JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act filed by the tenant against the decision of Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiffs suit. 2. The plaint allegations are that the defendant took the shop on a rent of of Rs. 220/- p.m. from the plaintiff by executing a rent note dated 30th August, 1969. From that date rent till May, 1972 Rs. 3030/- was due-after adjustment of payment made. After serving a notice of demand and termination of tenancy the suit was filed for possession and arrears of rent etc. 3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 3 filed their joint written statement setting up the defence that no rent note was executed by them in favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand the shop had been taken on rent from Kishan Chand and Buddha Ram through his power of attorney at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month ; that the rent was being regularly paid to the landlords and nothing was due from him ; that defendant No. 2 was neither the tenant of the shop nor in possession thereof. 4. Defendant No. 2 filed his separate written statement denying the plaint allegations. He also pleaded that no rent deed had been executed by him in plaintiff's favour but contended that he was in possession of the shop and was carrying on business therein. He also pleaded having paid Rs. 4,100/- in cash to the plaintiff to be adjusted towards future rent. He denied being in arrears rent and the suit was not maintainable. 5. The court recorded a finding that defendant No. 2 was neither tenant nor possession of the shop. Relationship of landlord and tenant was held proved and also that the rent note was executed by defendant No. 1 which was admissible for collateral purposes. On these findings the court decreed the plaintiff's suit for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent against defendant Nos. 1 and 3. 6. When the matter came before me on the earlier occasion a question about the admissibility of the deed dated 30th August, 1969 was raised. In view of some conflicting decision the matter was referred to a larger Bench. A Division Bench has since answered the question on 9th Oct. 1 and 3. 6. When the matter came before me on the earlier occasion a question about the admissibility of the deed dated 30th August, 1969 was raised. In view of some conflicting decision the matter was referred to a larger Bench. A Division Bench has since answered the question on 9th Oct. 82 and it has held that (i) an unregistered lease deed can be looked into only for collateral purposes and (ii) in the instant case the lease deed could not be looked into for the purposes of establishing relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties or proving the rate of rent and the duration of the lease. 7. The revision has now come up for hearing on merits before me in the light of the decision of the Division Bench. Sri S.N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the plaintiff opp. parties has urged that apart from the rent note dated Aug. 30, 79 (Ex. 1) there was other material also to prove the tenancy. According to him an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession was sufficient to create a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Such oral evidence, according to him, would not be barred by Section 91 of the Evidence Act. Lastly, he submitted that even if no relationship of landlord and tenant was proved the decree could still be granted and against the revisionist as a licensee. In my opinion, none of the above contentions can come to his rescue. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows :- "107-A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term, exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee ; Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.". 8. Accordingly, except in the case of leases which are from year to year or for a term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent all other leases can be made either (i) by registered instrument or (ii) by an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Sri Agrawal has contended that in cases of leases which are covered by latter part of para 2 of Section 107 T.P. Act mere existence of a written inadmissible instrument, will not bar the creation of lease by oral agreement with delivery of possession. He urged that where an inadmissible document had been executed but it was also established that delivery of possession followed the oral agreement the requirements of Section 107 would be amply satisfied and a valid lease would come into existence. The submission does not appear to be sound. The relevant portion of Section 91 of the Evidence Act is as under: "Section 91 When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained." Exception 1 .............. Exception 2 .... Explanations 1, 2, 3 ...... 9. The section gives primacy to the written text as against the frailty of memory which fades with passage of time. Exception 2 .... Explanations 1, 2, 3 ...... 9. The section gives primacy to the written text as against the frailty of memory which fades with passage of time. The provision is wholesome, both on principle and on a matter of policy. A document is normally supposed to be the correct record of what the parties thereto have agreed to and before signing had had an opportunity to alter its contents if what was written did not really conform to the agreement or did not correctly represent the true intention of the parties. However once the document has been written it must exclude all other evidence regarding its contents. The section makes the document as the sole and only evidence of the contents. As a matter of public policy the written document must always prevail against vageries of memory which may or may not be able to reproduce with any exactitude the actual terms agreed upon. The very object for which writing is used is to perpetuate the memory of what is written down and so furnish a permanent proof thereof. 10. The mere fact that the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document would therefore, bar admission of any other form of evidence about the terms of such contract except the document itself. Accordingly, when the terms of a contract or grant have crystallised as a written document then that document alone remains relevant for the purpose of proving the terms of the contract, and would exclude all other kinds of evidence in that behalf. Respondent's submission to the contrary would only result in rendering the provision of both Section 91 Evidence Act and Section 49 Registration Act as meaningless and nugatory. Such an interpretation, therefore, cannot be accepted. 11. In the instant case, admittedly a document had been executed between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 3 which has since been held to be inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. Here the contract of tenancy is not based merely on an oral agreement followed by delivery of possession simplicitor. Had that been a case certainly a valid lease might have come into existence. However, the position had become materially different as admittedly there was a duly executed document encompassing all the terms and conditions of the agreement of lease. Here the contract of tenancy is not based merely on an oral agreement followed by delivery of possession simplicitor. Had that been a case certainly a valid lease might have come into existence. However, the position had become materially different as admittedly there was a duly executed document encompassing all the terms and conditions of the agreement of lease. In view of Section 91 this document alone could be looked into as proof of the terms of the lease and all other evidence has to be completely excluded. Once it is held that Ex. 1 was not admissible for want of registration no evidence in proof of oral agreement and delivery of possession in pursuance thereof can be looked into. 12. Learned counsel has tried to get some support from AIR 1941 Calcutta 102, but there what was attempted to be proved was only the existence or otherwise of a document and not contents thereof. That case cannot be an authority for the proposition which has been canvassed before me. What Sri Agarwal wants to urge is that although Ex. 1 may be inadmissible yet it would be proper to consider the oral evidence about the terms of the lease and of delivery of possession along with it if it establishes the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. If such a course is allowed to be adopted the plaintiff would be successful in proving the contents of the document in a round about manner, provisions of Section 91 Evidence Act notwithstanding. 13. Such an argument cannot be countenanced. In this connection it was faintly submitted that this plea was not taken by the petitioner in the court below or even in the grounds of revision. It is true that this question has been raised for the first time after the reference had been answered by the Division Bench. However, I do not think there was any occasion for the petitioner to raise this question earlier. It is only after it had been decided that Ex. 1 was not admissible in evidence for want of registration that this question really cropped up, that too in reply to Sri Agarwal's submission based on the latter part of para 2nd of Section 107. This objection, therefore has no merit. 14. It is only after it had been decided that Ex. 1 was not admissible in evidence for want of registration that this question really cropped up, that too in reply to Sri Agarwal's submission based on the latter part of para 2nd of Section 107. This objection, therefore has no merit. 14. Lastly, it is urged that even though relationship of landlord and tenant may not have been proved yet the suit could still be decreed by treating the petitioner as a licensee. This appears to be the plea of a counsel in distress. The cases which have been relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his submission do not help him. 15. In Abdul Gani v. Smt. Babni I.L.R. 25 Allahabad p. 256, the defendant had denied the stand of the plaintiff based on contract of tenancy and pleaded adverse possession for a period of 17 years. The court below had upheld the plaintiff's ownership and also held that the defendant had occupied the house with plaintiff's permission, in these circumstances it was held that the plaintiff could succeed on the basis of his title even when he had failed to establish defendant tenancy. Similarly in Balmukund I.L.R. 25 Allahabad 498, a Full Bench of this court was considering a case in which an issue about the plaintiff's title had been framed and it was held that even if the plaintiff failed to prove tenancy he could succeed on the basis of his title. Both these cases are therefore, clearly distinguishable. Besides this in this case question of title could not have been gone into as the suit was tried by the court of Small Causes. A suit on the basis of title could only be heard and on the regular side. In U.P. a Judge of Small Causes Court can decree the suit for possession only where it was between lessor or lessee. Once it is found that such a relationship does not exist either the plaint will have to be returned for presentation to the proper court or the would fail. Reliance is also placed on Rama Shanker v. Noor Mod. Once it is found that such a relationship does not exist either the plaint will have to be returned for presentation to the proper court or the would fail. Reliance is also placed on Rama Shanker v. Noor Mod. and another 1976 A.L.J. 748, where in para 13 of the report Hon. R.B. Misra J. (as he then was) had this to say : "But in a case Where the question of title has also been gone into and the parties were at issue on the point and the parties had led evidence, it is not necessary to direct the plaintiff to file another suit for possession on the basis of title and the suit can be decreed on the basis of the findings recorded by the court below. The only guiding consideration is that no prejudice should be caused to the other side." 16. Therefore, it was in these very special circumstances that the court had decreed the suit on the basis of title when the plaintiff failed to prove contract of tenancy. In that case the question, of title was in issue between the parties and they had an opportunity of leading evidence on that question and the court's below had recorded their finding in plaintiff's favour. The instant case, however, is entirely distinguishable. This suit is based on tenancy and the question of title was neither decided nor could have been decided by the court below. The defendant also disputed the title only faintly just to oust the jurisdiction of the court. However none of the parties had led evidence to establish title. No finding has also been recorded by the trial court on this question. In the circumstances, the principles laid down in 1976 A.L.J. 748 ( supra ) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. As mentioned earlier a suit between the lessor and lessee is maintainable in the court of Judge Small Causes but such court had no jurisdiction to enter into disputed questions of title or to grant a decree based on title. It is, therefore, futile for the respondent to urge that in the present case the court could fall back upon plaintiffs title to sustain the decree for possession. 17. In view of the above discussion I find force in the revision and it is accordingly allowed. It is, therefore, futile for the respondent to urge that in the present case the court could fall back upon plaintiffs title to sustain the decree for possession. 17. In view of the above discussion I find force in the revision and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff respondent is dismissed. This, however, will not prejudice any right of the plaintiff which he may have to recover possession of the premises otherwise. There will be no order as to costs.