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1983 DIGILAW 52 (HP)

LAL SINGH v. MUNSHI RAIN

1983-10-28

T.R.HANDA

body1983
JUDGMENT T.R. Handa, J.—The petitioners have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to seek the quashing of the order recorded by the Subordinate judge Palampur on 6-4-1931 in a pending civil suit, being Civil Suit No. 172 of 1977 and vide which the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of two of the issues framed in the suit treating them as preliminary issues. The short question involved in these proceedings pertains to the interpretation and scope of the expression debt as defined in Section 2 (f) of the Himachal Pradesh Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. This is how the question has arisen : the respondent-plaintiff instituted his suit out of which this revision petition has arisen against the petitioner-defendants for the recovery of Rs, 6,000/-. The suit was based on a pronote executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. The consideration of the pronote as per allegations in the plaint was the balance of price of fuel wood supplied by the plaintiff to the defendants and which amount was due on the date of the pronote and so admitted by the defendants, 3. It appears that the defendants in their defence inter alia pleaded that they were marginal farmers as defined by Section 2 (k) of the Act presumably suggesting thereby that the amount claimed in the suit already stood discharged in terms of Section 3 of the Act, 4. The counter contention of the plaintiff was that the amount in suit was not a debt within the meaning of the Act nor were the defendants marginal farmers as defined in the Act and hence the provisions of Section 3 of the Act could not be attracted to liquidate the claim of the plaintiff. 5. Out of the several issues framed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the various pleas of the parties, issues Nos. 11-A and 12 covered the aforesaid pleas regarding the automatic discharge of the amount in suit in terms of Section 3 of the Act. These two issues read :— Issue No. 11-A : Whether the amount in suit is not a debt, as alleged ? O. P. P, Issue No, 12 : Whether defendants are marginal farmers, if so, to what effect ? O. P. P. Both these issues, as stated earlier, were tried as preliminary issues. These two issues read :— Issue No. 11-A : Whether the amount in suit is not a debt, as alleged ? O. P. P, Issue No, 12 : Whether defendants are marginal farmers, if so, to what effect ? O. P. P. Both these issues, as stated earlier, were tried as preliminary issues. Vide his impugned order the learned Subordinate Judge returned his findings on issue No. 11-A against the defendants holding that the amount claimed in suit though a liability of the defendants was not a debt as defined in the Act. Issue No. 12 was declared as redundant in view of the findings on issue No. 11-A. 6. The learned Subordinate Judge expressed the view that inasmuch as the amount in suit was the off shoot of the transaction of sale of fuel wood executed between the parties, it could not be treated as a debt as defined in the Act, I am totally unable to appreciate the logic behind the reasoning advanced by the learned Subordinate Judge in support of his above conclusion. His reasonings are contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his impugned order and 1 can do no better than to extract the same in extenso :— "4. Now let me advert to the very definition of the word "debt" as defined in Section 2 (f) of H. P. Relief of Agricultural Indeotedness Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as an Act. This term can be well comprehended if the very definition of it as envisaged under Section 2 (f) of the Act is given. The same reads as follows ;— (f) "debt" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from a debtor whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or otherwise." The very starting words "grammatical variations and cognate expressions" predominently govern the expression and intendment carried in this definition. If one takes the literal and grammatical meaning of this expression which as per the definition itself has got to be looked into, one is constrained to hold that all debts are liabilities but all liabilities are not debts. This conclusion and finding with regard to the term "debt" is in fact derived from the law of lexicon. If one takes the literal and grammatical meaning of this expression which as per the definition itself has got to be looked into, one is constrained to hold that all debts are liabilities but all liabilities are not debts. This conclusion and finding with regard to the term "debt" is in fact derived from the law of lexicon. Verily, this meaning of the terms appears to be practical, in consonance with the public policy and intendment of the aforesaid act as well. If all claims of money is suit irrespective of their primary and principal nature, are branded as debts, the sequel to which it will give rise would be disasterious and instead of furthering the intentions of the act, it would negative the whole expression as used above. 5. In nutshell I conclude that the amount in the instant suit arose not from a debt, but from an independent transaction between the parties. Apparently I conclusively hold that this amount has not arisen from a debt. This issue accordingly stands decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff." 7. The short and simple argument of Shri Ramesh Chand Sood, the learned counsel for the defendants is that the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his suit being admittedly a liability in cash due from the defendants, it squarely and clearly falls within the definition of term debt as found in Section 2 (f) of the Act and which takes into its purview the liability of the applicant. For this simple reason according to the learned counsel, the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge on issue No. 11-A cannot be sustained in law. As regards issue No. 12 the contention of the learned counsel is that in terms of the express provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, this issue belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer duly appointed in that behalf by the State Government and the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same not even to declare it as redundant 8. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, it may be observed, had practically nothing to urge in support of the impugned order. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, it may be observed, had practically nothing to urge in support of the impugned order. 9. Now a simple reading of the language employed in Section 2 (f) of the Act to define the term debt would suffice to suggest that it is wide and comprehensive enough to take into its purview every kind of liability due from a debtor regardless of the fact that the liability is in cash or kind, is secured or unsecured, is payable under a decree or order of any civil court or otherwise. The use of the expression otherwise at the end of the definition clearly shows that a liability created or incurred under a contract, commercial or other, would also be a debt for the purposes of the Act. The observations of the learned Subordinate judge that all debts are liabilities but all liabilities are not debts are certainly misconceived and in utter violation of the declared object and express provisions of the Act. In making these observations the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been influenced by the use of the phrase " debt with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means" used in Section 2 (f). This phrase was apparently used to enlarge and certainly not to narrow the scope of the terms debt as was considered by the learned Subordinate Judge. The use of this phrase only means that a liability not actually described or called as a debt but by some other cognate expression shall nonetheless be treated as a debt for the purposes of the Act. To take an example, a plaintiff may claim a certain amount from the defendant describing it as arrears or as due on account of the balance struck or as damages for breach of contract or in some like manner. The use of the phrase with its grammatical variations and cognate expression after the word debt in the definition clause only indicates that all such claims which are the alleged liability of the defendant would fall in the definition of debt even though they have not been specifically named or described as debt, 10. The only catch in the definition is that before a liability would fall under the definition of debt it must be shown that it is due from a debtor. The only catch in the definition is that before a liability would fall under the definition of debt it must be shown that it is due from a debtor. The expression debtor is defined in the succeeding clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act in the following terms : — "(g) "debtor" means a marginal farmer, a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan who is in debt ; but does not include a small farmer." 11. Now the avowed object of the Act as found in the preamble is to provide for relief from indebtedness to certain farmers, landless agricultural labourers and rural artisans in the State. The term debt and debtor were defined keeping in view the aforesaid object and Section 3 of the Act was also enacted in furtherance of the same object. If we read the two definitions, that is, of debt and debtor conjointly with Section 3 of the Act and in the light of the declared object of the Act, it would present no difficulty in appreciating that the intention of the Legislature was to liquidate all types of liabilities of such of the poor sections of the society which answered the definition of debtor. While defining the term debt the intention was not to make distinction between different types of liabilities but to make distinction only between different types of persons by whom the liabilities were payable. If there still remains any doubt on this score, Section 13 can be called into play to remove the same. This section reads : "13. While defining the term debt the intention was not to make distinction between different types of liabilities but to make distinction only between different types of persons by whom the liabilities were payable. If there still remains any doubt on this score, Section 13 can be called into play to remove the same. This section reads : "13. Savings.—Subject to the provisions of Section 9, nothing in this Act shall affect the debts and other liabilities of any debtor or small farmer falling under any of the following matters, namely :— (a) any rent due in respect of any property let out to such debtor ; (b) any liability arising out of breach of trust or any tortious liability ; (c) any liability in respect of wages or remuneration due as salary or otherwise for services rendered ; (d) any liability in respect of maintenance, whether under a decree of court or otherwise ; and (e) debt due to— (i) the Central Government or State Government ; (ii) any local authority ; (iii) a bank as defined in the Himachal Pradesh Agricultural Credit Operations and Miscellaneous Provision (Dank) Act, 1972 (7 of 1973) ; (iv) a body corporate established under any law for the time being in force ; (v) any co-operative society, registered or deemed to be registered under the provision of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 (3 of 1969) ; (f) any Government Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) ; (g) any sum due to Government; and (h) any amount recoverable as arrears of land revenue.” It is obvious that but for the enactment of this section all liabilities of the kind mentioned in this section right from clause (a) to clause (h) and due from a debtor must have stood liquidated in terms of Section 3 of the Act. The very fact that Section 13 was enacted to save such liabilities due from debtors from being liquidated under Section 3 of the Act shows that they were all treated as falling within the definition of the term debt. 12. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the amount in suit does not fall within the definition of ‘debt simply because it is an off shoot of a commercial contract of sale of fuel wood, therefore, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. 13. 12. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the amount in suit does not fall within the definition of ‘debt simply because it is an off shoot of a commercial contract of sale of fuel wood, therefore, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. 13. This, however, would not ipso facto resolve the controversy whether the amount claimed in suit is a debt within the meaning of the Act. All that can be concluded from the above discussion is that the amount in suit is a liability in cash which as per the case of the plaintiff is payable by the defendants. Whether this liability is a debt or not as defined in Section 2 (f) of the Act would depend upon the answer to the further question whether the defendants are debtors or not as defined in Section 2 (g) of the Act. 14. Now as is obvious from the definition of debtor reproduced earlier, a person would be a debtor only if he is :— (i) a marginal farmer, or (ii) a landless agricultural labourer, or (iii) a rural artisan and is in debt. The term marginal farmer, landless agricultural labourer and rural artisan have also been defined in Section 2 of the Act. 15 Whether a person is a debtor or not would, therefore, necessarily involve an enquiry into the question whether he is a marginal farmer or a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. The term marginal farmer, landless agricultural labourer and rural artisan have also been defined in Section 2 of the Act. 15 Whether a person is a debtor or not would, therefore, necessarily involve an enquiry into the question whether he is a marginal farmer or a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. Such an enquiry in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Officer duly appointed in that behalf by the State Government This sub-section reads :— "(2) If a question arises whether a person is a marginal or small farmer, or a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan, the question shall be referred to an Officer not below the rank of a Tehsildar duly appointed by the State Government in that behalf and the decision of such officer on the question shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any civil court : Provided that no such question shall be decided unless an opportunity has been given to the interested parties to be heard." The provision extracted above shows that the Revenue Officer would hold the enquiry of the kind mentioned above only if the matter is referred to him and that the matter shall be referred to him only if a question arises whether a person is a marginal farmer or a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. Such a question would obviously arise when a party in debt makes a claim of its being a debtor on account of its being a marginal farmer, or a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan and the other party repudiates such a claim. The claim of the person in debt, however, before it can call for investigation must be bona fide and not a frivolous one. The bona fides of the claimant should be a,-.parent in the sense that the claim is supported by material allegations of fact. The claim of the person in debt, however, before it can call for investigation must be bona fide and not a frivolous one. The bona fides of the claimant should be a,-.parent in the sense that the claim is supported by material allegations of fact. For example, as in the instant case, if a person claims to be a debtor on account of his being a marginal farmer, he must allege that he h an agriculturist, that he earns his livelihood mainly by agriculture and he holds land not exceeding one hector of irrigated or half hector of unirrigated land or in case of a mixture of the two, one hector of unirrigated land-after converting the irrigated land into unirrigated land as per conversion ratio given in Section 2 (k). In case he makes a simple allegation that he is a marginal former without anything more, he can be called upon to furnish the above particulars and in appropriate cases duly supported by affidavit in order to test his bona fides. It is only when such a claim prima facie appears to be a bona fide one that a question can be said to have arisen within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, There may be cases where in terms of the admitted facts, the claim of a person in debt of his being a marginal farmer is unsustainable. For example, such a person may be admittedly a full time employee in some Government Department or a Commercial Organization having nothing to do with agriculture and his main source of livelihood is his income from such employment. In such a situation the question cannot be said to have been raised so as to call for a reference to the Revenue Officer simply because the person claims to be a marginal farmer. Whether a question calling for reference to the Revenue Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act has arisen or not would, therefore, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it shall be for the Court concerned seized of the matter to decide after applying its judicial mind to the material placed before it whether such a question has arisen or nor. In case in the opinion of the Court no such question has arisen so as to cal for reference to the Revenue Officer, the matter would end and the liability would not amount to debt. In case, however, according to the Court concerned such a question does actually arise, it must refer the matter for decision to the competent Revenue Officer whose decision on the point whether a person is a marginal farmer etc. or not would be final. In case the finding is returned in favour of the person in debt, the liability would amount to debt and shall stand liquidated in terms of Section 3. In case, however, the finding is against such a person, the liability would not amount to debt and the provisions of Section 3 of the Act would, therefore, not be attracted in that case. 16. In view of what has been stated above I quash the impugned order of the learned Subordinate Judge and remand the case back to him with the directions to determine whether a question has arisen before him within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act which calls for reference to the Revenue Officer for his decision on the point whether the petitioner-defendants are marginal farmers and in case he is of the view that such a question has arisen then to make a reference accordingly. In case he is of the view that no such question arises in the proceedings before him, he may proceed with the trial of the suit. In case the learned Subordinate Judge in order to form his view whether such a question has arisen or not, considers it necessary to call for more particulars supported by affidavits from the petitioners/defendants, it shall be open for him to do so. Order accordingly.-