Who is an 'agent' within the meaning of election law is required to be sorted out in connection with Issues No. 3 and 4 which have been taken as preliminary issues. The main sub­mission relating to these two issues is that the allegations of the petitioner, even if taken as correct donot constitute corrupt practice under section 123 (2) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, for short, the Act. The election petitioner has cited a good number of instances relating to corrupt practice falling under sub-section (2) of section 123 of the Act, on the strength of which Issues 2 (a) to 2 (i) were framed. In most of them the allegation being that the workers of respondent No. 1 or Congress (I) workers had threatened supporters of the petitioner, a point has been urged that the workers or supporters cannot be regarded as agents of respondent No. 1. It may be pointed out that though sub-section (2) speaks of undue influence on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of "any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent", the question is whether the allegations in the issues with which we are concerned (the averments forming part of issues 2 (b) and 2 (i) having involved respondent No. 1 also, these were rightly left out by Shri Kataki from his address to the Court), can be attributed to something done by the agent of the retur­ned candidate as it is not the case of the petitioner that any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent had interferred with the free exercise of any elec­toral right. We have, therefore, to see whether the person who had allegedly indulged in undue influence can be said to be the agent of the candidate. 2. There is no denial that because of the Explanation (1) to section 123, the expression "agent" has a wider meaning than it has under the law of contract inasmuch as this Explanation reads : "In this section the expression 'agent' includes an elec­tion agent, a polling agent and any person who is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the election with the consent of the candidate". Admittedly, the persons to whom the acts of undue influence have been abscribed are not the election agents or polling agents of respondent No. 1. It has therefore to be seen whether they come within the fold of "any person who is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the election with the consent of the candidate". 3. Shri Kataki submits that for a person to become an agent within the third category mentioned in the Explanation some consent of the candidate is essential. Of course, the con­sent need not be express but could be implied as well. Reference has been made in this connection to Abdul Majeed vs. Bhargavan, AIR 1963 Kerala 18; Sarla Devi vs. Birendra Singh, AIR 1961 Madhya Pradesh 127, and Badri Narain vs. Kamdeo Prasad, AIR 2961 Patna 41, in which decisions it has been held that consent is part of the make-up or the constitution of a person as an agent even under the enlarged definition of 'agent' in the elec­tion law. It is stated that the mere fact that the acts of other persons helped and supported the election campaign would not be enough in this regard. (See para 50 of Sarla Devi supra, Shri Kataki states that the aforesaid decisions have received the general approval of the Supreme Coart in S. N. Balakrishna vs. Fumandez, AIR 1969 SC 1201 as would appear from what has been stated in para 47 of the judgment. It is reminded that it is common experience that some 'volunteers' take much interest in the election of a particular party or person and it would be risky to regard them as agents of the candidate as some serious consequences may follow if this view is adopted if nothing else the candidate would be guilty of corrupt practice for anything done by them within the purview of section 123 (2) of the Act. Though his election may not be set aside on this ground without anything more, the evil consequences of induldging in corrupt pract­ice may follow. 4. It cannot, however, be said, agrees Shri Kataki, that a person could be regarded as an agent under the enlarged meaning only if there is something to show that he had been so appoin­ted by the candidate. 4. It cannot, however, be said, agrees Shri Kataki, that a person could be regarded as an agent under the enlarged meaning only if there is something to show that he had been so appoin­ted by the candidate. This would be apparant from Lalsing vs. Vallabhdas, AIR 1967 Gujarat 62, a decision referred by Shri Kataki himself, where some persons who were members of the propongada committee of the candidate, or incharge of the printing arrangement of the election literature were held to be agents. Of course, this was so held as no doubt was left in the mind of the Court that these persons were acting with the consent of the candidate. 5. Reliance is ultimately placed by Shri Kataki on H. C. Mahanty vs. Surendra, AIR 1974 SC 474, where Biju Patnaik was not taken as an agent of the returned candidate despite personal intimacy and clear general political identification between the two. It was stated in this connection that agency cannot be inferred from remote causes like mere close friendship or other relationship. 6. Shri Choudhury, appearing for the petitioner, would himself rely on Fernandez wherein Shri Atrey, the editor of 'Maratha' and Chairman of Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti was accepted even by the candidate as his agent. The learned counsel, would however like to rely more on a Bench Judgment of this Court in Nanigopal vs. Abdul Hamid, 19 ELR 175, the ultimate deci­sion wherein had been approved by the Supreme Court in Abdul Hamid vs. Nanigopal, 22 ELR. 358. Dealing with the aspect with which we are concerned it was stated by this Court as below :- "For the purpose of the Act, the expression "agent" has a much wider connotation than it is ordinarily understood to have under the law of contract. Anybody who act in furtherance of the prospects of the candidate election may be said to be an agent of the candidate concerned provided he does so with the consent of the candidate. This consent may not be necessarily an express consent and no written document is necessary. It may be gathered and implied from the circumstances of the case. Anybody who act in furtherance of the prospects of the