JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Summary nature of jurisdiction exercised under Small Causes Courts Act coupled with harshness of requirement of depositing entire decretal amount before filing restoration application for setting aside ex-parte decree and involvement of heavy stakes appears to have persuaded this Court even in thirties to construe Section 17 of the Act liberally and upheld even substantial compliance rather than adherence to form. Despite mandatory character of provisions to work as deterrent against non appearance on date fixed by defendant or to delay proceedings by avoiding service courts have been moved by innate sense of justice and insist on decision on merits after opportunity and contest rather than ex-parte. Equity has been so dominant that even erroneous and illegal orders have been upheld in revision and the setting aside of restoration orders have not been normally, approved by this Court and Supreme Court. As far back as 1890 it was held by a Full Bench in Mohd. Baka v. Bahal Singh, ILR 13 Allahabad 227. that it was not intended by that Section (Section 25 of Small Cause Court Act) to give in effect a right of appeal in all Small Causes Court cases, either on law or fact. We think we should not interfere under the Act unless it is clearly established that some substantial injustice to a party in the litigation had directly resulted from a material misapplication of law of material error in procedure'. It was extended further in Mohan Lal v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1939 Allahabad 177 in a case in which order of furnishing security was not complied yet the ex-parte decree was set aside. It was held, mere fact that an order passed by a Small Cause Court is either illegal or without jurisdiction necessarily justified interference by this Court. The real test is whether any substantial injustice has been done by the order complained against'. 2. Law having been construed thus what calls for determination in these two tenants' petitions is if the revising authority was justified in interfering with order setting aside ex-parte decree because the order was not reasoned, there was non compliance of Section 17 of the Act and security furnished was invalid for want of registration. 2. Law having been construed thus what calls for determination in these two tenants' petitions is if the revising authority was justified in interfering with order setting aside ex-parte decree because the order was not reasoned, there was non compliance of Section 17 of the Act and security furnished was invalid for want of registration. Undoubtedly each of these reasons have been accepted as conferring jurisdiction on revisional court to interfere under section 25 of the Act yet it has to be examined if the order suffers from manifest error of law because the revising authority was under misapprehension of fact and even if it was not should the order restoring suit have been interfered even though the petitioner's had substantially complied with Section 17 of the Act and in any case by setting aside of ex-parte decree no injustice was being done to opposite party. It cannot be disputed that while disposing of an application for setting aside ex-parte decree the Court or authority has to apply its mind to sufficiency of reason, for being absent on date of hearing. In absence of any finding, on it the is certainly bad. As Order 20 Rule 4 C.P.C. does doubt dispense with mentioning of concise statement of the case yet it requires the Court to mention the points for determination and reasons thereon. In absence of reason the order is rendered invalid. That the trial Court's order suffered from this infirmity admits of no doubt. But the proper course for revising authority was to remand it. It should have avoided recording findings as in assuming role of fact finding authority it committed error in presuming that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption which arose due to affidavit filed by process-server and supported by affidavit of opposite party that petitioner had refused to accept summon. In fact petitioner had filed affidavits stating on oath that no summons were served and they never refused to accept it. It could not be ignored. Affidavit of process server raised a prima-facie presumption but once it was disputed by filing affidavit then it had to be decided as a fact whether service was effected or not. In ignoring petitioner's affidavit under impression that petitioner had not filed any evidence the revising authority committed error apparent on face of record. 3. It could not be ignored. Affidavit of process server raised a prima-facie presumption but once it was disputed by filing affidavit then it had to be decided as a fact whether service was effected or not. In ignoring petitioner's affidavit under impression that petitioner had not filed any evidence the revising authority committed error apparent on face of record. 3. But what impressed the revising authority most against petitioners was furnishing of security on 7th July when application for restoration was filed on 3rd July. The ex-parte decree had been passed on 1st June. And as security was not furnished on 3rd July the day on which application had been filed after reopening of Courts after vacation it was barred by time. Although observation was made that entire decretal amount including cost and interest should have been deposited but no finding was recorded if the security furnished was sufficient or not, therefore, it was of no consequence. And rejection of application as barred by time was contrary to the settled view of this Court that what is of prime importance is moving of application within time. And if that is done as it was done in this cases then, it is well settled that. if two conditions (direction of the Court for furnishing security and its furnishing) are not fulfilled at the same time, when the application was actually presented, there would be substantial compliance