JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - A young lady doctor whose husband is also a doctor at Jaypore in the district of Koraput, the Petitioner stands charged u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code with having committed the murders of her two children, a daughter aged three years and a son aged four months on June 30, 1980, at about 9 p.m. by throwing the two children into the well in the backyard. Repelling the contention raised on behalf of the defence that the materials were insufficient to presume that the Petitioner had committed the offence, the learned Sessions Judge framed the charge against her. The charge has been framed according to the provision contained in Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the 'Code'). The Petitioner assails the order framing charge in this revision. Mr. Ranjit Mohanty, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that the materials placed before the court by investigating agency would not give rise to a strong suspicion and in the absence of any proof of motive for the commission of murders of her own children and owing to complete paucity of materials against her, the Petitioner could not be charged with the offence of murder. Mr. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has supported the impugned order as well-founded on facts and according to him, it is not a fit case where the Petitioner should have been discharged. 2. In the case of Khirod alias Khirodra Debata v. State of Orissa 1982 ELR 583 : 1983 (1) Crimes 357 , after referring to and relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court, and other High Courts in a number of reported cases including Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker Vs. State of Gujarat. Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. AIR 1980 S.C. 1962, P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M.K.C.G. Medical College, Berhampur 47 (1979) C.L.T. 126, M/s Mohanlal Devdanbhai Chokshi and others Vs. J.S. Wagh and another Hasmukh J. Jhaveri Vs. Shella Dadlani and another, and Dr. Dattatraya Narayan Samant and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. AIR 1980 S.C. 1962, P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M.K.C.G. Medical College, Berhampur 47 (1979) C.L.T. 126, M/s Mohanlal Devdanbhai Chokshi and others Vs. J.S. Wagh and another Hasmukh J. Jhaveri Vs. Shella Dadlani and another, and Dr. Dattatraya Narayan Samant and others Vs. State of Maharashtra this Court held that an order framing a charge under the Code is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code and therefore, a criminal revision lies against such an order. The present revision against the order framing a charge against the Petitioner is, therefore competent and maintainable. 3. Section 227 of the Code provides that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. Section 228 of the Code reads: (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with procedure for the trial or warrant cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. 4. The conditions for the framing of a charge under Clause (b) of Section 228(1) of the Code are: (1) presumption of the commission of an offence on the materials placed before the court i.e. the existence of a prima facie case and (2) the offence is triable exclusively by a Court of Session. The expression 'ground' for presuming that the accused has committed an offence would mean basis, foundation or valid reason. The expression 'ground' for presuming that the accused has committed an offence would mean basis, foundation or valid reason. In Khirod alias Khirodra Debata v. State of Orissa 1982 ELR 583 : 1983 (1) Crimes 357 (supra) this Court has observed: The order framing a charge is not a matter of mere formality. It affects a person's liberty and it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the materials warrant the framing of a charge. This part of the trial does contemplate the application of a judicial mind to the materials placed before the Court against an accuse person. An order of framing a charge is an important and sacrosanct act and a charge should be framed after proper and careful consideration or the materials against an accused person placed before the Court. 5. The question for consideration is as to whether it is a fit case in which this Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, should quash the impugned order. Although, the revisional power of the High Court is as wide as the power of the Court of appeal, it is now well-settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court in revision is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. The High Court is not expected to act in its revisional jurisdiction as if it is hearing an appeal. See Amar Chand Agarwalla Vs. Shanti Bose and Another, etc. Akalu Ahir and Others Vs. Ramdeo Ram, and State of Orissa Vs. Nakula Sahu and Others, . 6. The prosecution presents the sad tale of a most unfortunate incident accusing the Petitioner of having' committed the murders of her two children by throwing them into a well. The materials placed by the investigating agency would show that the Petitioner was not pulling on well with her husband. She used to quarrel with him often, leave him and go a way to the house of her parents at Raipur in Madhya Pradesh. She was said to be having a quick temper and was, by temperament obstinate. There had been a quarrel between her and her husband in the evening of the fateful day. After having his dinner, the Petitioner's husband left the house and went out for a stroll. She was said to be having a quick temper and was, by temperament obstinate. There had been a quarrel between her and her husband in the evening of the fateful day. After having his dinner, the Petitioner's husband left the house and went out for a stroll. While her mother-in-law was washing utensils on the verandah of the kitchen, the Petitioner left the house with her two children and went to the backyard at about 9 p.m. Sometime thereafter, her husband returned home, did not find his wife and children and came to know from his mother that the Petitioner has gone to the backyard with the two children and had not come back. The Petitioner's husband and mother-in-law went to the backyard and found the Petitioner lying on the plank over the well and being asked the Petitioner got annoyed and went and hid herself behind a bush. On focussing his torch light, the Petitioner's husband found the two children floating in the water of the well. With the assistance of the Fire Brigade, the children were brought out and it was noticed that they were dead. The