ORDER S.K. Dhaon, J. - The Regional Transport Authority. Agra (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Authority), on the basis of the notification dated 10-1-1981 issued by the State Government under S. 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as inserted by the U.P. Legislature), (hereinafter referred to as the notification) on April 1982 granted no less than 35 permanent stage carriage permits on the Aligarh-Jalesarvia Gonda, Iglas, Hathras, route (hereinafter referred to as the route). Under S. 47131 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 (Central Act) the Transport Authority had fixed a limit of 41 stage carriages and 36 permanent stage carriage permits were already under issue. Therefore, there existed only five vacancies on the route and an equal number of permanent permits could be granted. However, the notification authorised the transport authorities in the State to grant permanent stage carriage permits on all non-notified routes to all eligible applicants in disregard of any limit or ceiling fixed on them (the routes). An existing operator of the route feels aggrieved by the said order dated 8-4-1982 passed by the Transport Authority. Hence this petition. 2. The validity of the notification was challenged in this Court by means of writ petitions, one of them was filed by an existing operator of the route. (not the petitioner). This court passed interim orders staying the. operation of the notification. The interim orders continued to operate till 24-3-1982 when all the writ petitions were dismissed by a common judgment. During the pendency of the writ petition some petitions were filed in this Court at Lucknow. There too, on 28-1-1981, interim orders staying the operation of the notification were passed. The interim orders continued till after 24-2-1983. The aforementioned existing operator of the route questioned the correctness of the judgment of this Court in the Supreme Court by a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court, on 16-4-1982, passed an interim order staying the implementation of the notification with respect to the route. 3. In pursuance of the impugned order the respondents 4 to 26 (hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondents were, on 14-4-1982, issued permanent stage carriage permits on the route. The Supreme Court, on 16-4-1982, passed an interim order staying the implementation of the notification with respect to the route. 3. In pursuance of the impugned order the respondents 4 to 26 (hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondents were, on 14-4-1982, issued permanent stage carriage permits on the route. Subsequent to 16-4-1982, the Transport Authority refused to issue permits to the remaining grantee s. One of them, Messrs Narendra Kumar Naresh Chandra, preferred a writ petition in this Court seeking, inter alia, the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Transport Authority to perform the ministerial act of issuing a permit in pursuance of the impugned order granting permits on the route. This Court, on 10-10-1982, issued an interim mandamus directing the Transport Authority to issue a permit. This order too was challenged in the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition by another existing operator of the route viz. Sri Satya Vir Singh. In it, he also challenged the legality of the impugned order. The Supreme Court, on 5-11-1982, stayed the operation of the interim mandamus issued by this Court. It, on 21-2-1983, decided the Special Leave Petition preferred by Sri Satya Vir Singh and held that, in view of the interim order passed by it on 16-4-1982, this Court was not justified in issuing an interim mandamus. However, the Court did not refer at all to the impugned order passed by the Transport Authority. 4. This petition was filed on 20-1-1983. It was founded mainly on the ground that the impugned order was passed in the teeth of the clear interim orders passed by this Court at Lucknow. It was prayed that a writ of mandamus may be issued commanding the Transport Authority to cancel the permits issued by it to the contesting respondents in pursuance of the impugned order. It was also prayed that the contesting respondents may be restrained from operating their stage carriages on the route. During the pendency of this petition, the Supreme Court. on 24th Feb. 1983, set aside the judgment dated 23.3. 1982 given by this Court. It held that the notification was ultra vires, void and ineffective. The judgment of the Supreme Court is reported in AIR 1983 SC 383 : 1983 All LJ 356 Rameshwar Prasad v. State of U.P.. During the pendency of this petition, the Supreme Court. on 24th Feb. 1983, set aside the judgment dated 23.3. 1982 given by this Court. It held that the notification was ultra vires, void and ineffective. The judgment of the Supreme Court is reported in AIR 1983 SC 383 : 1983 All LJ 356 Rameshwar Prasad v. State of U.P.. Thereafter, the petitioner sought an amendment of the instant writ petition to challenge the legality of the impugned order on the ground that, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case (supra), the same had been rendered void ab initio. A prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari was sought to be included in the petition. The application for the amendment of the writ petition has been allowed by me today after considering the objections of the contesting respondents. 