with the provision' to section 17, Ram Pyare v. Budh Sen, AIR 1977 Allahabad 15. Reason for construing the provision thus is not a latitude to mover of application under section 17 but pragmatic approach to the requirement of complying with it by depositing or furnishing security in compliance to Courts order at the time of moving application for review or setting aside ex-parte decree. Furnishing of security is contemplated on a direction by Court on a previous application. In other words the Court has first to apply its mind to sufficiency of security then direct the applicant to deposit the same. It may be simultaneous or after verification or satisfaction. Therefore, time which is or may be taken by Court cannot work against applicant. Filing of application, therefore, was substantial compliance of provision to Section 17 and the delay if any was not due to fault of petitioners but inherent in the nature of performance which could not entail dismissal of application. Therefore, time which is or may be taken by Court cannot work against applicant. Filing of application, therefore, was substantial compliance of provision to Section 17 and the delay if any was not due to fault of petitioners but inherent in the nature of performance which could not entail dismissal of application. Revising authority, therefore, committed error of law in rejecting the application on this ground. 4. Realising futility of defending order of revising authority on these shaky grounds on which the learned counsel for opposite party was lukeworm also he vehemently fought for dismissal of writ petition as security being not registered as required under section 17 (1) (a) of Registration Act it was invalid. According to him it was nonest resulting in non furnishing of any security and compliance of provision of Section 17. Controversy that security bond above Rs. 100/- is not exempt from registration stands decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Bishnu Sahi v. Prayag Devi, AIR 1958 Allahabad 820. The Court insists on adherence to form. And in view of this decision it was not complied. But once the Court accepted the security as sufficient should the petitioner suffer for it. In Dallan Prasad's case (supra) it was observed that no one should suffer at the hands of Court. In Kiran Kumar v. Baij Nath, AIR 1928 Allahabad 607 acceptance of fixed bank deposit receipt which is not transferable and does not amount to security was held to be sufficient because it was accepted by Court without any objection. Moreover, the revising authority could have himself or could have directed the trial court to get the defect removed as application for filing security had been furnished within time. In rejecting restoration application for failure on part of petitioners for which the Court was in no manner less responsible of the Revising authority committed error. 5. Even assuming illegally and error in order of trial Court in setting aside ex-parte decree the revising authority should not have interfered on ratio laid down by Supreme Court in Ramji Das and others v. Mohan Singh, 1978 A.R.C. 496. "The High Court, in exercise of its powers under section 115 C.P.C., set aside on various grounds. After having heard counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. "The High Court, in exercise of its powers under section 115 C.P.C., set aside on various grounds. After having heard counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that the order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interests of justice which always informs the power under section 115 C.P.C. We, therefore, set aside that order and also the ex-parte decree." 6. After the judgment was reserved but before it was delivered learned counsel for petitioner moved an application on 4th August, 1983 seeking permission to address on validity of Section 17. According to him in absence of any guidelines the provision is arbitrary. He maintained that the Act does not make any distinction between those defendants on whom no summons was served from those on whom it was served but they could not appear for some sufficient cause. He urged that ex-parte decree in former case would be void and any condition of depositing entire amount for getting ex-parte decree set aside in such case is bound to work hardship. Learned counsel elaborated by giving an illustration that suppose an unscruplous plaintiff filed a suit against a tenant by claiming rent at Rs. 1000/- when in fact it was Rs. 100/- only and manages to procure false service resulting in ex-parte decree then the condition of depositing entire decretal amount shall not be onerous only but it may render the remedy of revision infructuous. Reliance was placed on following observation in New Manek Chowk Spt. v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmadabad, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1801. As order of revision is being quashed and prescribed authority is being directed to proceed with case in accordance with law after affording opportunity to petitioner to file written statement it is not necessary to decide this controversy. It is, however, doubtful if the argument can be accepted. Provision of security and liberal construction of Section 17 do not necessitate examination of this aspect. Moreover, invalidity of provision cannot be decided on assumptions. 7. In the result both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the revising authority is quashed. As sufficient time has elapsed it would not be conducive to direct trial court to decide the application afresh. Moreover, invalidity of provision cannot be decided on assumptions. 7. In the result both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the revising authority is quashed. As sufficient time has elapsed it would not be conducive to direct trial court to decide the application afresh. He may permit petitioner to file written statement and proceed in accordance with law. Parties shall bear their own costs.