JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - Premises No. 118/230, 80 Ft. Road, Kaushaipuri, Kanpur, belonged to Dr. Purshottam Singh, Respondent No. 3. The ground floor had several portions. One of them was in the use and occupation of Dr. Purshottam Singh Respondent No. 3, wherein he was running his clinic. Another portion of the ground floor had been released in favour of Dr. Manjeet Kaur, wife of Dr. Didar Singh, the son of Respondent No. 3. The third portion had been let out to a firm M/s. Sardar Finance Corporation whereas the fourth portion was a room measuring 18 ft. x 18 ft. let out to the Petitioner for a tea shop. In October 1978, Respondent No. 3 applied for release of the room in occupation of the Petitioner on the ground of personal requirement of his son. Dr. Didar Singh. Dr. Didar Singh passed his M.B.B.S. in the year 1972 and since then he was practising as medical practitioner at Kanpur. Respondent No. 3 alleged that Dr. Didar Singh had taken on rent a shop in Mohalla Rawatpur but this shop was situated in the locality that did not suit him. As Dr. Didar Singh wanted to establish his clinic in the premises in which Respondent No. 3 was practicing, the application u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed for release of the shop let out to the Petitioner. Respondent No. 3 alleged that the tenanted portion in occupation of the Petitioner was required for being used as a consulting room clinic by Dr. Didar Singh to make him independent. It was alleged in the application that if the father, son and daughter-in-law had their clinic independently in one building, they would consult each other as and when necessity arose in their medical profession. Respondent No. 3 had alleged that in 1976. The Petitioner had been given a notice requiring the Petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute for the above purpose. But the Petitioner did not try to get an alternative accommodation and insisted on living in the disputed premises. 2. The application was contested by the Petitioner and the landlord's version in regard to his bonafide need and his requirement were denied. But the Petitioner did not try to get an alternative accommodation and insisted on living in the disputed premises. 2. The application was contested by the Petitioner and the landlord's version in regard to his bonafide need and his requirement were denied. The Petitioner asserted that he had a large family of about ten persons and that the income earned from the business run in the premises was the only source of livelihood for him. It was asserted that the alternative accommodations stated in the application u/s 21 by Respondent No. 3 were not vacant and were not available to him. The Petitioner asserted that Dr. Didar Singh was having joint practice with Respondent No. 3 and he did not require the shop in possession of the Petitioner for the purpose disclosed in the application. 3. The Prescribed Authority accepted the contention of the landlord. He held that the need of the landlord was bonafide and a pressing one and his hardship would be greater than that of the tenant. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur who dismissed the same on March 6, 1981. Being aggrieved by these judgments, the Petitioner has filed the present writ. 4. So far as the need of Respondent No. 3 was concerned, it has been pointed out above that the same was for opening a clinic/consulting room by Dr. Didar Singh, son of Respondent No. 3. It has been admitted by Respondent No. 3 himself that Dr. Didar Singh had been practising since 1972 with Respondent No. 3 and that he had a clinic of his own in Mohalla Rawatpur. 5. For finding that the need of Respondent No. 3 was bonafide, the learned Additional District Judge relied on Rule 16(2)(b) of the Rules framed under U.P. Urban Buildings Act 1972. The said rule runs as under: Where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. 6. The view taken was that as Dr. 6. The view taken was that as Dr. Didar Singh had received technical education and he wanted to engage himself in the employment, he was entitled to get the benefit of the aforesaid rule. On that basis the view taken by the Additional District Judge was that the need of Respondent No. 3 for his son was presumed to be bonafide under the aforesaid provision. I am unable to agree with this interpretation of Rule 16(2)(d). Rule 16(2)(d) has been enacted to give effect to Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972 by which the Court can release if it was satisfied that the need of the landlord was bonafide. Rule 16 has two Sub-rules (1) and (2). Sub-rule (2) deals with non-residential accommodations. It prescribes that that 'regard' would be given while considering an application for release under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business. Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-rule (2) deal with different factors which have to be taken into account. In the instant case, the rule relied upon by the landlord was 16(2)(d) on the ground that as Dr. Didar Singh had received technical education and was not employed in government service, for the purpose of engaging himself in the said employment, he was entitled to get the benefit of the same. Clause (d) would apply where a son of the landlord is unemployed or not settled. This rule will not be applicable to a case where the son of the landlord is already engaged in some employment and wanted the accommodation in possession of the tenant for the purpose of getting higher income. This rule deals with a situation where before filing of the application the person for whose need the application is made is unemployed and is not engaged in any business. In the instant case, it has been established that after doing MBBS in 1972 he was also doing his medical practice in one of the shops taken in Rawatpur. That being so, Rule 16(2)(d) could not be applied to such a case. 7. It may further be seen that under Rule 16(2)(d) the Court is only required to give due consideration to the factor mentioned therein. The expression 'due consideration' would mean weight or significance to a particular factor which is mentioned in this provision. That being so, Rule 16(2)(d) could not be applied to such a case. 7. It may further be seen that under Rule 16(2)(d) the Court is only required to give due consideration to the factor mentioned therein. The expression 'due consideration' would mean weight or significance to a particular factor which is mentioned in this provision. This factor cannot be considered as over riding or clinching circumstance. The authority dealing with an application u/s 21 would still be required to consider the question of bonafide need of the landlord and to arrive at a finding thereon. It cannot take the factor stated in Rule 16(2)(d) as conclusive of the controversy. 8. The rules made in an Act are required to be considered for the purpose of considering the question of bonafide requirement. This duty requires the authority to find whether a landlord honestly, sincerely without deceit or fraud needs the accommodation. It does not shut the controversy merely because Rule 16(2)(d) is applicable to a particular case. 9. In this case, however, Rule 16(2)(d) did not apply because Dr. Didar Singh was not unemployed and was doing his medical practice. The learned Additional District Judge was influenced by irrelevant considerations of the need being conclusive of Rule 16(2)(d). As such, the influence of extraneous matters has rendered the judgment illegal. The influence of irrelevant matter was substantial. 10. The next question that crops up for consideration is about comparative hardship. The Additional District Judge erred grossly in deciding that controversy as well. Mainly relying upon the fact of giving notice by the landlord to the Petitioner in 1976, the learned Additional District Judge held that the landlord was entitled to a finding that he was likely to suffer greater hardship by the rejection of the application. It may be true that in 1976 Respondent No. 3 had called upon the Petitioner to vacate the premises but merely because of the said notice, the finding of comparative hardship could not be recorded in his favour. The Additional District Judge was required to consider the evidence of the parties and to give finding thereon. In the affidavit the Petitioner had alleged that no alternative accommodation was available to him where he could shift his business. This affidavit was required to be considered on merits along with the evidence of the landlord. The Additional District Judge was required to consider the evidence of the parties and to give finding thereon. In the affidavit the Petitioner had alleged that no alternative accommodation was available to him where he could shift his business. This affidavit was required to be considered on merits along with the evidence of the landlord. As the question of comparative hardship has not been decided in accordance with law, the judgment of the Additional District Judge is set aside and the appeal is directed to be decided afresh. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Additional District Judge is quashed and the appeal is sent back to him for a fresh decision in accordance with the observations made above and the law. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.