JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition arises out of an appellate order passed under section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Roop Chand and Rukmani Devi, respondents 2 and 3 were the landlords of the building in dispute. They both died and their heirs have been brought on the record. One Mullu was the tenant of the disputed building. Mullu also died and his widow, three sons and three daughters have filed the present writ petition. The landlords filed an application under section 21(l)(a) of the Act for the release of the building on the ground of their personal need. Their case was that the accommodation they had with them in House No. 59/86, Nachghar, Birhana Road, Kanpur was wholly insufficient to accommodate the two applicants, the wife of the applicant Roop Chand, five sons, one daughter-in-law and one grand son. It was also stated that the tenant had got his own House No. 116/406, Rawatpur, Kanpur where he could shift to easily. 2. The application was contested, but the fact that the tenant had a House No. 116/406, Rawatpur, Kanpur was admitted. Their case was that the landlords have many houses and accommodation in the city of Kanpur and that they had from time to time let out those accommodation to different parties without utilising the same for their own need, if any. They could have very well satisfied their need from such accommodations. It was also alleged that the landlords have sufficient accommodation with them which they have concealed. Further, it was stated that the family of Mullu consisted of eight persons. The eldest son was employed in the Nagar Mahapalika and two other sons were students. Lastly, it was alleged that the tenant carries on the work of washerman and if he shifted to Rawatpur, he would lose his business and means of livelihood. 3. The Prescribed Authority after considering the evidence of the parties and the circumstances arising out of the case came to the conclusion that the accommodation in occupation of the landlords was adequate to meet their need. It was further observed that the plea of the landlords that the tenant could shift to his own house in Rawatpur was not entertainable, as the said house had already been let out. It was further observed that the plea of the landlords that the tenant could shift to his own house in Rawatpur was not entertainable, as the said house had already been let out. On a consideration of the question of hardship the Prescribed Authority was of the view that it would act harshly to the tenant and his profession of washerman will also be affected in case he was asked to vacate the accommodation in dispute. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. 4. The landlords filed an appeal before the District Judge. By a judgment dated 22nd June, 1981 the appeal was allowed. The order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside and the application for release under section 21(1)(a) of the Act was allowed. The learned District Judge held that the bonafide need of the landlords was made out for additional accommodation. On the question of hardship, the learned District Judge held that the amount of inconvenience or loss apprehended was not such as to by pass the pressing and genuine need for additional accommodation for residential purpose by the landlords. 5. In this petition, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that the findings on the question of pressing need and hardship given by the learned District Judge were both wrong and vitiated by errors of law. The contention was that the District Judge had not taken into consideration the exact number of persons in the family of the landlords, and that of the tenant, the exact extent of accommodation with the landlords and the alleged letting out of accommodation by the landlords from time to time. In regard to the question of hardship it was urged that correct approach had not been made to the question in issue. Reference was made to the provisions of Rule 16(1)(d) and Rule 16(2)(b) in this context. The other question urged by the learned counsel was whether the Explanation to section 21(l)(a) of the Act would be attracted to the facts of the case. 6. Learned counsel for the landlord-respondents however urged that in view of the fact that the tenant admittedly owned another accommodation in the same city, a part of which was already available in a vacant state to him and which would prove adequate for his need, was a sufficient consideration for allowing the application of the landlords under section 21(l)(a) of the Act. As a matter of fact, the fact that the tenant had another accommodation in the same city in a vacant state was sufficient to disregard the objection by the tenant against the application made by the landlords for the release of the accommodation. It was further urged that the finding on the question of bonafide need could not be challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and this Court would not re-appraise the evidence itself to see whether the finding was vitiated or not. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The finding by the court below is that the need of the landlords was bonafide and genuine. Strenuous attempt was made at the Bar to show that this finding was vitiated. Even if the finding was vitiated on account of wrong or incorrect appreciation of evidence, it is not open to correction by this Court in writ jurisdiction. See Syed Yaqoob v. Radha Kishan, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477. and Babhut Mal v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1297. It is, therefore, not open to this court to go into question to find out whether the finding is correct or not. Nothing could be shown that any material evidence had been ignored or any inadmissible evidence had been taken into consideration. The question is purely a question of fact-what is the extent of accommodation available with the landlords and secondly, whether the landlords had not availed of any other accommodation which was owned by them when the concerned tenant had vacated it. Merely because a tenant vacates an accommodation, the landlord is not entitled to occupy it for himself. Firstly, it may require release order. Secondly, it may be an accommodation which does not cone within the purview of the Act. Thirdly, it may be an accommodation which would not be suitable or sufficient of the use of the landlord. All these questions would be questions of fact and this court in writ jurisdiction will not go into such questions of fact. The finding arrived at by the learned District Judge that the landlords had a genuine and bonafide need for additional accommodation has to be accepted as final. 