JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a second appeal by the Union of India from a decree declaring that the order of plaintiff-respondent's dismissal from service No. C. G. 159l/Con/l dated 15th January, 1972 passed by the General Manager, Ordnance and Parachute Factory, Kanpur, is illegal and ultra vires and that the plaintiff continues in service of the Union of India with full benefits on the date of the institution of the suit and further directing the defendant not to give effect to the said dismissal order, "deeming the plaintiff in continuous service." 2. The plaintiff-respondent was a labourer in the Ordnance and Parachute Factory at Kanpur. On 6th July, 1971 he was charged along with Satya Narain of gross misconduct, wilful neglect of duty and repeated and deliberate disobedience of the orders of their superiors. A charge-sheet under Rule lq of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, was duly served on the two and enquiry was held under the said rule by Sri H.L. Nayar, who was appointed the inquiring authority. A written reply was filed by the plaintiff-respondent to his charge-sheet. He attended at some hearings before the enquiring authority but moved for charging him with the allegation of bias against him. That request was turned down and the inquiring authority having completed the enquiry he submitted his report holding the plaintiff-respondent guilty of the charge against him. A notice dated 14th December, 1971 was thereafter issued to the plaintiff under Clause (4) of Rule 15 of the said C. C. A. Rules by the General Manager of the Factory, who was the Disciplinary Authority. The notice reads as under: "MEMORANDUM No. CF-1591/Con. Ordnance Parachute Factory, Kanpur, dated 14-12-71. A copy of the Enquiry Report submitted by the officer appointed vide Order of even No. dated 18-8-71 to enquire into the charges framed against Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L, Lab. 'B' OPF vide this office Memo No. CF-1591/Con. Dated 6-7-71 is enclosed. On a careful consideration of the enquiry report aforesaid the undersigned agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and holds that the articles of charges are proved. The undersigned has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L. Lab. 'B' OPF vide this office Memo No. CF-1591/Con. Dated 6-7-71 is enclosed. On a careful consideration of the enquiry report aforesaid the undersigned agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and holds that the articles of charges are proved. The undersigned has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L. Lab. 'B' is not a fit person to be retained in service and so the undersigned proposes to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on him. Shri Ram Babu. T. No. 4933/L. Lab. 'B' is hereby given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. Any representation which he may wish to make on the penalty proposed will be considered by the undersigned. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than fifteen days from the date of receipt of this Memorandum by Shri Ram Babu. The receipt of this Memorandum should be acknowledged. Enclo: as above. Sd. J. S. Rastogi 13/1 O/c (J. S. Rastpgi) General Manager. Sd. Illegible 13/1 To Shri Ram Babu T. No. 4933/L. Lab. 'B', OPG 30/140, Ghumni Mohal, Kanpur. A representation dated 28th December, 197 was thereupon submitted by the plaintiff-respondent to the said General Manager. The representation was disposed of by the said General Manager by the following order: "ORDER N. CF-1591/Con./l. Ordnance Parachute Factory, Kanpur, dated 15-1-72. Ref:- Representation dated 28-12-71 of Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L. Lab. 'B\ OPF. I, the undersigned, do hereby impose the penalty of dismissal from service with effect from 15-1-72 on Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L, Lab. 'B\ OPF. Sd. J. S.Rastogi 13/1 O/C (J. S. Rastogi) General Manager." It was communicated lo the plaintiff-respondent by the Dy. Manager/Admin, with his covering letter dated 15th January 1972 which reads as follows: "CONFIDENTIAL No. CF-1591-/Con. Ordnance Parachute Factory. Kanpur, dated 15-1-72. To Shri Ram Babu, T. No. 4933/L, Lab. 'B/ OPF Regd. A/D post 31/140 Ghumi Mohal, Kanpur. Sub: Disciplinary action. Ref: Your representation dated 28-12-71. Your above representation has been examined carefully and it has been decided by the disciplinary authority that the penalty of dismissal from service be imposed on you. The attached order of such penalty is accordingly served on you. Enclo: One Sd. B. B. Verma O/c (B. B. Varma) Dy. Manager/Admin. For GENERAL MANAGER. Ref: Your representation dated 28-12-71. Your above representation has been examined carefully and it has been decided by the disciplinary authority that the penalty of dismissal from service be imposed on you. The attached order of such penalty is accordingly served on you. Enclo: One Sd. B. B. Verma O/c (B. B. Varma) Dy. Manager/Admin. For GENERAL MANAGER. N. O. O. Copy to : I/C, L. B. for necessary action in regard to publication of F. O. and making suitable endorsement in the Service Book of the individual concern. The above penalty has been imposed for gross misconduct, wilful neglect of duty, repeated and deliberate disobedience of orders." 3. The plaintiff's case was that the order of dismissal was illegal on the several grounds (i) to (xii) under paragraph 32 of the plaint. 4. The following were the issues on which the parties went to trial: "1. Whether the dismissal order dated 15-1-72 is illegal and ultra vires on the grounds mentioned in Para 32 (I) to (XI) of the plaint? 2. Whether the notice under Section 80 C. Pt C. is illegal and invalid? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff.entitled." 5. The grounds on which the validity of the dismissal order was challenged were considered by the learned Munsif seriatim. He found: (1) that the plaintiff was provided with all the necessary materials for his reply to the charge sheet and defence; (2) that the plaintiff was posted in H. T. Shed as stated by defendant in his written statement; (3) the plaintiff's version that S/Shri Prem Shanker, R. K. Mittal and S. D. Verma were displeased with him and the charges were fabricated by these persons out of malice, was not believable; (4) the other grounds that the enquiry officer was biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff and that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with Rules 14 and 15 and that the plaintiff was not given the statutory assistance, have no force; and that (5) Rules 14 and 15 of the said C.C.A. Rules were properly followed. The next ground to be considered by the learned Munsif was to The effect that the disciplinary authority had arrived at a final conclusion while issuing the show cause notice which amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff of disproving the charge and establishing his innocence. The next ground to be considered by the learned Munsif was to The effect that the disciplinary authority had arrived at a final conclusion while issuing the show cause notice which amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff of disproving the charge and establishing his innocence. The show cause notice dated 14th December, 1971 was then referred to by the learned Munsif. He then read Clause (4) of Rule 15 of the said C.C.A. Rules and observed: "In the present case he punishing authority in show cause notice has come to a conclusion though provisionally that a penalty of dismissal should be imposed upon the plaintiff. Once a delinquent servant came to know his fate at the time of show cause notice, there is no sense to call upon him to submit his representation. This is a clear violation of statutory rules and also the principle of natural justice because it cannot be said that delinquent servant was afforded reasonable opportunity to make representation against the punishment proposed to be imposed.'' The learned Munsif proceeded to hold that: "In these circumstances it is crystal clear that in the present case Rule 15 of C.C.S. (C.C.A,) Rules, 1965 has not been followed and the plaintiff was deprived of reasonable opportunity to disprove the guilt and establish innocence at this stage and the impugned dismissal order deserved to be quashed on this count only." 6. The last ground considered by the learned Munsif was that the impugned order of dismissal does not contain reasons and that it was not a speaking order and the plaintiff was thus denied an opportunity of having it scrutinised and tested by an appellate authority or a court of law. The last ground considered by the learned Munsif was that the impugned order of dismissal does not contain reasons and that it was not a speaking order and the plaintiff was thus denied an opportunity of having it scrutinised and tested by an appellate authority or a court of law. After referring to the contents of the dismissal order, the learned Munsif referred to a decision of this Court in Cheda Lal Jha v. Union of India, (1973 Serv Lj 834) in which it was observed that though it was true that where the punishing authority agrees with the finding of Enquiry Officer, it need not record reasons of its own, but where serious objections have been raised against the enquiry report and the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer itself is challenged, it is necessary for the punishing authority to deal with such objections, not necessarily by 'a'" detailed order but nevertheless an order containing brief reasons as to why the objections of the Government servant were not accepted. Having referred to these observations, the learned Munsif observed that although the plaintiff had made applications for a change of the Enquiry Officer on the ground that he was biased against him, those applications were rejected without assigning any reasons. In the words of the learned Munsif: "This raises a suspicion on the part of th2 defendant, that is why he is bent upon not to consider the applications of plaintiff in a just and proper manner. First application was rejected on the ground that it is at a belated stage and the subsequent applications were rejected on the ground that it does not reveal any fresh ground. Further in his representation to show cause notice dated 14-12-71, plaintiff has again repeated his allegations against the Enquiry Officer and also stated that relevant witness Ram Prasad overseer, under whose direct control he was, was not called for. To my mind, what applies is that these are some important and serious allegations against the Enquiry Officer and the punishing authority should have given reasons why their allegations were not accepted.............. the impugned dismissal order passed by the General Manager, Ordnance Factory is a laconic order and contains no reason whatever. In the present circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the impugned dismissal order is illegal and ultra vires." 7. the impugned dismissal order passed by the General Manager, Ordnance Factory is a laconic order and contains no reason whatever. In the present circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the impugned dismissal order is illegal and ultra vires." 7. The result was that on issue No. 1 the learned Munsif found that the impugned order was passed in clear disregard of Rule 15 of the said Rules and the principles of natural justice and was, therefore illegal and ultra vires. Issue No. 2 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff and consequently holding. on issue No. 3, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief claimed, the learned Munsif decreed the suit in the aforesaid terms. 