JUDGMENT 1. - 24 Writ petitions were filed in the High Court by various petitioners, challenging the validity of acquisition proceedings, initiated under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (Act No. 24 of 1953) (hereinafter referred to as the Act'), relating to lands situated in village Sukhalpura, Devri, Jhalana Chod, Balrampura, Balrampura and Nand Kishorepura. On January 12, 1982, the Government of Rajasthan, in exercise of its powers, conferred by Sub- section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, issued Notification (Annexure-P/3) to the effect that the land in question was likely to be needed for public purpose, namely, for the construction of residential colony, through the Rajasthan Housing Board. The State Government authorised one of its subordinate officers, namely, the Special Officer, Urban Development Housing Department, to enter the said land and survey it. Subsequently on February 9, 1982, the State Government, in the purported exercise of its powers under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the, Act, issued second Notification (Aunexure-P/4), directing that since the acquisition of the said land was urgently required the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act would not apply to the proceedings of acquisition. By the same Notification the Government also made declaration under Section 6 of the Act that the notified land was needed tor public purpose and directed the Special Officer to take orders for the acquisition of the said land. The Government simultaneously directed the said Officer under sub-section, (I) of Section 17 to take possession of the notified land within 15 days of the publication of the notices mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. A public notice, dated May 5, 1982, was published in the Rajasthan Gazette, on May 7, 1982, stating that the Special Officer intended to take possession of the notified land after the expiry of 15 days from the date of publication of the notice and that claims to the compensation or of interest on such laud he made to him. 2. In the writ petitions, filed by the petitioners, the main attack was on the Notification Annexure-P/4, dated February 9, 1982, issued by the State Government in the purported exercise of its powers under Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act. 2. In the writ petitions, filed by the petitioners, the main attack was on the Notification Annexure-P/4, dated February 9, 1982, issued by the State Government in the purported exercise of its powers under Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act. The petitioners' case is that this Notification, which was issued with a view to dispensing with compliance with the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act, is void inasmuch as, the State Government did not apply its mind as to the existence or otherwise of the two preconditions, namely, (i) that there was urgency; and (ii) that the land was waste or arable land, to enable the State Government to take valid recourse to the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act. According to the petitioners, there was no urgency at all and in any case the urgency, if any, not of such a character so as to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Had the State Government applied its mind to the question as to whether the land, which formed the subject-matter of the acquisition was waste or arable, it would have discovered that their pucca residential buildings and other constructions in existence thereon and that it could not have been possibly treated as waste or arable land. It was also urged that a perusal of the impugned Notification revealed that while it contained recital regarding urgency it was conspicuously silent as to whether the notified land was waste or arable, indicating thereby that the question regarding the land being waste or arable was not even present before the authorities, who acted on behalf of the State Government while issuing the impugned Notification and, therefore, the High Court should hold that the State Government failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of law. It did not at all apply its mind and the impugned Notification deserved to be quashed. 3. Learned Single judge, before whom these cases came up for decision, after taking into consideration the ratio decidendi in the cases: (1) Anand Braham Shah v. State of U.P. (AIR 1967 SC 10,11), (2) Smt. Dhanni & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1982 Rajasthan Law Reporter 412), (3) Narain Govind Gavte v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ), (4) Yashonath Mahajan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1980 Bom. v. State of Rajasthan (1982 Rajasthan Law Reporter 412), (3) Narain Govind Gavte v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ), (4) Yashonath Mahajan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1980 Bom. 221 ), (5) Jamanadass Devki Bhai Bhate & Ors. v. The Commissioner, Nagpur Division ( AIR 1976 Bom. 129 ;, (6) Motia and others v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1981 Rajasthan 284), (7) Famens Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ), and (8) Menka Gandhi v. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ), came to the conclusion that on the basis of the material made available to the State Government it was a case of urgency, which fell within the purview of Section 17 (4), read with Section 17 (1) of the Act. The Court, eventually held that the State Government had fulfilled the first condition to enable it to dispense with the compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act. 4. As regards the second point, whether the land under acquisition was arable or waste land, the learned Single Judge observed that the petitioners failed to show in each case the exact area of the construction. Moreover, even in agricultural land some portion of the land was permitted to be constructed so that a cultivator could store his agricultural equipments, fodder for cattle and also stay there for the purpose of cultivation, but on account of such construction the nature of the land could not be converter from agricultural or arable land to urban land. General and vague allegations that there were houses-kutcha and pucca, failed to provide any definite data or material for adjudication whether the entire land sought to be acquired ceased to become arable land. In the opinion of the learned Judge the definition of 'agricultural land' was comprehensive enough and merely by making some constructions here and there on agricultural land, the land could not be automatically converted into urban land. Even if houses were constructed over agricultural land, such land would not become urban land unless under the Rules applications were made and permission was given. As nothing of the above requirements was shown in the cases before him, the learned judge held that the entire land under acquisition, could not be considered anything else except arable land. Even if houses were constructed over agricultural land, such land would not become urban land unless under the Rules applications were made and permission was given. As nothing of the above requirements was shown in the cases before him, the learned judge held that the entire land under acquisition, could not be considered anything else except arable land. The learned Single Judge further held that both the conditions for dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, namely, (i) that it was a case of urgency, and (ii) that the land was arable land, had been fulfilled. In this view of the matter, he dismissed all the writ petitions : vide judgment, dated October 22, 1982. 5. Not being satisfied with the above noted judgment, 15 appellants filed Special appeals which came up for decision before a Division Bench, presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. M. Kasliwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dr. K.S. Sidhu. 6. Hon'ble Kasliwal J, vide his judgment, dated March 25, 1983, repelled all the arguments advanced before him. He held that there was real urgency for taking steps under Section 17 (4) of the Act. The land was being acquired for construction of houses, keeping in mind the planned development of Jaipur City, grave scarcity of houses in Jaipur and time-bound programme for construction of those houses. He further held that the Notification, issued under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, did make mention regarding the urgency which itself was sufficient to carry great weight, though the same might not be conclusive. After considering the entire material the learned judge held that on the basis of the material on record the Government was correct in forming opinion that there was urgent necessity for acquisition land and urgency was of such a nature that compliance of Section 5-A of the Act could he dispensed with. As regards the second condition, the learned judge observed that under the Notifications. issued under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act, khasra numbers, areas in Bighas and Biswas, kind of land, name of the agriculturists have been mentioned, which clearly showed that the State Government was fully alive to the fact that the land sought to be acquired was arable. issued under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act, khasra numbers, areas in Bighas and Biswas, kind of land, name of the agriculturists have been mentioned, which clearly showed that the State Government was fully alive to the fact that the land sought to be acquired was arable. Moreover, the petitioners themselves did not dispute the nature of the land being arable and as such it was not necessary for the State Government to mention in the Notification that the land was waste or arable. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that using or not using the word 'waste' or 'arable' in the Notification in itself was not sufficient to decide the controversy. Admission of a party in the pleading could be considered to be unimpeachable evidence on record and as such the mere non-use of the word 'waste' or 'arable' in the Notification could not render it invalid. He further held that taking an over all view of the matter a Notification could be issued in respect of the land, where only a small fraction has been utilised by cultivators for constructing pucca buildings over their fields for residence or keeping fodder or cattle sheds or for similar other purpose. In the opinion of the learned judge, the notified land was undisputably arable and if the respondents had not taken possession over pucca constructions and were not ready to do so until the final award was given, there was no necessity of quashing the entire Notification. With these observations he dismissed the special appeals. 