Judgment :- 1. The petitioner challenges Ext. P3 order of the Government rejecting his appeal (Ext. P2 dated 26-2-1979) against Ext. P1 order of the 2nd respondent, the Joint Director of Factories and Boilers, Trivandrum, whereby he rejected the petitioner's application in Form No. 2 prescribed under R.4 and 12 of the Kerala Factories Rules, 1957 for registration and grant or renewal of licence for the year 1977 onwards. By Ext. P1 the 2nd respondent held that the petitioner did not produce any document in support of his application. Upholding that decision, the Government stated in Ext. P3 that the petitioner was not the occupier of the factory, that the 4th respondent to whom the premises had been conveyed by the 5th respondent under a registered document was at all material times the occupier and licensee, and that prior to that conveyance the 5th respondent was at all material times the occupier and licensee of the factory. The Government took into account the fact that until 1976 the licence was held by the 5th respondent as owner and occupier and it was transferred to his grand daughter, the 4th respondent in 1979 pursuant to the transfer of all his rights and interest in the property to her. At all material times the licence fee was paid by the 5th respondent or the 4th respondent as the case may be and was on that basis renewed from time to time. Until 1977 the petitioner did not apply for the transfer or the grant of licence to himself. The petitioner's contention that he was the lessee of the property by virtue of a document which came into existence as early as 1970 was ignored by the Government. The main challenge of the petitioner against the impugned order is on the ground that the Government had not taken into account the significance of the registered lease deed of 1970 which although referred to in the order was not considered in proper light or given proper weight. 2. It is a well established principle reiterated by courts from time to time that "judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision making process". See the principle reiterated by the House of Lords in Chief Constable v. Evans 1982-3 All. E.R. 141 (H. L.). 2. It is a well established principle reiterated by courts from time to time that "judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision making process". See the principle reiterated by the House of Lords in Chief Constable v. Evans 1982-3 All. E.R. 141 (H. L.). The questions with which the court is concerned are whether or not the decision was reasonably based on evidence, whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether all relevant matters had been considered or whether there was violation of rules of natural justice or whether the relevant provisions of law had been ignored or misapplied, or whether the decision is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question, could reasonably have made such a decision: See the observation of Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp. (1947) 2 All. E. R.680. In the instant case, as I shall presently show, the Government had applied their mind to the relevant provisions of law as well as to the evidence on record. 3. An occupier is defined by the Act as follows: "'occupier' of a factory means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a managing agent, such agent shall be deemed to be the occupier of the factory." The contention of the petitioner is that he was in ultimate control of the factory being the lessee. His application for the licence in Form No. 2 was under R.4 and 12. R.4 says: "Application for registration and grant of licence The occupier of every factory shall submit to the Chief Inspector an application for registration and grant or renewal of licence and notice of occupation, specified in S.6 and 7 in Form No. 2 in triplicate". Rule 12 says: "Notice of occupation The notice of occupation shall be in Form No. 2." The application was thus made by the petitioner as an occupier of the. factory. The burden was upon him to show that he was the occupier as statutorily defined. He produced in support of his contention a registered document of 14th January, 1970 executed by himself and granting to himself the lease in respect of property owned by the 5th respondent. The 5th respondent was not a party to the document. factory. The burden was upon him to show that he was the occupier as statutorily defined. He produced in support of his contention a registered document of 14th January, 1970 executed by himself and granting to himself the lease in respect of property owned by the 5th respondent. The 5th respondent was not a party to the document. No evidence was produced by him to indicate that the 5th respondent was even aware of the document No rent receipt or any other document was produced by him to support the contention that the 5th respondent or the 4th respondent acted in accordance with the terms of the document. The document executed and registered by the lessee in his own favour without the owner being a party to it and without any evidence to show the owner's knowledge of the document or subsequent consent to act in accordance with the document has, in my view, no value at all to support the argument that respondents 4 and 5 are bound by the alleged lease in favour of the petitioner. The significant fact that during all material times respondents 4 and 5 held the licence in their favour with the knowledge of the petitioner was duly taken note of by the Government. The 5th respondent was the owner of the property until he transferred his rights to his grand daughter, the 4th respondent. He was the occupier of the property and the licensee of the factory until his rights were transferred to his granddaughter upon which she became the owner in possession of the property and the occupier of the factory. She was accordingly granted the licence by the authority. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the Government took into account all material facts and rightly rejected the registered document alleged to be the lease deed which, in my view, was rightly considered by the Government as a totally irrelevant document in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had no right under the relevant provisions of the law to be recognised as an occupier or to be granted a licence. The challenge against Ext. P3 is accordingly unsustainable. The Original Petition is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.