JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J.- The petitioner is a registered partnership firm and manufactures building and hardware fittings etc. Its factory is situated at Industrial Area, Aishbagh, Lucknow. Provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Funds Act, 1952, as amended from time to time, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) are applicable to the establishment of the petitioner. The petitioner was served with a notice dated 8th Oct., 1969, issued under the signatures of Accounts Officer for Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, U. P., Kanpur, bringing to the notice of the petitioner that the Provident Fund dues were remitted by the petitioner after the prescribed dates for the period from March, 1968 to February, 1969 and thus rendered himself liable for damages under S. 14-B of the said Act, which come to Rs. 2448.10 Paise on account of Provident Fund contribution and Rs. 50.00 on administrative charges. By this notice, petitioner was required to show cause within seven days of the receipt of the notice as to why the State Government of Uttar Pradesh may not impose damages up to 25% on the belated payments as per revised procedure intimated to the petitioner vide Circular Letter No. 1557/EPF/ UP/Gr. I/221 (Dmg.) dated 22nd June, 1963. In reply to said notice, the petitioner on 18th Oct., 1969 wrote to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner that the Provident Fund dues as well as administration charges were sent to the State Bank of India, Lucknow within prescribed period and the State Bank of India in clearance has recorded payment on the date of the presentation of the cheque, and possibly the delay in clearance on the part of State Bank of India may have been caused due to intervening holidays and suspension of work due to strike etc. The petitioner asserted that payment of the Provident Fund dues and administrative charges have always been regularly made in due time as would be evident from past records. Later on the petitioner received letter dated 27th Aug., 1971 issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (hereinafter to be referred to as opposite party No. 1) requiring him to deposit a sum of Rs. 2448.10 on Provident Fund contribution and Rs. Later on the petitioner received letter dated 27th Aug., 1971 issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (hereinafter to be referred to as opposite party No. 1) requiring him to deposit a sum of Rs. 2448.10 on Provident Fund contribution and Rs. 63.65 on administrative charges under S. 14-B of the Act for making belated payments of provident fund dues for the period referred to in earlier letter dated 8th Oct., 1969, failing which the said amount will be recovered as arrears of land revenue under S. 8 of the said Act without any further reference. After receiving the said notice, the petitioner immediately wrote to the Secretary, Labour Department, U. P. Government, Lucknow on 8th Sept., 1971 enclosing therein a statement showing dates of deposits in respect of the period for which the damages had been levied and asserted that the delay, if any, cannot be attributed to lack of bona fides on their part. The petitioner through its representation made a request for consideration of the matter and for cancellation of the said demand notice issued by opposite party No. 1. A request for giving an opportunity of personal hearing in order to clarify the matter was also made. When the petitioner did not hear anything from the Government on the subject, he wrote a letter dated 10th Aug., 1974 to opposite party No. 1 wherein it was asserted that payments were regularly made without any delay towards provident fund contribution and administrative charges. It was also mentioned in the said letter that the representative of the petitioner had called on opposite party No. 1 in his office and had shown the details of the payments made by the petitioner. Bank challans showing dates of payments through cheques where also enclosed with the said letter. In reply to said letter opposite party No. 1 intimated to the petitioner that in view of certain amendments made in the Act, the State Government is no longer bound to decide any issue with regard to damages and it is Regional Commissioner who has been vested with full powers to levy damages. It was also referred in this letter that the damages in question were levied by the State Government and intimated to the petitioner vide letter No. 19796/UP/52/Dmg. dated 27th Aug. 1971 which the petitioner was required to deposit. He has failed to deposit the same. It was also referred in this letter that the damages in question were levied by the State Government and intimated to the petitioner vide letter No. 19796/UP/52/Dmg. dated 27th Aug. 1971 which the petitioner was required to deposit. He has failed to deposit the same. The petitioner was, thus, called upon to make deposit of the said amount within ten days of the receipt of this letter, failing which action to recover the same under S. 8 of the Act was threatened. The petitioner has sought gushing of notice of demand dated 18th June, 1975 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) and earlier notice of demand dated 27th Aug., 1971 (Annexure 3) to the writ petition. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1 to which an order dated 31st July, 1971, issued by the State Government in which a sum of Rs. 2448.10 as damages under S. 14-B of the said Act and Rs. 63.65 as administrative charges was imposed upon the petitioner, was annexed as Annexure A-4. The petitioner has also sought for quashing of the said order. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr. R. K. Srivastava urged that the aforesaid order dated 31st July, 1971 (Annexure A-4) passed by the State Government cannot be enforced and deserves to be quashed as it was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In para 19 of the writ petition, it has been specifically averred that the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not afford any opportunity to the petitioner before levying the damages nor there could arise any occasion for the petitioner to put up their case before the Government of Uttar Pradesh. In para 20 of the writ petition it has been averred that the order dated 31st July. 1971 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh was never sent to the petitioner and the order dated 27th Aug., 1971 passed by opposite party No. 1 -could not be a substitute for the order which the State Government was required to pass in case the damages were imposed under S. 14-B of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, 1952. In para 20 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1, the said averments of para 19 of the writ petition have not been disputed and only this much has been said that the contents of said para need no comments. In para 20 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1, the said averments of para 19 of the writ petition have not been disputed and only this much has been said that the contents of said para need no comments. Similarly with reference to contents of para 20 of the writ petition. it has been averred that those do not concern opposite party No. 1 consequently no reply in respect of the same is required. It may be mentioned that no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2 disputing the aforesaid facts averred in the writ petition. Thus we are left with no option but to accept it to he a correct fact that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the State Government before passing the order 31. July, 1971, contained in Annexure A-4, levying damages etc. on the petitioner. This order, thus, stands vitiated in law being violative of principle of natural justice. It is well settled that no order prejudicial to a party can be passed by any authority without giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned party. The said order, therefore, cannot be said to be a valid and proper order in the eye of law. 3. Learned standing counsel Sri H. N. Tilhari, however, urged that no opportunity of hearing was required to be given by the State Government while passing the said order contained in Annexure A-4 becauses opposite party No. 1, namely, Central Provident Fund Commissioner was authorised by the Governor to calculate and realise damages recoverable under S. 14-B of the Act from the employers of 'the defaulting factories. According to him, the petitioner was served with a notice to show cause why the matter may not be referred to the State Government for imposing damages recoverable under S. 14B of the Act and in pursuance of the said notice, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing by opposite party No. 1. In this connection he referred to the petitioner's letter dated 10th Aug., 1974. (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and pointed out that the petitioner in said letter has himself admitted that a representative had called on the opposite party No. 1 and had shown the details of the payments made by him on account of provident fund dues and administrative charges in question. (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and pointed out that the petitioner in said letter has himself admitted that a representative had called on the opposite party No. 1 and had shown the details of the payments made by him on account of provident fund dues and administrative charges in question. The petitioner has also submitted documentary evidence namely Bank Challans etc. with the said letter. He, thus, urged that in view of these facts it cannot be said that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunty of hearing by opposite party No. 1. Learned Standing Counsel referred to Circular Letter No. E 128 (1)/60-1, dated Nov., 23, 1962 and urged that the Government had authorised opposite party No. 1 to calculate and realise damages recoverable under S. 14B of the Act. In view of this authorisation opposite party No.1 was competent to calculate damages etc. under S. 14-B of the Act, which, according to him, were calculated by opposite party No. 1 after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. After calculation of damages and administrative charges payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the Act, there remains nothing on which the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing by the State Government prior to passing of the order contained in Annexure A-4. Learned Standing counsel further contended that in view of said delegation of power, the calculation of damages etc. by opposite party No. 1 payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the Act cannot be said to be illegal and without jurisdiction and thus the notice of demand contained in Annexures 3 and 6, referred to above, cannot be, said to be illegal and unenforceable in law. At the first flush the said arguments appear to be attractive, but on scrutiny we find that the same are devoid of any substance. 4. At the first flush the said arguments appear to be attractive, but on scrutiny we find that the same are devoid of any substance. 