candidate election may be said to be an agent of the candidate concerned provided he does so with the consent of the candidate. This consent may not be necessarily an express consent and no written document is necessary. It may be gathered and implied from the circumstances of the case. Under the Act, an "agent" includes not only a person, who has been speci­fically engaged by the candidate or his election agent to work for him in the election, but also a person, who does in fact work for him and whose services have been accepted by the candidate. Thus an association of persons OF a society or a political party and its prominent members who set up the candidate, sponsor his cause and work to promote his election, may be aptly called the "agent" of the candidate for election purposes. If it is found that the person concerned was merely an officious intermeddler in the election or a mere volunteer, then of course the candidate cannot be said to have any responsibility for his action, even though the person may have acted for the candidate's benefit and with a view to advance his interest in the election". (Emphasis supplied) Thus, even on the strength of Nanigopal, it cannot be held that any and every person acting to advance the interest of the candidate would be an agent. A "mere volunteer" has been expressly held not to be agent. As to "anybody" who acts in furtherance of the prospect of candidate, it was stated that he would be an agent provided he does so with the consent of the candidate. Of course, in case of prominent members of a poli­tical party, this would not apply. 7. Shri Choudhury has finally referred to Trilok Singh vs. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 ELR 234, which is a decision of three members of Election Tribunal, Lucknow. Reference to this case is for the reason that many English decisions have been set out in the judgment which, according to Shri Choudhury, may throw-some light from across the seas. Of these, we may first note the views quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. Reference to this case is for the reason that many English decisions have been set out in the judgment which, according to Shri Choudhury, may throw-some light from across the seas. Of these, we may first note the views quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 12-page 245, para 501 wherein it has been observed that : "a candidate's liability under the Parliamentary common law of agency depends upon a peculiar principle special to this matter and distinct from the principle prevailing in the criminal or civil law of agency. The candidate's liability under this principle may extend to the acts of every person who is de facto a member or the staff which is conducting the election and whose services are directly or indirectly recognised or made use of by the candidate or his election agents, whether such person be paid or unpaid. The crucial test is whether there has been employment or authorisation of the agent by the candidate to do some election work, or the adoption of his work when done......Canvassers-those who ask persons to vote or refrain from voting-may or may not be agents; but canvassing is one of the things from which agency may be inferred. The mere fact of canvassing is not conclusive, especially if the candidate is himself carrying on a personal canvass. But proof of canvassing at the request, express or implied, of the candidate is sufficient to establish agency." (emphasis supplied) 7. Reference may then be made to the case of Bewdley, T O'M & H 16, where it was laid down: "No one can lay down a precise rule as to what would constitute evidence of being an agent. Every instance in which it is shown that, either with the knowledge of his agents who had employment from him, a person acts at all in furthering the election for him, in trying to get votes for him is evidence tending to show that the person so acting was authorised to act as his agent. It is by no means essential that it should be shown that a person so employed in order to be an agent for that purpose, is paid in the slightest degree; or is in the nature of being a paid person". 8. We may also note with profit what was stated in Borough of Westbury, 3 O'M & H 78. It is by no means essential that it should be shown that a person so employed in order to be an agent for that purpose, is paid in the slightest degree; or is in the nature of being a paid person". 8. We may also note with profit what was stated in Borough of Westbury, 3 O'M & H 78. This is what Losh, J. had to say there: "An agent is a person employed by another to act for him, and on his behalf, either generally or in some parti­cular transaction. The authority may be actual, or it may be implied from circumstances. It is not necessary, in order to prove agency, to show that the person was actually appointed by the candidate. If a person not appointed were to assume to act in any department of service as election agent and the candidate accepted his service as such, he would thereby ratify the agency, so that a man may become the agent of another in either of two ways by actual appointment or by recognition and acceptance of his services". 9. Finally, the following observations in Wigan's case, 4 O'M & H I may also be set out: "It has been held that canvassing with the authority of the candidate or the candidate canvassing with him is proof of agency although there may be exceptions to that, for instance where canvass is limited or where a person is told only to go and sse one or two particular men and ask them for votes. There may be cases when canvassing would not necessarily involve agency but general canvassing has always been held to be strong evidence of agency and evidence which requires a very strong case to rebut it if it can be rebutted". 10. In Bewdley's case, Lopes, J. had dealt with the question as to when a candidate can be held liable for activities under­taken by a political party or association. In that case a conten­tion has been advanced that as there was no privity between the candidate and the association/party and that as the active members; of the association/party were not his agents, the candidate was not responsible for their illegal acts. In that case a conten­tion has been advanced that as there was no privity between the candidate and the association/party and that as the active members; of the association/party were not his agents, the candidate was not responsible for their illegal acts. This contention was not accepted and it was pointed out that in such a case a candidate could escape his responsibility attached to the acts of an agent by employment of the active members of political party or asso­ciation instead of individual agent (s). It was opined that this would make the Corrupt Practice Act a dead letter and would amount to sanctioning the most effective system of corruption. It may be further observed that a case for agency of the poli­tical party could well be built up on the ground that the candi­date having utilised all the power, influence and machinary of the party for his success must be deemed to have agreed to the party being his agent. 11. As we are not concerned in the present case with any political association as distinct from a political party, it is not necessary to advert to the question as to when such an association or its office became agents, which aspect has been dealt with in some of the English decisions noted in Triloki Singh's case (supra). 12. From what has been stated above the following conclu­sion may be arrived at on the question as to when a person be regarded as an agent of the candidate: (1) An election agent or polling agent could undoubtedly be an agent. (2) Any other person specifically appointed by the candidate to do any election work would also be an agent. (3) Payment of any kind is however not necessary to regard an employed person as an agent. (4) Every person who is a de facto member of the staff who is conducting the election, and whose service is directly or indirectly recognised or made use of by the candidate would be an agent. (5) The authorisation to act on behalf of the candidate may be express or it may be implied from circumstances. If the candidate accepts service of the person concerned, the same would amount to rectification of the agency. (6) Canvassing with the authority of the candidate or along with the candidate is a good proof of agency, though there may be exception to this rule. If the candidate accepts service of the person concerned, the same would amount to rectification of the agency. (6) Canvassing with the authority of the candidate or along with the candidate is a good proof of agency, though there may be exception to this rule. Thus canvassers may or may not be agents, though canvassing is one of the things from which agency may be inferred. (7) The political party setting up the candidate would be an agent of the candidate. (8) Prominent members of the political party would also be agents. (9) A mere volunteer would not however be an agent nor an officious intermeddler. (10) Anybody would be agent if he does any act in furthe­rance of the prospect of the candidate with the latter's consent. (11) Agency cannot be inferred from remote causes like perso­nal intimacy, close friendship or general political identi­fication. 13. This enumeration is not exhaustive but does being home the point at issue. Let it now be seen whether the persons who were alleged to have directly or indirectly interferred with the free exercise of the electorate right as averred in the petition can be regarded as agents of the returned candidate. We have to examine this aspect with reference to Issues 2 (c), (d), (f), (g) (h), (J) (k) and (1), (Issue 2 (c) is not being tested on the above touchs alone because the averments relating thereto speak of the threatening by agents of respondent No. 1). In so far as Issues 2 (c), (d) and (f), (g) the averment being that the alleged acti­vities were undertaken by (Congress (I) workers and it being not the case of the petitioner that these workers were prominent members of the party, it has to be held that they cannot be regarded as agents of respondent No. 1. The allegation as set out in these issues, therefore, do not make out a case under section 123 (1) of the Act even if the allegations be true. These issues, therefore, cannot go for trial. 14. As to Issues 2 (g), (h), (j), (k) and (1) the averment is that workers of respondent No. 1 had indulged in the alleged activities. If these persons had been engaged by respondent No. 1 or if their services had been recognised or accepted by the retur­ned candidate they would definitely be his agents. 14. As to Issues 2 (g), (h), (j), (k) and (1) the averment is that workers of respondent No. 1 had indulged in the alleged activities. If these persons had been engaged by respondent No. 1 or if their services had been recognised or accepted by the retur­ned candidate they would definitely be his agents. As such, without knowing something further in this regard it cannot be held at the threshuld that they cannot be regarded as agents of res­pondent No. 1. So these issues have to got for trial and can­not be struck either for want of material facts or because the allegations do not come within the fold of section 123 (2) of the Act. 15. Something more remains to be said about Issue 2 (j). It has been contended by Shri Kataki that threatening of polling agents of the petitioner would not attract the mischief of section 123 (2) as the discharge of functions by polling agents is not covered by the expression 'electorate right' as defined in section 79 (d) of the Act. This expression as defined in that section means "the right of a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting at an election". I am inclined to think that the right to stand would include the right to canvass, to conduct the election and to keep watchful eye on the proper-exercise of voting right. As polling agents do assist the voters in exercising their right and as they also keep an eye as to the voting by proper person, interference with the work of polling agents would amount to interference with the free exercise of 'elec­torate right'. It may be stated that this is tentative view and it would be open to the respondents at the time of final hearing of the petition to persuade the Court to take a different view. 16. The result is that Issues No. 3 and 4 are only partly answered in favour of respondent No. 1. The part victory sees striking off Issue 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (f). The remaining sub-issues under Issue No. 2 however remain unaffected.