JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This is plaintiffs' appeal. 2. The dispute is with respect to land shown by letters AB C D E F G H in red colour in the map appended to the plaint. The suit giving rise to this appeal,. was brought on June 1, 1963 by Sri Krishan with the allegations that his great grandfather Kan Kumar was the owner of the property comprised in the portion A B C D E Q P F G H. On April 10, 1863 Kan Kumar executed usufructuary mortgage of this land in favour of Bakshi Nand Kishore and put the mortgagee in possession. The plaintiffs father Bhikhan Lal applied under S. 12 of the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 for redemption and possession over the mortgaged property. This was registered as Case No. 2 of 51 in the Court of the Assistant Collector and was allowed in terms of the compromise on Nov. 29, 1952. The applicant obtained possession over the western portion shown in yellow colour by letters E F P Q in the above mentioned sketch map. One Fateh Ali had been the tenant of the portion A B C D Y X shown in green colour situate to the east of the disputed land at the time when the mortgage was executed. During the continuance of the mortgage Gulam Hussain the son of Fatch Ali made sale in favour of Rajjab All and put the latter in possession over a part of the mortgaged land as well. Rajjb Ali executed transfer by sale in favour of Manbhawan Lal (predecessor of defendants Nos. 1 to 3) on Sept. 9, 1900. In the year 1898 Rajjab Ali abovementioned instituted original suit No. 758 of 1898 in the Civil court against the mortgagee and the court of wards managing the estate of the mortgagee for possession and injunction with respect to a portion of the land covered in the deed of mortgage. That suit was decreed in part on Dec. 22, 1899. Sri Krishan the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest were not parties to that suit. That suit was decreed in part on Dec. 22, 1899. Sri Krishan the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest were not parties to that suit. Sri Krishan became aware of those proceedings after redemption of the mortgage and since the possession was not handed over to him in respect of the disputed land, the possession over the disputed land is being retained by the defendants 1 to 3 on the basis of the deed of sale obtained from Rajjab All. The relief claimed in the suit giving rise to the appeal is accordingly possession over the disputed portion shown in red colour. 3. The defendant No. I resisted the suit. It was pleaded that the disputed land does not belong to the plaintiff. On Sept. 9, 1900 Rajjab Ali and his son executed sale in favour of Manbhawan Lal, the predecessor- in-interest of the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and put them in possession. The suit is barred under Article 142/144 of the Limitation Act 1908. It was pleaded also that the decision in Original, Suit 758 of 1898 operates as res judicata against the plaintiffs. The redemption sought was beyond sixty years from the date of the mortgage and hence the same could not be allowed. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit on Sept. 29, 1965. It was found that the disputed portion was included in the property mortgaged. Rajjab All was held to be the owner in Original Suit No. 758 of 1898 filed by him. It was pointed also that the plaintiff had not established that Kankumar or Bhikhan Lal were agriculturists within the meaning of the expression appearing in the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 and also since the application of redemption under S. 12 of that Act was made more than 60 years after the date of mortgage, the order for redemption made on Nov. 29, 1952 by the Assistant Collector was without jurisdiction. As against the defendants 1 to 3 however, it was held that the suit is not barred by limitation since the right to sue accrue to the plaintiff only upon the mortgage being redeemed. 5. On April 22, 1966 the appellate court remanded the issues relating to the mortgagor and Kan Kumar being agriculturists and on the point as to whether the application for redemption was made within sixty years. 5. On April 22, 1966 the appellate court remanded the issues relating to the mortgagor and Kan Kumar being agriculturists and on the point as to whether the application for redemption was made within sixty years. The finding recorded by the trial court on these issues on Sept. 27, 1967 was that both of them were agriculturists and that the redemption sought was within the prescribed period of limitation. Upon the matter coming up before the appellate court, these issues were recast and remanded again for finding by the trial court. Finding recorded by the trial court on 23rd Dec. 1969 was the same as mentioned above. On May 13, 1970 the trial court accordingly, decreed the suit. Against this the defendants preferred the appeal which was allowed on Sept. 25, 1972 by the lower appellate court. It held that the order passed in the redemption proceedings under S. 12 was a nullity since. Kan Kumar and Bhikhan Lal were not agriculturists. The suit was accordingly dismissed by the lower appellate court. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs- appellants submitted that the order dated Nov. 29. 1952 made by the Assistant Collector in the proceedings under S. 12 of the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 was not without jurisdiction and that the defendants- respondents had failed to establish that the order would be disregarded as nullity. The application for redemption was made within the prescribed period of limitation. The right of the plaintiffs to sue against the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 did not accrue until the mortgage had been redeemed. The plaintiff or his predecessors-in-interest were not parties to the Original Suit No. 758 of 1898 filed by Rajjab Ali. The decree passed therein on Dec. 28, 1897 does not affect the right, title or interest of the mortgagor. The defendants 1 to 3 are not entitled to retain possession over the disputed land by virtue of having obtained possession from a trespasser during the continuance of the mortgage executed by Kan Kumar on April 10. 1863. 7. For the defendants-respondents it was urged that the land in dispute was not included in the application made for redemption under S. 12. The order dated Nov. 1863. 7. For the defendants-respondents it was urged that the land in dispute was not included in the application made for redemption under S. 12. The order dated Nov. 29, 1952 is to be disregarded being nullity since Kan Kumar and Bhikhan Lal were not agriculturists and because, it is submitted the application for redemption was made beyond sixty years from the date of the mortgage. The claim of the plaintiff to obtain possession, it was also argued, is barred by limitation, though the defendants may not have acquired title by adverse possession. 8. Taking up first the question whether the disputed land shown in the red colour in the sketch map appended to the plaint by the letters ABCDEFGH was included in the application made for redemption under S. 12 of the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934, the argument advanced for the respondents was that in the plaint it is admitted that this laird was not included. A perusal of the plaint shows clearly that there is nothing of the kind contained therein. Instead the plaintiff has averred in express terms that the disputed land was part of the mortgaged property and that redemption was sought in respect thereof as well. Para 3 recites the 'property mortgaged with reference to the map appended to the plaint as ABCDEQPFG H and the boundaries are as well stated. In para 4 it is recited in clear terms that Bhikhan Lal applied for redemption in respect of the above- mentioned property and further that on the application being allowed possession could he obtained by him in respect only to the portion E F P Q situate to the west and shown in yellow colour. The allegation, therefore, is that the application for redemption was in respect of the entire mortgaged property; the application was allowed as a whole but the possession could he obtained in respect only of a portion of that property. This is explained further in para. 6 stating that Ghulam Husain s/o Fateh Ali (who was tenant of the portion to the east shown in green which is not in dispute) executed sale to Rajjab All including therein a portion of mortgaged land. Rajjab Ali transferred that to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants I to 3. Para. 7 refers to the proceedings in original suit No. 758 of 1898 instituted by Rajjab Ali. Para. Rajjab Ali transferred that to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants I to 3. Para. 7 refers to the proceedings in original suit No. 758 of 1898 instituted by Rajjab Ali. Para. 8 also specifies that subsequent to the redemption of the property mortgaged the plaintiff Sri Krishan learnt of the proceedings in that earlier suit to which the mortgagor or his heirs were not parties. There can be no denial therefore, that in the plaint it is specified that the disputed land was included in the application made for redemption and that the claim of redemption was also granted in respect thereof but actually possession could not be obtained since the defendants I to 3 had stepped in during the continuance of the mortgage. Moreover, certified copy of the deed of mortgage dated April 10, 1863 is also on the record (vide Ex. 15). The property covered therein is specified by the boundaries and a comparison thereof with the boundaries given in the plaint shows that the disputed land was included in the property mortgaged. The application made for redemption ended in compromise between the parties concerned on Nov. 29, 1952. It was urged for the respondents that the claim allowed was in respect only of the property specified in the compromise. That is true no doubt but a comparison of those boundaries with the boundaries specified in the plaint reveals that the disputed land was wholly covered thereunder. In the cross- examination of Sri Krishna (P.W. 1) (the plaintiff) referred to by the respondent's learned counsel in his arguments it was as well maintained that the land now in dispute was also the subject matter of the application for redemption and possession. No portion of the property mortgaged was left over in the proceedings relating to redemption. Both the courts below have, in my view, rightly found that the disputed land was included in the proceedings for redemption under S. 12 aforesaid. 9. It is next to be considered as to what is the effect of the decree obtained by Raj jab All in original suit No. 758 of 1898 on Dec. 22, 1899. Both the courts below have, in my view, rightly found that the disputed land was included in the proceedings for redemption under S. 12 aforesaid. 9. It is next to be considered as to what is the effect of the decree obtained by Raj jab All in original suit No. 758 of 1898 on Dec. 22, 1899. The pleadings of that case and also the judgment are on the record, Rajjab Ali had made purchase from Ghulam Husain, son of Fateh Ali, who was the tenant of the portion situated to the east of the disputed land and not in controversy in the present case. He had sued for injunction and possession against the Court of Wards managing the estate of Bakshi Nand Kishore, the deceased mortgagee. In defence the heirs of the mortgagee admitted the existence of the abovementioned mortgage, dated 10th April 1863. The mortgagor or his heirs were not impleaded as parties to that suit. Consequently the decree passed in favour of Rajjab Ali does not affect adversely the right, title or interest of the plaintiff Sri Krishan who represents the mortgagor. There is no question of that decree operating as res judicata as between the plaintiffs in the present case and the defendants 1 to 3. The law is settled that since the mortgagor is not entitled to any kind of possession ' or enjoyment of the mortgaged property during the continuance of the usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor is not entitled to sue against a trespasser for possession. In Salig Ram v. (Babu) Gauri Shankar Tandan, ( AIR 1935 All 542 ) it was held that : "It is the mortgagee alone who can do so and if the mortgagee does not care to bring such suit for more than 12 years S. 28. Limitation Act, operates to extinguish, the mortgagee's title to the property in possession of a trespasser. The mortgagor's right to sue for possession accrues for the first time when after redemption he is unable to take possession of part of the mortgaged property which he finds to be in possession of a trespasser, who denies his title to it. He becomes entitled to sue the trespasser when he redeems the property and is opposed by the trespasser. He becomes entitled to sue the trespasser when he redeems the property and is opposed by the trespasser. It is clear that the period of limitation for his suit is 12 years to be reckoned from the date of redemption, and the trespasser's possession would not become adverse to him till after redemption." 10. Since the claim for redemption was granted on Nov. 29, 1952 in the instant case, the suit for possession instituted against the defendants I to 3 on June 1, 1963 was within limitation. The defendants cannot claim title by adverse possession nor can they maintain that the plaintiffs have lost title by limitation. The decree passed in suit No. 758 of 1898 does not adversely affect the right title or interest of the plaintiffs. 11. Learned counsel for the defendant- respondents then contended as mentioned above, that the order dated Nov. 29. 1952 is a nullity because the application for redemption was made beyond sixty years from the date of the mortgage and since Kankumar the mortgagor or the applicant Bhikhan Lal were not agriculturists within the meaning of S. 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934. According to S. 12 of that Act the application for redemption could he made by an agriculturist who had made a mortgage either before or after the passing of the Act or any other person entitled to institute a suit for redemption of mortgage. S. 24(1) provided that no application tinder S. 11 or 12 shall be filed unless the applicant was an agriculturist on the date of the application and the mortgagor was an agriculturist at the time of the mortgage. The expression 'Agriculturist' was defined in S. 2(2) of the Act. The relevant cls. are (a). (h) and (c) which read as under : 2.(2) "Agriculturist" means, in all sections of the Act where the term is used : (a) a person who, in districts not subject to the Banaras Permanent Settlement Regulation, I of 1795, pays land revenue not exceeding Rs. 1.000/- per annum: or (b) a person who in districts subject to the Banaras Permanent Settlement Regulation, I of 1795, pays a local rate under S. 109 of the District Boards Act. X of 1922. not exceeding Rs. 1.000/- per annum: or (b) a person who in districts subject to the Banaras Permanent Settlement Regulation, I of 1795, pays a local rate under S. 109 of the District Boards Act. X of 1922. not exceeding Rs. 120 per annum: or (c) a person holding land free of revenue who pays a local rate under S. 109 of the District Boards Act, X of 1922, not exceeding Rs: 120 per annum." 