7. The other learned judge Hon'ble Dr. Sidhu J. agreed with the findings arrived at by Hon'ble Kasliwal J. regarding urgency of the matter to dispense with the proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act. He held that the State Government acted within its powers and not perversely or arbitrarily in forming the opinion that it was a case of urgency within the purview of Section 17 (1) of the Act. Turning to the second point relating to question as to whether land proposed to be acquired was waste or arable, the learned Judge held that the State Government had not applied its mind to form an opinion as to whether the notified land was waste or arable, as envisaged by Section 17 (1) of the Act and the State Government could not have lawfully or validly issued direction 17 (4) of the Act. As on the notified land there were various types of buildings, like huts, kham houses, pucca houses, it could not be treated as waste or arable land. That being so, an inquiry must be held under Section 5-A of the Act giving an opportunity to the persons interested. Persons interested could not be restricted from raising objection in respect of built-up portions of the land alone. The scope of inquiry in this case must necessarily extend to the entire area notified for acquisition. In view of the foregoing reasons, he allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single judge. 8. As there was difference of opinion between the two judges in the special appeals, both the Judges by order dated March 25, 1983, referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the case to one or mote of the other Judges. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, vide his order dated April 7, 1983, directed these special appeals to be listed for hearing before me. These cases could not be listed for a pretty long time as the Single Bench was not formed. On September 27, 1983, arguments were commenced, but could not be concluded and thereafter the Bench was formed on November 16, 1983. The arguments were heard at length and the cases were reserved for judgment. 9. The learned judges, presiding over the Division Bench, have formulated the following points of controversy and referred the same for decision:- 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of these cases and especially looking to the pleadings of the petitioners themselves in the writ petitions in which the land in question has been described as agricultural land used for cultivation. is it necessary to make a mention by the State Government in the Notification that the land was waste or arable and if it is not mentioned then the Notification would be invalid merely on this account ? 2. If a Notification, issued by the State Government in the purported exercise of its powers under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, dispensing with the requirement to hold inquiry under Section 5-A regarding the proposed acquisition, is silent as to whether or not the land proposed to be acquired is waste or arable land, is the Notification valid according to law ? 3. 3. If a small fraction of an arable land proposed to be acquired is occupied by buildings, like huts, khan houses, and pucca houses for residential purposes and for keeping fodder, cattle ponds, cattle sheds and for similar other purposes. is it still permissible to treat the entire land as arable land issue notification under Section 17 (4) read with Section 17 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 ? If not, what are the legal consequences which such buildings as aforementioned, entail in the context of the said Notification ? 10. Before dealing with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties it would be profitable to reproduce Section 17 (1) with its provisos of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, because there is marked distinction between the language of Section 17 (1) of the Act and the Act of 1894. The two Explanations added to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act do not find place in Section 17 (1) of the Act of 1894 and as such the cases decided under that Act will have to be noticed and applied to the facts of the cases keeping in view the difference in language of the relevant portions of the two Sections : Section 17. (1) of Rajasthan Act. Section 17 (1) of Act of 1894. "17. Special powers in case of urgency:-(1) In caws of urgency. when- ever the State Government so directs, the Collector though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-Section (1) take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purpose or for a company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State Govt free from all encumbrances. "17. Special powers in cases of urgency:- (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Govt., free from all encumbrances." Explanation (1):- For the purpose of this sub-section the expression "arable land includes garden land. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Govt., free from all encumbrances." Explanation (1):- For the purpose of this sub-section the expression "arable land includes garden land. Explanation (2):- This sub-section shall apply to any waste or arable land, notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattred trees or temporary structure, such as huts or sheds." 