JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner was appointed as a Ticket Collector Western Railway, Jaipur on 9-2-1954, by an order dated 5-5-1956 passed by the Regional Traffic Superintendent, Western Railway, Ajmer. The petitioner was placed under suspension, and later on charge sheet dated 3-7-1956 was served upon the petitioner in respect of a scuffle which took place on 5-5-1956 between the petitioner and a passenger. Criminal complaints were filed in the Court of Railway Magistrate and the Railway Police by the said passenger and both the criminal cases were pending before the Railway Magistrate. When the charge sheet was served on the petitioner, the petitioner filed his reply to the charge sheet denying the charges and also brought to the notice of the authorities that regular criminal proceedings are pending in respect of the same matter in the court of law. Hence, no departmental enquiry was held. The Criminal complaint instituted by the passenger against the petitioner was dismissed by the Railway Magistrate by his order dated 31-3-1958 and the petitioner was discharged. On filing the copy of the said judgment the petitioner was taken on duty by order dated 19-4-1958. The petitioner was paid subsistence allowance to the tune of half of his pay during the period of suspension. The petitioner claimed that the authority passing the order of reinstatement should have also ordered for the payment of all the arrears of pay and allowances and also to allow the increments falling due on 9-2-1957 and 9-2-1958, during the period of suspension. Since no disciplinary proceedings were held against the petitioner as the matter was pending in the criminal Court, the petitioner made several representations and received a reply by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Western Railway, Jaipur dated 29-9-1958 that no arrears are payable to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on 1-1-1963 without assigning any reason whatsoever. The petitioner submitted a representation to the General Manager, Western Railway, Bombay, but he did not receive any reply and, ultimately, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) before the Payment of Wages Authority, Jaipur. This petition was dismissed by order dated 3-7-1973 holding that the order of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, as upheld by the Divisional Superintendent, was final. This petition was dismissed by order dated 3-7-1973 holding that the order of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, as upheld by the Divisional Superintendent, was final. The petitioner filed an appeal before the District .Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur which was also dismissed by order dated 3-4-1976 and now the petitioner has filed the present writ of certiorari for getting the orders dated 29-9-1958, 1-1-1963, 3-4-1976 and 17-4-1958 quashed and for issuance of a direction to the respondents to make the payment of all the arrears of pay and allowances, increments and other benefits for which he is entitled. 2. A reply has been filed by the respondents in April 1982 admitting all the averments in the writ petition. But they have submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to any arrears of pay and allowance during the period of suspension and. therefore, no interference is needed. It has further been submitted that the petitioner has alternative remedy by way of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed. 3. The petitioner argued the case in person and Shri Bapna appeared on behalf of the respondents. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted preliminary objection that since the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as held in (1) Bhonwri Singh v. Dy. C M.S. Loco Shops, W. Rly., Ajmer (IL.R 1938 Rajasthan 454) and since there is art alternative remedy, the petitioner is not entitled to approach this Court under its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. He has further submitted that even if the writ petition is held to be maintainable inspire of alternative remedy, this Court cannot go into the merits of the case as it is a writ of certiorari seeking to quash the order of the District judge on an appeal under the Payment of Wages Act and, therefore, unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment of the learned District Judge, no interference can be made nor any relief can be granted to the petitioner in the writ petition, nor this Court can go into the question about the propriety and correctness of the orders dated 29-9-1958 and 1-1-1963. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that since the deduction was rightly made and the order of deduction was passed by the competent authority, the petitioner was not entitled to make an appellation under Section 15 of the Act. Therefore, his application was rightly rejected by the Payment of Wages Authority and, in this connection, he has placed reliance on (2) Gopi Chand v. Western Railway ( AIR 1967 Guj. 27 ) and (3) Ganesh Ram v. District Magistrate ( AIR 1967 SC 356 ). Relying on these two authorities he has submitted that since the order disallowing the payment was passed by the competent authority and in accordance with law there was no cause of action for the claim and, therefore, his application for recovery of arrears was misconceived The Payment of Wages Authority was competent and justified in rejecting his application under Section 15 (2) and the judgment of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur while hearing the appeal under Section 17, of the Act was also justified in rejecting the appeal and confirming the order of the Payment of Wages Authority and agreeing with his view that the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act filed by the petitioner was misconceived and since there is no error much less apparent on the face of the record in the order of the District judge, nor there is any lack of jurisdiction. or any other complaint against the said order of the learned District judge, this writ of certiorari should be dismissed. 