5. The law declared by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case that the notification is "ultra vires, void and ineffective" is the law of the laud as is the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the impugned order was passed before that decision. The legal effect of the dictum is that the notification had not been issued at all. It neither existed in the past nor shall it exist in the future unless re-issued in accordance with law. It did not see the light of the day at all. It remained still born throughout. The courts do not enact law, but only discover or just find out the real law. Judges expound the law as has always stood. They do not introduce a new law as the legislature does when making a statute. Likewise, Judges while interpreting a law do not either repeal it or amend it or modify it. In other words, the judiciary does not make an inroad into the legislative function of the State. Necessarily, precedent much less a dictum of the Supreme Court has a retrospective operation. The Supreme Court has not prescribed the limits of the retrospectivity of the law declared by it in Rameshwar Prasad's case. Hence the problem of existing or vested right being destroyed or impaired, as in the case of a legislative act does not arise at all. 6. The notification is the foundation of he impugned order. The impugned order cannot stand by itself. Hence the problem of existing or vested right being destroyed or impaired, as in the case of a legislative act does not arise at all. 6. The notification is the foundation of he impugned order. The impugned order cannot stand by itself. Once the notification is declared void it too becomes nonest. It also in the eye of law did not take its birth. It therefore, did not confer any right upon the contesting respondents. None of the contesting respondents held or acquired any rights under the impugned order. The permits issued to the contesting respondents have ended automatically. 7. On behalf of the contesting respondents it is urged : (1) The writ petition is highly belated, (2) The Supreme Court while deciding the Special Leave Petition preferred by Sri Satyavir Singh by necessary implication upheld the impugned order, (3) the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy by way of an appeal. Neither of the three contentions are tenable. 8. The first contention of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents can be repelled on more than one grounds. Firstly in view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case on 24-2-1983, the cause of action for filing a writ petition really arose on that date. Secondly, on the basis of the said judgment it was open to an existing operator of the route to make an application to the Transport Authority that it should cancel the permits issued to the contesting respondents and stop the plying of their vehicles. On its refusal to do so, the operator would have been entitled to approach this Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus. Here the petition was filed on 20-1-1983. Thirdly, there is no period prescribed as such for filing a writ petition. No doubt the court has the discretion to throw out a petition on the ground of lathes on the part of a particular petitioner. The validity of the notification was under serious challenge all along. The judgment of this Court was under appeal before the Supreme Court. Having regard to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be said that on account of the inertness of the petitioner till 20-1-1983 the contesting respondents had altered their position to their detriment. Fourthly, on 8-4- 1982, the interim order dated 28-1-1981 passed by this Court of Lucknow was intact. Having regard to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be said that on account of the inertness of the petitioner till 20-1-1983 the contesting respondents had altered their position to their detriment. Fourthly, on 8-4- 1982, the interim order dated 28-1-1981 passed by this Court of Lucknow was intact. There cannot be any getting away from the fact that the Transport Authority observed the said interim order of this Court in its breach. The Transport . Authority will be encouraged to flout the orders of this Court with impunity in case this writ petition is thrown out on the ground of delay. 9. As regards the second contention, it is nobody's case that the petitioner was at any stage a party to proceedings either in this Court in the writ petition filed by Messrs Narendra Kumar Naresh Chandra or in the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition preferred by Satyavir Singh. Moreover, in its order dated 21-2-1983 the Supreme Court made a reference to the interim order dated 16-4-1983 passed by it in an appeal which was pending its decision before it. The Supreme Court, it appears. did not adjudicate upon the legality of the impugned order as it was conscious of the fact that in a large number of appeals pending before it, the validity of the notification was in question. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that by necessary intendment the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the impugned order. 10. The last contention too can be negatived on a number of grounds. First. the petitioner had no grievance against the merits of the individual grantees including the contesting respondents. He could not challenge the validity of the notification as the Appellate Tribunal was not competent at all to adjudicate upon that question. Secondly, this had already on 24-3-1982 held that the notification was valid. The judgment of this Court was binding upon the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, even if the Appellate Authority could go into the question of validity of the notification, no useful purpose would have been served in filing an appeal. The remedy of the appellant, in the circumstances, would not have been an efficacious one. Thirdly, the impugned order being void ab initio it can be challenged straightway in this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution by passing the remedy provided by the Statute. The remedy of the appellant, in the circumstances, would not have been an efficacious one. Thirdly, the impugned order being void ab initio it can be challenged straightway in this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution by passing the remedy provided by the Statute. Last but not the least, here is a case where facts "cry" for the grant of a relief by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction as the Transport Authority acted in flagrant disregard of the interim order passed by this Court on 28-1- 1981. 11. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8-4-1982 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Agra granting permanent stage carriage permits on the Aligarh-Jalesar via Gonda, Iglas, Hathras route is quashed. The respondents 4 to 26 are restrained from operate their stage carriage vehicles on the bays basis of the permits issued to them in pursuance of the impugned order. In the circumstance of the case there shall be no order as to costs