JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - The respondent No. 2, Ram Swarup, was employed as a waterman on workcharge b sis and later as Mazdoor in October, 1967 in the U.P. Government Roadways Central workshop, Kanpur. On April 30, 1971 he was placed under suspension by the Chief Mechanical Engineer, Central workshop due to being suspected of theft of workshop property. An Inquiry Officer was appointed by the Chief Mechanical Engineer. The Inquiry Officer gave his report on May 3, 1971 finding the respondent No. 2 guilty. A notice to show cause was issued on May 12, 1971, to which the respondent No. 2 submitted reply dated June 5, 1971. On 13th September 1971 he was dismissed from service by the Chief Mechanical Engineer. The respondent No. 2 instituted a suit in the civil court, contending that the dismissal was void and that he was entitled to be treated as continuing in service. Due to the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 coming into force the civil suit abated and the record was transferred under section 6(2), to the Tribunal for adjudication. The Public Services Tribunal gave its decision on May 16, 1977 in favour of the respondent No. 2. The claim of the respondent No. 2 was upheld and it was declared that he continued to be in service. The order dated September 13, 1971 was set aside. Aggrieved, the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and the Chief Engineer have approached this Court. 2. The petitioner's learned counsel contended that the Public Services Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain claim of the respondent No. 2. It was urged that the respondent No. 2 was a workman and hence he is excluded from the purview of the Tribunal. Section 2(b) of the U.P, Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 defines public service as meaning, inter alia, a person in the service or pay of the State Government. The U.P. Government Roadways was indisputedly a transport undertaking run and maintained by the Transport Department of the State Government. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation was constituted with effect from June 1, 1972. According to section 1(4) (e) of the 1976 Act mentioned above, the provisions of that Act other than sections 1, 2 and 6 do not apply to a workman as denned in the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation was constituted with effect from June 1, 1972. According to section 1(4) (e) of the 1976 Act mentioned above, the provisions of that Act other than sections 1, 2 and 6 do not apply to a workman as denned in the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947. It will be noticed that insofar as section 6 is concerned, that applies even in relation to a workman, according to section 1(4) (e). In the instant case the suit brought by the respondent No. 2 abated and the record thereof was transferred to the Tribunal as required under section 6 (2). Therefore, even if it is assumed that the respondent No. 2 is a workman, the application of section 6(2) is not excluded and hence it is not right to contend, in my view, that the claim could not be entertained by the Tribunal. This was also the view taken by Brother 3. This apart, it also appears, as contended for the respondent No. 2 that the said respondent cannot be placed in the category of a workman. It is agreed on both sides that the U.P. Government Roadways, a transport undertaking, was an industry as defined in section 2(j) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as explained by the Supreme Court in the Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Bajappa and others (1978 AIR SC 542). This undertaking was owned and controlled in its entirety by the State Government. The respondent No. 2 was a government servant having the status as such. There was no relationship of master and servant as between the respondent No.2 on the one hand and the State Government on the other, as the Supreme Court laid down in the case of D.C. Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (1952 (2) ANR 256). In order that a person may be said to be a workman, there should be an employment of his by employer and there should be the relationship between the employer and him as between the master and servant In. Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasia v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal and others (writ petition No. 4580 of 1975) decided on 27.1.1977. In order that a person may be said to be a workman, there should be an employment of his by employer and there should be the relationship between the employer and him as between the master and servant In. Bhagwati Prasad Chaurasia v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal and others (writ petition No. 4580 of 1975) decided on 27.1.1977. H.N. Seth, J. held that the petitioner who was a contractor in the Roadways Department of the U. P. Government before the establishment of the corporation, was a workman in the employment of the corporation. Mufti, J., however, took the view that the employees of the earstwhile U. P. Government Roadways were on deputation with the Corporation and they retained the character of Government servants as they had not been absorved in the service of the Corporation. The Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Gupta and others Vs. State of U.P. and others 1980 (6)ALR 81 (DB) at page 90 agreed with the view taken by Mufti J. and held that the employees of the U.P. Government Roadways Corporation were placed on deputation with the Corporation and having not been absorved in the services of the Corporation they continued to be in Government Service and the officers of the Corporation had no authority in law to terminate their services or to compulsorily retire them. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P. ( 1981 AWC 481 ) the majority of the Full Bench of this Court also held that the employees serving in the Roadways having been government employees, continued to retain their status as such upon the constitution of Road Transport Corporation to which they were placed on deputation. The learned single Judge held in U.P. State Electricity Board & others Vs. Dal Chandra Sharma & another ( 1982 AWC 587 ) that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case such as the present brought before it, under Section 6 of the 1976 Act. It is plain that as the claimant retains the status of government servant even while placed on deputation with the State Road Transport Corporation, there can be little doubt that he was a government servant and held the status as such before the Corporation was constituted. It is plain that as the claimant retains the status of government servant even while placed on deputation with the State Road Transport Corporation, there can be little doubt that he was a government servant and held the status as such before the Corporation was constituted. In other words, thus the respondent No. 2 was a public servant, being a government servant during the relevant time and as such the claim brought by him was maintainable before the Tribunal under section 6(2) aforesaid. 4. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the claim of the respondent No. 2 gives rise to an industrial dispute which ought to have been taken to the Labour Court and for these reasons it could not be entertained by the Tribunal. This also is not acceptable. In pith and substance the contention of the respondent No. 2 has been that clause 26 (a) of the Standing Orders on which the petitioners proceeded in this matter is inconsistent with Article 311(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the impugned order is void. The petitioners have taken the stand on the other hand that they could legitimately proceed against the respondent No. 2 in exercise of powers under clause 26(a) of the Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employees (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Clause 26(a)reads as follows: 26(a) Any workman who is adjudged by the employer on examination of the man, if present, and of the facts, to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be summarily dismissed without notice or compensation in lieu of notice, or alternatively to be suspended for a period not exceeding four days. As appearing from this clause, the punishment of dismissal is imposed on the ground of misconduct. Inquiry is dispensed with and the employer is given the power to dismiss the workman summarily. The clause does not even require the service of a charge sheet to the workman concerned, nor does it provide for opportunity being accorded to him. This evidently runs in conflict with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, according to which a person holding a civil post in the State cannot be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry and he has been informed ofthe charges and given reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. This evidently runs in conflict with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, according to which a person holding a civil post in the State cannot be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry and he has been informed ofthe charges and given reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The communication of the charges is basic of the reasonable opportunity envisaged in this provision. (See Khem Chandra v. Union of India & others (1958 AIR SC 300). It is of no consequence whether prejudice has or has not been caused to the person concerned on account of the non service of the charge sheet. Needless to say, the crossexamination of evidence adduced by the Department in proof of the charge cannot be complete or effective in the absence of knowledge, precisely, of the nature and the contents of the charges against the accused person and there is apparent likelihood of the defence being handicapped on this account. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to section 13B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and argued on the basis thereof that since there has been no notification made in the Gazette, the petitioner cannot claim that the Standing Orders are inapplicable to his case. Section 13B says: 13B Act not to apply to certain industrial establishments Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment insofar as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the official Gazette, apply. 6. It will be noticed that the expression that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the official Gazette govern the words or any other rules or regulations and not the rest of the text thereof. The absence of a notification is, therefore, immaterial for the purposes of this case. 7. It was argued also for the petitioners, referring to Management Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. The absence of a notification is, therefore, immaterial for the purposes of this case. 7. It was argued also for the petitioners, referring to Management Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union (1969 AIR SC 513) that in paragraph 18 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the requirement of Article 311 with respect to the second show cause notice cannot be imported in Industrial matters and hence it was submitted, clause 26 (a) of the Standing Orders in the instant case cannot be regarded as inconsistent with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. This again seems to overlook that insofar as the application of the provisions with respect to Government servants is concerned, Article 311 (2) being attracted in such a matter, the conflicting provision contained in clause 26 (a) cannot be given effect to. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel, there was no question of attracting Article 311 since that did not relate to an enquiry in the State or authority or against one in Government service. Clause 26(a), in other words, cannot hold good in its application to a government servant, for the obvious reason of being in conflict with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 8. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Article 31l(2) of the Constitution may not be said to apply to the case of the respondent No. 2 because, it is argued, he was a workman during the relevant period. As mentioned above, it is common ground that the State Government was running the Roadways for providing the passengers transport service in U.P. The respondent No. 2, serving in the Roadways, was a Government employee. He held a civil post in the State in other words. The expression 'civil post' is used under Article 311 (2) in contradistinction from employment in Defence Services. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Employers of Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Company (P) Ltd. v. The Workmen (1968 AIR SC 236) that domestic enquiry could not be equated to enquiries under Article 311 of the Constitution. It may not be overlooked that in the present case we are not concerned with domestic enquiry relating to a private Company or a private concern. It may not be overlooked that in the present case we are not concerned with domestic enquiry relating to a private Company or a private concern. In the instant case the respondent No. 2 was in the service of the State Government and hence the law relating to domestic enquiry conducted by a private Company is inapplicable. Clause 26(a) of the Standing Orders came to be formulated before the Constitution came in force. Ever since the commencement of the Constitution, the said clause cannot stand side by side with Article 311(2) in its application to one in Government service. The petitioner cannot, therefore, take the aid of this clause 26 (a) to maintain the impugned order of dismissal of the respondent No. 2. 9. Lastly, the petitioner's learned counsel urged that the instant case be taken to be governed under the proposition (3) as laid by the Supreme Court in the case of the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others ( AIR 1975 SC 2238 ) and hence the remedy of the respondent No. 2 lay before the Labour Court. The contention is untenable in my opinion. At page 2251 in the case of the Premier Automobile Ltd. their Lordships of the Supreme Court have enunciated the propositions (2) &(3)as under: (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the Industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. 10. The significant fact in the instant case is that the respondent No. 2 does not seek enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the proposition (3) is attracted. On the other hand the respondent no. 2 maintains the impugned order of dismissal passed against him is void, since the same is in contravention of the principles of natural justice which form part of the general or common law of the land. It cannot, therefore, be said that the proposition (3) is attracted. On the other hand the respondent no. 2 maintains the impugned order of dismissal passed against him is void, since the same is in contravention of the principles of natural justice which form part of the general or common law of the land. The contention of the respondent No. 1 in other words is that there could not be summary dismissal made relying upon clause (26) 2 of the Standing Orders & that the dismissal had necessarily to be preceded by enquiry duly conducted and reasonable opportunity accorded to him to adduce his defence, for which the service of the charge sheet was also mandatory. In view of this the respondent No. 2 clearly had an option to prefer his claim before the Labour Court or the Civil Court. The respondent No. 2 opted to take the suit to the civil court from where the record came to be transferred to the Public Services Tribunal in view of section 6(2) of the 1976 Act. In my view the instant case is governed squarely by the proposition(2) above mentioned. 11. For the reasons given above, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. (Petition dismissed)