Medical Officer, who conducted the autopsy, was of the view that the deaths of both the children were due to respiratory failure as a result of drowning. Initially, a case had been registered against the Petitioner for committed murder u/s 302 and for attempting to commit suicide u/s 309 or of the Indian Penal Code, but on the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was placed only in respect of the offence or murder 7. No one had seen the Petitioner throwing her two children inside the well but noticing the materials of a circumstantial nature, the learned Sessions Judge observed and held: The facts of this case are that the accused who was a lady doctor was not pulling on well with her husband (who is also a doctor). It is stated that in the might of occurrence at about 9 p.m. while the mother-in-law Maya Devi was cleaning utensils in the verandah of the kitchen, the accused went to the backyard with her two children (daughter aged 3 years and son aged 4 months). She did not return. At about 10 p.m. the husband doctor returned and enquired about the accused and got the reply that the accused had gone to the backyard with the two children. She did not return. At about 10 p.m. the husband doctor returned and enquired about the accused and got the reply that the accused had gone to the backyard with the two children. Thereafter the husband went to the backyard with torch-light and offend the accused lying on the plank over the well. None of the children was there. On being asked, the accused showed annoyance. On focussing the torch-light the two children were found floating in the well. Subsequently others came to the spot and the dead-bodies of the two children were brought out from the well. The accused was then found concealing herself under a bush. It is further stated that the accused was somewhat short-tempered. This is also the statement of the husband. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the accused that after an the accused is the mother of the two children and it is some-how pot conceivable that she would throw the two children in the well. That is true. But the facts prima facie indicate that she had taken the two children to the backyard. None else was there in the backyard and an tour after her going to the backyard, the two children were found inside the well. It may be the plea of the accused that the children some how slipped into the well, but in that case the conduct of the accused would have been somewhat different. Be that as it may, the facts found, in my opinion, do make out a case of strong suspicion against the accused that she had thrown the two children into the well, may be out of aberration of her mind or to teach the husband a lesson which the trial would unfold. In any case, the act of throwing the two children into the well was undoubtedly imminently dangerous as to cause their death. I would, therefore, frame charge u/s 302, I.P.C. against the accused. 8. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. In any case, the act of throwing the two children into the well was undoubtedly imminently dangerous as to cause their death. I would, therefore, frame charge u/s 302, I.P.C. against the accused. 8. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh with reference to the provisions made in Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, it would be clear that at the beginning and at the initial stage of the trial, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged, nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any in detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the fact, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter u/s 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or where the trial is sure to end in conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Supreme Court observed: If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit or doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. The Supreme Court observed: If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit or doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand it is to at the initial stage of making an order u/s 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one u/s 228 and not u/s 227. In Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Others the Supreme Court, following the. principles laid down in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, observed and held: At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor reposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. The Supreme Court has reiterated the same view in Mohd. Akbar Dar and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, by observing that at the stage of charge, the court cannot enter into a meticulous consideration of the evidence and materials. 9. The learned Sessions Judge had kept the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh in mind and quoted the same in the body of the impugned order and held that it was a fit case in which the charge was to be framed to. The view taken by the learned Judge cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse. Ramesh Singh in mind and quoted the same in the body of the impugned order and held that it was a fit case in which the charge was to be framed to. The view taken by the learned Judge cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse. We do not feel ourselves called upon to examine the case on merits and indeed, we should refrain from doing so or going into the details of the matter lest any observation which we make might prejudice either party at the trial. Suffice it to say that for the purpose of framing a charge, it could not be said that the materials placed before the court of trial could not be the basis for it. 10. Keeping the aforesaid principles of law in mind and examining the materials placed by the investigating agency, we find that the charge could not be said to be groundless. This observation of ours is made for the limited purpose of finding out as to whether to impugned order is or is not to be maintained and must not, in any manner, have any effect on the court of trial which shall independently examine the evidence to lie produced at the trial for what it is worth. 11. In the result, therefore, the revision stands dismissed. The charge had been framed in May, 1981 in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in June, 1980. We would call upon the court of trial to take up the trial and dispose of the case, if possible, within three months hence. The record of the court below be sent down at once. P.K. Mohanti, A.C.J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed