JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the judgment of the court of IV Additional District Judge, Meerut dated July 31, 1980 allowing an appeal of respondent No. 2 preferred against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. 2. Building No. 89, Dr. Caroli Road Begum Bagh, Meerut was constructed by the petitioner in the year 1965 consisting of 2 floors which were originally numbered as 505/11 Ground floor and 505/12 1st floor. Now the entire building is numbered as 69 Dr. Caroli Road, Meerut. In 1965 when the building was constructed by the petitioner, he was in the employment of the State of U.P. and was posted at Jhansi. He remained posted out of Meerut till 1981. Having postings out of Meerut, the petitioner had rented out the said building to the different tenants one at the ground floor and the other on the 1st floor. Sri N.K. Dega was the tenant of the 1st floor. On 19-4-76 Sri N.K. Daga sent a letter to the District Supply Officer informing his intention to vacate the portion in his use and occupation. Upon this the petitioner moved an application for release of the 1st floor by applying under section 16(l)(b) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 on 22-4-1976. There were also two applicants for allotment of the accommodation under section 16(1)(a) of the said Act. By the order dated 11-5-1976 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application of the petitioner and allotted the accommodation to respondent No. 2 by a separate order. Two revisions filed by the petitioner, one against the order rejecting his release application and the other against the allotment order, were dismissed. The petitioner challenged the revisional order, unsuccessfully, in writ petition No. 1510 of 1976. 3. The petitioner on May 24, 1978, made an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release on the ground that his requirement of the premises in question had since increased, he was entitled to get a release order made in his favour under section 21. The respondent No. 2 filed a written statement and challenged that the petitioner's need had increased. The said respondent contended that the present application was barred by principles of res-judicata. 4. The respondent No. 2 filed a written statement and challenged that the petitioner's need had increased. The said respondent contended that the present application was barred by principles of res-judicata. 4. In support of his application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 the petitioner filed his own affidavit and those of Sri Sudhir Kumar Khurana, Sri Fazal Hasnaini Zaidi, Advocate, Sri Harbansh Lal Wadhwa and Sri Mehar Chand Dhingra, Advocate. The respondent No. 2 also filed his own affidavit and those of Sri Munshi Ram, Sri Vishnu Manohar, Sri P.C. Jain and Sri M.P. Swami. 5. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application filed under section 21 by his judgment dated 28-4-1979. Against the said judgment the respondent No. 2 went up in appeal under section 22. In the appeal the petitioner moved an application before the District judge on 14-3-1980 supported by an affidavit, alleging that his eldest son got married on 7-11-1979 and he had retired from Govt. service on the attainment of age of superannuation. On 31-,-1980 the IV Additional District judge agreed with the findings of the Prescribed Authority that the need of the petitioner was bona fide and that he was likely to suffer greater hardship by the refusal of the application under section 21. But having held that the judgment given in the proceedings under section 16(1)(b) operated as res-judicata, he allowed the appeal of respondent No.2 and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. As a result thereof the application filed under section 21 stood rejected. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition, 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as in proceedings under section 21 the principles or res-judicata cannot apply the appellate authority errored grosely in holding that the application of the petitioner filed under section 21 was barred. 7. The application under section 21 had been filed by the petitioner by asserting that new facts had come into existence since the decision of the application filed under section 16(l)(b) and that on the basis of the emergence of those new facts the petitioner's need to get release order had become more acute. It was also said in the application that the greater hardship was likely to be suffered by him by the rejection of the application than that which the respondent No. 2 would suffer by the acceptance. It was also said in the application that the greater hardship was likely to be suffered by him by the rejection of the application than that which the respondent No. 2 would suffer by the acceptance. The petitioner alleged that vacant accommodations were available in Meerut and the respondent No. 2 could take any one of them for his residence. Apart from the new facts which according to the petitioner were new and not in existence at the time of the decision of the earlier application, the petitioner also laid emphasis on the fact of his eldest son being married and he himself having retired from service. The respondent No. 2 had denied that any new fact or circumstance had come into existence. He alleged that the petitioner after retirement had obtained a shop near Dr. Y.L. Hospital and that he did not require the disputed premises for himself. The respondent No. 2 also denied the requirement of second son of the petitioner for opening a shop of radio. He alleged that Sri Grish Gandhi, second son of the petitioner, did not know anything at all about radio and transistor work and that he had no academic or other qualification for the said purpose. 8. The controversy relating to the changed circumstances had been disposed of by the appellate authority by observing :- "In the present application under section 21(1) (a) the same grounds are repeated which were taken in the earlier petition under section 16(1) (b). Not a single additional factor could be brought forward to show any need for the disputed premises. What is more, this petition under section 21(1) (a) was made on 24-5-18 when the earlier proceedings under section 16(1) (b) were finally concluded by the Hon'ble High Court less than a month before, i.e., on 22-4- 78. Obviously within this short period of less than a month no appreciable change in the circumstances of the landlord or the tenant could have taken place......" The aforesaid finding of the learned Additional District judge appears to me erroneous and an error apparent on the face of record has crept into the same. The application under section 16(1) (b) was filed by the petitioner on 2-4-76 whereas the present application under section 21 had been filed on 24-5-78. There was thus a difference of two years in the dates of the commencement of these two proceedings. The application under section 16(1) (b) was filed by the petitioner on 2-4-76 whereas the present application under section 21 had been filed on 24-5-78. There was thus a difference of two years in the dates of the commencement of these two proceedings. It may be true that the application under section 21 was moved after a month of the judgment of the High Court given in the writ petition preferred against the dismissal of the writ arising out of the proceedings under section 16(1) (b) but that was not in the present case of any consequence. The time lag between the initiation of the proceedings under section 16(1) (b) and section 21 was material and, therefore, one of the main points which weighed against the petitioner in coming to the conclusion that the conditions and circumstances remained the same vanishes. So far as about the strength of family and other circumstances were concerned, the learned Additional District Judge and not properly consider. He appears to be under an erroneous thinking that as the question of bonafide requirement in the earlier proceedings had been gone into and decided against the petitioner, the same finding must be given while deciding section 21 proceedings. I do not mean to suggest that on this controversy the petitioner was entitled to a judgment in his favour. What I want to emphasise is that the appellate court, should have considered the new facts stated by the petitioner including that relating to respondent No. 2 wherein the petitioner had alleged that new accommodations had been available to the said respondent but he did not occupy. It may be noted here that in the appeal under section 22 the petitioner had filed an affidavit about the marriage of his son and about his own retirement. This aspect of the matter has been completely lost sight of by the learned judge. In the writ petition also the parties have exchanged the affidavits supporting their case about the changed circumstances. 9. It may be correct that in section 16(1) (b) as well as in section 21 (1) (a) the legislature has used the same expression, i.e., "bona fide requirement". The settled rule of interpretation of statutes is that an expression used in the same statutes at two places should be given the same meaning unless the context requires otherwise. 9. It may be correct that in section 16(1) (b) as well as in section 21 (1) (a) the legislature has used the same expression, i.e., "bona fide requirement". The settled rule of interpretation of statutes is that an expression used in the same statutes at two places should be given the same meaning unless the context requires otherwise. Though the object and purpose of section 16 is different than that of section 21, but in the background or in the context of these provisions, this expression has to be given the same meaning. The expression require significance that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough There should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he requires the building in question for the purpose for which he has applied. The use of the expression 'bonafide' is indicative of the intention of the legislature that the requirement should be common or with good faith, honestly, truely or actually. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel that the proceedings of sections 16 and 21 being different, the meaning to be assigned to this expression used in the two sections should also be different does not appeal to me. The same word may mean onething in one context and another in different but hear the context of section 16 and 21 is necessarily the same, i.e., the requirement of the land to get his premises released. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires additional accommodation in occupation of the tenant is not sufficient. It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bonafide. The test, as said by the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhelal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596 is objective and not subjective. 10. For what I have said above the next question that arises for decision is whether the principles of res-judicata can be applied to the proceedings under section 21 when the application of the landlord made earlier under section 21 has failed. It had been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that to such a case the principles of res-judicata do not apply and every application has to be decided independently and without being influenced by the judgment given in the earlier. It had been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that to such a case the principles of res-judicata do not apply and every application has to be decided independently and without being influenced by the judgment given in the earlier. To me it appears that in a case where no new facts have come into existence and there have been no intervening change or circumstance the second application may not be entertainable on the principles of res-judicata but where the landlord establishes a change of circumstance since the first application, the said case would require the court typing the second application to reinvestigate not only the question of bona fide requirement but also of greater hardship and to find on the basis of intervening changed circumstances as to whether the landlord is entitled to a release to be made in his favour under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 11. The test is whether the second proceeding involves a new cause of action or whether it is merely an attempt to reiterate the same facts and to get a judgment in his favour on the same old cause of action. Whether or not matter of res-judicata must depend solely upon whether the issue to be decided by the court has already been litigated and decided between the parties. If the circumstances had changed it could not be contended that the issue between the parties remains the same. It is quite clear that a court can upon fresh evidence after very the judgment previously made if the cause of action of this subsequent proceeding is different than what it was in the former, but, of course, if there is no evidence of any fresh circumstance, the second application may be barred by principles of res-judicata. 12. It may worthy of being noted that the question of greater hardship which is required to be decided under the proviso is also one which can change with the lapse of time. Every sort or circumstance may rise to change relevant fact on which the issue of greater hardship falls to be decided. In deciding the question of greater hardship the court must bear in mind that the change of circumstance may occur from day to day and a court will consider changed circumstances while deciding the second application for release made by the landlord. In deciding the question of greater hardship the court must bear in mind that the change of circumstance may occur from day to day and a court will consider changed circumstances while deciding the second application for release made by the landlord. A trivial or insignificant change will not oust the applicability of the principles of res judicata, Each case will have to be decided on its own fact for finding out as to whether the change is of a nature which has altered the position of the parties. It if the answer is in the affirmative the principles of res judicata would not be applicable, 13. Reference was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Act and it was submitted on its basis that as the legislature did not want the principles of res-judicata to apply to an application under section 21, the only restriction imposed is that within an year of the dismissal of the previous application, the second one cannot be moved. This is not the purpose and object of rule 18. Rule 18 no doubt restricts a landlord from moving the second application within an year of the dismissal of the first but it does not rule out the applicability of the principles of res-judicata. The principle behind the res-judicata is different than one which led to the legislature to frame rule 18. The two things should not be mixed up and confused. 14. For all that I have said above the judgment of the appellate court is to be set aside and the case to be sent back to him for deciding the appeal of respondent No. 2 afresh for taking into account the affidavits which were filed in the appeal as well as those which were filed in the writ petition. The parties may file the copies of the affidavits filed in the High Court within one month of the receipt of this judgment by the appellate court. 15. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the appellate authority dated 31-7-80 is set aside and the case is sent back for afresh decision in accordance with law and the observations made in this judgment.