JUDGMENT R.P. Gupta, Member - The brief facts of the case are that second appeal No. 188 of 1969-70/Budaun filed by Sri Sher Singh appellant against Hardayal Singh and others respondent was dismissed for default on December 17, 1979 on which date none was present for the appellant but Sri Ratan Singh, Advocate the learned counsel for the respondent was present on that date. On June 23, 1980 the learned counsel for the appellant applied for the restoration of the appeal alleging that he bad no notice of the date of hearing and as such he could not appear in the case. On June 16, 1980 this fact came to his notice. Then he moved restoration application. Prayer for condonation of delay was also made. On November 25, 1980 without notice to the learned counsel for respondent, appeal was restored to its original number, after condoning the delay. On January 16, 1981 learned counsel for the respondent Sri Ratan Singh, Advocate applied that the order dated November 25, 1980 should be set aside as it was passed without hearing the respondent. No opportunity was given to the respondent to file objection against restoration application though restoration application itself was time barred. This application dated January 16, 1981 is now fixed before me for hearing. 2. The learned counsel for the applicant respondent argued that the appeal could not have been restored without heating the respondents who were present at the time of the dismissal for default in the absence of the appellant. According to him this order was against the provisions of C.P.C. and against the principle of natural justice. According to him order passed without hearing the respondent was nullity. The learned counsel for the O.P. appellant argued that the order posed by the court on November 25, 1980 was the correct order. According to him while there was specific provision under order IX rule 9 (2) C.P.C. for notice to the O.P. There was no such provision under order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. and as such it will be presumed that the intention of the legislature was that the appeal can be restored to its original number without notice to the respondents even if they were present in court when the appeal was dismissed for default. According to him the order passed by the court was in accordance with the provisions provided in Civil Procedure Code and as such no question of breach of principle of natural justice arises. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on Vol. 17 (1912) Indian Cases 202, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1933, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1144 and A.1.R. 1971 S.C. 40. The learned counsel for the O.P. appellant further argued that there was no provision of law under which this court can set aside the order dated November 25, 1980. 3. The main question to be decided in the case is whether an appeal dismissed for default can be restored without notice to the respondent though the respondent was present when it was dismissed for default. 4. It is true that under order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. and under order 41 rule 21 there is no provision for issuing the notice to the O.P. before deciding applications given under these rules. These rules are silent on the point of notice. It is not specifically provided in these rules that the applications can be decided oh merit without notice to the other party. It is also not provided that the applications cannot be decided on merit without notice to the other party. On the other hand order 9, rule 9, (2) provides that no order shall be made under this rule unless the notice of the application has been served on the O.P. Similarly order 9, rule 14 C.P.C. provides that no decree shall be set aside unless notice thereof has been served on the O.P. Let us examine whether issue of the notice to the O.P. under order 41 rule 19 and order 41 rule 21 will be against the specific provision of law and against the mandate of the legislature. In other words let us examine whether intention of the legislature is that the application under order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. should be decided without notice to the O.P. 5. Principle of Audi Alteram Partem, which mandates that one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice. Law is well settled that even in administrative proceedings which involves Civil consequences doctrine of natural justice is applicable. There is no distinction between a quasi judicial function and administrative function for the purpose. Principle of Audi Alteram Partem, which mandates that one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice. Law is well settled that even in administrative proceedings which involves Civil consequences doctrine of natural justice is applicable. There is no distinction between a quasi judicial function and administrative function for the purpose. An opportunity to be heard to be given to the persons affected although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramappa v. Bojjappa, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1633. observed that it is necessary to remember that what is administered in Court is justice according to law and consideration of fair-play and equity, however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of law. In Bombay Corporation v. Pancham, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1008 also it was observed that it is the duty of the court of law not only to do justice but to ensure that justice is done. It should bear in mind that it must act only according to law and not otherwise. In the Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40 it was observed that if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rule of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. 6. How the various provisions of C.P.C. in the light of the principles of natural justice are to be interpreted, this thing was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 425. It was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that `Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participation in them of course, these must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso; our laws of procedure should be cons trued, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.' In the light of these observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court order 41, rule 19 and order 41 rule 21 should be interpreted in such a manner so that there may be no conflict between specific provisions of law and rules of natural justice. Absence of the specific provision of law should not be taken as provision by the legislature or as mandate of legislature that notice should not be issued. When order 41 rule 19 and 21 C.P.C. are silent regarding the issue of notice to O.P. we may take help from the various provisions of order 9 C.P.C. where notice was provided to the O.P. if he was present at the time of dismissal of suit for default or where ex parte decree in favour of the plaintiff is to be set aside. Where the suit was dismissed in the absence of the parties for want of process fee etc., no provision was made for notice of the O.P. The plaintiff is given a discretion to file suit or to get the same suit restored under order 9 rule 4 C.P.C. on showing sufficient cause. In view of the provisions of Section 151 C.P.C. In Vol. 17 (1912) Indian Cases 292 the Hon'ble Allahabad Hight Court order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. does not require any notice to be issued to respondent prior to making an order of restoration of appeal struck of for default. This was a case where the appeal was dismissed on account of absence of both the parties. The court examined restoration order in the provisions of order 9 C.P.C. also and found that the order was proper even if the provision of restoration of suit are applied for restoration of appeal. This case is not the authority for the proposition that notice is not to be issued to the respondent though he or his counsel was present when appeal was dismissed for default in the absence of appellant or his counsel. One cannot think of setting aside the decree ex parte in favour of appellant without notice to him, simply because order 41 rule 21 C.P.C. is silent on the point of notice. One cannot think of setting aside the decree ex parte in favour of appellant without notice to him, simply because order 41 rule 21 C.P.C. is silent on the point of notice. The demand of justice is that no such decree passed in favour of the appellant should be set aside on the application i f the respondent without notice to the appellant, Similarly no appeal should be restored without notice to the respondent, if he was present when the order dismissing the appeal was passed. This interpretation of order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. or order 41 rule 21 C.P.C. is neither against the principle of natural justice nor against specific provisions of law. I accordingly hold that where respondent was present when the appeal was dismissed for default in the absence of the appellant or his counsel, application under order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. cannot be heard without notice to the respondent, but where appeal was dismissed in the absence of both the parties, the application under order 41 rule 19 C.P.C. can be heard without notice to respondent. 7. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case it is clear that the order passed on November 25, 1980 restoring the appeal to its original number was not proper order as no notice of the application of the appellant dated June 23, 1980 was given to the respondent, though the learned counsel for the respondent in court when the appeal was dismissed for default on December 17, 1979. This order is ex parte order as it was passed behind back of the respondent and as such it can be set aside under Section 151 C.P.C. under inherent powers of the court as there is no specific provision for setting aside such order which is against law and the rules of natural justice. It is true that in Ram Karan Dass v. Bhgwan Dass, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1144 it was observed that inherent powers are to be exercised by the court in very exceptional circumstances for which code lays down no procedure. The present case is such a case in which this power should be exercised. In fact the order dated November 25, 1980 passed without notice to the respondent was nothing but nullity. The present case is such a case in which this power should be exercised. In fact the order dated November 25, 1980 passed without notice to the respondent was nothing but nullity. For a court which desire to do justice by correcting its own mistakes, it is not always necessary that the order to be corrected must be a nullity. In Sita Ram Sahu v. Kedar Nath Sahu, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 825. Division Bench observed that a court always has power to recall order which has the effect of perpetrating an injustice on a party.' In Jang Sangh v. Brij Lal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1631 it was observed that there is no higher principle for the guidance of the court than the one that no act of court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of the court to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. 8. The result is that the application dated January 16, 1981 given by the respondent is allowed and the order dated November 25, 1980 is set aside. Let the restoration application No. 161 of 1979-80 dated June 23, 1980 given by the appellant be listed for hearing in November, 1983 session after notice to both the parties and their counsels.