was required to show cause why the penalty specified in item (vii) of Rule 14 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, namely, dismissal from service, should not be imposed upon him. Another learned Single judge of this Court (D.P. Gupta J.) relying upon the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Abdul Khaliq Sheikh v. Deputy Commissioner, Baramolla (7) and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (4) has held as under:- "The principle of natural justice, on which the giving of a show-cause notice to the delinquent Government servant is based, requires that the disciplinary authority should keep an open mind with regard to the charges brought against the Government servant until such charges are proved. If an open mind is not kept. but as an enquiry is held on the assumption that the Government servant is guilty of the charges which have been levelled against him and he is also liable to specified penalty, then such an enquiry should be considered to have been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. It would be clear in such circumstances that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the matter regarding the guilt of the concerned Government servant. At the stage of framing the charges, no question of deciding as to what punishment would possibly be imposed upon the Government servant, in case the charges are proved against him, can arise. The very fact that the proposed punishment is mentioned in "the charge-sheet would" go to show that even before the charges are enquired into and a finding is arrived at in respect thereof, on the basis of the enquiry which is yet to be made, the guilt of the delinquent Government servant has been 'prejudged'. It is on this ground that the notice which includes not only the charges against the delinquent Government servant, but also contains a statement of punishment proposed to be "imposed upon" him, has been struck down by the courts. It is on this ground that the notice which includes not only the charges against the delinquent Government servant, but also contains a statement of punishment proposed to be "imposed upon" him, has been struck down by the courts. The procedure prescribed in the Rules for holding a disciplinary enquiry gives sonic assurance to the Government servant concerned that the disciplinary authority maintains on open mind with regard to the charges framed against him. In case the competent authority were to determine even before the charges are proved as a result of the enquiry to be conducted against the concerned Government servant, that particular punishment would be meted out to him, the employee may be justified in feeling that the disciplinary authority had already formed and opinion against him generally to the subject matter of the charge and also with record to the quantum of punishment to he imposed upon him. In such circumstances, the competent authority would not be able to consider independently the facts which emerge as a result of disciplinary authority." 21. A cursory reading of the aforesaid two decisions of this Court may give an impression that there is a conflict between the said two decisions. But it closer perusal of the said decisions would indicate that there is no such conflict between two decisions and both the decisions can be reconciled in the light of the distinction that has been pointed out by the division bench of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosad Roy (6) between a case where the charge-sheet contains a proposal of several punishments, major or minor, and a case where the charge-sheet contains the proposal of a particular punishment. In State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosad Roy (6), it has been observed that in cases where the charge-sheet contains a proposal of several punishments major or major it will not by itself If indicate that the disciplinary authority was biased or prejudiced, against the delinquent inasmuch as it indicates the flexibility and openness of mind of the disciplinary authority and this, without more, will not vitiate the disciplinary proceeding where in fact the enquiry is held according to rules and principles of natural justice and the delinquent is given a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment; but in cases where in the charge-sheet the disciplinary authority proposes the penalty of dismissal or other major penalty, which may indicate the closed mind of the disciplinary authority and his prejudice against the delinquent, a reasonable apprehension may exist in the mind of the delinquent that his case has been pre-judged and it will vitiate the enquiry. Lakh Ram Saini v. Union of India (12) decided by Tyagi J. falls in the first category because in that case the disciplinary authority had, in the charge- sheet, indicated the major penalty as well as other minor penalties which could be imposed on the delinquent officer under the Rules and further it was found that a proper enquiry had been held into the charge and a second show-cause notice requiring the delinquent officer to submit his explanation against the proposed punishment had also been given and in these circumstances it was held that reference to the proposed punishment in the charge-sheet did not vitiate the enquiry. Keshrimal v. State of Rajasthan (13) decided by D.P. Gupta J. falls in the second category of cases mentioned in State of West Bengal v. Sati Roy (6) it has been observed that case the disciplinary authority had proposes only one penalty, namely, dismissal from service, in the charge-sheet and it was held that disciplinary authority by mentioning the proposed punishment in the charge-sheet had prejudged the matter regarding the guilt of the Government servant and that it vitiated the disciplinary enquiry as well as the order of punishment passed as a result of the said enquiry. 22. In so far as the present case is concerned, I find that in the charge- sheet (Ex. 4) the disciplinary authority. 22. In so far as the present case is concerned, I find that in the charge- sheet (Ex. 4) the disciplinary authority. after setting out charged, had stated that the said misconduct fall-, within the ambit of Standing order No. 34 of the Standing orders and the respondent workman was asked to show cause as to why after finding him guilty of the said charge he may not be removed from service and he was required to submit his reply within seven (lays to the enquiry officer. This would show that the disciplinary authority, while issuing the charge-sheet, had made up its mind about the penalty that was to be imposed on the respondent workman and had also indicated the said penalty in the charge-sheet itself. This is a case which falls in the second category of cases referred to in State of West Bengal v. Sati Prosad Roy (6) and is covered by the decision of Gupta J. in Kesrimal's case (13) which is in consonance with the decisions of the other high Courts in Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (4), Meena Jahan v. The Deputy Director of Tourism (Headquarters) Home (Tourism) Department. Government of' West Bengal and others (5), (6), Abdul Khalik Sheikh v. Deputy Commissioner Baramulla (7), and M. Chinnappa Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (11). It must therefore, be held that the disciplinary authority while issuing the charge-sheet against the respondent workman had already prejudged the matter regarding the guilt of the respondent workman and the enquiry that was conducted into the charges levelled against the respondent workman by the Asstt. Deputy Mangagar, who was subordinate to the disciplinary authority, cannot be held to have been conducted with an open mind and the punishment that has been imposed on the respondent workman on the basis of the said enquiry cannot be sustained. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed any error of law in holding that the respondent workman was prejudiced on account of the fact that the proposed punishment was mentioned in the charge-sheet and the proceedings that were taken thereafter should be deemed to have been vitiated. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed any error of law in holding that the respondent workman was prejudiced on account of the fact that the proposed punishment was mentioned in the charge-sheet and the proceedings that were taken thereafter should be deemed to have been vitiated. Since I am of the view that the aforesaid reason given by the Labour Court in holding that the termination of the services of the respondent workman was illegal and invalid, does not suffer from any legal infirmity, no case is made out for interfering with the Award of the Labour Court by issuing a writ of Certiorari. 23. In the result the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. The petitioners will pay costs to the respondent workman. Costs are assessed to Rs. 250/-. *******