Judgment Nainar Sundaram, J.: The petitioner in W.P.No.9737 of 1982 is the appellant in this Writ Appeal and he shall be referred to only as the petitioner, in this judgment. The respondents herein are the respondents in the writ petition. The petitioner filed the writ petition for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent in R.P.No.3 of 1982 dated 25.11.1982, confirming the order of the second respondent in ARC No.1502 of 1982 dated 14.10.1982 and of the third respondent in ARC.No.1421 of 1982 dated 12-8-1982. The proceedings arose under the following circumstances: The petitioner was elected as the President of the Pondicherry Co-operative Industrial Printing Press Limited, for the sake of convenience hereinafter referred to as the press, in the year 1981. While he was so holding the post, he got himself elected as the President of the Embalal Milk Producers Co-operative Society, for the sake of convenience hereinafter referred to as the Milk Society, on 12.3.1982. The election to the Committee of Management of the Pondicherry Co-operative Milk Producers Union Limited, for the sake of convenience hereinafter referred to as the Union, came off on 22-5-1982. Earlier to that, the petitioner resigned his Presidentship in the Press on 8-5-1982. It is admitted that for the purpose of getting elected to the Committee of Management of the Union, the petitioner must be the President of a Primary Milk Producers Society, such as the milk society. The petitioner succeeded in getting himself elected to the Committee of Management of the Union. This election was challenged by the fourth respondent before the third respondent under the provisions of the Pondicherry Co-operative Socei-ties Act, 1972 (No.7 of 1973 ) hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the ground that the petitioner suffered the disqualification under section 35(1)of the Act with regard to the milk Society. The objection of the fourth respondent found countenance by the third respondent by the order dated 12-8-1982, referred to above. The petitioner preferred a revision to the second respondent and that revision did not fructify and it ended in confirmation of the order of the third respondent. The petitioner agitated the matter by way of a further revision to the first respondent and even before the first respondent, the petitioner could not succeed. The petitioner preferred a revision to the second respondent and that revision did not fructify and it ended in confirmation of the order of the third respondent. The petitioner agitated the matter by way of a further revision to the first respondent and even before the first respondent, the petitioner could not succeed. Thus the petitioner was obliged to come to this Court under Article 226of the Constitution of India with the above prayer. 2. Before Mohan, J. who heard the writ petition, it was urged that the view of the first respondent that the petitioner lost the membership of the Committee of all the registered societies by virtue of section 34(6)(a)of the Act is unsustainable and that provision would work out so to make the petitioner lose his office only in respect of the Press, which he even otherwise resigned on 8-5-1982 and hence, his induction into and functioning of as the President of the Milk Society can survive to enable him to contest for and getting elected to the Committee of Management of the Union. The learned Judge did not uphold this contention and held, construing the provisions of sections 34(1), (i) ; 34 (6)(q) and 35 of the Act, that the petitioner lost the membership of the milk society and he was ineligible for contesting the election of the Union. This order of the learned Judge is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ appeal. 3. This order of the learned Judge is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ appeal. 3. To appreciate and assess the contentions put fourth by Mr.J.Stanislas, learned counsel for the petitioner, it has become necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Act and they are, as stated above, sections 34(1) , 34(6)(a) and 35of the Act, and they stand extracted as hereunder: “No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a committee if he (a) is such near relation as may be prescribed of a paid employee of the registered society; or (b)(i) is in default to the society or to any other registered society or if he is a representative of a society, which is in default to the financing bank or to any other registered society, in respect of any sum of money due by him or by the society, which he represents for a period exceeding three months; Provided that a member of the Committee who has cessed to hold office as such under this sub-clause shall not be eligible for a period of one year from the date on which he ceased to hold office, for re-election as a member of the committee, of the registered society of which he was a member or for election to the Committee of any other registered society; or (ii) is a person against whom any decree, decision, award or order referred to in section 133 has been obtained or a representative of a society against which such decree, decision, award or order has been obtained; or (iii) is a person against whom an application has been made for the recovery of debts under section 134 or for the sale of the mortgaged property or any part thereof under section 105: Provided that a member of the Committee who has ceased to hold office, as such under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) shall not be eligible for a period of three years from the date on which the dues involved in such decree, decision, award order or as application have been fully discharged for re-election as a member of the committee of the registered society of which he was a member or a representative, or for election to the committee of any other registered society or; (c) is interested directly or indirectly in any contract made with the society, or in any sale ox purchase made by the society privately or in any auction or in any contract or transaction of the society (other than investment/and borrowing) involving financial interest; or, (b) is interested as a member of the committee, in any such contract, sale, purchase or transaction and a period of five years has not elapsed from the date of completion of such contract, sale, purchase or transaction: Provided that clauses (c) and (d) shall not apply to such class of contracts, sales, purchase or transaction as may be prescribed; or (c) is employed as legal practitioner on behalf of the registered society or against the registered society or on behalf of or against any other registered society which is a member of the former registered society; or (f) is