JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - The opposite party No. 1 was appointed as Assistant Boring Mechanic in the Minor Irrigation Department in a temporary capacity by an order dated December 2, 1965. He was transferred to Gonda by an order dated March 21, 1969 w here he joined on June 13, 1969. Later on he was asked to Join duties at Balrampur Block where he served in the capacity of Assistant Boring Mechanic. It has been said in the instant petition filed on behalf of the State of U. P., that the work and conduct of the opposite party No. 1 at Balrairpur Block was not satisfactory and he failed to achieve the target of the work there. A show'-cause notice was hence given to him as to why his services be not terminated. It is said that the opposite party No. I did not give any reply to the same. The work of the opposite party No. 1 also remained unsatisfactory while posted in Block Katia as Assistant Boring Mechanic. Ultimately his services w;ere terminated by an order dated September 27, 1971. The opposite Party No. 1 challenged that order by filing a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Gonda. During the pendency of that suit the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act was enforced; hence the suit stood transferred to the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. The matter was contested there and the Public Services Tribunal allow ed the claim petition. The State of U. P. being aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal has filed the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition has been opposed and a counter-affidavit has been filed. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the State of U. P. 2. I have gone through all the documents placed before me and I have heard the learned counsel for the State as also the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1. 3. A perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, a certified copy of which is Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition would show' that the Tribunal allow ed the claim petition on the ground that no satisfactory reason was disclosed in the written statement for terminating temporary employment of Virendra Kumar the opposite party No. 1, hence the termination order was not sustainable. The Tribunal in support of its findings placed reliance on The Manager Government Branch Press v. D. B. Belliappa, 1979 (1) SLR 351 . The learned counsel for the State submitted that the opposite party No. 1 in his plaint had clearly admitted that he was informed of the reason of termination of his employment by the authority concerned when he made inquiry from him and the reason was that the work of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory. The learned standing counsel referred me to paragraph 6 of the plaint, a copy of which is Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition. In that paragraph of the plaint the opposite party No. 1 had stated that his services had been terminated by the order dated September 25, 1971 without serving on him any charge-sheet or asking him to show-cause as to why his services be not terminated and when he made inquiries as to why his services were terminated he was told that his work was not satisfactory, that he was in disciplined and was negligent and careless in the performance of his duties and that his reputation was not good; hence he was not fit to be retained in service. He also said in the same paragraph of the plaint that his services had been mala fide terminated. 4. It is now well settled that even a temporary Government servant is entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution where termination involves a stigma or amounts to punishment. However, where the decision to terminate the services of the servant had been taken on the ground of unsuitability of the servant in relation to the post held by him and it was not by way of any punishment and no ssigma was attached to him by reason of the termination of his services, termination could not be said to be vitiated by non-observance of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution (see Commondore Commanding, Southern Navai Area, Cochin v. V. N. Rajan, 1981 (1) SLR 656 . The matter was examined by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Sakoji, 1979 (2) SLR 527 wherein Hon'ble Mr Justice R. S. Pathak made the following observation : "The law, it seems to me is that where the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer Government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex facie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the Government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter, there is no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what is purports to be. Where, however, the order discloses on the face of it that a stigma is cast on the Government servant or that it visits him with penal consequences, then plainly the case is one of punishment. There may still be another kind of case where although the termination of services is intended by way of punishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter. In such a case, if the Government servant is able to establish by material on the record that the order is in fact passed by way of punishment, the innocence of the language in which the order is framed will not protect it if the procedural safeguards contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution have not been satisfied. In a given case case, the Government servant may succeed in making out a prima facie case that the order was by way of punishment but an attempt to rebut the case by the authorities may necessitate sending for the official records for the purpose of determining the truth. It is in such a case generally that the official records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punishment. It is in such a case generally that the official records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punishment. For unless there is material on the record before the Court in support of that allegation, an attempt by the Court to find out from the record whether the termination of service is based on the unsuitability of the Government servant in relation to the post held by him or is in reality an order by way of punishment will in effect be an warranted attempt to delve into the official records for the purpose of determining the nature of the order on the basis of a mere allegation of the Government servant. On a sufficient case being made out on the merits before the Court by the Government servant it is open to the Court to resort to scrutiny of the official for the purpose of verifying the truth." 