JUDGMENT R.K. Shukla, J. - Mohd. ALaln petitioner has moved this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of his further detention under order dated October 6. 1982, passed by the District Magistrate. Moradabad under Section (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). It may be mentioned here that the petitioner filed an earlier petition in the name of Mohammed Alam and that petition was dismissed on March 23, 1983. The question as to what is the real name of the petitioner is disputed by the respondents. This question may have relevancy at the trial of the criminal case but it does not appear to have much relevancy so far as the present petition is concerned. We, therefore, do not propose to go into this question here. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was arrested in the night between October 3i4, 1982 in connection with two incidents dated October 213, 1982. The District Magistrate, Moradabad was satisfied that there was apprehension of the detenu being released on bail and thereafter was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. He consequently passed an order of detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act on October 6, 1982, which was served on the petitioner on the same day. The grounds of detention were also supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner made a representation dated October 18, 1982 which was rejected by the State Government on October 30, 1982 after completing the formalities. The rejection of the said representation was communicated to the petitioner through the Superintendent, District Jail, Moradabad on November 2, 1982. 3. Since the representation of the Petitioner dated October 18, 1982 was also addressed to the Home Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, therefore, the copies of the said representation and comments of the District Magistrate, Moradabad were prepared and sent to the Central Government on November 8, 1982 with a note that State of U.P. has rejected the representation. The Government of India rejected the said representation and informed about the rejection to the petitioner and as well as to the State Government vide its letter dated December 18, 1982. 4. The Government of India rejected the said representation and informed about the rejection to the petitioner and as well as to the State Government vide its letter dated December 18, 1982. 4. The petitioner filed a habeas corpus writ petition No. 76 of 1983 which has been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on March 23. 1983 holding that "there is no substance in the petition and the order of detention is in terms of rules".. 5. Thereafter on March 28, 1983 the petitioner sent another representation for the revocation of the order of his detention addressed to the Prime Minister and to the Chief Minister, U.P. After due processing this representation was finally rejected on April 14, 1983 by the Chief Minister, U.P. The fact about the rejection of this representation was communicated to the petitioner through the Superintendent. District Jail, Moradabad on April 19, 1983. Thereafter the copies of this representation and the comments of the District Magistrate, Moradabad were prepared and sent to the Central Government on May 6, 1983 together with a note that the Government of U.P. has rejected the representation. The aforesaid representation dated March 28, 1983 and another representation dated April 19, 1983 through an Advocate of the petitioner lying with the Central Government and have not been dealt with by that Government till today. 6. Sri D.S. Mishra, the learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed before us the only submission that the Central Government has not decided till today the representation dated March 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983 under Section 14 of the Act made by the petitioner. The delay and inaction for an indefinite period which has now exceeded four months vitiates the detention. Reliance for this contention has been placed on four decisions of the Supreme Court in Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 346 ; Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1980) 3 SCC 321; Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1 ; Sabir Ahmad v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 295 ; and also on the following decisions of this Court: Lalji v. Union of India and others, 1983 Crimes (Vol. I) 1136. I) 1136. Awadh Kumar Shukla v. Adhikashak Kendriya Karagar, Nami, 1983 A.L.J. 545; Rajendra v. Superintendent, District Jail, Moradabad, Writ Petition No. 12969 of 1982; and Badre Alam v. State of U.P. and others, 1982 Cr. L.J. 132. 7. On the other hand the stand taken by the Central Government, opposite party No. 4 in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit of Sri Manglani is that Section 8(1) of the Act provides to the detenu a statutory right to only one effective representation to the appropriate Government. That statutory requirement has been fulfilled by deciding the representation dated October 18, 1982, The stand of the Government of India regarding the representations dated March 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983 has been stated in para 10 of the said affidavit which runs as follows: "10. That a further representation dated the March 28, 1983 from the petitioner and a representation dated the April 19, 1983 from his Advocate, both addressed to the Hon'ble the Prime Minister, are not statutory representations within the ambit of Section 8(l) of the ibid Act. Therefore, there is no statutory obligation on the part of the Central Government to consider such representations. That in this context reliance i also made on the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.I.R. 19821 S.C. 1178, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme( Court has inter alia, observed that "Nor is it possible to treat the countless petitions, memorials and representations which are everywhere presented to the Prim Minister and other Ministers as statutory appeals or petitions statutorily obeli them to consider and dispose of such appeals and petitions in the manner provided by statute." 