6. The petitioner, on the other hand, has vehemently argued that there is no alternative remedy. The order of the learned District judge as an appellate authority under the Act is final and no revision is provided under the Act. The District judge as an appellate authority is a persona designate and, therefore, no revision lies and only writ petition is maintainable. Suit is also barred under Section 22 of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner had no other alternative remedy much less equally efficacious. In the alternative he has submitted that even if this Court conics to the conclusion that a revision was maintainable in the High Court and there was an alternative remedy, there is no bar in entertaining the writ petition. In the alternative he has submitted that even if this Court conics to the conclusion that a revision was maintainable in the High Court and there was an alternative remedy, there is no bar in entertaining the writ petition. The objection regarding alternative remedy should have been concerned at the preliminary stage, that is, at the stage of admission and, once the writ petition is admitted, as in the present case, and is pending for the last more than 6 years, the writ petition should not he dismissed on the ground of existence of alternative remedy. The writ petition should be considered on merits. He has relied on Syed Syfulla v. Supdt. of Police. Shimoga (1932 (2) SLR 145), (5) M/s. New National Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works. Bharatpur (1966 RLW 533) & (6) Purshottam Singh v. The Union of India & Another (1980 WLN 321). He has further submitted that the existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar and the High Court can interfere in the writ petition in a suitable case. In this connection, he has placed reliance on (7) Gyan Devi v. State (AIR 1919 Rajasthan 5). 7. The petitioner then submitted that his suspension order dated 5-5-1956 was passed in violation of Rule 1711. He could be suspended only if a depart mental inquiry of a charge of maximum penalty for which dismissal, or removal from service or a police investigation was pending and since neither of these were pending on 5-5-1956, his suspension order was unjustified, and when the suspension of a railway servant is held to be unjustifiable, the revising or a appellate authority alone can grant him pay for the period of his absence from duty as provided in Rule 2044 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code as it stood at the time of passing order Ex. 1 and, therefore, he has submitted that Ex. P/ 1 is without jurisdiction. 8. After filing of the reply to the charge sheet no further action was taken as the matter was subjudice before the Railway Magistrate. The Criminal case was decided in favour of the petitioner and was decided on 31/3/1958, and therefore, the suspension order should be deemed to have been revoked automatically. P/ 1 is without jurisdiction. 8. After filing of the reply to the charge sheet no further action was taken as the matter was subjudice before the Railway Magistrate. The Criminal case was decided in favour of the petitioner and was decided on 31/3/1958, and therefore, the suspension order should be deemed to have been revoked automatically. However, the order of reinstatement as passed on 19/4/58, it was incumbent upon the authority to pass an order under Rule 2044 and since the suspension was wholly unjustified, the petitioner should have been granted pay of the whole period when he was absent from duty during suspension, There was no justification for withholding the arrears, pay and allowance etc. for the period during which the petitioner remained suspended. This order under Rule 2044 could have been passed either by the revising or the appellate authority and since the order of suspension was passed by the Regional Traffic Superintendent (redesignated as Divisional Superintendent), he alone was competent to pass the order with regard to the payment of arrears of pay and allowance etc. The Divisional Commercial Superintendent being the lower authority was not at all competent to pass such an order Moreover, the impugned order (Ex. 1) does not contain any reason as to why the arrears of pay and allowance etc. may not be paid to the petitioner. No notice or opportunity was given to the petitioner as to why the arrears of pay and allowance may not be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter made an appeal to the Divisional Superintendent. Western Railway; but the Divisional Superintendent also dismissed the appeal vide order date 1/11/1983 without assigning any reason whatsoever. The petitioner has submitted that the Rules in the Railway Establishment Code have statutory force and any breach thereof will render the order ultra vires and without jurisdiction. Reliance in this connection has been placed (8) on Eastern Railway Employees Congress v. General Manager Railway and Others ( AIR 1965 Cal 389 ). The petitioner has also placed reliance on the case reported in (9) Govind Prasad v. Union of India ( 1977 WLN 32 ), in which it has been observed that the order which is to be passed under Rule 2044 is of quasi-judicial nature and it presupposes an opportunity of being heard before an order is made. The petitioner has also placed reliance on the case reported in (9) Govind Prasad v. Union of India ( 1977 WLN 32 ), in which it has been observed that the order which is to be passed under Rule 2044 is of quasi-judicial nature and it presupposes an opportunity of being heard before an order is made. The principle of natural justice postulates that whenever a quasi judicial order is passed, it shall be incumbent upon the authority to give notice to the effected parties, before any order is made against him. Since in the present case, also, no notice was given, nor any opportunity afforded to the petitioner before passing the order under Rule 2044 the same is invalid and void being in violation of principles of natural justice. Reliance, in this connection, has also been placed on (10) B. D. Gupta v. State of Haryana (1973 SLJ 25) and (11) Gopal Krishna v. State of M P. ( AIR 1968 SC 240 ). The petitioner further submitted that since the impugned orders Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 do not contain any reasons and are not speaking orders, the orders ore fable to be quashed Reference in this connection has been made to (12) Kripal Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (1980 CI J 598), (13) H. M. Ahmed v. State (AI K 1970 All 467) and (14) Ajantha Industries v. Central Board of Direct Taxes ( 1976 (I) SCC 1001 ) 9. The petitioner has submitted that since the inquiry was dropped and ultimately no inquiry was held and he was acquitted in rite criminal case, he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the suspension period. In this, connection he has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in (15) Govind Prasad v. Union of India (1980 (2) SLR 529), wherein relying on Rule 2044 of tic Railway Establishment Code it has been held that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances during the period of suspension on his reinstatement. He has also placed reliance on (16) Mohan Lal v. Union of India and Others (1981 (2) SLJ 489). 