5. In the case of the Manager, Govt. Branch Press v. D. B. Bellappa (1) referred to by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal in its judgment the Supreme Court laid down : "The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory or for a like reason which marks him of a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service there is no question of the applicability of Article 16." 6. It was also laid down in the same case that "if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated arbitrarily, and not on the ground of his unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service (emphasis supplied), a question of unfair discrimination may arise, notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing [authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the employment. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motive which impelled it to take the impugned action." 7. Similarly in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali 1980 (2) SLR 792, it was laid down : "As the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his service at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service." Referring to the entries made in the Character Roll the Supreme Court observed: "The remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigma." Further it was observed, "In these circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that as the respondent was merely a probationer, the appointing authority did not consider it necessary to continue the enquiry but decided to terminate the services of the respondent as he was not found suitable for the job. It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that in the case of a probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, such a termination of his service is valid and does not attract the provisions of Art 311 of the Constitution." The Supreme Court in Commodore Commanding, Southern Naval Area's case looked into the file relating to the respondent ending with the order of termination of his service and was satisfied that the decision to terminate the services of the respondent had been taken at the highest level on the ground of unsuitability of the respondent in relation to the post held by him and it was not by way of any punishment and no stigma was attached to the respondent by reason of the termination of his services. 8. The facts of the instant case may now' be examined in the light of the principles stated herein-above. Admittedly, the opposite party No. 1 was appointed in a temporary capacity. 8. The facts of the instant case may now' be examined in the light of the principles stated herein-above. Admittedly, the opposite party No. 1 was appointed in a temporary capacity. His services were terminated by giving him one month's notice. He made inquiries from the authority concerned as to why his services were terminated and he was told that his services were terminated on the ground of his unsuitability to the post; that his reputation was not good; that he was careless and negligent in his work and his performance was not satisfactory, vide paragraph 6 of the plaint filed by the opposite party No. 1 himself in the Civil Court. In the written statement the reason as to why his services were terminated was not stated. The Public Services Tribunal allowed the claim petition on the ground that the reason had not been stated in the written statement. The learned standing counsel submitted that the reasons were stated by the opposite party No. 1 himself in the plaint; hence the same should have been considered by the Tribunal. Now in the writ petition the reasons have been specifically stated and it has been averred in the petition that the work of the petitioner was not found satisfactory while he was posted at Balrampur and Katra Blocks. He was also given a notice to show'-cause as to why his work was not satisfactory but he did not give any reply and he remained careless in the performance of his duties. A copy of that notice has been annexed to the rejoinder affidavit as Annexure No. A-l. The Character Roll entries for the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69 have also been annexed as Annexures Nos. A-2, A-3 and A-4 to the rejoinder affidavit. These entries disclose that the work of the opposite party No. 1 was not satisfactory and that he was not taking interest in his work. The impugned order of termination of employment of the opposite party No. 1 is an /order simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma against him. The opposite party No. 1 was informed orally that his services were terminated on the ground of his unsatisfactory work. There was basis for it as is evident from the Character Roll entries and the warning given to him, vide notice dated 25-11-1970. It does not cast any stigma against him. The opposite party No. 1 was informed orally that his services were terminated on the ground of his unsatisfactory work. There was basis for it as is evident from the Character Roll entries and the warning given to him, vide notice dated 25-11-1970. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the services for the opposite party No. 1 were terminated on the ground of his unsatisfactory work and unsuitability and not with a view to impose any penalty on him or to punish him or to cast any stigma against him ; hence even if persons junior to him were retained in service the termination order would not be violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. It is also not violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Public Services Tribunal had failed to apply the law' correctly to the facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order of the Tribunal hence suffers from manifest error of law. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal III, Lucknow dated 11-1-1980, a certified copy of which is Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition, is quashed and the order terminating the services of the opposite party No. 1 is maintained. However, in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.