Judgment :- 1. The petitioner owns a few acres of land in Sy. No. 154 of Mekkapala Kara, Vengoor East Village, Kunnathunad Taluk. The adjoining property on the eastern side, also in Sy. No. 154, belongs to his brother. In the year 1980, the petitioner came to know about a proposal to open up a "field channel" through the above items of properties, as part of the distribution system of the Periyar Valley Irrigation Project. According to the petitioner, such a channel was totally unnecessary for irrigation purposes; the real idea of the authorities was to put up a wide bund fit for vehicular traffic, in order to benefit some influential persons on the eastern side. The proposal was only an excuse for raising such a bund. He therefore came to this Court with O.P. No. 2793/1980, complaining that S.12 and 13 of the Irrigation Act were not being complied with. The O.P. was however dismissed, on the view that the aforesaid provisions were not intended to protect owners whose lands were likely to be acquired. Safeguards and protections in the matter of land acquisition were to be found in the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, it was suggested; and it was indicated that the petitioner could wait till proceedings were initiated under that Act. 2. The petitioner was then expecting to get a notice under S.3 of the Land Acquisition Act, read with R.3 of the Land Acquisition Rules, if the authorities were intending to proceed with the acquisition. But no such notice was served on him. On 8-12-1982, however, the Land Acquisition Officer issued a notice to the petitioner directing him to surrender 16.45 acres of land. The notice made reference to notifications made in two newspapers in September, 1982, in connection with the acquisition. On enquiries thereafter, the petitioner came to learn that "some order" had been passed by the District Collector under S.19(4) of the Act. 3. The present writ petition is directed against the whole of the acquisition proceedings. It is contended that many of the provisions of the Act have not been complied with. The more formidable contention is against the manner in which the District Collector has exercised power under S.19(4). 4. The Special Tahsildar (L. A.) has filed a counter-affidavit, setting out the following facts. It is contended that many of the provisions of the Act have not been complied with. The more formidable contention is against the manner in which the District Collector has exercised power under S.19(4). 4. The Special Tahsildar (L. A.) has filed a counter-affidavit, setting out the following facts. He initiated action on receipt of a requisition from the Executive Engineer, P. V. I. Division No. I, for acquiring land required for constructing a field channel from the Paneli Branch canal of the project. Notification under S.3(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the 'Mathrubhumi' and 'Malayala Manorama' on 20-1-1982 and 24-1-1982 respectively. Notice under R.3 was taken out to the petitioner and his brother, but as the petitioner refused to receive the same, the process-server affixed it on the petitioner's dwelling house on 5-2-1982. The District Collector, Ernakulam exercised power under S.19(4) on 4-1-1982. The draft declaration under S.6 of the Act was approved by the Board of Revenue in due course, and the declaration was published in the newspapers in September, 1982. Notice under S.9(3) was served by affixture on 2-11-1982, and notification under S.9(5) was published on 9-11-1982. 5. Before proceeding further, I should say that it is difficult to believe the petitioner's case that he came to know about the acquisition proceedings only when Ext. P1 dated 8-12-1982 was served on him. As already seen, he was on the look-out from the very beginning i.e. even before initiation of any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. He had come to this Court in 1980 complaining against a possible acquisition of his land. S. (3) notification was published both in the Mathrubhumi and the Malayala Manorama in January, 1982. It cannot be assumed that the petitioner was keeping himself blissfully ignorant of this development. As disclosed by the counter-affidavit, all the other land owners concerned had surrendered possession of their lands by August, 1982. Despite the newspaper publications, and despite the surrender of land by neighbouring owners, if the petitioner claims to have remained ignorant of all such proceedings, I think the safer course is to believe the case of the respondents that notice under Rule (3) was attempted to be served on him, and was served by affixture on 5-2-1982. 6. The more important question, as I said, is about the exercise of power by the District Collector under S.19(4). 6. The more important question, as I said, is about the exercise of power by the District Collector under S.19(4). S.19(1) of the Act provides that "in cases of urgency", the District Collector can direct the Land Acquisition Officer to take possession of the land before the passing of the award. And S.19(4) provides that if the District Collector is of opinion that the land in question is one to which the urgency provisions of sub-s. (1); are applicable, he can direct that the enquiry under S.5 be dispensed with. The normal procedure under the Act is to make the preliminary notification under S.3, hear and decide the objections under S.S, make the declaration under S.6, give notice to the persons affected under S.9, pass the award under S.11, and then take possession under S.18. Sub-S. (1) and (4) of S.19 permit a departure from the above procedure "in case of urgency", when the District Collector forms the opinion that such urgency exists. And when the complaint is against exercise of power under S.19(4), the scope of scrutiny by the courts is limited to examining whether the Collector has acted honestly and bona fide, with due regard to the materials before him, from which any reasonable person can spell out the existence of urgency. As Govindan Nair C. J. said in Damodara Menon v. P. A. CL. A.) to District