12. In so far as the burden of proof on the subject is concerned, it is evident in my view that this lay upon the defendants- respondents. The reason is that the defendants-respondents asserted' that the order passed in the proceedings under S. 12 is a nullity or without jurisdiction. If no evidence were led on either side, this contention of the defendant-respondents may fail. It is not to be presumed in other words that the order passed as aforesaid was without jurisdiction. 13. The principle is well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can he set up even in collateral proceedings (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ). In order to avail of this rule, it must, however, be shown that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit was instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking on jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it vide Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath ( AIR 1962 SC 199 ). The ground should be such as renders the court incompetent to try the case. The contention that a decree or order is contrary to law does not go to its jurisdiction. If a suit is decreed though barred by time the decree is executable notwithstanding the ellegality, vide Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ). It was held in this case that even assuming that the suit was barred by time, it is difficult to subscribe to the contention that the decree can he ignored as a nullity in subsequent litigation. It was held in this case that even assuming that the suit was barred by time, it is difficult to subscribe to the contention that the decree can he ignored as a nullity in subsequent litigation. It was further observed (at p. 910) : "If the suit was barred by time and yet, the Court decreed it the court would he committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would he entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that it court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot he treated as nullities." 14. Even if the Assistant Collector, therefore, seized of the application under S. 12 proceeded on wrong premise, namely, that the mortgagor (Kan Kumar) and the applicant were agriculturists and that the limitation to claim redemption and possession had not expired, this would mean only that the finding was erroneous. These do not qualify to import inherent lack of jurisdiction. In this collateral proceeding the Court does not sit in appeal on the merits of the order passed under S. 12 by the competent authority. 15. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The question whether the mortgagor and the applicant in this case were agriculturists on the respective dates within the meaning of the 1934 Act and whether the application was made before the expiry of limitation for seeking redemption and possession under the general law is integral part of the issue which the Assistant Collector was authorised to decide in the proceeding under S. 12. This, therefore, cannot be classed as a collateral or jurisdictional fact. This, therefore, cannot be classed as a collateral or jurisdictional fact. In Raman & Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras ( AIR 1956 SC 463 ), the Supreme Court observed : "There may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of same condition precedent or upon the existence of same particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try. 16. In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1962 SC 1621 ), it was stated (at p. 1630) : "The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the.fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists or not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to try." 17. Both the questions, therefore pertain to merits of the proceeding initiated under S. 12 and are not open to be agitated collaterally in this case it being neither an appeal nor revision or review against the order dated Nov. 29, 1952. (See also Hari Swarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad (1982 All WC 790) (1983 All LJ 112). 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand ( AIR 1966 SC 893 ) relied on for the respondents does not advance their contention. S. 16 of the U. P. Act III of 1947 provided that the order made under this Act shall not be called in question in any court. The question arose whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted from challenging an order under S. 3 in all conditions. Their Lordships applied a twofold test, namely, whether the special statute has used clear and unambiguous words indicating that intention and, secondly, whether the Statute provides for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order. Applying these tests it was held that S. 16 was an express provision excluding the civil court's jurisdiction. Applying these tests it was held that S. 16 was an express provision excluding the civil court's jurisdiction. It was observed at page 897 : "The merits of the order are concluded by the decision of the appropriate authorities under the Act and they cannot be agitated in a civil court. But where a plea seeks to prove that the impugned order is a nullity in the true legal sense, that is a plea which does not come within the mischief of the bar created by Ss. 3 (4) and 16 of the Act." 19. An order, it was further held, would be a nullity where it suffers from any fundamental irregularity i.e. "a defiance or non-compliance with the essentials of the procedure" (including the principles of natural justice) and also that the alleged defiance or non-compliance with the essentials of the procedure must be strictly proved by the party alleging it. 20. The principle accepted for' ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is the same in Sree Raja K. Srinivasa v. State of A.P. ( AIR 1971 SC 71 ) (also cited for the respondents) adopting the view taken in Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ). 21. Dealing with Ss. 16/7A of the U. P. Act III of 1947 it was held in Smt. Munni Devi v. Gokal Chand ( AIR 1970 SC 1727 ) also relied on for the respondents that the District Magistrate is conferred with the jurisdiction to direct ejectment, if there is vacancy, but the Legislature has not made the determination of the preliminary state of facts by the District Magistrate conclusive. The rule approved citing Lord Esher in (18881 21 Q.B.D. 313 was : "The legislature may entrust the Tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction and on finding that it does exist, to proceed further to do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a Tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. When the Legislature are establishing such a Tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases, I have mentioned it is erroneous application of the formula to say that the Tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." 22. Under the scheme of the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 19.34, the specially created tribunal i.e. the Assistant Collector is conferred exclusive jurisdiction to determine the maintainability of the application for redemption and possession in the light of S. 12/24 and to pass suitable orders therein. S. 23 (1) provides for `an appeal to the District Judge from an order of the Assistant Collector, but S. 25 contains an express bar to a suit in the civil courts. It says : "No suit shall be brought in any court for any relief which can be claimed by an application under this Chapter." 23. This bar, in my opinion, is complete; it excludes the jurisdiction of civil court to determine whether the applicants the mortgagors were or were not agriculturists on the respective dates. The special statute herein not only created the right to seek redemption and possession; it also provides self contained and exclusive remedy to enforce that right. 24. This apart a note needs also be made of the fact that under Article 148 of the First Sch. to the Limitation Act, 1908 applicable when the application under S. 12 was filed on 17th May, 1951 the limitation prescribed for a suit for redemption and possession of the property mortgaged was sixty years commencing when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.' Under the terms of the mortgage dated 10-4-1863 in this case the right to redeem was to accrue on the principal sum being satisfied by the usufruct. The interest was to be met from the rental realised by the mortgagee. The interest was to be met from the rental realised by the mortgagee. As the courts below, moreover, specified the existence of the mortgage was acknowledged in express terms by the legal representatives of the mortgagee in the course of original suit No. 758 of 1898 filed by Rajjab Ali. The claim for redemption and possession in May 51, under S. 12 was, therefore, not beyond limitation. 25. In relation to the question of Kan Kumar (the mortgagor) having been agriculturist when the mortgage was executed in 1863, the lower appellate court observed that the case is governed by the definition clause in S. 2 (2) (c) read with S. 24 (2) of 19.34 Act. It was said that in the Khewat of 1284 F. Kan Kumar was recorded as proprietor, but there was no entry of land revenue, and hence it should be presumed that he held land free of revenue and that the plaintiff has not shown that Kan Kumar paid land rate under S. 109 of the District Board Act, 1922 less than Rs. 120 p.a. It seems to be overlooked that there can be no question of invoking the provision of S. 109 of the District Board Act, 1922 to a case of the mortgagor who executed the mortgage long back in 1863. It was up to the defendants-respondents, moreover, as I mentioned above, to establish that Kan Kumar or Bhikan Lal, for that matter, paid land revenue in excess of Rs. 1000/- p.a. or that they held land free of revenue but paid land rate in excess of Rs. 120/- p.a. and were, therefore, not agriculturists. The reason being that the validity of the order D/- 29-11-1952 is assailed by the defendants- respondents on this account. This burden they have not discharged. 26. Viewed from any aspect of the matter, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court D/- 25-9-1972 cannot be sustained. 27. The appeal succeeds accordingly and is allowed. The suit shall stand decreed for possession of the portion shown as A B C D E F G H in the map appended to the plaint. Costs on parties throughout.