M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, a former Sub Inspector of Police has questioned the legality of the joint disciplinary proceedings instituted against him in which originally, punishment of reduction to the rank of Asst. Sub-Inspector of Police for a period of 5 years was imposed, and, which has been subsequently modified in appeal to a period of 1 year and in revision to one of reduction by one increment in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police for a period of 1 year. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follows : A Departmental inquiry was instituted against the petitioner who was a Sub-Inspector of Police and another, a head constable, by an order made by the Supdt. of Police, KGF, The Dy. Supdt. of Police was appointed as the Enquiring Authority. On the basis of the inquiry report, in which the petitioner was found guilty, the Dy. IGP by his order dt. 24 12 1975 (Ex. 'b') confirmed the finding on the charges and imposed the punishment of reduction to the rank of Asst, Sub-Inspector of Police for a period of 5 years. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the IGP. The Appellate authority by its order dt. 22 6-1976 (Ex. 'c') modified the punishment of reduction to the rank of Asst. Sub-Inspector of police for a period of I year. The petitioner preferred revision petition before the government. The Government, in revision modified the punishment and imposed penalty of reduction by one increment in the rank of Sub Inspector of Police for a period of 1 year, without affecting his further increments. ( 3 ) VARIOUS contentions are raised in the petition. One of them is that the Superintendent of Police had no authority to institute joint inquiry against the petitioner and another Head Constable in view of r. 8 of the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965. ( 4 ) THERE is no dispute that the Supdt. of Police, KGF, instituted the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner who was a Sub-Inspector of Police and another head Constable by same Subbarayachari. There if also no dispute that the Supdt. ( 4 ) THERE is no dispute that the Supdt. of Police, KGF, instituted the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner who was a Sub-Inspector of Police and another head Constable by same Subbarayachari. There if also no dispute that the Supdt. of police has the power to impose some of the minor penalties against the Sub-Inspector of Police, but, still the question that is raised is a joint inquiry against a Sub-Inspector of Police and another Head Constable could have been instituted only by an officer who had the power to impose the penalty of dismissal from service against both of them. This contention is based upon the wording of R. 8 of the rules, which provides for a joint enquiry. The said rule states: "where two or more police officers are concerned in any case, the authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such police officers may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding". Therefore the only authority which could have instituted a joint disciplinary proceeding against a Sub-Inspector of Police and another Head Constable was either the Dy. IGP or any other higher authority,, because it is only the dy. IGP and higher authorities who have the powen to impose the penalty of dismissal from service againvt both the officials. ( 5 ) THIS question is directly covered by an earlier judgment in Rachaiah v. Dy. IGP (1 ). ( 6 ) SRI S. V. Narasimhan, learned High court Government Pleader submitted that in the said judgment attention of the Court was not drawn to R. 433 (5) of the Kar. Police Manual. The said rule reads as follows :"433 (5) Joint inquiry :- Where more than one police officer of different ranks are involved in a single default and it has been decided to hold a joint inquiry against all such accused Police Officers, the disciplinary authority in respect of the accused Police Officer holding the highest rank or post, should appoint the inquiring Authority in respect of all accused police Officers. In such cases, sufficient number of copies of the order should be prepared for service on all the accused Police Officers as required under sub-Older 4 above". On the wording of the above rule, he contended that as undoubtedly the Supdt. In such cases, sufficient number of copies of the order should be prepared for service on all the accused Police Officers as required under sub-Older 4 above". On the wording of the above rule, he contended that as undoubtedly the Supdt. of Police was the disciplinary authority, though he had the power to impose only minor penalties aginst a Sub Inspector of police, he could have instituted the present inquiry. The 'police Manual' is framed by the IGP under S 21 of the Act. It cannot override the provisions of the Rules framed by the Government under Ss. 23, 24 and 25 read with Cl. (b) of S. 163 of the act. Further I see no conflict between paragraph 433 and Rr 8 of the Rules. R. 8 specifically provides that a disciplinary authority who has the power to impose penalty of dismissal from service against more than one police officer involved in case, can alone institute a joint inquiry. Paragraph 433 (5) of the Police Manual states that the highest among the disciplinary authorities in respect of the accused police Officers of different ranks can institute disciplinary proceeding. The said paragraph does not say the disciplinary authority who has the power to impose minor penalty in respect of the higher officer involved, can institute a disciplinary inquiry. Therefore, the expression 'disciplinary authority' u?ed in paragraph 433 (5) must be given a meaning which does not come into conflict with R. 8 of the Rules. Therefore, the expression disciplinary authority used in paragraph 433 (5) means that the disciplinary authority in so far it relates to the institution of a joint inquiry, is that authority which has the power to impose the penalty of dismissal on all such police officers. In the circumstances, I hold, the institution of disciplinary proceeding by the supdt. of Police was not valid in law and therefore, the entire proceeding from inception is illegal and invalid. Accordingly, I make the following order : (i) Rule made absolute ; (ii) The impugned orders of the Dy. IGP (Ex. 'b'), of the IGP (Ex. 'c') and of the State Government (Ex. 'd') are quashed. (iii) The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing from the quashing of the orders. --- *** --- .