8. On the question of hardship, the learned District Judge has taken into consideration two essential facts. The finding arrived at by the learned District Judge that the landlords had a genuine and bonafide need for additional accommodation has to be accepted as final. 8. On the question of hardship, the learned District Judge has taken into consideration two essential facts. Firstly, that the building under tenancy was essentially a residential one, the landlords needed additional residential accommodation and that it suited the need of the landlords. Similarly, the tenant had his own house in Rawatpur, a part of the said house had been let out to other but substantial portion was in his possession and occupation. It was further found that Rawatpur was an area where a number of Washerman lived and carried on their business. The learned District Judge was of the view that the tenant would not suffer any such hardship or less in business if he shifted to his own house in Rawatpur. It was also observed that there were essential facilities for washing clothes in that area. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that in this court that the tenant had his clientele in the area where he resided and he would lose his livelihood if he shifted to Rawatpur. The question is that the accommodation in dispute is a residential one. It was not let out for doing any business. If the washerman keeps some clothes there or irons some of the clothes, it would not change the nature of the accommodation from a residential to non-residential one. Since the accommodation was not taken for purposes of business, the question of loss of business would not be a relevant consideration. What the court had to see was whether there would be a greater hardship to the tenant in case he was made to shift his residence from the accommodation in dispute to another one. Since it was not a non-residential accommodation, the provisions of Rule 16(1)(a) would not be attracted. On the contrary, the provisions of Rule 16(l)(c) would be attracted. This rule provides that where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held as tenant of any public premises, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be construed liberally. On the contrary, the provisions of Rule 16(l)(c) would be attracted. This rule provides that where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held as tenant of any public premises, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be construed liberally. There is no manner of doubt that the tenant has another accommodation owned by him in the same city and, as such, the landlord claim for additional requirements had to be construed liberally. It is true that there is no provision like Rule 16(2)(b) in regard to residential accommodation, yet the provisions of Rule 16 l)(c) are clear and applicable. Since the accommodation in dispute is not a non-residential accommodation, the provisions of Rule 16(2) b) would not be attracted, but then the position remains that if the landlord bonafide needs additional accommodation and the tenant has another accommodation of his own which is adequate for his need, the tilt will be in favour of the landlord. The learned District Judge has, in my opinion, applied this very test and has held in favour of the landlords. I do not find any manifest error of law in the view taken by the learned District Judge. 9. In view of the above, it will not be necessary to decide the question whether the Explanation to section 21(l)(a) of the Act was attracted and is applicable. An argument was raised at the Bar on behalf of the respondents, but it is equally true that no such point was taken in the counter affidavit in this court nor was such a point raised before the appellate court. The above Explanation is clear in its intent. Where a tenant or any member of his family builds or acquires in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, the objection of the tenant to an application under section 21(1)(a) of the Act is not to be entertained. The Act clearly stipulates that where a tenant gets an accommodation in a vacant state either by himself or through any member of his family, his objection to the grant of an order for the release of the accommodation occupied by him as a tenant would not be considered. The Act clearly stipulates that where a tenant gets an accommodation in a vacant state either by himself or through any member of his family, his objection to the grant of an order for the release of the accommodation occupied by him as a tenant would not be considered. In other words, the intention is that where a tenant has his own accommodation, he is not entitled to remain in possession of another accommodation as a tenant. However, in my opinion, it is not necessary to go into question of the applicability of the Explanation to section 21(l)(a) of the Act in the present petition. The writ petition can be decided without going into this question. 10. For the reasons indicated above, I find no merits in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition has no merits. It must fail and is accordingly dismissed. However, parties are directed to bear their own costs. 11. It would be in the interest of justice to grant some time to the petitioners to vacate the accommodation in dispute. Their ejectment will remain stayed for a period of three months provided they give an undertaking in writing to the prescribed authority within one month of this order stating that they would vacate the accommodation immediately on the expiry of three months from today and will hand over vacant possession peacefully to the landlords and also deposit within a period of one month a sum equivalent to three months' rent of the accommodation with the prescribed authority. In case the undertaking and the deposit are not made within a period of one month, the eviction of the tenants may take place any time after the expiry of the said period of one month.