4. Section 14-B of the Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by Act No. 40 of 1973 provided that : "14-B. Where an employer makes default in payment of any contribution to the fund or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section (2) of S. 15 (or sub-section (5) of S. 17) or in 'the payment of any charges payable under any other provision of this Act or of any Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under S. 17, the appropriate Government may recover from the employer, such damages, not exceeding twenty-five per cent of the amount of arrears, as it may think fit to impose." (Emphasis supplied) 5. Section 19 of the unamended Act relates to delegation of powers, which reads as follows : "19. The appropriate Government may direct that any power or authority or jurisdiction exercisable by it under this Act (the scheme or the Family Pension Scheme) shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also - (a) where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or by State Government or by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, as may be specified in the notification; and (b) where the appropriate Government is a State Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification." 6. A perusal of sub-section (b) of S. 19 of the Act indicates that the State Government can delegate powers to officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification and not to an officer or authority subordinate to Central Government. 7. It is well settled that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance of the work, which the statute has in contemplation, has got to be done strictly in accordance with the manner prescribed and any departure from it would make the action taken altogether void. A thing which has got to be done in the manner prescribed has to be performed in accordance with it or not at all. A thing which has got to be done in the manner prescribed has to be performed in accordance with it or not at all. Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous on the matter as to how the power is to be exercised, the doctrine of implied power to perform the act in any bona fide manner for achieving the object to give effect to certain provisions of the Act cannot be invoked. It goes without saying that if any action taken is found to have been done not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Rules on the subject, it cannot be sustained even if performed bona fide. A delegation of power by the competent authority under the enactment has got to done strictly in accordance with the provisions of the statute and any departure from it would be unwarranted and void in law. If in the statute it is provided that the delegation of power is to be made to a certain specified person, body or authority, the delegation of power has got to be made to it and to none else. If the delegation fails on this vital ground, the delegatee would be incompetent to perform any act on the basis of such delegation and so all the work done and action taken by the delegate would be illegal, without jurisdiction and void and cannot be sustained even for a moment. Thus, in this view of the matter, the State Government could not validly delegate the powers exercisable by it under S. 14-B to opposite party No. 1 who admittedly is not a State Government employee. It is, thus, evident that opposite party No.1 was not a competent authority to calculate and realise damages recoverable under S. 14-B of the Act from the employers of the defaulting factories. We are thus of the opinion that the opposite party No. 1 on his own accord could not initiate proceedings under S. 14-B of the Act for calculating damages recoverable under S. 14-B of the Act, even if there was any default on the part of the petitioner in making deposits of the provident fund contribution during the period in question under the provisions of the said Act. In this view of the matter, even if any opportunity of hearing was given by opposite party No. 1 to the petitioner in the matter, it cannot justify the order dated 31st July, 1971 contained in Annexure A-4, imposing damages on the petitioner. No opportunity of hearing was admittedly afforded by the State Government while passing the said order and as such the said order stands vitiated being violative of principle of natural justice. 8. Learned standing counsel, nowhere contended that although the delegation of powers by the State Government to opposite party No. 1 for action under S. 14B of the said Act may not be held to be valid, but the spade-work done by opposite party No. 1 in calculating the damages after hearing the petitioner cannot be said to be unwarranted and the State Government could pass order on the report submitted by opposite party No. 1, calculating the damages payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the said Act. In other words his contention was that even if the referring authority lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the ultimate order passed by the Competent Authority based on such reference report submitted to it cannot be struck down being illegal or without jurisdiction. We are unable to agree with this contention as well. 9. In Baradakanta v. High Court of Orissa, ( AIR 1976 SC 1899 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "If the order of the initial authority is void, an order of the appellate authority cannot make it valid. The confirmation by the Governor cannot have any legal effect because that which is valid can be confirmed and not that which is void." (Emphasis supplied). 10. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the order dated 31st July, 1971, contained in Annexure A-4, which was passed on the report submitted by opposite party No. 1 would be a valid order. The opposite party No. 1 was not competent to make calculation of the damages under S. 14-B of the Act on the strength of aforesaid delegation of power, which, as already observed above, was not a valid one. We are, thus, of the opinion that whatever action was taken by opposite party No. 1 on the strength of said delegation of power to him was illegal and without jurisdiction and non-est in the eye of law. We are, thus, of the opinion that whatever action was taken by opposite party No. 1 on the strength of said delegation of power to him was illegal and without jurisdiction and non-est in the eye of law. Opposite Party No. 2, namely Government of Uttar Pradesh, also acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order dated 31st July, 1971 merely on the basis of alleged reference report submitted to it by opposite party No. 1 and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 11. Thus, in our opinion the notices dated 27th Aug., 1971. contained in Annexure 3 and dated 18th June. 1975 contained in Annexure 6 issued by opposite party No. 1 requiring the petitioner to pay the amount detailed therein in pursuance of said order dated 31st July, 1971, passed by the State Government are per se illegal and no action can be taken on the basis of these notices for the recovery of the amount from the petitioner. 