11. The leading arguments in these cases were advanced by Mr. H C. Rastogi on behalf of some of the appellants. The other Advocates appearing for the rest of the appellants have adopted those very arguments. Mr. Rastogi submits that the appellants have pucca houses, constructed on a part of the land in question and have wells with electric fittings. They reside with their families in the houses, situated on the land under acquisition and by no stretch of imagination the land convered by pucca constructions could be said to be waste or arable land. He further argued that if on a small portion of the land there was pucca residential building, no Notification at all could be issued under Section 17 (4) of the Act and the entire Notification would have to be quashed, as it included a portion of the land, which was neither waste nor arable. The State Government failed to apply its mini to the nature of the land, while describing the land as agricultural land. It was necessary fur the State Government to exclude those portions of land over which pucca constructions, wells, huts and cattle sheds were standing from being included in the Notification under Section 17 (1) and Section ion 4 of the Act If the State Government would have applied its mind, such a mistake would not have been contained and the Khasra cumbers over which the pucca houses, wells, cattle-sheds were standing could have been excluded front acquisition or at least a mention could have been made regarding that in the Notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. Learned counsel further urged that the expression 'land', as defined in Section 3 (a) of the Act, did not make any distinction between agricultural land or abadi land. Therefore, the definition of the land given in other Acts, namely the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, could not be applied. Learned counsel further urged that the expression 'land', as defined in Section 3 (a) of the Act, did not make any distinction between agricultural land or abadi land. Therefore, the definition of the land given in other Acts, namely the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, could not be applied. In support of his contention he has placed strong reliance on (9) Sarju Prasad Saha v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1965 SC 1763 ). (10) Nandeshwar Prasad & Ors. v. U.P. Government & Ors. ( AIR 1964 SC 1217 ), and 1) Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab & Ors. ( AIR 1979 SC 1594 ). 12. On the other hand, Mr. B.L. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the housing Board, contended that according to the appellants themselves they were cultivating the land in question and its nature being arable one remained unquestioned and undisputed. Parties were bound by their own admission in pleadings at least in the same case. The land under acquisition has been shown in the Revenue record as agricultural land and was subject to the payment of land revenue. Under Section 66 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act a khatedar tenant, could snake improvement on his holding subject to the restrictions imposed by the State Government from tithe to time. A land-holder, other than the Stair Government, with the prior sanction of the Tehsildar (applied for and accorded in the prescribed manner) could make an improvement on or effecting the holdings of any of its tenants, but no such sanction was necessary if the improvement intended to be made was a well. Further, all or any of the improvements refs tied to in sub-clause (a) of sub-section (19) of Section 5 of the Act, could not exceed over an area not exceeding one-fiftieth of the total area of the holding. The Tehsildar could grant permission for a work subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 68 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. None of the appellants has placed on record the copy of the orders granting sanction in their favour for making improvements over the land and if they made any constructions in violation of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, they could not he allowed to take advantage of their own wrong. One could not change the nature of the land by making unauthorised construction. One could not change the nature of the land by making unauthorised construction. The land as such acquired did fall within the category of arable or waste land. The further submits that a perusal of the Notification. issued under Section 4 (1) and published in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated January 13, 1982, marked as Annexure-R/1, and filed along with the reply of the Housing Board, revealed that the State Government had sufficient material before itself and had applied its mind before issuing Notification under Section 17 (4) of the Act. In the said -Notification khasra numbers, their measurements in bighas and biswas, the type of land viz., Banjar, Barani, Ghair Mumkin Rasta, Barani No. 1 and No. 2, Chahi, Jav had been mentioned. The names of the tenants cultivating over the land and in whose name the land stood recorded in the revenue record had also been mentioned. The measurements of Jav, Chahi, the kinds of Barani had also been mentioned. Mentioning of the above rioted details clearly indicates that the concerned authorities did apply their mind and the issuance of Notification under Section 17 (4) of the Act was neither mechanical nor arbitrary. There was presumption of correctness of entries in the revenue record. Moreover, the land over which constructions were existing have not been taken into possession in pursuance of the Notification, issued under Section 17 (4) of the Act. 13. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by both the parties. As already noticed above, the Central Act (Act No. 1 of 1894) came into force on March 1, 1894. The Central Act applies to the whole of India except the territories which immediately before November 1, 1956, were comprised in Part-B States. Rajasthan was also a Part-B State then and hence the Central Act did not extend to the State of Rajasthan. The Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act came into force with effect from December 12, 1953. As such while considering the applicability of the ratio decidendi of the judgments delivered by various High Courts, the difference in the language of the relevant provisions under the two Acts will have to be kept in view. 14. Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel for the appellants, has placed strong reliance on Nandeshwar Prasad & Ors. v. U.P. Government & Ors. As such while considering the applicability of the ratio decidendi of the judgments delivered by various High Courts, the difference in the language of the relevant provisions under the two Acts will have to be kept in view. 14. Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel for the appellants, has placed strong reliance on Nandeshwar Prasad & Ors. v. U.P. Government & Ors. (Supra), wherein Hon'ble Wanchoo J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as under: "It would also be seen that under the Land Acquisition Act an order under Section 17 (1) or Section 17 (4) can only be passed with respect to waste or arable land and it cannot be passed with respect to land which is not waste or arable and on which building stands " He has also placed reliance on Sarju Prasad Saha v. State of U. P. (supra), wherein Hon'ble Shalt J. speaking for the Court, followed the ratio decidendi of the case of Nandeshwar Prasad (supra) and quashed Notification dated November 10, 1960, issued under Section 17 (4) of the Act and the Notification, dated November 29, 1960, under Section 6 of the Act. 15. He has also cited the case of Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab (supra) and has urged that the State Government on the impugned Notification has not mentioned that the laud likely to he acquired was waste or arable land. As such requirement of Section 17 ( 1) and (4) of the Act have not been complied with and the impugned Notification should be set aside. Under Section 17 (1) of the Act Explanations (1) and (2) have been added vide Section 9 (i) of the Rajasthan Act No. 22 of 1966, published in the Rajasthan Gazette part IV-A Extraordinary, dated November 22, 1966. The Explanation added to sub- section (1) includes gardens within the definition of arable land and Explanation (2) includes scattered trees, temporary structures, such as huts or sheds, within the definition of waste or arable land. The Courts have held that waste or arable land not only includes land capable of cultivation, but also actually cultivated. Whether a particular piece of land is arable or not is a question of fact. Using or not using or the words waste' or 'arable' in the Notification is not of much consequence. It is not alone sufficient to decide the controvetsy either way. Whether a particular piece of land is arable or not is a question of fact. Using or not using or the words waste' or 'arable' in the Notification is not of much consequence. It is not alone sufficient to decide the controvetsy either way. Even if such words are used in a Notification and in fact the land is not waste or arable, the Notification will have to be quashed but on the contrary if the nature of the land remains to be waste or arable, mere non-mentioning of such words in the Notification will not render the sane to be illegal. The Court will have to examine the real substance of the matter. A perusal of the writ petitions filed by the appellants reveals that they have described themselves as Khatedar tenants and in support of that most of them have filed copies of the entries in the, pass-books. They have also mentioned that they grow green vegetables as well as they have prepared land for the crops of Bajra, Makka, Gawar and Jwar. An admission is the best evidence and an opposite party can well rely upon it, and is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved to be erroneous. Reference in this connection tray be Made with advantage, to ( 12) Narayan Bhagv antrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and others ( AIR 1960 SC 100 ). What is admitted by a party must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. Admissions in pleadings stand on a higher footing Even a part of the admission can be relied upon. A perusal of Ex R/3 reveals that in the Notification, issued under Section 17, sufficient details regarding the land sought to be acquired have been mentioned. Khasra numbers, its measurements, quality of the land and names of the tenants have been mentioned therein. A perusal of Ex R/3 reveals that in the Notification, issued