JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is an execution second appeal. The decree under execution was passed by the High Court in First Appeal From Order No. 87 of 1964 (Kunj Behari v. Lal Behari). The trial court had dismissed the suit by judgment D/- 23rd May, 1963. The plaintiff appealed therefrom. That was Civil Appeal No. 231 of 1963 in the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, and was allowed by that court's judgment D/- 21-1-1964. The dismissal of the suit was set aside and the case was remanded for a trial de novo after reframing of issues and clarification of pleadings and allowing the parties a chance to lead fresh evidence. The said First Appeal From Order No. 87 of 1964 was directed against that judgment of the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur. 2. The relief claimed in the suit, as originally filed was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from demolishing a wall (which separated the houses of the parties) and encroaching upon the plaintiffs land on his side of the wall. The defendant claimed that the wall as well as a portion of the land beyond it on the plaintiff's side belonged to him. This land was shown by letters C E G D on the map annexed to the written statement. This court held that the wall belonged to the defendant but also held that the very success of the defendant's claim that the wall had been built by his ancestors "is fatal to his claim to the narrow portion of the land lying on the plaintiffs side of the wall.". In the result this court allowed the appeal and set aside the remand order, and instead, while dismissing the plaintiffs suit for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession of the wall or demolishing the wall, decreed his suit for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs possession of the narrow portion of the land lying to the south of the wall. 3. 3. It appears that after the remand order, before the First Appeal From Order was admitted by this Court, an application for amendment of the plaint was allowed by the trial court's order D/- 24-2-1964, and instead of the relief of injunction restraining the defendant from demolishing any wall or from damaging in any manner the plaintiff's house shown by letters Aa, Ba, Sa, Da, Ya, Pha, Ja in the sketch map at the foot of the plaint, the relief for demolition of constructions and possession over 25' east- west and 7' wide north-south land shown by letters Sa Da Ya Va on the plaint map was claimed. The defendant appears to have applied for a revision of the order allowing the amendment. That revision, being Civil Revision No. 1145 of 1964, was heard by the same learned Judge of this Court and dismissed on 14-3-1966. that is, on the same day on which the First Appeal From Order No. 87 of 1964 was allowed as aforesaid. This Court observed that the defendant had raised certain constructions on the land in suit whereupon the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint which was allowed. This Court did not see any reason to interfere with the exercise of its discretion by the trial court, and also observed that the suit itself having been disposed of, the application had become infructuous. The suit had been disposed of by this Court's judgment in First Appeal From Order No. 87 of 1964. The result was that the relief of injunction that was granted by this Court was not a relief claimed in the plaint. The relief claimed in the plaint was for demolition of the constructions raised on the land Sa Da Ya Va 25' long east-west and 7' wide north-south. The relief granted by this Court was an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over that land. From the trial court's order D/- 24-2-1964, on the application for amendment of the plaint, it appears that the constructions which were sought to be demolished had been raised after the dismissal of the suit by the trial court and during the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 231 of 1963 in the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur. From the trial court's order D/- 24-2-1964, on the application for amendment of the plaint, it appears that the constructions which were sought to be demolished had been raised after the dismissal of the suit by the trial court and during the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 231 of 1963 in the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur. According to the plaintiffs allegation in the amendment application the wall in respect of which he had claimed an injunction restraining the defendant from demolishing it, had already been demolished by the defendant. That relief was refused by this Court on the finding at the wall belonged to the defendant, and the relief decreed by this Court was an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs possession on the narrow strip of the land to the south of the wall. This narrow strip of the land appears to be the land 25' long east-west and 7' wide north- south shown by letters Sa Da Ya Va in the plaint map, to the south of the defendant's house, although the shape of the area Sa Da Ya Va as shown in the plaint map does not accord with its dimensions. The shape of the land is better shown on the map at the foot of the written statement by letters C D E G although there appears to be a slight difference in the dimensions. 4. It is not surprising that the plaintiffs suit having been decreed as aforesaid and the revision against the order allowing the amendment of the plaint having been dismissed simultaneously, the plaintiff applied for execution of the decree by demolition of the constructions raised on the land Sa Da Ya Va. The defendant objected under S. 47, Civil P. C. That objection was dismissed by the executing court, but appears to have been allowed on first appeal by the court of the Additional Civil Judge, vide its order dated 21-3-1968 in Appeal No. 288 of 1967, on the ground that there was no decree for demolition. The plaintiff-decree-holder thereupon filed a fresh execution application No. 28 of 1968 praying for the execution of the decree under cl. The plaintiff-decree-holder thereupon filed a fresh execution application No. 28 of 1968 praying for the execution of the decree under cl. (1) of R. 32 of O. 21 Civil P. C. The defendant-judgment-debtor again filed an objection under S. 47, Civil P. C. That objection was dismissed and the execution application was allowed by an order dated 7-1- 1968 of the court of the 1st Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur. The judgment-debtor was ordered to be arrested and detained in civil prison for a period of six months, and simultaneously property of the value of Rs. 2000/- was ordered to be attached with the direction that the- attachment shall continue for 3 months, and, if the default continues, the attached property shall be sold by auction and they sum of Rs. 2000/-out of the auction proceeds shall be paid to the decree-holder and the balance, if any, to the judgment debtor. 5. This order was confirmed by the court of the IIIrd Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur, on the judgment-debtor's appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 302 of 1968 vide judgment dated 30th May, 1970. 6. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor-appellant urged that before an order of arrest and detention in civil prison could be passed under R. 32 of O. 21 the judgment-debtor must be shown to have had an opportunity of obeying the decree, and further to have wilfully failed to obey it. In the present case, on the other hand, although this Court was seized of the entire case, including the trial Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint, when First Appeal From Order No. 87 of 1964 was decided on 14-3-1968, yet this Court, in its wisdom, did not grant the relief of demolition of the constructions already raised, although it must have known that the constructions had already been raised and the only relief claimed in the plaint was the relief of demolition of those constructions. The interference with the plaintiffs possession over the land was complete and irrevocable when the constructions were raised and the relief of demolition of the constructions and possession over the land not having been granted there was nothing which the defendant-judgment-debtor was required to or could do in the matter. 7. The interference with the plaintiffs possession over the land was complete and irrevocable when the constructions were raised and the relief of demolition of the constructions and possession over the land not having been granted there was nothing which the defendant-judgment-debtor was required to or could do in the matter. 7. While there is no denying the fact that the application for amendment of the plaint having been allowed by the trial court and the revision against that order having been dismissed by this Court, it would have prevented confusion if this Court had granted to the plaintiff the relief of demolition of the constructions which had been raised, after the trial court had dismissed the suit, on the narrow strip of the land to the south of the wall in suit. This court in his wisdom did not do so and only passed an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land. The injunction issued by this Court was clear and the plaintiff could not walk over that land or in effect to go into or use the constructions erected by him at any time after the date of the decree of this Court; but the plaintiff was interested in having these constructions removed, and consequently applied for the execution of the decree by removal of the constructions. That was not allowed as the decree passed by this Court did not direct removal of the constructions. 8. Nevertheless the fact remains that the land over which the constructions stand and even the constructions must be deemed to be in the plaintiff's possession and the defendant cannot interfere with the possession by going on that land for using those constructions in any manner. The defendant could solve that tangle by voluntarily removing those constructions himself and in the process in salvaging the material which had gone into the making of those constructions. 9. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor appellant urged that the decree was under these circumstances in-executable, inasmuch as there being no direction for the removal of those constructions, and the constructions being his property, he does not commit any breach of the injunction issued by the decree, by using those constructions. 9. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor appellant urged that the decree was under these circumstances in-executable, inasmuch as there being no direction for the removal of those constructions, and the constructions being his property, he does not commit any breach of the injunction issued by the decree, by using those constructions. He also urged that the order of detention or even attachment of the property could not have been passed because there is no finding by either of the two courts below that he ever disobeyed the decree: I find it difficult to agree with these contentions. The raising of the constructions on the land amounted to interference with the plaintiffs possession. Even if the judgment-debtor-appellant does not go on to the land or use the constructions in obedience of the injunction, the continued existence of the constructions on the land amounts to a continuing interference with the plaintiff's possession on the land. The constructions were raised after the dismissal of the suit while the plaintiffs appeal No. 231 of 1963 was pending in the district court. The relief of prohibitory injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession over the land was undoubtedly appropriate when the suit was filed and the court could have passed a decree for demolition of the constructions raised during the pendency of the suit, and for restoration of possession over the land to the plaintiff, even without the amendment of the plaint, but although the plaint was amended,and demolition was claimed and the order allowing amendment of the plaint was simultaneously upheld by this Court, it granted the relief of prohibitory injunction which was no longer claimed, and did not grant the relief of demolition of constructions and possession which had come to be claimed by the amendment of the plaint which it upheld. These reliefs must be deemed to have been refused by the court. The court is, however, not precluded from granting a relief not claimed. It is, however, difficult to apply that rule to the present case inasmuch as the relief of prohibitory injunction was specifically claimed in the plaint as originally it stood but was deleted, and a different relief of demolition and possession was claimed in its place. The court is, however, not precluded from granting a relief not claimed. It is, however, difficult to apply that rule to the present case inasmuch as the relief of prohibitory injunction was specifically claimed in the plaint as originally it stood but was deleted, and a different relief of