12. Learned standing counsel next contended that since under the amended provision of S. 14-B, of the Act, the opposite party No. 1, namely Central Provident Fund Commissioner is authorised to recover from the employer damages etc. and as such this Court should refuse to. proceed to quash the impugned notices issued by opposite party No. 1 requiring the petitioner to pay the amount mentioned therein. His contention was that the amount of damages payable by the petitioner were calculated after giving due opportunity of hearing by the opposite party No. I and as such the petitioner cannot dispute his liability to pay that amount, which was rightly calculated, according to the Rules and Standing Orders on the subject. We do not find any substance in this contention as well. 13. As already observed, above, we find that whatever proceedings were taken by opposite party No. 1 in calculating the damages payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the said Act, were per se illegal and without jurisdiction because delegation of power was altogether void. No action could, therefore, be taken by opposite party No. 1 to assess the damages payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the Act as he lacked lawful authority for doing so. No action could, therefore, be taken by opposite party No. 1 to assess the damages payable by the petitioner under S. 14-B of the Act as he lacked lawful authority for doing so. The petitioner has averred in the petition that they had not committed any default in making payments within prescribed time of their contribution of provident fund and no proper hearing was made in the matter either by the opposite party No. 1 or by the opposite party No. 2. The petitioner has annexed to the petition several representations filed by him to the opposite party No. 1 and to the State Government, disputing his liability to pay any damages under S. 14-B of the Act by asserting that no wilful default was made on their part in making the payment of provident fund dues within prescribed period. It has been asserted that the clearance of the cheques drawn by the petitioner towards payment of provident fund dues was not done properly by the State Bank of India and so no wilful default can be attributed to them in making relevant payments. In this view of the matter we find that apart from the fact that opposite party No. 1 at that time lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings to decide the matter, but it also appears that due probing in the matter was not done for calculating the damages payable by the petitioner. if any, under S. 14-B of the Act. The impugned notices of demand, therefore, cannot be sustained on the said grounds urged by the learned standing counsel. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the conclusion urged that since the matter regarding alleged default in making requisite deposits of the period from March, 1968 to Feb., 1969 and as such the opposite party No. 1, who at present is authorised to take action under S. 14-B of the Act cannot proceed to levy and recover damages under the aforesaid provision after such a long lapse of time. This submission is devoid of any merit in view of a decision of this Court in M/s. Shyam Glass Works v. State of U.P..( AIR 1979 All 19 ) , wherein it has been laid down that no period of limitation is prescribed for levy or recovery of damages from the defaulter under S. 14-B of the Act. This submission is devoid of any merit in view of a decision of this Court in M/s. Shyam Glass Works v. State of U.P..( AIR 1979 All 19 ) , wherein it has been laid down that no period of limitation is prescribed for levy or recovery of damages from the defaulter under S. 14-B of the Act. In Para 4 of the report of said case, an earlier Division Bench decision in Regional Provident Fund Commr. v. Allahabad Canning Co. (1979 Lab IC 998) (All), was referred to wherein the view expressed by the Punjab High Court in Amin Chand & Sons v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1965 Punj 441), was disapproved and it was held that no limitation is prescribed for taking action under S. 14-B of the Act for assessing and realising damages. In this view of the matter we find that since S. 14-B of the said Act does not provide any limitation for taking action against the erring employers for not depositing the provident fund dues, as such the Provident Fund Commissioner would not be debarred from exercising statutory power under S. 14-B of the Act on the said ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. The opposite party No. 1, therefore, can still proceed to take action under S. 14-B of the Act according to law against the petitioner in the matter. 15. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 31st July, 1971, passed by opposite Party No. 2, contained in Annexure A 4 and the notice dated 18th June, 1975, contained in Annexure 6 and notice dated 27th Aug., 1971, contained in Annexure 3 issued by opposite party No. 1 requiring the petitioner to pay the amount mentioned therein are hereby quashed. This order will, however, not disentitle opposite party No. 1 to take action and initiate fresh proceedings under S. 14-B of the Act according to law. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.