JUDGMENT 1. - These nine revision petitions have been filed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), against the order of the Executing Court, rejecting the objection of the Corporation that the decrees being in declarative form, no execution can be made. 2. It is common ground that in all these cases, civil suits were filed against the Corporation claiming that a decree may be passed quashing the order of termination, removal or dismissal from service, as the case may be, in each case and further the plaintiff may be allowed all benefits of salary etc., which he would have got if the order of termination would not have been passed. 3. In civil suits in all cases, a decree has been given quashing the order of termination of service of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and further that they are entitled to all consequential benefits in respect of the salary etc. 4. 3. In civil suits in all cases, a decree has been given quashing the order of termination of service of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and further that they are entitled to all consequential benefits in respect of the salary etc. 4. The operative portion of the judgment in Sita Ram's case reads as under : " oknh dk okn izfroknhx.k ds fo:) fMdzh fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ;g ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd oknh lsok i`FkDdj.k vkns'k fnukad 23-4-79 voS/k] izHkko'kwU; o fu;e fo:) gS] vr% mls fujLr fd;s tkrs gSA oknh lsok ds rRlca/kh leLr ykHk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA oknh dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd oknh izfroknhx.k ls okn O;; Hkh ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA " The order in Damodar Lal's case reads as under : " nkok oknh fo:) izfroknhx.k e; [kpkZ fMdzh fd;k tkrk gSA fooknxzLr lsok izFkd vkns'k fnukad 1&9&81 voS/k ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrkA oknh dks os leLr ykHk izkIr gksxs tks mls izfroknh ds lsok esa jgrs gq, izkIr gksus okys FksA " The order in Mahendra Kumar's case reads as under : " oknh dk okn izfroknhx.k ds fo:) fMdh fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ;s ?kks"k.kk fd;k tkrk gS fd oknh dk lsokA i`FkDdx.k vkns'k la[;k 470 fnukad 16&9&80 voS/k] vf/kfu;e] fu;e fo:) ,oa izkd`frd U;k; ds fl)kUrksa ds foijhr gSA ;g ?kks"k.kk fd;k tkrk gS fd oknh lsok ds rRlca/kh leLr ykHk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, ;g vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd nksuksa i{kdkj viuk ckn O;; Lo;a cgu djsaxsA " In Ram Prasad's case, it reads as under : " oknh dk okn izfroknhx.k ds fo:) lO;; fMdh fd;k tkrk gS tc mls lsok ls i`Fkd djus okys vkns'k dzekad 295 fnukad 31&7&82 dks voS/k] fof/k fo:) ,oa izHkko'kwU; rFkk mls izfroknhx.k dks lsoka esa leLr rRlac/kh ykHkksa lfgr iwoZor cuk gqvk ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA " In Parma Nand's case, it reads as under : " okn oknh f[kykQ izfroknhx.k e; [kpkZ dkuwuh fMdh fd;k tkrk gS rFkk lsok i`FkDdj.k vkns'k fnukad 11&12&81 voS/k o xSj dkuwuh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS] ;g Hkh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd oknh leLr ykHk lfgr lsok esa jgus dk vf/kdkjh gSA " In Sarvan Lal's case, it reads as under : " oknh dk okn lO;; izfroknhx.k ds fo:) fuEu izdkj ls fMdzh fd;k tkrk gSA " " 1- oknh dks lsok ls i`Fkd djkus dk vkns'k fnukad 15&12&81 voS/k] fo:) izHkko 'kwU; gSA 2- izfroknhx.k ds fo:) mDr vkns'k dks rnuqlkj ?kksf"kr fd;k tkdj mUgs vkKkid LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk }kjk tc ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd og oknh dks fujUrj iwoZor lsok esa ekus vkSj mls feyus okys osru o vU; ykHkksa ls ugh jksdsA 3- foHkkxh; vihy esa oknh ds fo:) izLrkfor vkns'k ikfjr ugh djs vkSj dj fn;k x;k gks rks mls fujLr le>sA " In Ikwal Ahmed's case, it reads as under : " okn oknh fo:) izfroknhx.k e; [kpkZ dkuwuh fMdh fd;k tkrk gS rFkk lsok i`FkDdj.k vkns'k fnukad 27&2&80 xSj dkuwuh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA rFkk ;g Hkh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd oknh leLr ykHk lfgr lsok esa jgus dk vf/kdkjh gSA " In Ram Chandra's case. it reads as under : " okn oknh fo:) izfroknhx.k fMdh fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA fd i`FkDdj.k dk vkns'k fnukad 17&1&80 voS/k gS rFkk oknh leLr ykHk lfgr lsok esa jgus dk vf/kdkjh gSA i{kkdkj viuk [kpkZ Lo;a ogu djsxsaA " In Mohan Lal Khandelwal's case, it reads as under : " okn oknh fo:) izfroknhx.k e; [kpkZ fMdh fd;k tkrk gSA izfroknh dk fooknkLin vkns'k fnukad 10&9&81 voS/k] izHkko'kwU; ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls osru vkfn leLr ykHk izkIr gksaxs tks mls lsok esa jgrs gq, gksrsA " 5. When the execution petition was fired by the decree-holder, an objection was taken by the Corporation (Judgment-debtor) that since that decree is in dectarative form, it cannot be executed. The Executing Court has rejected this objection in all cases and directed that the decree should be executed but on payment of the court fee of the amount specified in the execution application. 6. In Damodar's case, it has further been mentioned in the impugned order that no stay order has been obtained from the appellate court where the appeal is pending and the decree is executable. 7. In some of the other cases, it has been mentioned that the judgment debtor has not complied with the condition, of the stay order passed by the appellate court and the objection that the decree is not executable, is not tenable. 8. It is common ground that invariably in all cases, the decree is in appeal in the first appellate court and the same is pending. 