under Section 17, sufficient details regarding the land sought to be acquired have been mentioned. Khasra numbers, its measurements, quality of the land and names of the tenants have been mentioned therein. The cumulative effect of the admissions made by the appellants in the writ petitions, non-rebuttal of the entries trade in the revenue record and presumption arising under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act by themselves are sufficient to hold that the Government has formed opinion regarding the land under acquisition being waste or arable on relevant evidence aid it cannot be said that the opinion is based on irrelevant grounds and such suet the validity of the Notification cannot be successfully challenged in a writ petition on the ground that in the impugned Notification words 'waste or arable' laid have not been mentioned. In view of the above findings, I answer questions Nos. 1 and 2 against the appellants and in favour of the respondents. 16. Mere construction of a building on every agricultural land does not convert it into non-agricultural land. A dwelling house erected on a holding by the tenure-holder is regarded as improvement under Section 5 (19) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1955'). Similarly tube-well or a well is also regarded as improvement. 16. Mere construction of a building on every agricultural land does not convert it into non-agricultural land. A dwelling house erected on a holding by the tenure-holder is regarded as improvement under Section 5 (19) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1955'). Similarly tube-well or a well is also regarded as improvement. Sub-section (19) of Section 5 reads as under : "5 (19) "improvement" shall mean, with reference to a tenant's holding, (a) a dwelling house erected on the holding by the tenant for his own occupation or a cattle shed or a store-house or any other construction for agricultural purpose erected or set up by him on his holding ; (b) any work which adds materially to the value of the holding and which is consistent with the purpose for which it was let ; and subject to the foregoing provisions of this clause, shall include- (1) the construction of bunds, banks, wells, water channels and other works for the storage, supply or distribution of water for agricultural purposes ; (2) The construction of works for the drainage of land or for its protection from floods or from erosion or from other damage of water; (3) The reclaiming, clearing, inclusion, levelling or terracing of land; (4) The irrigation in the immediate vicinity of the holding, otherwise than on the village side, of building required for convenient or profitable use or occupation of the holding; (5) The renewal or reconstruction of any of the works or such alteration therein or additions thereto as are not of the nature of mere repairs ; but shall not include such temporary wells, water channels, bunds, enclosures or other works as are made by tenants in the ordinary course of cultivation." 17. In Nandeshwar Prasad's cases (supra) the land sought to be acquired were two plots in the Ahata of the Hamirpur Road. In that case in the Notification, issued under Section 4, it was mentioned that the Governor was pleased to direct that under sub-section (4) of Section 17 the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply and as such the Notification was held to be bad. Such is not the position in the cases on hand. Thus, the observations made in that case do not apply to the facts of these cases. Such is not the position in the cases on hand. Thus, the observations made in that case do not apply to the facts of these cases. In the case of Sarju Prasad (supra) the land sought to be acquired was situated in the Mohalla Nai Bazar in the town of Basti. The Land Acquisition Officer had submitted a report to the Government recommending that the land be exempted from acquisition. Besides that, it was not contested by the State of U.P. that the land under acquisition was not waste or arable land. Thus, this decision is a decision on the special facts of that case and has no bearing on the controversy in issue. In the cases before me, as already mentioned above, the entire land is arable. It has been shown as arable land and waste land in the revenue records. Section 66 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides that a khatedar tenant may make any improvement in his holding, but the State Government may from time to time restrict, in the public interest, making of any such improvement as is referred to in sub-clause (a) of sub-section (19) of Section 5 of the Act of 1955, in the area to be notified for the purpose. Section 67 of the Act of 1955 provides that a land-holder, other than the State Government, may, with the sanction of the Tehsildar (applied for and accorded in the prescribed manner) make an improvement on or affecting the holding or any of his tenament provided that no such sanction is required if the tenant of such holding is a Ghair Khatedar tenant and the improvement which a land- holder desires to make is a well. The second proviso to Section 67 provides that an improvement referred to in sub-clause (a) of Clause (19) of Section 5 shall not extend over such area not exceeding 1/50th of the total area of the holding and the Tehsildar is prohibited from sanctioning any construction