8. The lower appellate court considered the two grounds on which the impugned order of plaintiff's dismissal from service was held to be bad by the learned Munsif and agreeing with his findings on those points, it dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I find that The two courts below did not appreciate the true scope of the principles of natural justice and the law applicable to the facts of the present case. This is not a case where the matter called for a decision on the general principles of law enunciated and expounded in the context of Article 311 of the Constitution or the general principles of natural justice. The plaintiff-respondent was employed on a civilian post in a defence establishment. The lower appellate court has held that he was a member of the defence service and Article 311 did not apply to him but being a civilian employee, the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeals) Rules, 1965 did apply to him by virtue of the opening clause of Rule 3 (1), which lays that "these rules shall apply to every Government servant including every civilian Government servant in the Defence Services but shall not apply to " Rules 14 to 21 contain detailed provisions as to the procedure for imposing penalties. A look at these rules will show that they take care of every aspect of fair-play and natural justice and there is no scope left for importing or taking aid of any principle of natural justice or the provisions for giving a reasonable opportunity as contained in Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. A look at these rules will show that they take care of every aspect of fair-play and natural justice and there is no scope left for importing or taking aid of any principle of natural justice or the provisions for giving a reasonable opportunity as contained in Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. These rules are a complete Code by themselves and have the binding force of law, having been framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. They regulate and control the entire procedure to be followed in all disciplinary proceedings for punishment of the members of the Central Civil Services governed by them. I may here observe that the enquiry in this case was held and the punishment imposed before the amendment of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976 and the consequential amendment of Clause (4) of Rule 15 which did away with a second show cause notice on the question of penalty to be imposed. Clause (4) of Rule 15 as it stood at the relevant time, is in the following terms: "(4) (i) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall (a) furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the inquiry held by it and its findings on each article of charge, or, where the inquiry has been held by an inquiring authority, appointed by it, a copy of the report of such authority and a statement of its findings on each article of charge together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any. with the findings of the inquiring authority; (b) give the Government servant a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within fifteen days of receipt of the notice or such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be allowed, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under Rule 14; (ii) (a) In every case in which it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry, together with a copy of the notice given under Cl. (i) and the representation made in pursuance of such notice, if any, shall be for- warded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice. (b) The disciplinary authority shall after considering the representation, if any, made by the Government servant, the advice given by the Commission, determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the Government servant and make such order as it may deem fit. (iii) Where it is not necessary to consult the Commission the disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by Government servant in pursuance of the notice given to him under Clause (i) and determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on him and make such order as it may deem fit." If it had been a case of minor penalties provided by Clauses (ii) to (iv) of R. 11. the Disciplinary Authority could have straightway proceeded to impose penalty under Clause (3) of Rule 15 without serving the second show cause notice on the question about penalty to be imposed, under Clause (4). It follows that before a second show cause notice under Clause (4) could be issued, the Disciplinary Authority had to apply its mind to the charges and arrive at its findings, on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry held under Rule 14, and then to form an opinion as to the penalty which should be imposed in view of its findings. A show cause notice under Clause (4) of Rule 15 was required to be issued only if the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion, in view .of its finding on the charges on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry held under Rule 14, that one of the major penalties specified in Cls. A show cause notice under Clause (4) of Rule 15 was required to be issued only if the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion, in view .of its finding on the charges on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry held under Rule 14, that one of the major penalties specified in Cls. (v) to (ix) should be imposed on the Government servant. Such notice was not required to be issued in case the Disciplinary Authority was of opinion that one of the minor penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) should be imposed. Therefore, to say that the show cause notice issued by the General Manager, Ordnance Parachute Factory showed