9. Mr. Gupta learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a declarative decree cannot be executed. According to him, if non-petitioners wanted the amount of salary etc. to be decreed, they should have prayed for a direction in the decree after specifying the amount, paying the court-fees valuing the suit, according to the jurisdiction of the amount involved, but it has not been done. It was farther argued that there is no direction in mandatory form of reinstatement and payment of salary by the trial court at the time of passing these decrees and therefore, he is not required to comply with any such direction which has now been passed in the form of execution without a proper bedrock and foundation in the decree itself. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Gupta referred to Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure and invited my attention to the Commentary of C.P.C. by Chitaley's Manual v. 5. page 55, in which it has been mentioned that a decree which is merely declarative, cannot be executed. Order 21 Rule 32 reads as under:R. 32. Decree for specific performance, for restitution of the conjugal rights or for an injunction : (1) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed. has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both. (2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention. (3) Where any attachment under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) has remained in force for (Six months) if the judgment debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold; and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the judgment-debtor on his application. (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the sane which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of (six months) from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall case. (5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed. (5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed. the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment. debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree. 11. In the above comments, a reference has been made to a decision of Allahabad High Court reported in (1904) I All LJ 541 (542). 12. Counsel for the respondents have controverted the contentions of Mr. Gupta and argued that a decree for declaration can be executed in service matters. It was then argued that it is a misnomer for calling a decree of declaration only, because in terms it directs that the plaintiffs would be given all benefits on quashing the order of reinstatement. 13. It is not in dispute that the present cases relate to service matters, where termination from service of the petitioners have been challenged in civil suits. It is also not in dispute that these termination orders have been' quashed holding them to be illegal. It has been mentioned invariably in all the decrees and in the operative part of the judgment of the civil court that the plaintiff-decree-holder would be entitled to get all the benefits on account of quashing of termination orders. 14. In order to be precise, I would translate in english the operative portion of the judgment in one or two cases. 15. In Sita Ram's case, the order translated in english would read as under : "The suit of the plaintiff is decreed against the defendant and it is declared that the order of termination of plaintiff's service dated 23-4-1979 is illegal, null and void and irregular, and this order is quashed. The plaintiff would be entitled to get all benefits in respect of his service period. Looking to the conditions of the plaintiff. it is further ordered that the plaintiff would get cost from the defendant." 16. The plaintiff would be entitled to get all benefits in respect of his service period. Looking to the conditions of the plaintiff. it is further ordered that the plaintiff would get cost from the defendant." 16. In Mohan Lal's case the relevant portion of the order translated in English would read as under : "The suit of the plaintiff is decreed against defendant with costs. The impugned order of termination dated 10-9-81 is declared illegal, null and void. The defendant should give all benefits to plaintiff to which he was entitled if he would not have been removed from the service by the impugned order." 17. With a slight variation of the words the substance of all the decrees is that the suits of the plaintiffs have been decreed with costs and the orders of term nation have been quashed and the plaintiffs have been allowed all benefits etc. to which they were entitled, if they would not have been removed from the service, on account of termination order. 18. The question which is now for consideration is that such a decree can be executed either in whole or cannot be executed at all. 19. Shri Gupta submitted that there is no direct decision either of any High Court or of the Supreme Court on this point that in matters of decrees, in cases of civil servants about their service condition, a decree is unexecutable because no further direction has been given for getting the payment of such and rich amount. 20. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. In the absence of the direct decision either of this Court or of the Apex Court the controversy raised for the first time in this Court requires authoritative pronouncement, both for these cases & for the decision of subordinate courts and litigants. It would be pertinent to notice at the very thresh-hold of this decision that a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Radhu Ram v. Municipal Committee, Barnala and another, 1983(1) SLR 151 , though in a slightly, in different situation, considered this controversy. The question referred to the Full Bench reads as under : "Whether, in a suit for declaration, the Civil Court or the High Court setting in appeal or otherwise is competent to give any direction etc. The question referred to the Full Bench reads as under : "Whether, in a suit for declaration, the Civil Court or the High Court setting in appeal or otherwise is competent to give any direction etc. for the payment of the arrears of pay as a result of the dismissal order having been declared illegal or without jurisdiction." 21. In the civil suit, out of which this controversy arose in Punjab and Haryana, a declaration was sought that termination order dated 27th July, 1966. was absolutely illegal, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, null and void. In this declaration, it was prayed that the appellant be deemed to be still in the service enjoying full right, and privileges of monthly salary, dearness and other allowances including annual grade increments already accrued or yet to accrue in future. The trial court decided the two issues against the appellant and, consequently, dismissed the suit. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed. In second appeal the Municipal Committee cannot resist the claim on merits but prayed that the appellate court in its discretion may decline the relief of rein statement and consequential benefits. Shri Gupta, J. then referred the matter to a Division Bench for consideration & the Division Bench then considered the matter. Such a direction was given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal v. State of Punjab, decided on the 16th Oct. 1978 but since an objection was raised about the jurisdiction, the whole question was reconsidered. 22. In Full Bench, their Lordships of the High Court after due consideration first opined that the legal and substantial effect of declaring the order of termination as illegal and nonest is that the employee would be deemed to continue in service as before. In essence, the quashing of the termination restores the status quo ante as regards the employee. Therefore, the mere use of terminology either claiming to be deemed in service" or a declaration that the order of termination is illegal and without jurisdiction, makes no difference, as the said terminology is identical in its legal import. 23. Their Lordships of the High Court then referred to the decision of Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 S.C. 1233 . In that case Krishan Murari Lal was an employee of Patiala State way back in the year 1948 and then he was integrated in the Punjab State. 23. Their Lordships of the High Court then referred to the decision of Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 S.C. 1233 . In that case Krishan Murari Lal was an employee of Patiala State way back in the year 1948 and then he was integrated in the Punjab State. He was dismissed from service on the 21st Oct. 1959. A suit was instituted in 1962, seeking a declaration that the dismissal order was nonest and that he continued to be in the service of the State of Punjab. 24. Meanwhile, in June, 1962. he filed another suit which again was decreed on 15th Jan, 1963. Against the decrees, the State of Punjab filed Regular Appeals, which were allowed by the Division Bench with the rsult that both the suits were dismissed vide State of Punjab v. Krishan Murari Lal, 1966 Cur. L. J., 968 Punjab . The case then went to Supreme Court and the following order was passed : "In the result both the judgments of the High Court are set aside and the judgments and decrees of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Patiala stand restored." 25. It would appear that despite the success of the appellant before the final court he was denied the emoluments beyond 15th Jan, 1963 when his suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge 1st Class Patiala. Thus, faced with the not unusual nightmare (by the denial of salary emoluments etc.), even the successful employees after they have secured a declaration that the termination of their services is nonest, the appellant preferred Civil Misc. Petition No. 10572 of 1978 subsequent to the decision of the two Civil appeals in the Supreme Court in his favour on 9th Feb , 1977. It was on the said miscellaneous application that their Lordships issued the under-mentioned categoric directions ; "Heard. counsel for the parties. This application is disposed of on a short ground. It has become necessary to clarify the order made by this Court allowing the appeals of the petitioner. According to the decision of this court, the petitioner was given a declaration that he would be deemed to continue in service with effect from the date of the suit. As a logical consequence of this declaration, it is manifest that the petitioner would be entitled to back-salary right from 1st June, 1062 till 9th Feb., 1974. According to the decision of this court, the petitioner was given a declaration that he would be deemed to continue in service with effect from the date of the suit. As a logical consequence of this declaration, it is manifest that the petitioner would be entitled to back-salary right from 1st June, 1062 till 9th Feb., 1974. The only way in which the judgment of this Court can he implemented is to pay the aforesaid amount of salary to the petitioner. With these observations, this application is disposed of. The amount of the salary must be paid within two months from today." 26. Viewing the issue in the context of the aforesaid enunciation, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that a direction of the aforesaid nature is not only within the power of the trial court and the appellate court but in the classical language of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is the only way in which judgments of this nature can be implemented. Apparently, in a refreshing departure from any static hyper-technicalities of the law, their Lordships have said in no uncertain terms that the right to get the emoluments and back-salary is a local consequence of a declaration that the employee continues in service or what in effect, is the something that his termination is illegal or without jurisdiction. Pre-emptory language has been used with design and calculated effect to law down that the petitioner Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal would be entitled to his back-salary right from the date of the decree till the 9th Feb. 1974 for a period of about 12 years. Not only this, their Lordships time-bound their order to see that this must be paid within two months from the date of the order. It deserves recalling that originally. their Lordships by their Judgment had only restored the decree of the trial court which had granted the salary upto the 15th Jan. 1963. Therefore. the grant of relief of payment of salary for 11 years thereafter was rested wholly on the order given by their Lordships and not on any existing decree or a prayer for any such relief earlier. 1963. Therefore. the grant of relief of payment of salary for 11 years thereafter was rested wholly on the order given by their Lordships and not on any existing decree or a prayer for any such relief earlier. It follows inexerably from the above that a direction of this nature is not only within the jurisdiction of the courts of law but from language used by their Lordships appears to be the proper.if not the only mode of relief in act such cases. 27. The Full Bench then considered Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal's case and observed that in that case the Court was of the opinion that not only relief can be given by the court but it was desirable also to give such relief because when the case itself deserves to be treated as well-merited case. Sant Singh's case decided by Harbans Lal, J. alongwith G. C. Mittal, J. further came with the same problem. The Court then observed as under :10. Viewed from another angle as well the necessity or in any case the desirability of such a direction (where it is merited) emerges from two recent judgments of the final Court. It deserves recalling in this context that for a considerable length of time in some High Courts the view had prevailed that in such a situation the right to salary and emoluments accrued not when the Court grants a declaration to the effect but either from the point of termination or the date when such emoluments become due. Consequently it had been held that a claim for such salary would be barred by tune after three years of the order of term nation or when the salary fell due. This view has now been authoritatively reversed and the anomalies flowing therefrom have been forcefully pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 28. Before the Full Bench, reliance was placed by the respondents in Prakash Chand v. S. S Garewal, ILR 1974 (2) Punjab and Haryana 56 , and the Full Bench was of the view that this also supports the view that the decree must be executed in such cases. 28. Before the Full Bench, reliance was placed by the respondents in Prakash Chand v. S. S Garewal, ILR 1974 (2) Punjab and Haryana 56 , and the Full Bench was of the view that this also supports the view that the decree must be executed in such cases. It would be seen from the above that a declaratory decree enjoins the employer to reinstate the decree-holder and grant him all the benefits and privileges including his past emoluments, then it is obvious that a direction to that effect only makes pointedly explicit what is plainly implicit in the decree. 29. The Punjab Full Bench then opined that apart from precedent. on larger consideration of principle as well, the stand of the appellant herein commends itself for acceptance. Once the relief of setting aside or quashing the order of termination has been granted, or a declaratory decree has been passed to the similar effect, it necessarily follows that the employee in the eye of law continues to be in service and as a necessary consequence thereof would be entitled to all the emoluments flowing from the statute. 30. Relying upon the Krishan Murari Lal's case again it was observed that a direction had been given by their Lordships not even at the appellate stage when they decided to allow the appeals but indeed it was so done in a miscellaneous petition preferred more than a year later. Now such a direction can be given even years after the conclusion of the appellate proceedings. Once a direction of the aforesaid nature is given. it was not seriously disputed before us that the same would be plainly executable. Reliance was placed in Donald Grahem & Co. v. Kewalram, AIR 1921 Sand 132 . 31. Similarly relying on the earlier Madras view it was observed as follows in Nawab Qutbuddin Khan v. Nawabzada Sardar Sadullah Khan, AIR 1937 Peshawar 62 :........It was held by the Madras High Court in case reported as Thyaguraja Swami Devasthanam Tiruvalur v. Balayee Ammal, AIR 1928 Mad. 61 , that although certain parts of a decree might be declaratory in nature, where there were express directions to perform certain duties such as the payment of money either at a point of time or periodically, such directions were meant to be enforced in execution. In my opinion the same principle should be applied to this case." 32. 61 , that although certain parts of a decree might be declaratory in nature, where there were express directions to perform certain duties such as the payment of money either at a point of time or periodically, such directions were meant to be enforced in execution. In my opinion the same principle should be applied to this case." 32. Their Lordships of Supreme Court speaking for the Court observed as under : "The next contention of the appellant is that the award is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties and is therefore inexecutable. This contention is based on the wording of clause 7 of the award which provides that on the happening of certain events the respondents 'shall be entitled to take back the possession.' We are unable to appreciate how this clause makes the award merely declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the executability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief. The tenor of the award shows that the arbitrator did not intend merely to declare the rights of the parties." 33. In view of the above discussion, the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court categorically and specifically answered the reference observing that such a decree is executable. 34. It is to be noticed that the above view of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court is based on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court mentioned in para No. 8. In Supreme Court case the civil courts decrees were upheld but they were declaratory in nature. What was declared was that the decree-holder would be deemed in continuation of service but no direction for payment of salary of reinstatement was given as such. 35. Even then their Lordships of Supreme Court from the above decree deduced as under : "As a logical consequence of this declaration, it is manifest that the petitioner would be entitled to back-salary right from 1st June, 1962, till 9th Feb., 1974. The only way in which the judgment of this Court can be implemented is to pay the aforesaid amount of salary to the petitioner. 36. The only way in which the judgment of this Court can be implemented is to pay the aforesaid amount of salary to the petitioner. 36. In Radha Ram's cases, Shri Gupta, J. confronted with the above submitted that this direction was given by a separate order on a miscellaneous application and not in executing court while executing the application. With respect the distinction drawn by Shri Gupta, J. is not based on any regal difference. 37. I have on a careful and serious study of the above order of Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed that their lordships of lion. Supreme Court expressely used the words "not of modification of the decree but they said that they were clarifying the order made by the Court." 38. According to Encylopaedia Britannica Vol (ii) Picropaedia page 966:-Clarification, removal of tumidity from liquids by precipitation, filtration, contrifugation, or similar methods. 39. In my view, in the simple description, words clarification means as under : "To put it in simple language, clarification means to make explicit what is implicit, to make express, what is implied, to make certain, what is uncertain." 40. It is obvious that their lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court were not passing the order on the review application nor they altered or modified the decision or judgment. They did not add anything to the earlier judgment, nor modified it nor varied it but on the plain, legal or logical reading of the earlier judgment of their lordships, they clarified what they mean by it and in what manner that judgment is to be enforced or executed. It cannot be disputed that if a decree passed earlier by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Suit was unexecutable, their lordships would have dismissed the applications holding the decree as unexecutable and unless it is modified, amended, altered, varied, it cannot be executed. 41. It is well-known that when judgments are given by such apex courts, it is known to the Hon'ble Judges that by virtue of Article 14t of the Constitution every word which falls from the lips is embodied in the judgment by the judgment writer, would be the law of the land. 41. It is well-known that when judgments are given by such apex courts, it is known to the Hon'ble Judges that by virtue of Article 14t of the Constitution every word which falls from the lips is embodied in the judgment by the judgment writer, would be the law of the land. In that view of the matter, it is not permissive for this court to incorporate by addition in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, by holding that although the word used was 'clarified' as such but this was used inadvertently without meaning it. 42. In my considered opinion, in view of the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not permissible by this Court to doubt on the correctness, of the same. When the apex courts enunciate the position of law, it becomes impermissible for all other courts of the Country to that the meaning of it as being in consonance with the text of the law as no one can be more pious than the Pope himself. In that view of the matter, I have got no hesitation that judgments and decrees in all nine cases are executable both for the purpose of reinstatement as well as for the purpose of payment of salary and other dues to which they were entitled. 43. Shri Gupta's contention regarding court-fees and jurisdiction to be ascertained on the basis of the specification of the amount of salary, cannot alter the nature of the decree, its effect, its import, its enforcebility and its executability. 44. It is true that the earlier interpretation was too technical and precedent based in rigid frontiers of the doctrine of precedents. The dimensions of social justice have removed these technical frontiers for doing real justice. The hypertechnicalities are now abhored by the courts because they retard the course of real and substantial justice. 44. It is true that the earlier interpretation was too technical and precedent based in rigid frontiers of the doctrine of precedents. The dimensions of social justice have removed these technical frontiers for doing real justice. The hypertechnicalities are now abhored by the courts because they retard the course of real and substantial justice. In my considered opinion, though at the initial stage of a litigation the objection regarding court-fees and pecuniary jurisdiction cannot he treated as hypertechnical and may be substantial in some cases, but to rake such objection for the purpose of a remote act the executability, would be trying to build hurdles in the courts, on legal technical ies which stand wiped out by the fresh wind of substantial justice The court-fees can always be paid and as rightly held by the executing court, it has been an important condition precedent and that ensures the interest of the public exchange and also the compliance of law regarding court fees. 45. New apart from the above, it may also be mentioned that it has been held even earlier by privy council in Robert Fischer v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, 1922 ILR Madras 270 , that in cases of service the provisions of Section 34 would not be applicable. Again in Panna Lal Tayal v. State of M. P. 1975 SLR (2) 527 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that the Civil Court is competent to grant declaration in respect of the revised pay scales and if such a declaration is implicit then the Government should execute the order and the consequential relief follows automatically. 46. In Lt. Col. G. S. Dutta v. Union of India, AIR 1966 J. & K. 124 , declarative relief for arrears of pension was also respected. Even, earlier in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1962 S. C. 1334 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "(1) In our view this contention is wholly misconceived. G. S. Dutta v. Union of India, AIR 1966 J. & K. 124 , declarative relief for arrears of pension was also respected. Even, earlier in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1962 S. C. 1334 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "(1) In our view this contention is wholly misconceived. Rule 54, as amended in 1953, stands as follows : "54(l) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make specific order : (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty" (2) Where such competent authority holds that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be, together with any allowances of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension. (3) In other cases the Govt. servant shall be given such proportion of such pay & allowances as such competent authority may prescribe: Provided that the payment of allowances under clauses (2) and (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (4) In a case falling under cl (2) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as the period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In a case falling under cl. (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as period spent on duty unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purposes." The Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Madhava Sastry v. Director Post Graduate Centre, Anantpar, SLR 1991 (1) 403 , held that in service matters a declarative decree is valid and no consequential relief is necessary. 47. In Smt. Sajmo Devi and others v. Haryana State, 1080 (3) SLR 707 , the decision of Sehgal's case was retied and declaratory decree was held to be executable. 48. 47. In Smt. Sajmo Devi and others v. Haryana State, 1080 (3) SLR 707 , the decision of Sehgal's case was retied and declaratory decree was held to be executable. 48. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities in this respect any more because now after the decision of a series of cases by Hon'ble Supreme Court it has been held that the civil servants or the employees of the Corporation should enjoy status as per service rules, which are statutory in nature and the status is to be restored by the courts. 49. In the earlier days it is true that reinstatement could not be granted. The employer could 'hire and fire' but the same cannot be done now. 50. In view of the above, though so far as merits of the cases are concerned, it would be for the first appellate court where the appeals are pending to decide whether decree was given on valid reasons or it is liable to be quashed or reversed and further it is always open to the appellate court to stay the execution on suitable terms if the interest of justice so warrants, but that would not in any manner reflect upon the executability of the decree. I have no hesitation in holding that the rejection of the objection by the Executing Court was an act of exercise of proper and legal jurisdiction by the Executing Court and further it committed no error of law in holding that the decree is executable, both for reinstatement and recovery of salary and dues, subject to payment of court fees. 51. Consequently all the nine revision petitions are dismissed with costs and the stay orders are vacate.Revision petitions dismissed with cost. *******