D.L. MEHTA, J.—By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed that a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued and the second respondent may be ousted from the Office of the Member, Municipal Board, Ladnu. 2. A few facts leading to filing of this writ petition are briefly as under. 3. Respondent No. 3, the Collector, Nagaur appointed the Sub-Divisional Officer, Deedwana as Returning Officer for cooption of one woman member to the vacancy which had occurred in the office of Municipal Board on July 18, 1983. By the same order, the Sub-Divisional Officer was directed to issue a notice to the members of the Municipal Board of a period not less than 7 days before the date of election and to get the notices served on all members and then take proceedings as per law. The Collector, Nagaur (respondent No. 3) annexed a list of members of the Municipal Board to this order. That list did not contain the name of Smt. Dilbahar. Thereafter, respondent No, 2 proceeded to issue a notice calling upon the members of the Municipal Board, Ladnu to co-opt one woman member to fill in the vacancy which had occurred in the office of Co-opted member and as per the notice, the meeting was to be held on July 18. 1983 at 8 A.M. in the office of the Municipal Board, Ladnu. By this very notice, the programme of the election was also notified. Nominations were required to be filed by 3 P.M. of July 16, 1983. The date for scrutiny of nomination papers was fixed as July 17, 1983, the date for withdrawal was fixed to be prior to the beginning of the counting and the polling was to take place on July 18, 1983 between 2 and 3 P.M. The notice (Annexure-3) was sent to all the members of the Municipal Board, except Smt. Dilbahar. Smt. Dilbahar, thereupon, made an application to the Returning Officer requesting him to give a notice of the meeting to her so that she may participate in the election. The Returning Officer vide his letter dated July 17, 1983 informed Smt. Dilbahar that as her name is not included in the list of members received by him, the notice of election was not sent to her. 4. The Returning Officer vide his letter dated July 17, 1983 informed Smt. Dilbahar that as her name is not included in the list of members received by him, the notice of election was not sent to her. 4. Smt. Dilbahar proceeded to file a suit in the Court of Munsif, Ladnu. The plaint was accompanied by an application under O. 39 rr. 1 and 2 and S.151 C.P.C. praying that respondents be restrained from holding the meeting of the Municipal Board, Ladnu on July 18, 1983 for filling the vacancy aforesaid by co-option. On this application, the learned Munsif proceeded to issue a notice to show cause. This notice was taken for service upon respondent No. 2 and also on respondent No.3. It has been alleged that notice (Annexure-5) was submitted to respondent No. 1 at 2 45 P.M. on July 18, 1983 and a request was made that the notice may be accepted but the Returning Officer declined to accept the notice. The elections were conducted on July 18, 1983 and Smt. Sundari respon-dent No 2) was declared elected. However, Smt. Dilbahar was not allowed to attend the aforesaid meeting Hence, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 5. On behalf of respondent No.2, reply to the show cause notice has been filed. Respondent No. 2 has challenged the submissions made by the petitioner. It was submitted that the order Annexure-2 had rightly and validly been issued and the name of Smt. Dilbahar was rightly excluded from the list of members of the Municipal Board who are entitled to participate in and vote for the election-co-option of the lady members to be co-opted. It was further submitted that the election process i.e polling was started at 2 P.M. and was complete and result was declared before any injunction order could be received or served upon the respondents, It was also submitted that the meeting for co-option was started at 8 A.M. in the morning and all the members present had signed the proceedings register, According to respondent No, 2, the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to issue any injunction in view of s. 272(b) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was submitted that no injunction order was ever served upon respondent No. 1 before declaration of the result of the election. It was submitted that no injunction order was ever served upon respondent No. 1 before declaration of the result of the election. It was further submitted that the petitioner is dissident member in the Municipal Board, Ladnu and he and his colleagues could pursu-ade the process server to make any report. It was submitted that the petitioner and other members walked out from the meeting at that stage leaving 12 members out of the 21 members in theme eting. It was further submitted that 12 members casted the vote and out of them 11 votes were in favour of respondent No. 2 and one vote was found to be invalid. It was submitted that Smt. Dilbahar is a co-opted member and in the scheme of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Appointment of Members and Councilors by Co-option) Order, 1959 (for short the Order of 1959), the electrol college for election would consist of the elected members alone. It was further submitted that various clauses of the Order of 1959 clearly show the legislative intent and recognise the position that election for co-option are held after the members of the Municipal Board are elected and it is that electrol college which co-opts the further members. According to respondent No. 2, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the validity of Annexure-2 now as the process of election has been completed and the result has also been declared. 