JUDGMENT 1. An auction was held by the Municipal Board, District Nainital, Kashipur, for collection of Tehbazari for markets nos. 4 and 6, on 30th March, 1983. The appellant was the highest bidder and on his bid being accepted he deposited l/4th of the auction money. The balance of the consideration was to be deposited in 8 installments. The appellant, however, deposited one installment only therefor. Proceedings for recovery of the auction money as arrears of land revenue were, thereupon, initiated by the Municipal Board. The appellant instituted a suit for injunction restraining the Municipal Board from recovering the said amount and also made an application for temporary injunction for the same relief. This application was contested by the Municipal Board and has been rejected by the Civil Judge, Nainital, by the order appealed against. 2. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court has erred in taking the view that there was a completed contract between the parties. In this connection it may be pointed out that the trial court, in taking the aforesaid view, has placed reliance on condition no. 5 of the agreement in pursuance whereof the appellant admittedly started realising Tehbazari with effect from 1st April, 1983 and continued to realise the same even during the months of may and June which have in the order appealed against, been described as peak season, and certain other facts stated in its order. It has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in B.C. Mohindra v. Municipal Board, Saharanpur (1970 ALJ 570). 3. Moreover, we are of opinion that even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that there was no completed contract as urged by counsel for the appellant in as much as the formal agreement had not been executed, it can at best be said that the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case in his favour. However, it is settled law that a temporary injunction can be granted in favour of a party only if it succeeds in not only making out a prima facie case in its favour but also establishing that the balance of convenience lies in its favour and that in the event of the temporary injunction not being granted it will suffer an irreparable injury. As such, merely making out a prima facie case will not suffice. On the facts of the instant case we find it difficult to take the view that the appellant has succeeded in establishing these two ingredients. As has been found by the trial court, the appellant, on his bid being accepted, not only deposited 1/4th amount but also deposited one installment and started realising Tehbazari from 1st April, 1983, itself. The trial court, on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, seems to be right in taking the view that the parties had acted upon the auction. In this view of the matter and in view of the circumstance that the appellant derived benefit in pursuance of the auction in his favour, it cannot be said that the balance of convenience was in favour of a temporary injunction being granted as prayed by the appellant. 4. We also find it difficult to take the view that the finding of the trial court that the appellant was not likely to suffer any irreparable injury in the event of his application for temporary injunction being dismissed, suffers from any such error which may justify interference with the discretion exercised by the trial court in refusing to grant a temporary injunction in favour of the appellant. As regards the mode of recovery of the amount due, namely its realisation as arrears of land revenue, there was an agreement between the parties as has been pointed out by the trial court, that the unpaid amount of the auction money could be recovered as arrears of land revenue In view of section 3 (d) of the U. P. Public moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, the unpaid amount of the auction money could be realised as arrears of land revenue In the result, we find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, CPC. A copy of this order may be supplied to the counsel for the appellant within three days. (Appeal dismissed)