JUDGMENT 1. This is defendant's appeal. 2. The dispute is with respect to a piece of land specified at the foot of the plaint. Admittedly one Ram Tahal was the owner of the house existing on this land. Ram Tahal is dead. The defendants 2, 3 and 4 are his heirs. The plaintiff made purchase from them by a registered deed of sale on May 19, 1966. The suit was instituted for possession and injunction since the defendant no. 1 started interfering with the exercise of possession by the plaintiff. The defendant no. 1 resisted the suit contending that the title did not vest in the defendants 2 to 4 and consequently, they were not competent to make sale in favour of the plaintiff. 3. Both the courts below have recorded concurrent finding to the effect that subsequent to the death of Ram Tahal the defendants no. 2 to 4 have continued to remain in possession over the site of the house. It has been found also that on this basis the defendants 2 to 4 had right to convey valid title to the plaintiff. The suit was accordingly decreed and the lower appellate court has affirmed the same. 4. Learned counsel for the defendantappellant submitted that since the house standing on the disputed land had fallen prior to the date of vesting, the defendants no. 2 to 4 could not claim that the site is to be deemed settled with them under section 9 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Consequently, it is argued, these defendants could not confer valid title to the plaintiff b deed of sale executed on May 19, 1966. The learned counsel has also placed reliance in this connection upon the decision reported in Amrit Ram and others v. Gaud Shanker Singh (1983 All LJ 509). In that case the finding arrived at by this Court was that the heirs of the Zamindar who earlier had his house on the disputed land resided in different village and that they did not retain possession of any kind over the Khandahar. It was held that the land in question was not in use of any of those persons. It is on this footing that it was held that section 9 abovementioned could not be invoked by them. It was held that the land in question was not in use of any of those persons. It is on this footing that it was held that section 9 abovementioned could not be invoked by them. In this case, on the contrary, the concurrent finding of the courts below on the point of fact is that the defendants No. 2 to 4 have continued to exercise their possession over the site despite the house having fallen. It cannot, therefore, be said that this is a case of abandonment or that the site be deemed on this count to have vested in the Zamindar prior to July 1, 1952. 5. Assuming, as the learned counsel for the appellant contends, that the defendants No. 2 to 4 did not have title to the site under section 9 abovementioned, it is also to be considered whether they could not convey possession to the plaintiff on the basis of having possessory title in themselves. It was urged for the plaintiffrespondent that even if the vendors did not have title, they could legally put the plaintiff in possession over the said land and as against every one this possession of the plaintiff will hold good except against one who may claim through a lawful title. The defendant no. 1 cannot be said to have a better claim to retain possession over the disputed land. On account of the possession over the said land having been duly conveyed to the plaintiff on May 19, 1966 they became entitled to retain and obtain the same against the trespasser such as the defendant no. 1. Therefore, even if section 9 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not available to the defendants no. 2 to 4 the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree in their favour if they have possessory title, 6. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, No order as to costs. (Appeal dismissed)