6. I have heard Mr. M. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. D.S. Shishodia, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 7. Mr. M. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that co-opted member is also a lawful member of the Board and so, the name of Smt. Dilbahar was wrongly excluded from the list of voters. He invited my attention to S. (15) of the Act, which defines member as under : "3(15) member means any person who is lawfully a member of a Board". He invited my attention to S. (15) of the Act, which defines member as under : "3(15) member means any person who is lawfully a member of a Board". S. 9 of the Act provides composition of boards S. 9(5) of the Act is as follows : (5) To every board there shall be appointed by co-option in the manner provided for the order published in the Official Gazette- (i) two persons belonging to the female sex if no such person has been returned to the board by election referred to in sub-section (4), or (ii) one person belonging to the female sex if only one such person has been returned to the board by such election, and such co-opted person or persons being treated for all purposes of this Act as elected members or member of the board, and the numbers of seats fixed for that board under sub-section (1) being deemed to be increased accordingly." The process of co-option is really an election with this difference that the electors cannot stand as candidates for co option. S. 34 of the Act deals with Election Petitions. 8. In Nirmala Devi v. Election Tribunal (1), this Court observed as follows:- "The co-option of a person under s. 9(5) cannot be challenged by means of an election petition under s. 34 of the Act. Section 34 does not contemplate the challenging of the co-option of any person by an election petition. It is provided that a co-opted member shall be treated for all purposes of the Act as an elected member. But in the Act two different expressions election and co-option have bean used for two processes of election and co-option and there is no provision that co-option to be treated for all purposes as an election. Further the provision contained in Section 36(2) that a petition can be presented by an elector of the ward goes to show that the legislature did not contemplate that co-option should be challenged by means of an election petition under s. 34 and consequently did not use more comprehensive language." In Ahmad v. Mohammad Umar (2), it was observed as under : "The incurring of disqualification under s. 26 (xiv) of the Act does not automatically amount to removal of a member from Municipal Board or Council because the removal can be made only by the Government under S. 63. But he cannot exercise a valid vote under S. 65 (9) of the Act. Therefore, a Chairman against whom a vote of no confidence is brought can be ensured only by those members who are qualified to vote on that day." Looking to the various provisions of the Act referred to above, the word member defined in s. 3 (15) of the Act should only be construed for the purpose of functioning of the Board and should not be construed for the purpose of the process of election or co-option. S. 3 (15) of the Act defines member as any person who is lawfully a member of a Board. The composition of Board takes place under s. 9 of the Act and before the composition of the Board, the process of co-option takes place in accordance with the provisions of the Order of 1959. For this reason the word member as used in s. 3 (15) means a member only for the purpose of functioning of the Board and not for the purpose of election or co option of the member to be nominated or appointed by co-option in the manner provided under s. 9(5) of the Act read with Order of 1959. 9. Mr. D. S. Shishodia, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has further invited my attention to the Order of 1959 and has submitted that from the perusal of Schedule VI appended to the Order of 1959, it is clear that the intention of the legislature was that for the purpose of co-option of the members of the Board only those members who have been elected are entitled to vote. If other view is taken then the position will be that no co-option can take place before complete composition of the Board under s. 9 of the Act. For this reason, I am of view that for the purpose of co-option the word member referred to in s 3(15) of the Act should only be construed as elected members. I am fortified with the view taken in Motilal v. Collector, Sri Ganganagar (3). For this reason, I am of view that for the purpose of co-option the word member referred to in s 3(15) of the Act should only be construed as elected members. I am fortified with the view taken in Motilal v. Collector, Sri Ganganagar (3). In that case, in para 6 of the report it was observed as under :- "There is a material difference between proceedings for election and proceedings for co-option inasmuch as in an election every elector has a right to stand as a candidate and to vote and no personal notice is served on individual electors. In the case of co-option the right of voting is confined to the elected members on whom individual notice is served under clause 3 of the Co-option Order and the right of sponsoring names is also confined to them. Co-option is also confined to the electors of the female sex." Thus it is clear that in the case of co-option, the right of voting is confined to the elected members on whom individual no ice is served under cl. 3 of the Co-option Order of 1959. The definition of the member as used in s. 3(15) of the Act relates to the members for the purpose of functioning of the Board and it has no relevancy as far as the election or co-option of the member is concerned. 10. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to Atma Singh v. State of Rajasthan (4) and has tried to make out a case that as Dilbahars name was not included, the whole proceedings are vitiated. I have read the judgment of Atma Singhs case (supra). This case does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 11. Mr. Miridul, learned counsel for the petitioner has further cited the case of Lal Chand v. Sohan Lal (5), wherein it was observed as follows: "A temporary injunction under the provisions of Rule 1, O. 39, is not a stay order issued by a Court competent to stay execution proceedings under any provision of the Code authorising such an order. The effect of non-compliance with an injunction issued under O. 39, r. 1 is to make the offender liable to the punishment prescribed in O. 39. The effect of non-compliance with an injunction issued under O. 39, r. 1 is to make the offender liable to the punishment prescribed in O. 39. r. 2(3) and a completed sale in contravention of an injunction under O. 39, r. 1 is not a nullity as being jurisdiction. A temporary injunction under O. 39, r. 1 is not a mandatory direction to a Court, as is a stay order of the kind provided for by the Procedure Code, but is an order directed against a particular person which can be issued only in the circumstances described in r. 1." Lal Chands case (supra) has been approved by this Court in Udai Ram v. State (6). In Udai Rams case (supra), it has been observed as under : "that where a Superior court directs the stay of execution pending in the lower court (O. 41, r. 5 of C. P. Code) the jurisdiction of the lower court to execute the decree is suspended and all proceedings taken after the stay order would be invalid. In this case, however, there was no such order for the stay of execution and the delivery of possession to the complainant in execution of the decree in his favour was not void on the ground that he was restrained by a temporary injunction not to take possession (O. XXXIX, r 2. C. P. Code.)" Mr. Shishodia, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has invited my attention to s. 272 (B) of the Act, which reads as under- "272. Civil Court not to grant temporary injunctions in certain cases: No Civil Court shall in the course of any suit grant any temporary injunction or make any interim order : (a) ............ .......... ......... (b) restraining any person or persons or any board or committee or subcommittee of a board from holding any election or from holding an election in any particular manner." Mr. Shishodia submits that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order restraining the Returning Officer from holding any elections. 1 will not like to express any opinion on this point at this stage suffice it to so say that if the order of the Court below has not been complied with, the petitioner or Smt. Dilbahar had a right to file the contempt petition and the Presiding Officer shall take note of the contempt if any committed. 1 will not like to express any opinion on this point at this stage suffice it to so say that if the order of the Court below has not been complied with, the petitioner or Smt. Dilbahar had a right to file the contempt petition and the Presiding Officer shall take note of the contempt if any committed. When the facts are also disputed, it will not be proper for me to hold that the proceedings were vitiated. 12. Mr. D.S. Shishodia, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has invited my attention to Anup Singh v. State (7) and has submitted that the petitioner attanded the meeting and thereafter, he and his colleagues walked out. 12 members polled out of total number of 21 members. It was submitted that even if it is assumed that all the co-opted members were eligible to vote even then respondent No. 2 secured 11 votes and one vote was declared invalid. Thus, respondent No.2 secured more than 50% votes and there cannot be any prejudice to the petitioner or any of the members including the co-opted members. It was also pointed out that the rival group attended the meeting and when the objections were rejected they walked out. It was submitted that at the time of casting vote, no one can canvass within the polling booth and there was no restriction otherwise in the matter of canvassing. Mr. Shishodia submits that for this reason also, the writ petition fails. I have already held that respondent No. 2 secured more than 50% votes and even if Smt. Dilbahar had casted the vote, the result would not have been different. Thus, there is no prejudice to the petitioner. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs.