JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - Secretary, MohakmaAliya, Islamia EKAnna Fund, has directed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying for quashing of the order dated 3. 1.1977 passed by the Controller, U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, opposite party no. 1, contained in Annexure11. 2. The brief facts are that Mohammad Begum, w/o Haji Illahi Bux, resident of 279, Meerpur, Kanpur was the owner of the house. On 241972, it is said that she made a charitable waqf of all her houses mentioned in Annexure1 and appointed herself as Mutwalli for life and, thereafter, Secretary elected by the Managing Committee of MohakmaAliya, Islamia ExAnna Fund (hereinafter referred to as 'petitioner') was to be Mutwalli. On 3. 11. 1974 Mohammadi Begum died and petitioner became Mutwalli of the said waqf. On 2321976 the petitioner applied under Section 29 of the U.P. Muslim waqf Act for registration, a copy of this application is Annexure2. On 1941976 it was ordered that the said waqf be registered and a certificate to that effect was issued, which is dated 2241976, photostat copy of this is Annexure3. The entire property was in occupation of opposite party no. 3 Smt. Qamar Jehan, widow of late Maqsood Ali. The petitioner, on becoming Mutwalli, issued notices to the tenants, requiring them to pay rent to the petitioner. The petitioner, after becoming Mutwalli, terminated the licence of oppositeparty no. 3 pertaining to House No. 279, Meerpur, Kanpur and called upon her to vacate the premises, through a registered notice dated 751976. Opposite parties 3 to 5 gave notice to oppositeparty no. 2, Secretary, U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, requiring him to cancel registration no. 431, after due enquiry, within two months, failing which legal proceedings would be taken against him, at his costs. A copy of this notice was also sent to the petitioner. A reply was sent by the petitioner. This is annexure7. The petitioner received a notice dated 481976 from Superintendent Auqaf, Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, requiring him to produce evidence on 2181976, to prove that the waqf was created by Mohammadi Begum, as it was contended by opposite parties nos. 3 to 5 that Mohammadi Begum had not made any waqf. The hearing continued. The petitioner challenged the maintainability of the objection made on behalf of opposite parties 3 to 5. 3 to 5 that Mohammadi Begum had not made any waqf. The hearing continued. The petitioner challenged the maintainability of the objection made on behalf of opposite parties 3 to 5. The case was fixed for hearing, several times, and, ultimately, vide order dated 3.1.1977 the objections of oppositeparties 3 to 5 were allowed and the registration made under orders of oppositeparty no. 2 was cancelled. It is in these circumstances that the present petition has been brought to this Court. 3. The petition has been resisted on behalf of opposite parties 3 to 5 and counteraffidavit has been filed and the averments made in the petition which are inconsistent to the facts of the case, have been denied. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that once the registration of the waqf had been made, its validity could not be questioned. It has further been argued that on several dates the case was heard but no orders we are passed on the application raising preliminary question regarding maintainability of the application and, thus, the order was passed without providing any opportunity of hearing and, lastly, it was contended that it was an incorrect fact that Secretary was not delegated with powers to order the registration and., therefore, the order suffers from apparent error and deserves to be quashed. 5. It may be mentioned that in the order it had been mentioned that no spot enquiry was made in the case and the registration was made behind the back of the applicants, that is to say, oppositeparties 3 to 5. The ExSecretary of the Waqf Board could order for registration only in noncontested cases by the Waqf Board. The instant case was hotly contested and it was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary to order for registration and, therefore, the registration was void abinitio. In view of the findings, the registration made in favour of the petitioner was cancelled. 6. The learned counsel vehemently argued that once the registration has been granted that order of registration could not be reviewed. He pointed out that there was no power of review and, therefore, the impugned order was manifestly perverse. In view of the findings, the registration made in favour of the petitioner was cancelled. 6. The learned counsel vehemently argued that once the registration has been granted that order of registration could not be reviewed. He pointed out that there was no power of review and, therefore, the impugned order was manifestly perverse. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision given in Second Appeal No. 23 of 1975, Abdul Rahman and others v. waqf Masjid Takia Fatan Sarai, Sitapur etc., decided on 21.8.1980. It may be mentioned that in the instant case while dealing with certain aspect of the case, whether Abdul Rahman, defendant no. 1, was a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice, reliance had been placed by me on the decision Anjuman Islamia 'through Zahur Uddin v. Latafat Ali (AIR 1950 Allahabad 109). In that case it was laid down that if waqf was valid at inception whether the same was acted upon or not, is not all relevant. In this appeal I had occasion to consider various provisions of the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act (Act No. XVI of 1960). 7. Waqf Masjid Takia Fatan Sarai, Sitapur had filed a suit for recovery of possession of house etc., alleging that Amir Ali was the owner and was succeeded by his sons. This was resisted by Abul Rahman and others. The trial court had held that Niamat Ali. was also the son and Smt. Niazan, Smt. Kulsoom and Smt. Ghasitey were the daughters of Amir Ali; Mohammad Ali was not entitled to half share in the house and Mohammad Ali had gifted his share to his wife Smt. Nasiman and Smt, Nasiman came in possession. Smt. Nasiman had executed a will In respect of the house in suit in favour of the plaintiff, and defendant no. I was bona fide purchaser for value. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. The appellate court had concurred with the findings recorded by the trial court but it had, however, further held that defendant no. I was not bona fide purchaser without notice and, therefore, held that defendant no. 3 had not perfected his right by adverse possession and the appeal was allowed. On the basis of these facts the second appeal preferred in this Court was dismissed by me. I was not bona fide purchaser without notice and, therefore, held that defendant no. 3 had not perfected his right by adverse possession and the appeal was allowed. On the basis of these facts the second appeal preferred in this Court was dismissed by me. It was on the basis of the facts and circumstances that I had observed that the rights of the cosharers, even if there were any, got extinguished. The presumption of jointness in the property is foreign and not known under Mohammedan Law and the cosharers ceased to have any right in the property. With respect to the provision of Section 29 of the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act (Act No, XVI of I960) (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') it was observed that since a certificate had been granted under section 29 of the 'Act', if any defendant was aggrieved by the rights of the plaintiff or had any concern with the subjectmatter in suit, the proper remedy was available by reference before the Tribunal constituted under section 70 of the Act. The learned counsel, on the stray observation made in the judgment, argued that there was no power of review in the Board quashing a registration which had been granted in accordance with subclause (7) of Section 29 of the Act. A perusal of the entire judgment would not lead to such an inference. The relevant provisions read as under: Section 29. (1) (2)............. Provided that such applications may be made by the waqif or his descendants or a beneficiary of the waqf or any Muslim belonging to the sect to which the waqf belongs. (3) . (4) .. (5) . (6) .. (7) On receipt of an application for registration, the.Board may, before the registration of the waqf, make such inquiries as it thinks fit in respect of the genuineness and validity of the application and the correctness of any particulars therein, and when the application is made by any person other than the person administering the waqf property, the Board shall, before registering the waqf, give notice of the application to the person administering the waqf property and shall, after affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it may deem fit. (8) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Board under subSection (7) may by application within 90 days from the date of that order, refer the dispute to the Tribunal which shall give its decision thereon. Sec. 31. The Board may direct a mutwalli to apply, for the registration of a waqf, or to supply any information regarding a waqf or may itself collect information and cause the waqf to be registered or may at any time amend the register of waqfs. Sec. 32 (1) In the case of any change in the management of a registered waqf due to the death or retirement or removal of the mutwalli, the incoming mutwalli shall forthwith, and any other person may notify the change in the Board. (2) In the case of any other change in any of the particulars mentioned in Section 29, the mutwalli shall, within three months from the date of occurrence of the change, notify such change to the Board. Sec. 33. (1) The Board may collect or cause to be collected information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be a waqf property and if any question arises whether a particular property is waqf property or not, it may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, decide the question. (2) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Board under subSection (I) may by application within 90 days from the date of such decision refer the dispute to the Tribunal which shall give its decision thereon. 8. While considering the question whether the Board acting through, its counsellor does or does not have the power to review its decision to register the waqf under Section 29, Hon'ble K. N. Goyal, J, in writ petition no. 4053 of 1981 Waqf Mlrza Mohd. Alt Mirzai v. Shia Central Board of Waqf, U.P. and ors. decided on 1.2.82, observed that it is, of course, beyond controversy that if an order is quasijudicial in nature, it cannot be reviewed in the absence of any express provision in that behalf. But this only implies that the decision, if reached after following the quasijudicial procedure cannot be reviewed at the instance of any party to that decision. This principle cannot be extended to mean that a decision reached without notice to a party cannot be reviewed at the instance of such party. But this only implies that the decision, if reached after following the quasijudicial procedure cannot be reviewed at the instance of any party to that decision. This principle cannot be extended to mean that a decision reached without notice to a party cannot be reviewed at the instance of such party. It may be mentioned that the term quasijudicial merely implies that before reaching a particular decision, opportunity has to be given to the party affected and the decision should be free from bias. If no opportunity is given to the person affected, the decision cannot be characterised as quasijudicial qua that person even though it may be quasijudicial qua any other person. It seems that the expression the person administering the waqf property cannot be confined to the person claiming to be administering the waqf property. It should be widely construed as including any person actually in possession or control or administration of the property alleged to be waqf property. From the perusal of the abovementioned provisions it would transpire that notice to a person who is known to be in actual possession or control of the property, even though in the eye of the Board he may be a trespasser or usurper, is necessary before any property can be declared to be waqf. If a person is not given notice then he can certainly ask for review of the matter as held in Mohammad Laiq v. U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf (Civil Revision No. 157 of 1978). This view is supported by a decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Naqshe Ali v. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board (1970 ALJ 715). In this case an application was moved for cancellation of an entry in the Waqf Register maintained by the Board, on the ground that the waqf was registered without notice to them and the properties which are entered as waqf properties were their private properties, the deed of waqf relating to them having been declared as void in a previous suit. The application was opposed by the Mutwalli at whose instance the waqf was previously registered by the Board. The Secretary of the Board to whom the powers of the Board were delegated, treated the application as one for amendment of the WaqfRegister and after holding an enquiry directed the deletion of the entry. The application was opposed by the Mutwalli at whose instance the waqf was previously registered by the Board. The Secretary of the Board to whom the powers of the Board were delegated, treated the application as one for amendment of the WaqfRegister and after holding an enquiry directed the deletion of the entry. Mustafa Ali, the mutwalli, feeling aggrieved, took the matter in reference before the Civil Judge of Bareilly, who was constituted as the Tribunal under Section 70 of the Act. He held the reference competent, having taken the view that the order of the Secretary, deleting the entry in the Waqf Register, being one under sub Sec. (7) of Sec. 29 was wrong. The other side feeling aggrieved, approached the High Court through a civil Revision. Learned K.B. Asthana, J., as he then was, held, that this was not a decision under Section 29, subSection (7) of the Act and, therefore, reference to Tribunal was incompetent. He, however, held that under Section 31 of the Act the deletion of the waqf from the Register had been made and, therefore, the deletion of waqf itself would be nothing but an amendment made in the register of waqf. It was canvassed before the learned Judge that the order of the Secretary was not a final order, it being subject to the revision by the Board, therefore, for that reason also no reference directly could go from that order and the remedy was by way of revision to the Board. The learned Judge, after considering the record, observed that it was not clear from the record whether the Board itself scrutinised the order of the Secretary. It transpires from the written statement of the Board that the Board adopted the said order and treated the same as its own. The learned Judge did not deal with this matter and held that it was only of an academic nature and did not, therefore, dilate upon it. He, however, held that it was not an order under subSection (7) of Section 29 nor was an order under subsection (2) of Section 33 of the Act, and, therefore, the reference was incompetent. He, however, did not quash the order of correction made in the register. Hon'ble K.N. Goyal, J. in Waqf Mirza Mohd. He, however, held that it was not an order under subSection (7) of Section 29 nor was an order under subsection (2) of Section 33 of the Act, and, therefore, the reference was incompetent. He, however, did not quash the order of correction made in the register. Hon'ble K.N. Goyal, J. in Waqf Mirza Mohd. All Mirzai's case (supra) has further held: If the person was not given notice, then he can certainly ask for review of the matter, as held in Mohammad Laiq's case (Supra). Even if it be assumed that the claimants had no right to notice under Section 29 (7), then also they would have a right to ask for review because in that case the proceeding could not be deemed to be quasijudicial qua such claimants. The proceeding, in that event, would be purely administrative, and as such the power of review could be exercised either under Section 31, as held in Naqshe Ali's case (supra), or under Section 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act read with Section 29 (7) of the Waqfs Act or under the inherent power of every authority to undo a wrong done to any party by its (the authority's) own act. This view was expressed after considering various decisions and well settled principles of natural justice. In the instant case, therefore, the Board was competent to review the decision as the earlier order had been passed in flagrant violation of natural justice inasmuchas, no opportunity had been provided to the respondents before earlier order was passed without notice to the respondents. Interference with the impugned order, therefore, on this score is devoid of merit. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner had vehemently argued that he had been denied opportunity to adduce evidence to substantiate that waqf was genuinely created and, therefore, registration order was legal, just and proper. The perusal of averments and various annexures indicates that on behalf of the petitioner in fact an stress had been laid that review application was not maintainable and the said matter should be decided as a preliminary issue. There were certain orders passed by the Board for disposal of the application but ultimately a composite order was passed. The perusal of averments and various annexures indicates that on behalf of the petitioner in fact an stress had been laid that review application was not maintainable and the said matter should be decided as a preliminary issue. There were certain orders passed by the Board for disposal of the application but ultimately a composite order was passed. It also transpires that an application had been moved seeking opportunity to adduce evidence, but since no orders have been passed on that, the petitioner was deprived of the fair opportunity of adducing evidence in order to substantiate his claim about the genuineness of the waqf. There is ample material to show that petitioner had not been given a fair opportunity to put forth his defence to substantiate his claim that genuinely the waqf was made. Therefore, observing the same yardstick we are of the view that Board did not act in consonance with the settled principles of natural justice inasmuch as it did not provide an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence to substantiate his claim whether there was genuine waqf created for purposes of registration. On that score the order passed by the Board deserves interference. It may further be mentioned that the Board has also observed in his order that Secretary had no powers. This finding has not been (sic) would be necessary. 10. In view of aforesaid discussion the writ petition deserves to be partly allowed, in order to facilitate the petitioner to lead evidence to show about the genuineness of waqf having been created and the order registering the waqf was correctly passed. It is, however, clarified that the petitioner would not be permitted to raise any question with respect to the jurisdiction of the Board to review its earlier order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also accepted that no question of jurisdiction of the Board would be urged but fair opportunity to lead evidence be provided to him. 11. The writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed and the order dated 3. 1. 1977 is quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. We further direct that the limited question whether waqf was genuinely created and deserves to be registered will be duly considered after proper notice to the parties, enabling them to lead evidence. Let mandamus issue accordingly. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. (Petition partly allowed)