an associate member; or (g) is a minor or of unsound mind;-or (h) has been sentenced for any offence under this Act, such sentence not having been reversed and a period of three years has not elapsed from the date of the expiration of the sentence; or (1) has been removed from the office of the member of the committee of the registered society or of any other registered society or disqualified under section 35.” “(6) A member of the Committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he (a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in sub- section (1).” “35(1) A member of the Committee shall not hold any of the offices of President, Chairman, Vice-President, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer or an office of any other designation in more than one registered society. (2) If any member of a Committee is at the commencement of this Act, an office-bearer of more than one registered society, then at the expiry of the period of ninety days from such commencement, he shall cease to be an off ice-bearar of all such registered societies, unless he had previously resigned his office in all but one of the societies.” The preliminary portion of section 34(1)states: “No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a committee”, if he comes within any of the mischiefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (i). The later part of clause (i) speaks about disqualification under section 25. Section 35(1imposes the disqualification and it inhibits a person from holding more than one office. In other words, a conjoint reading of section 34(1) and section 35(1)of the Act amply makes out that if a person already holds office in one society, he will be debarred from entering and holding office in a second society. Section 34(6)(a) speaks about cessation of the office, if a member of the committee becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in sub- section (1) of section 34of the Act. The entire argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is built only on this provision to state that the petitioner lost his office only in the first society, namely, the press and his election to end holding of office in the second society namely the milk society can survive so as to enable him to contest for the election in the Union. Section 35(2) of the Act is a transitory provision. It says that if any member of a committee, at the commencement of the Act, is an office --- bearer of more than one registered society, then at the expiry of the period of ninety days from such commencement, he shall cease to be an office --- bearer of all such registered societies unless he has previously resigned his office in all but one of the societies. Obviously, the bar, inhibition and the consequences adumbrated under sections 34(1), 35(1) and 34(6)(a) of the Act were not there to operate before the commencement of the Act. Obviously, the bar, inhibition and the consequences adumbrated under sections 34(1), 35(1) and 34(6)(a) of the Act were not there to operate before the commencement of the Act. An option is given to a person who holds offices in more than one society at the commencement of the Act to come within the policy of the Act and confine the holding of office only to one society. We have nothing to do with this provision on the facts of this case. 4. Mr. J. Stanislas, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that section 34(6)(a) of the Act speaks about cessation of office when a member of the committee becomes subject to any of the disqualification that is mentioned in clause (i) of sub- section (1) of section 34 is the one under section 35 and the disqualification could work only to make a member, in the instant case the petitioner, to lose the office which he held in the first society, namely, the Press. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner can hold on to his entry into and functioning in the office of the milk society and the disqualifiction will not operate so far as this office is concerned. Learned counsel wants to derive support for this proposition of his from the decision in Election Commission v. Venkata Rao (1953)1 MLJ.702 = 1953 S.C.J.293= 1953 S.C.R.1144= 66 L.W.378= A.I.R.1953 S.C.210 wherein the provisions of Articles 190(3) , 192 and 193 of the Constitution of India were the subject-matter of consideration. We will presently come to the question as to how far the learned counsel for the petitioner could derive support from this decision. Obviously, the petitioner wants to sustain his election to and holding of office in the second society, namely, the milk society, which alone would enable him to contest for the election in the Union. 5. One of the rules of construction and interpretation of statutes is that the object must be to discover the intention of the legislature. The principal duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, of course, in the language used by it, by a cogent and cohesive reading of all the relevant provisions. Prior to the enactment of the Act, there was a possibility of a person holding offices in more than one society. This has been done away with by the Act. Prior to the enactment of the Act, there was a possibility of a person holding offices in more than one society. This has been done away with by the Act. After the commencement of the Act, a person could hold office only in the society and the very entry into the second office is barred by section 34(1) of the Act and if he enters unawares and holds office, in spite of the bar, in the second society, the disqualica-tion could only operate to send him out of the second office, which alone is tainted with disqualification. If the construction which the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to put on section 34(6)(a) is to be accepted, it would mean that a person could gain entry into and hold office in a second society, in spite of his holding office in one society earlier, if others are not wary about this deception or remain indolent over it - which state of affairs, the very provisions of the Act discountenance and deprecate, and the said person could, with all naive-ness, say that he will cease to hold office in the first society and he will stick on to the office in the second society and he could hop from one society to another by adopting this tactics and that would be completely negating the very intention and scheme’ of the legislature. That would be the resultant mischief if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted. The court is bound to put a construction to prevent evasion or abuse. The office of the Judge is to make construction as will suppress the mischief and advance the cause of the legislature and to suppress all evasions by the continuance of the mischief. The court must carry out effectually the object of the statute and the statute must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do or avoid doing in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined. This rule stands expressed in Naxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 137. 