otherwise than in the prescribed circumstances. The Government of Rajasthan, vide Notification No. F. 6 (61) Rev. B/Gr. The Government of Rajasthan, vide Notification No. F. 6 (61) Rev. B/Gr. 1/61 dated April 29, 1965 published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary Part IV (Ga), dated April 30, 1965, made restrictions on making of improvement as is referred to in sub-clause (a) of Clause (19) of Section 5 of the Act of 1955 namely, dwelling houses, cattle-sheds, store houses or any other construction within 12 miles of municipal limits of the city of Jaipur. The Notification reads as under:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to the sub-section 66 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955), and in supersession of this Department's notification No. F. 6 (71) Rev. B,63, dated the 1st May, 1961, the State Government hereby restricts, in the public interest, the making of any such improvement, as is referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (19) of Section 5 of the said Act, namely, dwelling- house, cattle shed, or store-house or any other construction for agricultural purposes erected or set up on a holding, in acres specified below, namely:- (1) Areas situated in the Gang Canal area or the Bhakra, Chambal, Jawai or Rajasthan Canal Projects or areas irrigated by any other Major Irrigation Project, and declared as a colony under clause (ii) of the then Colonisation Act, 1954 (Rajasthan Act 27 of 1954); (2) All areas within a radius of - 1. twelve miles of the municipal limits of the city of Jaipur; or 2. six miles of any other city as defined in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959); or 3. three miles of any other municipality; or 4. ten miles of any area for which the State Government has, by an order issued under section 3 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Ac[ 35 of 1959) directed as carrying out of a civic survey and the preparations of a master plan; or 5. three miles of any other municipality; or 4. ten miles of any area for which the State Government has, by an order issued under section 3 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Ac[ 35 of 1959) directed as carrying out of a civic survey and the preparations of a master plan; or 5. five miles of any city, town or village, or other area in which an industry with an investment capital of over one crore of rupees has been or is proposed to be set up or within the area which may be fixed by Government for this purpose." This Notification was amended and the restrictions were lifted, vide Notification, dated January 23, 1971, published in Rajasthan Gazette, dated January 27, 1971 and the cultivators were allowed to make improvements on their holdings on an area upto 400 sq. yards only within the published limits of the areas mentioned in sub-paras (2), (3), (4) and (5) of para 2 of the Notification, dated April 29, 1965, published in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated April 30, 1965. None of the appellants (petitioners) has filed any sanction granted by the Tehsildar in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Agricultural land can be converted into Abadi land only under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act and the procedure provided in accordance with the Notification, issued under the provisions of the Act. One, who makes all unauthorised construction, cannot be permitted to seek an extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and base his case on the ground that because he has made unauthorised construction, the land on which he has made construction ceases to be waste or arable land. However, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the Housing Board, has given an assurance that as far as possible unless the particular portion of the construction fall within the area meant for construction of roads under the scheme, the dwelling houses would not be demolished and their respective owners would be allowed to live in those houses, but that never means that the nature of the land over which those houses are standing have changed or have ceased to he arable land and stand converted into Abadi. Thus the question No. 3 is answered as under:-If on a fraction of arable land proposed to be acquired some construction has been made by raising buildings, huts, kham houses or pucca houses for residential purposes, which fall within the definition of improvement within the meaning of clause (a) of subsection (19) of Section 5 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the land occupied by those constructions does not cease to be arable and even if it is held otherwise, the entire impugned Notification for acquisition under Section 17 (4) read with Section 17 (1) of the Rajasthan and Acquisition Act, 1953, is not alible to be quashed. The appellants are also not entitled to the grant of relief as they have failed to bring anything on record to show that the constructions were made after obtaining permission from the concerned authorities in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, because one who commits wrong cannot improve his own position by ones wrong and seek extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. The reference made by the Division Bench regarding cases, list of which is annexed herewith, stands disposed of as indicated above. *******