8. In reply Sri Girdhar Malviya, the learn-r; ed Additional Government Advocate, relying on the four decisions of the Supreme Court namely, Philippa Anna Duke v. State Tamil Nadu, AIR 1982 SC 1 178; Mrs. In reply Sri Girdhar Malviya, the learn-r; ed Additional Government Advocate, relying on the four decisions of the Supreme Court namely, Philippa Anna Duke v. State Tamil Nadu, AIR 1982 SC 1 178; Mrs. Iris Fernandes v. Union of India and others, (1981) 3 SCC 663 ; Satpal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 2230 ; and Ram Bali Rajbhar v. State of W.B. and others, AIR 1975 SC 623 urged' (a) that non-consideration of the second and' subsequent representations will not vitiate the order of detention as such representation are not contemplated by Article 22(5) of the Constitution; (b) that all the six cases of the Supreme Court, namely, two Tara Chand's case (supra), Shyam Amba Lal Siroya's case (supra), Rajia Umar Kakshi's case (supra) and Rattan Singh's case (supra) are the cases of either non-disposal or unreasonable delay in disposal of the first representation. All the Division Bench decisions of this Court have applied the principle Laid down in the above noted Supreme Court cases without drawing any distinction between the first and subsequent representations (c) that none of the cases of subsequent representations decided by this Court have considered the principle Laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Bali Rajbhar v. State of West Bengal and others (supra) and (d) that the view of this Court requires reconsideration in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court's decision in Philippa Anne Duke's case (supra). 9. One of the stand taken by Central Government, opposite party No. 4, the main question for determination in this case is whether the representations dated March 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983 (Annexure 2 and 3) are statutory representations and whether that Government was under legal obligation to consider them. 10. From the affidavit of Sri Manglani mentioned above it appears that the Central Government has concentrated only on the provisions of Section 8 (1) of the Act and has not applied its mind to its obligation under Section 14 of the Act which provides that "a detention order may, 'at any time, be revoked" by the Central Government or State Government as the case may be. 11. Since Section 14 of the Act contemplates revocation of detention 'at any time', it necessarily postulates existence of such facts and circumstances, which may justify revocation of the detention order. 11. Since Section 14 of the Act contemplates revocation of detention 'at any time', it necessarily postulates existence of such facts and circumstances, which may justify revocation of the detention order. The power of revocation can be exercised suo motu and it will also have to be exercised if the representation is made by the detenu bringing to the notice of the authority concerned the facts and circumstances justifying the revocation. Such a representation would fall within the purview of the statutory representation contemplated by Section 14 of the Act by necessary implication, If the subsequent representation is made on the basis of new or additional facts which, if found correct, would entitle the detenu to have the detention order revoked, such representation even though subsequent one will again be a statutory representation. Such subsequent representation or petition under Section 14 of the Act would have to be decided within a reasonable time. The question as to whether new or additional facts stated in the subsequent representation under Section 14 of the Act are correct or not is essentially a question of fact and it will hay,; to be decided by the authority concerned after making proper enquiry. Whether or not the Central Government revokes the detention is a matter of discretion. But this discretion is coupled with a duty. They can reject or accept the representation without writing a speaking order. 12. There is no doubt that the power under Section 14 of the Act is supervisory as contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate; Mr. Malviya. But the nature of this supervisory power has been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Sabir Ahmad v. Union of India (supra), in the following words: "The power under Section 11(COFEPOSA) is a supervisory power. It is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government. If this statutory safeguard is to retain its meaning and efficacy, the Central Government must discharge its supervisory responsibility with constant vigilance and watchful care. The report received under Section 3, or any communication or petition received from the detenu must be considered with reasonable expedition. What is reasonable expedition' is a question depending on the circumstances of the particular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be Laid down. The report received under Section 3, or any communication or petition received from the detenu must be considered with reasonable expedition. What is reasonable expedition' is a question depending on the circumstances of the particular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be Laid down. But it certainly does not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable redtapism and unduly protracted procrastination." 13. These observations of the Supreme Court are very useful for interpreting the scope of Section 14 of the Act because the language of Section 14 of the Act (National Security Act) is in pari-materia with that of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. The words "constant vigilance and watchful care" and "any communication or petition received from the detenu" clearly indicate that subsequent representations on new or additional facts are not barred under Section 14 of the Act. 14. In reply to the arguments of Mr. Malviya, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no legal bar under Section 14 of the Act in making second or subsequent representation for revocation of detention of the detenu. In support of his contention he placed reliance on several decisions of this Court, namely, Badre Alam v. State of U.P. (supra), Awadh Kumar Shukla v. Adhikshak Kendriya Karagar, Naini (supra), Lalji v. Union of India and others (supra), Sunil Kumar v. Superintendent District Jail and others, Habeas Corpus Petition No. 3170 of 1982. In Badre Alam's case (supra) which was a case of COFEPOSA Act, it has been held: "Section 11 of the Act enables the State Government or the Central Government as the case may be at any time to revoke or modify a detention order made under the Act. The power so conferred upon the State Government or the Central Government can be exercised at any time either suo motu or at the instance of the detenu. The action. therefore, recognises a right in the detenu to move the State Government at any time and to request it to recall the order for his detention. It also obliges the State Government to consider such request. The action. therefore, recognises a right in the detenu to move the State Government at any time and to request it to recall the order for his detention. It also obliges the State Government to consider such request. There is nothing in this section to indicate that once request of a detenu for the recall of the order has been rejected, he is debarred from making such a request again or if such a request is made the State Government may not consider." 15. In Sunil Kumar's case (supra). this Court has held as under: "We may point out that Article 22 (5 ) of the Constitution is also applicable to the disposal of second representation of detenu as it is his first representation." 16. In Awadh Kumar Shukla's case (supra) his Court has held: "Section 14 of the National Security Act also obliges the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be, to consider the said representations made by the petitioner expeditiously and further if there is some improper delay on the part of the concerned Government to dispose of the same it would render petitioner's continued detention invalid." 17. This has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no difference between the first representation and subsequent representation made to the Central Government or the State Government under Section 14 of the Act. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court cases relied upon by this Court were cases of first representation but in one of them the Supreme Court ever held that the second or subsequent representation under Section 14 of the Act is barred. So far as the case of Ram Bali Rajbhar v. State of W.B. (supra) is concerned, it has been referred in Sabir Ahmad's case (supra) to issue a direction was not accepted. That was a case under Article 32 of the Constitution. In the circumstances of that case their Lordships did not quash the order but directed the Government to refer the petition was dismissed. The facts of this case are quite different. Here the Central Government is not prepared to consider and decide the representation of the detenu even though there are some new facts. 18. So far as the observations of the Supreme Court in Philippa Anne Duke's case (supra) is concerned, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. The facts of this case are quite different. Here the Central Government is not prepared to consider and decide the representation of the detenu even though there are some new facts. 18. So far as the observations of the Supreme Court in Philippa Anne Duke's case (supra) is concerned, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. In the instant case the representations dated March 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983 are probably routed to the Central Government. The State Government has rejected the representation dated March 28, 1933 and sent the same to the Central Government with its comments. Those representations are lying in Home Department of the Central Government for disposal. Those two representations lying with the Central Government are not such representations which are handed over to some executive authority in the course of his sojourn or travel. Philippa Anne Duke's case (supra) came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Tara Chand v. Superintendent District Jail (supra) and it has been held by this Court: "Had it been made at the proper time or in a proper manner at the proper place the representation would have been disposed of on merits." 19. In the case in hand, as we have already pointed out, the representation have been properly routed to the Central Government and they are lying there unattended. 20. The distinction between Sections 8 and 14 of the Act has been very well drawn by the Supreme Court in Sat Pal v. State of Punjab and others (supra) in the following words : "The making of an application for revocation to the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act is, therefore, part of the constitutional right a citizen has against his detention under a law relating to preventive detention. While Article 22(5) contemplates the making of a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority, which has to be referred by the appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 8 (a) of the Act. Parliament has, in its wisdon, enacted Section 11 and conferred an additional safeguard against arbitrary executive action." 21. While Article 22(5) contemplates the making of a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority, which has to be referred by the appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 8 (a) of the Act. Parliament has, in its wisdon, enacted Section 11 and conferred an additional safeguard against arbitrary executive action." 21. The language of Section 14 of the National Security Act is in pari-materia with that of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, and the law declared by the Supreme Court is equally applicable to the cases covered by Section 14 of the National Security Act. These observations of the Supreme Court negative the stand taken by the Central Government and the arguments advanced by Sri Malviya on the basis of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Article 22(5) prescribes only he minimum procedure but the Parliament has in its wisdom enacted Section 14 of the Act and conferred an additional safeguard against arbitrary executive action, which cannot be ignored. 22. Admittedly, the petitioner has sent his representations dated March 28, 1983 and April 19, 1983 properly on certain new facts, which are lying unattended in the Home Department of the Central Government. It is not disputed that there are some new facts in these representations. Therefore, in view of our above conclusion, we hold that it was the duty of the Central Government to consider and decide these representations of the petitioner expeditiously. 23. It is clear from Ram Bali Rajbhar's case and Mrs. Fernandes case (supra) that where representation has not been considered by the appropriate authority the Court has a discretion to direct to consider it; but in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is not a fit case for adopting that course and the proper course would be to follow Sabir Ahmad's case. 24. From the affidavit of Shri Manglani it is apparent that the Central Government is not inclined to consider and dispose of the representations of the petitioner. The detenu had a right to make representation or petition to the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act for revocation of his detention order and it was the duty of the Central Government to decide it expeditiously. It was their discretion to accept or reject it. The detenu had a right to make representation or petition to the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act for revocation of his detention order and it was the duty of the Central Government to decide it expeditiously. It was their discretion to accept or reject it. If the right of representation in such a case is to be real and not illusory, it was a legal obligation imposed upon the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act to consider the representations and to take appropriate decision thereon. Although about four and a half months have gone since the dispatch of the representations by the detenu, yet the Central Government has not applied its mind to it. It has thus ignored it. Under the circumstances, there is no option but to hold that further detention of the detenu is illegal. 25. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Respondents are directed to set detenu at liberty forthwith unless he is being deed in connection with some other case