that he had closed his mind by having come to a definite finding and conclusion that a penalty of dismissal should be imposed upon the plaintiff, is not a fair interpretation of the notice. The second show cause notice was required to be issued only when the Disciplinary Authority had reached a conclusion that one of the major penalties should be imposed. The object of giving the second show cause notice was only to give the Gov-judgement servant an opportunity to point out the mitigating circumstance, if any, or to show that the proposed penalty was too harsh and should not be imposed upon him in all the facts and circumstances of the case. The representation and the decision at this stage was limited to the consideration of the question as to what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the Government servant. The order of punishment followed thereafter. 10. As to the giving of reasons for agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court ruled as follows: per Gajendragadkar, C.J., in the State of Madras v. A. R. Srinivasan, ( AIR 1966 SC 1827 ) (Paras 14 and 15 at pages 1831-32): "(14). Mr. Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue that the impugned order gives no reasons why the appellant accepted the findings of the Tribunal. Disciplinary proceedings taken against the respondent, says Mr. Setalvad are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and when the appellant passed the impugned order against the respondent, it was acting in a quasi judicial character. Mr. Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue that the impugned order gives no reasons why the appellant accepted the findings of the Tribunal. Disciplinary proceedings taken against the respondent, says Mr. Setalvad are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and when the appellant passed the impugned order against the respondent, it was acting in a quasi judicial character. That being so, the appellant should have indicated some reasons as to why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal; and since no reasons are given, the order should be struck down on that ground alone. (15) We are not prepared to accent this argument. In dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on the State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. That enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial, but having regard to;the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." 11. The proceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial, but having regard to;the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." 11. The decisions referred to by the lower appellate court are not applicable to the facts of the present case and at any rate do not and cannot override the law declared by the Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. A.R. Srinivasan (supra). They are distinguishable on the facts and do not govern the case in hand. So far as Central Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 are concerned, Clause (23) of Rule 14 specifies the contents of the enquiry report and the papers to be submitted by the Inquiring Authority before the Disciplinary Authority. Clause (1) of Rule 15 requires the Disciplinary Authority to record reasons if it decides to remit the case for further enquiry to the inquiring authority. Clause (2) of Rule 15 again requires the Disciplinary Authority to record reasons if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority and in such a case to record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. Clause (4) does not require that the disciplinary authority should record reasons for issuing the show cause notice. It is sufficient that the record shows that the disciplinary authority applied its mind to the case. So far as the appeal is concerned, a Government servant is not prejudiced by any want of reasons in the order of punishment, inasmuch as the entire record is before the appellate authority. The contents of Clause (23) of Rule 14 provide ample safeguard, inasmuch as the inquiry authority has to state in his report the article of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour: the defence of the Government servant in respect of each article of charge; an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; and the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor. Where the disciplinary authority does not give any reasons and agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority and imposes a penalty on that basis, its reasons are thus given by the inquiring authority. Where the disciplinary authority does not give any reasons and agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority and imposes a penalty on that basis, its reasons are thus given by the inquiring authority. The repetition of the same could not serve any useful purpose. 12. The ultimate order of punishment need not contain any reasons under the rules, and if the procedural requirements of Rules 14 and 15 are satisfied, there is nothing else which is needed to be shown by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority need not show anything more before a civil court, or in a collateral proceedings where the validity of its order is challenged, otherwise than by way of appeal or representation before a higher authority under the rules. I may add that it was stated before me at the bar that in Satya Narain's case who was proceeded against along with the plaintiff-respondent on identical charges, the punishment was upheld by the District Court and has become final on the dismissal of Satya Narain's second appeal by this Court. 13. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decree under appeal are set aside. The plaintiff respondent's suit is dismissed but in the circumstances I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.