demolition and possession was claimed in its place. Even so, this Court might have been in error in granting the relief of prohibitory injunction and omitting to grant the relief of demolition and possession yet it cannot be said that the grant of the relief of prohibitory injunction was beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The executing court cannot go behind the decree and must execute it as it is. That must have been the reason why the earlier application for execution of the decree for demolition of the constructions that was made by the decree-holder was dismissed and the present application giving rise to this second appeal was filed for the enforcement of the decree by arrest of the judgment-debtor. By this process the plaintiff decree-holder wants to coerce the defendant judgment-debtor to do what the court cannot directly do, namely, to remove the constructions and to restore possession over the land to the decree- holder. One of the cases cited at the bar was Nawab Singh v. Mithu Lal ( AIR 1935 All 480 ) wherein a Division Bench of this Court ruled as follows : "It seems to us that where the injunction is for doing of an act, and the judgment-debtor has failed to do the act, the attachment can continue for three months and if in the meantime the judgment-debtor carries out the directions contained in the decree and in that way obeys the decree his property cannot be sold. But where the injunction is for restraining him from doing an act and the judgment-debtor has already done the act in disobedience of the injunction he has made it impossible for himself to obey the decree. No doubt, the property cannot be sold until three months have expired after the attachment, but after the expiry of this period it will still be impossible for the judgment-debtor to show that he has obeyed the decree inasmuch as he has really irrevocably disobeyed it. No doubt, the property cannot be sold until three months have expired after the attachment, but after the expiry of this period it will still be impossible for the judgment-debtor to show that he has obeyed the decree inasmuch as he has really irrevocably disobeyed it. If this were not the interpretation then the result would be that where there is an injunction restraining a defendant from demolishing a house, and he deliberately disobeys the injunction and demolishes the house no compensation can be awarded to the decree-holder in execution because the judgment-debtor will be able to say that he has not demolished the house a second time after the attachment. In our opinion where the judgment-debtor has, by his own act, made it impossible for himself to obey the decree he cannot escape from the liability to pay compensation which will be enforced after the attachment has subsisted for three months. If, however, it be impossible to award the decree-holder any compensation, then 'the only remedy which must be adopted would be to detain him in civil prison." This shows that the decree should have been first executed by attachment of the judgment-debtor's property for six months and if it were found that the judgment-debtor did not remove the constructions or the other interference with the plaintiff's possession over the land, and it was impossible to compensate the decree-holder by sale of the attached property and awarding compensation from the proceeds of the sale then the only remedy was to detain him in civil prison. In the present case, however, the learned Munsif dismissed the objection and directed the arrest and detention of the defendant judgment-debtor for a period of six months from the date when he is sent to the civil prison and also the attachment of the judgment-debtor's property up to the value of Rs. 2000/- for a period of three months with the further direction that if the default continues the attached property shall be put to auction and out of the proceeds, the amount of Rs. 2000/- shall he paid to the decree- holder. The lower appellate court has by a rather cryptic order dismissed the appeal and maintained the order of the executing court. 2000/- shall he paid to the decree- holder. The lower appellate court has by a rather cryptic order dismissed the appeal and maintained the order of the executing court. It was urged before me that the execution was excessive, and at any rate the detention of the judgment-debtor in civil prison was not warranted and it could not be said that the decree-holder could not be compensated by the sale-proceeds of the attached property. On an overall view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the fact that the process of.the civil court is not penal but remedial, that is to say, it is meant to remedy the wrong suffered by the decree- holder by compensating him and not to punish the judgment-debtor. The proper order to pass was to order attachment of the constructions raised by the defendant judgment-debtor on the land in suit, that is the narrow portion of the land lying to the south of the wall in suit which is shown by letters Sa Da Ya Vaon the plaint map and is said to be 25' long east-west and 7' wide north-south, but appears to be better shown by letters C D E G on the map at the foot of the written statement, with the direction that if the defendant-appellant (judgment-debtor) does not remove those constructions or other interferences on the plaintiffs land, the said constructions, namely, the Malba (debris) thereon shall be sold with the condition that the purchaser, shall remove the same from the land at his own cost within one month from the confirmation of the sale and sale-proceeds shall.be paid over to the plaintiff decree-holder as compensation. 10. In the result this appeal is allowed in part. 10. In the result this appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and instead it is ordered that the said constructions he attached for six months, and if the judgment-debtor does not remove those constructions or other interference from the plaintiffs land, which is shown by the letters Sa Da Ya Va on the plaint map and is said to be 25' long east- west, and 7' wide north-south, but is better shown by letters C D E G on the map at the foot of the written statement, during that period, the said constructions, namely, the Malba thereof, be sold with the condition that the purchaser shall remove the same from the' land at his own cost within one month from the confirmation of the sale; and the sale proceeds be paid over to the plaintiff decree-holder as compensation. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal in this Court.