Collector (1915 KLT 537), the question can only be about honest application of the mind by the District Collector: "It is settled law that in view of the wording of sub-section (4) of S.19 what is required is the subjective satisfaction of the Government or the District Collector, for the words used are "in the opinion of the Government or the District Collector". The satisfaction being a subjective one the scope of enquiry regarding that satisfaction in proceedings before the court under Art.226 of the Constitution is very very limited. Nevertheless it is equally well established that if there has been no application of the mind to the question of urgency which alone will justify the direction that the provisions of S.5 of the Act will not apply, a court will be entitled to set aside the procedure adopted of doing away with the enquiry under S.S." 7. Nevertheless it is equally well established that if there has been no application of the mind to the question of urgency which alone will justify the direction that the provisions of S.5 of the Act will not apply, a court will be entitled to set aside the procedure adopted of doing away with the enquiry under S.S." 7. No doubt there are decisions which have taken the view that exercise of power under S.19(4), followed by lethargy in proceeding with the matter afterwards, may cast a shadow on the bona fides of such exercise. In Kunhammad Keyi v. Tahsildar (1965 KLT. 1021), notification under S.3 was issued on 20-5-1963, emergency powers were invoked on 23-6-1963, but notice under S.9(5) was published only on 21-1-1964; and the court held that the dates "belie the story of any extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under sub-s. (4) of S.19." The same approach was made in Damodara Menon's case (supra) where the Collector's direction under S.19(4) was on 6-12-1973, but the S.9 notification was issued only on 22-8-1974. In Noor Mohamed v. District Collector (1981 KLT 816) Khalid, J. observed that: " "the long-felt need" starting from 1976 which went into hibernation till 1981 can never be projected as sufficient to invoke the provisions contained in S.19(4) of the Act." And in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, Krishna Iyer, J. said: "Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Art.14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under S.17 of the Act." In Raman v. District Collector (1967 KLT 552), Gopalan Nambiyar J. (as he then was) did not agree with the proposition that a delay of more than thirty days in proceeding with the acquisition would necessarily negative the existence of urgency. Relying on observations of the above nature, Mr. Narayana Pillai for the petitioner contends that the delay in the present case-from January, 1982 to November, 1982-is sufficiently long to destroy the inference that there was such urgency to proceed with the acquisition as to deprive the landowner of the protection he would otherwise have obtained under S.S. 8. It seems to me that there are two or three aspects which require consideration before such a generalisation can be made with reference to the time element alone. It seems to me that there are two or three aspects which require consideration before such a generalisation can be made with reference to the time element alone. The first is that the decisions noticed were not attempting to lay down any mathematical formula for testing urgency; in fact, the responsibility of deciding whether there is urgency or not is primarily that of the District Collector. It is his opinion that matters; and the courts, in the cases cited, were only evaluating the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the Collector had acted honestly and bona fide in exercising the statutory discretion. 9. The second is the extent to which the opinion formed by the District Collector can be tested in the light of the time-consuming steps taken thereafter, in the matter of proceeding with the acquisition. Take a case where a landowner comes to this court immediately after the direction is made under S.19(4) and obtains an order of stay, complaining that there is no public purpose behind the acquisition and that the District Collector has acted arbitrarily. The complaint may ultimately be rejected and the stay vacated; but can the time so taken before this Court destroy the urgency which was there at the time the Collector had acted? If it will not, the same must be the case with delay caused for other reasons beyond the control of the Collector. It is not always the District Collector who exercises power under S.19(4) who functions as the Land Acquisition Officer. After the direction under S.19(4), the matter will go back to the Land Acquisition Officer who has to approach the Revenue Board for obtaining the declaration under S.6. The declaration has then to be published, and further proceedings under S.9 taken. Can the administrative delay and red tape involved at all these subsequent stages over-shadow the bona fides of the District Collector's decision under S.19(4)? Is it proper to test his opinion on the basis of the delay occasioned by others, subsequent to its formation? 10. Yet another aspect to be borne in mind is that most of the decisions cited were rendered at a time when the courts were bound to protect the fundamental rights under Art.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Is it proper to test his opinion on the basis of the delay occasioned by others, subsequent to its formation? 10. Yet another aspect to be borne in mind is that most of the decisions cited were rendered at a time when the courts were bound to protect the fundamental rights under Art.