6. The first office, in the instant case, the office in the press, is not tainted with any disqualification. The holding of the office in the first society will operate as a disqualification for entry into and holding of office in the second society. This rule stands expressed in Naxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 137. 6. The first office, in the instant case, the office in the press, is not tainted with any disqualification. The holding of the office in the first society will operate as a disqualification for entry into and holding of office in the second society. The cessation of the office or in other words, going out of the office, could only be with reference to the office in the second society, because that alone suffers the infirmity on account of disqualification. Of course, subclause (1) of section 34 of the Act enumerates number of other disqualifications. But, they relate to the holding of office in a particular society. By virtue of any of the disqualifications, the holding of one office in. that society alone will suffer. Hence, by virtue of the petitioner holding office in the Press he stood disqualified for entry into and holding of office in the milk society and that disqualification would operate only as to make him to lose the office in the milk society. We are more concerned with the disqualification and the elements of disqualification with reference to the holding of office in the particular society. As stated above, section 34(1) speaks about ineligibility when there is a disqualification and one of the disqualifications is the one found in section 35 and section 35(1) inhibits a person from holding a second office. Hence, the only construction that could legitimately be put on section 34(6) (a) of the Act is to hold that the disqualification operates only with reference to the second office and the person will lose only the second office and not the first office, which obviously was not tainted with disqualification. The other clauses in sub- section (1) of section 34, as stated above, could relate only to the particular society and the disqualification which the person suffers with reference to his office in that society. It is true that an extreme view has been taken by the first respondent when he held that the petitioner lost the offices in both the societies, namely, the press and the milk society. It is true that an extreme view has been taken by the first respondent when he held that the petitioner lost the offices in both the societies, namely, the press and the milk society. It is unnecessary ‘to concentrate on this aspect any longer because, we are more concerned with the petitioner's holding office in the milk society and the question of his losing the office in the press is of no consequence at all for the purpose of this case. 7. There is another rule of construction and interpretation of statutes, which cannot be omitted to be taken note of and that is, if the words of the statute are susceptible to two interpretations, they should be construed in a sense which is more in harmony with the intention of the legislature. If there are two possible constructions, the Court is duty bound to adopt the common sense construction. If the construction which the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to be put on section 34(6)(a)of the Act is to be adopted, it will lead to absurd and unintended results, as stated above, and this court shall avoid the same and make the statute-logical. 8. Coming to the support which the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to derive from Election Commission v. Venkata Rao (1953)1 MLJ.702 = 1953 S.C.J.293= A.I.R.1953 S.C.210 we must straightway point out, that the said decision dealt with the provisions in the Constitution of India, not analogous to the scheme of the provisions in the Act. With regard to the holding of office with reference to the inhibition for being a member of both houses of the legislature of a State or a member of the legislature of two or more States, Articles 190(1) and (2)of the Constitution of India stand self contained. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the scope of these articles. Merely because some of the expressions used in Articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Constitution of India are somewhat similar to the expressions used in section 34(6)(a)of the Act, it will not be in order to adopt the same rule of construction. The scheme of the other sections cannot be omitted to be taken note of. Merely because some of the expressions used in Articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Constitution of India are somewhat similar to the expressions used in section 34(6)(a)of the Act, it will not be in order to adopt the same rule of construction. The scheme of the other sections cannot be omitted to be taken note of. The working of the concerned provisions of the Act, as discussed above, has got a specific purpose to serve and it cannot be abrogated by putting a construction which would defeat the very intendment of the legislature. We are not prepared to cull out of context the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above and apply it to the scheme of the provisions of the Act which operate differently depending on one another. 9. The cessation of the office could have only relevance with regard to the office in the second society, namely, the milk society because, by virtue of the petitioner holding office in the press, he stood disqualified from entering into and holding office in the milk society. That is how the disqualification was intended to work and must work. 10. For all the foregoing reasons, we are not able to countenance the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and we have to uphold the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned single Judge. This obliges us to dismiss the writ appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment, Mr.J. Stanislas, learned counsel for the appellant, prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In the instant case, we have not departed from the well accepted rules of construction of statutes, keeping in mind the scheme of the provisions of the Act. We do not think that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance that would require a decision from the Supreme Court. Hence, leave refused. Appeal dismissed.