Judgement ORDER :- In these civil revision petitions at the instance of the second defendant in O.S. No. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981. District Munsiff's Court, Gobichettipalayam, directed against the order of dismissal of the applications in I. A. No. 573 of 1982 and I. A. No. 574 of 1982 in O.S. No. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981 filed by the petitioner under O.38 R.9 C. P. C., the question that arises for consideration is whether the court below was right in dismissing the applications on the ground that they were not maintainable. The circumstances under which the proceedings arose may be stated as under: The respondents in these civil revision petitions instituted O.S. No. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981 against the petitioner and others for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,987/- and Rs. 6451/- respectively with subsequent interest on the basis of a savings deposit scheme conducted by the petitioner. Those suits are being resisted by the petitioner and others on several grounds which are not very relevant for purposes of these civil revision petitions. In I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981, the respondents herein applied for attachment before judgment of a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 8000/- respectively belonging to the petitioner. Initially, the court passed an order of conditional attachment and subsequently the attachment was also made absolute after hearing the objections raised by the petitioner and others. It is not in dispute that the order of attachment absolute has become final in the sense that the petitioner had not preferred any appeal against the orders of attachment. However, the petitioner subsequently filed I. A. No. 573 of 1982 I. A. No. 574 of 1982 in O.S. No. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981 under O.38 R.9 C. P. C. Praying for the raising of the attachment effected already in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981 in O.S. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of those applications, the petitioner. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of those applications, the petitioner. after referring to the attachment already effected in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981, stated that though he is possessed of sufficient property to clear all the amounts that may be due to the respondents in the event of the respondents succeeding in the suit, yet, he had also spent quite large amounts in raising sugar cane crops in his lands which had been harvested by the Receiver and the amounts were lying with the Receiver and the Sugar Mill as well and that he had not been paid any amount at all. It was also further stated by the petitioner that he was in need of money and that he was prepared to furnish sufficient security for the payment of money due to the respondents without prejudice to his contentions in the suits. A draft security bond was also stated to have been furnished along with the petition. Ultimately, the petitioner prayed that after accepting the security so furnished by him, the order of attachment effected in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and A. No. 1572 of 1981 may be raised. That application was resisted by the respondents herein on the ground that immediately after the institution of the suits, an order for conditional attachment was passed by the court and after the petitioner and others appeared and contested the proceedings, the court as satisfied that a case for making the conditional order of attachment absolute had been made out and passed an order also to that effect on 23-9-1981 and therefore. the petitioner cannot be permitted again to offer security and release the amounts already attached. According to the respondents, if the petitioner was acting bona fide, then, such an application ought to have been filed even before the orders were passed in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981 and after the disposal those applications by passing an order attachment absolute, the remedy of the petitioner was only by way of an appeal and not to again pray for the raising of the attachment. An objection that the applications were not maintainable was also raised by respondents. 2. The learned Principal District Munsiff. An objection that the applications were not maintainable was also raised by respondents. 2. The learned Principal District Munsiff. Gobichettipalayam, who enquired into these applications, was of the view that if the petitioner was in any manner aggrieved by the order of attachment passed already in I. A. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981, an appeal ought to have been preferred by him under O.43, R.1 (Q) C. P. C. and not having done so, it was open to the petitioner to urge again that the attachment should be raised on accepting the security. The applications were therefore held to be not maintainable and dismissed. 3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that though in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981, an order for attachment absolute had earlier been passed, yet. that would not preclude the petitioner from approaching the court under O.38 R.9 C. P. C. offering security and praying that the attachment effected earlier should be withdrawn. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel that O.38 R.9 C. P. C. is intended to facilitate the raising of attachment already effected and to enable a party to deal with either his money or property already attached on furnishing adequate security to meet the claim of the plaintiff to the satisfaction of the court and that the circumstance that earlier, the defendant was unable to satisfy the court that the claims of the plaintiff would be met by offering sufficient security, would not. preclude him from filing an .application for raising the attachment when subsequently he is able to offer immovable property or other properties as sufficient security to meet the amounts due under the decree that may be eventually passed, Reliance in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision in Ravi Na gabhushanam v. Neti Gopalakrishna Murthy (AIR 1969 Andh Pra 184). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents in these petitions would submit that the petitioner and others had already been heard in the applications for attachment before judgment and only thereafter, final orders were passed and those orders had also become final and thereafter, it is not open to the petitioner to re-agitate the question of furnishing security and raising the attachment again, as the proper remedy of the petitioner would only be to prefer an appeal against the order of attachment and that not having been done, such a relief cannot be prayed for by the petitioner by another independent application. The learned counsel also drew attention to the circumstance that if such applications were permitted that would destroy the finality of the orders even without resort to remedies provided for under law. 4. The fundamental question is whether the applications are not maintainable in view of the inaction on the part of the petitioner in not having preferred appeals against the order; in I. A. No. 1571 of 1981 and I. A. No. 1572 of 1981. It is true that originally, on the applications for attachment before judgment taken out by the respondents, notice was given to the petitioner and others and they had appeared in response to such a notice and had also shown cause as to why there should not be an attachment before judgment but their objections were overruled and the attachment was made absolute on 23-9-1981. There is no dispute now that no appeals had been preferred by the petitioner against those orders. Even so, the petitioner maintains that it is open to him to invite the attention of the court to the availability of security to meet the claim of the respondents and the hardship caused to the petitioner by the order of attachment passed against him and to request the court to raise the attachment. To appreciate this, it is necessary to refer to Sec. 94 (b) and O.38 Rr. 5, 6 and 9 C.P.C. S.94 (b) C.P.C. is the substantive statutory provision conferring powers on court to direct the defendant to furnish security, to produce any property belonging to him or her and to place the same at the disposal of the court or order attachment of any property. Such powers have been conferred in order to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. Under O.38. Such powers have been conferred in order to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. Under O.38. R.5 (1) C. P. C. the court must first be satisfied that the defendant is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his or her property or he or she is about to remove the whole or any part of his or her property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court with a view to delay or defeat or obstruct the execution of any decree that may be passed against him or her and thereafter, the court should issue a notice in the appropriate form, conforming to the requirements of O.38. R.5 (1), and setting out the details specified thereunder within a time to be fixed by it either calling upon him or her to furnish security in such sum as may be specified in the order, or to produce and place at the disposal of the court when required the property so specified in the application or the value of the same or even such portion thereof as may be sufficient to meet the decree or issue notice merely directing the defendant to appear and show cause why he or she should not furnish security for the amount claimed in the suit. O.38, R.5 (2) C. P. C. requires specification of the property to be attached as well as the estimated value thereof under O. 38. R.5 (3) C.P.C., the court may consider directing the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified. That power of the court is intended to safeguard and protect the interest of the plaintiff during the interregnum between the filing of an application for attachment before judgment and the service of notice of that application on the defendant and his or her appearing in response to that with reference to the matters mentioned in the notice under O.38. R.5 (1). C. P. C. and showing cause. The expression used in O.38, R.5 (3) C. P. C. is "conditional attachment" which would normally mean that it is in the nature of a dependent attachment or an attachment which would enure and depend upon certain conditions. namely, the defendant appearing and furnishing security or showing cause. Such a conditional attachment is intended to be operative during the interregnum or the intervening time. namely, the defendant appearing and furnishing security or showing cause. Such a conditional attachment is intended to be operative during the interregnum or the intervening time. As otherwise, the defendant can part with all his or her valuable properties either pending receipt of a notice under O.38. R.5 (1) C. P. C. or during the pendency of the suit as well and the court as well as the plaintiff who may eventually succeed would be left helpless and justice would be defeated to prevent which the power of conditional attachment is conferred on courts under S.94 (b) C. P. C. to be exercised in conformity with and after satisfying the requirements of O.38. R.5 (1). and (3) C. P. C. O.38. R.5 (4) C. P. C. is a newly introduced provision and that states that any order of attachment if made and effected in violation of the requirement of O.38. R.5 (1) C. P. C. shall be void. O.38. R.6 (2) provides for withdrawal of the attachment effected earlier. If. in response to a notice under O.38. R.5 (1) C. P. C. the defendant appears and shows cause or otherwise satisfies the court, then the court may proceed to withdraw the attachment effected earlier. If, on the other hand, the defendant does not show cause why he or she should not furnish security or fails to furnish security, then it will be open to the court to proceed under O.38. R.6 (1) C. P. C. and order attachment of the property specified in the application or such portion thereof as appears sufficient to satisfy any decree that may be passed in the suit, in the appropriate form namely, Form 7-A in Appendix F. Then occurs O.38, R.9 C. P. C. providing for withdrawal of the attachment made by court when the defendant furnishes security required together with security the costs of the attachment or when suit is dismissed. All that is contemplated by O.38. R.9 C. P. C. is that though an order for attachment before judgment has been made yet the court has power to direct the withdrawal such attachment when the defendant furnishes the security required ether with security for costs of the attachment. The later part of O.38. All that is contemplated by O.38. R.9 C. P. C. is that though an order for attachment before judgment has been made yet the court has power to direct the withdrawal such attachment when the defendant furnishes the security required ether with security for costs of the attachment. The later part of O.38. R.9 C. P. C. declares that the attachment shall be ordered to be withdrawn when the suit is dismissed and that would also indicate that the stage for applying R.9 is really after the court passes an order for attachment under 38. R.6 (1) C. P. C. O.38, R.9 P. C. speaks merely of an order made for attachment before judgment and proceeds to state that nevertheless, the court shall order an attachment being withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the required security. There no restriction upon the exercise of power by the court and O.38. 