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Property rights were then sacrosanct, and dispensing with the enquiry under S.5 of the Land Acquisition Act, on the mere ipse dixit of a Collector, was a serious threat. The courts therefore exacted a rigorous standard, for ensuring that arbitrary action by the authorities did not lead to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights involved. The main part of the discussion in Kunhammed Keyi's case (1965 KLT 1021) was about the validity of S.19(4) itself, in the context of the guaranteed right under Art.19(1)(f). Should the same philosophy inform the Court's approach after Art.19(1)(f) and 31 have been deleted from Part III of the Constitution by the 44th amendment? The importance of property rights was examined by the Court of Appeal in Davis v. Johnson (1978) 1 All E.R. 841, where the question was whether a court could exclude the husband from the matrimonial home by injunction, at the instance of a "battered wife", in order to protect her personal rights, in exercise of power under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. It was vehemently contended, on the authority of the House of Lords, that an enactment could not ordinarily be construed so as to affect rights of property; and Lord Denning answered the point in the following terms: "I venture to suggest that the concept about rights of property is quite out-of-date. It is true that in the 19th century the law paid quite high regard to rights of property. But this gave rise to such misgivings that in modern times the law has changed course. Social justice requires that personal rights should, in a proper case, be given priority over rights of property. In this court, at least, ever since the war we have acted on that principle I know that in those two cases the House of Lords reversed the decisions of this court and gave priority to property rights. But Parliament in each case afterwards passed laws so as to restore the decisions of this court. In this court, at least, ever since the war we have acted on that principle I know that in those two cases the House of Lords reversed the decisions of this court and gave priority to property rights. But Parliament in each case afterwards passed laws so as to restore the decisions of this court. I prefer to go by the principles underlying the legislative enactments rather than the out-dated notions of the past" If personal rights could thus get priority over property rights in certain contexts, why not give the same priority to public purposes or public interest, at least after the 44th amendment? 11. Turning now to the facts of the case on hand, what is seen is that the Executive Engineer of the P.V.I. Project had made a requisition to the Special Tahsildar on 28-11-1981, to take steps for acquiring the land needed for the field channel. He had drawn the Tahsildars attention to the urgency involved, from the stand point of agriculture. The Tahsildar inspected the site and forwarded the requisition to the District Collector on 28-12-1981 along with the relevant site plans, recommending invocation of the emergency provisions. On a consideration of the material on record, the District Collector accorded 'sanction' for invoking "the emergency clause", and the formal direction under S.19(4) was drawn up on 4-1-1982. The file apparently went back to the Land Acquisition Officer who caused S.3 notification to be published within a matter of days. R.3 notice was attempted to be served shortly thereafter and the Revenue Board was then approached for its declaration under S.6. That declaration came only on 22-9-1982, and notice under S.9(3) was issued by the Land Acquisition Officer on 2-11-1982. Assuming that the proceedings were not sufficiently speeded up by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Revenue Board after 4-1-1982, it is impossible to think that the District Collector should have for seen such delay when he was exercising his power under S.19(4) on the aforesaid date. When he made the direction on 4-1-1982, he had before him the reports and recommendations of the Executive Engineer and the Tahsildar that steps for construction of the 'field channel' had to be emergently taken. The Collector of a District should be expected to know about the need and urgency attached to a major irrigation work of his District. When he made the direction on 4-1-1982, he had before him the reports and recommendations of the Executive Engineer and the Tahsildar that steps for construction of the 'field channel' had to be emergently taken. The Collector of a District should be expected to know about the need and urgency attached to a major irrigation work of his District. The main canal had already been completed and the field channels were obviously part of the scheme. On an examination of the relevant files, I am unable to hold that the District Collector had not applied his mind, or that the subsequent developments were such as to undermine the bona fides of his decision. 12. Reference can also be usefully made to the Division Bench decision in Venugopal Raja v. State of Kerala, reported in 1981 KLT SN 5 (Case No. 10). The District Collector in that case had invoked S.19(4) on 6-9-1978 and S.3 notification was made on 10-10-78. Declaration under S.6 was made only on 4-5-79, and the Original Petition was filed on 4th March, 1980. The Court refused to accept the petitioner's case that the notification and declaration had escaped his notice in due time. S.3 notification in the present case was published in January, 1982 in two of the most widely circulated newspapers of the State. Ignoring the averment of the respondents that R.3 notice was affixed on 5-2-1982, it is clear that S.6 declaration was also similarly publicised in September, 1982. All the other neighbouring landowners had surrendered their lands earlier, in August, 1982. I am therefore not persuaded to accept the petitioner's case thai all such developments had escaped his notice till Ext. P1 was received by him on 10-12-1982. In my opinion, the petitioner has not been vigilant; he has approached this court with an unbelievable story in order to explain away his 'hibernation'. And as was done by the Division Bench in Venugopal Raja (1981 KLT SN 5), I decline to interfere with the acquisition proceedings impugned, even if it is possible to assume that some illegality was committed somewhere on the way. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.