10. He has also placed reliance on (16) Mohan Lal v. Union of India and Others (1981 (2) SLJ 489). 10. He has also placed reliance on a circular No. EDAR/308/14/7 dated 26/3/1974, issued by the General Manager, Western Railway wherein it has been clarified that in case when the inquiry is dropped for one reason or the other the suspension period cannot be treated as period "not spent on duty" as the dropping of an action implies that the employee is exonerated in which case the period will have to be treated as duty for all purposes. 11. I have considered the arguments of each party and given my most anxious consideration to the whole matter. The petitioner was posted as TTE at Jaipur Rly. Station, and a complaint was filed against him by a lady passenger Mrs. Vidhya Devi saying that the petitioner misbehaved with her and therefore, he was suspended on 515/1956 itself. The lady then filed a complaint against the petitioner in the Court of Railway Magistrate, Jaipur under Section 509, 323 and 342, IPC. The petitioner trade representation that since a complaint has already been filed and the matter is pending in a criminal court, departmental inquiry should not be held against him and, therefore, no inquiry was held and ultimately the petitioner was discharged by the Railway Magistrate by his order dated 31-3-1958. The petitioner was thereafter reinstated by order dated 19-4-58; but he was denied the payment of his remaining wages during the period of suspension and other allowance. His representations were of no avail. Therefore, the petitioner moved an application to the Payment of Wages Authority, but the same was also rejected and his appeal to the District judge was also dismissed. The petitioner has relied on a decision of this Court reported in Govind Prasad v. Union of India ( 1980 (2) SLR 529), in which this Court has held after referring and relying an Rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code and the observations of the Gujarat and Mysore High Courts that if any employee is reinstated rifer suspension and no inquiry is held and is acquitted of the criminal charges by the Court, he is entitled to full pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled if he was never suspended. In view of this authority I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single judge of this Court and, therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowance during the period of suspension after his reinstatement. The only question which remains to be examined in the present cane is whether this Court in a writ of certiorari could grant him this relief. The petitioner had approached the Payment of Wages Authority and his application was rejected. Then he appealed to the District Judge which was also dismissed and the petitioner has challenged these orders by this writ of certiorari. In the prayer clause, he has also prayed that the order denying him full pay and allowance should also he quashed. The learned counsel for tire respondent has vehemently argued that the High Court should not go beyond the order of the learned District judge dismissing his appeal and if there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the learned District Judge, then only this Court can interfere in its writ jurisdiction. He has also submitted that a revision lies in tire high Court against the order of the learned District, Judge and since tie petitioner had an alternative remedy, the High Court should not interfere in the writ jurisdiction. In my opinion, since there is no appeal or revision provided under the Payment of Wages Act it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of filing a revision in the High Court and even if it be held that there is an alternative remedy. I am of the opinion that if the order is illegal and against law, there is no legal bar in exercising the writ jurisdiction for doing justice. It was not necessary for the petitioner to have moved to the Payment of Wages Authority, and his application was misconceived and so also the appeal before the District Judge. Merely because the petitioner had approached a wrong forum and had been unsuccessful there, justice should not be denied to him. As far as possible, the anxiety and endeavour of the Court should be to remedy the injustice when it is brought to its notice rather than denying the relief to the petitioner on purely technical and procedural grounds. Merely because the petitioner had approached a wrong forum and had been unsuccessful there, justice should not be denied to him. As far as possible, the anxiety and endeavour of the Court should be to remedy the injustice when it is brought to its notice rather than denying the relief to the petitioner on purely technical and procedural grounds. More ever, the order passed by the Authority denying payment or full wages and allowance is laconic and did not assign any reason whatsoever. An order to be passed under Rule 2044 is a quasi-judicial in nature and presupposes affording of an opportunity of being heard, and it was incumbent upon the authority to give notice to the petitioner before an order was made against him and, admittedly, in the present case, no notice was given to the petitioner, nor he was given an opportunity of bring heard as to why his remaining pay and allowance for the suspension period should not be withheld. Even the appellate authority also did not assign any reasons for rejecting his appeal and that the order is also laconic and against the principles of natural justice as he was not afforded any opportunity of hearing even by the appellate authority. I am supported in my view by the earlier decision of this Court reported in Govind Prasad v. Union of India ( 1977 WLN 32 ). Rule 2044 of the Code has a force of law and any violation thereof will make the order invalid and illegal More so, when there is a clarification as well issued by the General Manager in its circular dated 26/8/1974. In view of this, I am of the view that the writ petition should be allowed and the order dated 29/9/1958, as also the order dated 1/1/1963, Annexures 1 and 2 respectively cannot be upheld and deserve to be quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the remaining pay and allowance during the period he remained under suspension before he was reinstated. However, in the circumstance of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. *******