9 C. P. C. has been couched in terms which are wide and general. Being a provision intended to safeguard the rights of a successful plaintiff in the suit, there is really no fetter on the exercise of such a power by the court even after the court had passed an order of attachment earlier which had be come final. Indeed, it clearly appears from the phraseology adopted in O.38. 9 C. P. C. that an order of attachment is essential before the power of withdrawal of such an attachment on furnishing of security contemplated in that rule can be exercised. The Rule infers an independent and substantive statutory right on a defendant to bring to the notice of the court that he is a position to furnish security to meet the claim of the plaintiff and that therefore, there is no need for an order of attachment effected earlier to continue to be operative as the security would be sufficient to meet the claim of he plaintiff which may ripen into a decree. O.38, Rr.5 and 6 (1) C. P. C. would also indicate a scheme by which the defendant is given an opportunity to show cause against the attachment by furnishing security and the attachment being effected owing to his failure to do so. Despite that, an independent right is conferred by O.38, R.9 C.P.C. on the defendant to furnish the required security and to pray for the withdrawal of the attachment effected already. Despite that, an independent right is conferred by O.38, R.9 C.P.C. on the defendant to furnish the required security and to pray for the withdrawal of the attachment effected already. This provision is quite understandable as it may very often happen that at the time when the application for attachment before judgment is considered by court. the defendant, for no fault of his. may not be in a position to furnish the required security to meet the claim of the plaintiff as he may not then own any valuable Property and for his inability to furnish security. the court may direct the attachment of either moneys or assets belonging to the defendant and specified in the application for attachment before judgment. Subsequently it may be that the defendant comes by some substantial property, say by inheritance or a bequest or through some other unexpected but fortunate circumstance and he would then be in a position to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff with reference to the claims in the suit by the offer of security subsequently available but not available earlier and persuade the court to withdraw the attachment order so that the defendant may not be prejudiced and the interest of the plaintiff may also be adequately safeguarded. Thus, the provision made in O.38. R.9 C. P. C. is a beneficial one intended to give an opportunity to defendants who despite an order of attachment passed against them are in a position to offer security for safeguarding the claims of a plaintiff made in the suit and pray for a withdrawal of the order of attachment made already either over their other assets or moneys. 5. The decision in Ravi Nagabhushanam v. Neti Gopalkrishna Murthy (AIR 1969 Andh Pra 184) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner dealt with a case of release from attachment of one half of an item for the purpose of satisfying the debts other than the one sued upon. The court had ordered the release of the property from attachment on the view it took that the properties still left intact and under attachment would be sufficient to satisfy the debt. Even so, it was held that there was no provision under which such an application could be brought or maintained. Dealing with the scope of O.38. The court had ordered the release of the property from attachment on the view it took that the properties still left intact and under attachment would be sufficient to satisfy the debt. Even so, it was held that there was no provision under which such an application could be brought or maintained. Dealing with the scope of O.38. Rr.5, 6 and 9 C. P. C. Gopalrao Ekbote, J., pointed out as follows at page 186:- "It his also to he seen whether, when once an order under R.5 of O.38, Civil P. C. is made final under R.6 of O.38, Civil P. C. an application to release the property from attachment for the purpose of privately selling it in order to discharge the debts of third parties is permissible under O.38, Civil P. C. A combined reading of Rr.5. 6 and 9 O.38. C. P. C. would leave no in one doubt that when a conditional order of attachment is made under sub-rule (3) of R.5, it can be either withdrawn or made absolute after notice to the defendant under R.6. The effect of sub-rule (2) of R.6 is not to provide for a further stage of showing cause or furnishing security after an order of attachment under sub-r. (1) of R.6 has been made. The only other stage of directing removal of attachment made under R.6 is under R.9. While sub-rule (2) of R.6 refers to the withdrawal of a conditional attachment made under R.5 (3). R.9 refers to the withdrawal of an unconditional attachment effected under R.6, R.9 provides that the court shall order such attachment to be withdrawn when (1) the defendant furnishes the security required together with security for the costs of attachment or ('2) the suit is dismissed". In the instant case conditional order of attachment was made under R.5 (3). It was made absolute under R.6. The attachment was not withdrawn under R.9 as there was no application under that rule made by the defendant". The above observations would indicate that the remedy provided for under O.38. R.9 C. P. C. is in the nature of an independent remedy and can be availed of by a defendant even after an order for attachment under sub-r. (1) of R.6 of O.38. C. P. C. has been made, as in this case. The above observations would indicate that the remedy provided for under O.38. R.9 C. P. C. is in the nature of an independent remedy and can be availed of by a defendant even after an order for attachment under sub-r. (1) of R.6 of O.38. C. P. C. has been made, as in this case. The view taken by the court below that the applications filed by the petitioner are not maintainable is, therefore, plainly erroneous. Since the applications had been dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability without an investigation into their merits, the orders of the court below dismissing I. A. No, 573 of 1982 and I. A. No. 574 of 1982 in 1982 O.S. No. 955 of 1981 and O.S. No. 956 of 1981 are set aside and those applications are directed to be restored to file to be dealt with on their merits in accordance with law. These civil revision petitions are, therefore, allowed; but there will be no order as to costs.