BHATNAGAR, J.—The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, at the request of the Commissioner of the Wealth Tax Rajasthan has referred following two questions to this Court under section 27 (1) of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1857 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act):— 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable for penalties under section 18 (1) (a) of the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment year 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 ?" 2. "Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that, even after the amendment of section 18 (1) (a) of the Wealth Tax Act by Act No. 46 of 1964 the question, whether the Wealth-tax Officer should obtain the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax for levying a penalty under that section, was not free from doubt and in proceeding to give the benefit of that doubt to the assessee so as to cancel the penalty?" 2. The assessee had failed to file the returns of his wealth for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. The due date for filing the return for these years was 30th day of June of each one of the years 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1961. A notice u/s. 17 of the Act was served upon assessees Kamdar on Jan. 20, 1962 for filing the return of the first three years and on February 10, 1962 for the year 1961-62. The due date of filing the returns in respons to the notices was Feb, 20, 1962 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and March 10, 1962 for the year 1961-6:. However, the assessee filed the returns for all the four years in October 26,1962 with a delay of 8 months in the first three years i.e. 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 7 months for the year 1961-62. The assessments for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 were completed on July 9, 1967, July 29, 1967, January 31, 1968 and February 24, 1968 respectively. The Wealth tax Officer (for short WTO) decided to initiate the proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 18(1) (a) of the Act and, therefore issued show cause notice to that effect to the assessee on July 29,1967 for the first two years, on January 31, 1968 for the year 1960-61 and on February 24,1968 for the year 1961-62. 3. The Wealth tax Officer (for short WTO) decided to initiate the proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 18(1) (a) of the Act and, therefore issued show cause notice to that effect to the assessee on July 29,1967 for the first two years, on January 31, 1968 for the year 1960-61 and on February 24,1968 for the year 1961-62. 3. The WTO was of the opinion that there was about fifteen months delay in filing the return from the date on which the assessee was liable to file the returns. The submissions of the assessee regarding the reasons for delay did not find favour with the WTO. Separate orders u/s. 18 (1) (a) for the assessment years were therefore, passed and penalties for default amounting to Rs. 4849. Rs. 8444, Rs. 9290 and Rs. 4891 respectively for the aforesaid four assessment years was imposed. 4. The assessee preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) against the levy of penalties. The AAC also was not convinced that there was any reasonable cause for not filing the returns in time and held that the penalties were validly levied. He, however, directed that for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959 60 the quantum of penalty should be computed after giving the assessee credit for the tax already paid by way of provisional assessment. For the other two years the amount of penalty levied by the WTO was confirmed. 5. The assessee then preferred further appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short the tribunal). The following two grounds were mainly relied on before the Tribunal :— 1. that, the assessee had reasonable cause for the defaults, and 2. that, the levy of the penalties, without obtaining the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was illegal. 6. The learned Accountant Member of the Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee that there was reasonable cause for not filing the returns of his total wealth in the individual capacity within the time prescribed by Sec. 14 1) of the Act. The Judicial Member of the Tribunal did not agree with that opinion. 6. The learned Accountant Member of the Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee that there was reasonable cause for not filing the returns of his total wealth in the individual capacity within the time prescribed by Sec. 14 1) of the Act. The Judicial Member of the Tribunal did not agree with that opinion. The two members were, however, in agreement regarding the applicability of provisions of Sec. 38(1) (a) to the case of the assessee and held that the provisions of Sec. 18, as they stood prior to the amending Act, No. 46 of 1964 coming into effect from April 1, 1965, were applicable to the assessee for the reason that the infringement of the provisions of the Act took place prior to the amendment of sec. 18 of the Act. The learned Members were of the opinion that the question of the applicability of amended sec. 18 of the Act was not free from doubt, and therefore, benefit should be given to the assesse. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal allowed the four appeals of the assessee by its consolidated order dated January 20, 1972, The two appeals filed by the WTO against the deduction, in the quantum of the penalty, granted to the assessee by the AAC for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 were dismissed. 7. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Rajasthan, filed applications before the Tribunal for referring two questions of law arising out of their order dated January 20,1972 to the High Court under section 27 1) of the Act. 8. The learned Members allowed the request and drew up a statement of the case referring the two questions as mentioned above, to this Court. 9. The point involved in the first question is regarding the plea of the assessee that he had reasonable cause for not filing the Wealth-tax return within the time allowed u/s. 14 (1) of the Act. The WTO did not accept the submissions made by the assessee in this respect. That finding on the point was affirmed by the AAC in the appeals. There was, however, difference of opinion between the two Members of the Tribunal in this regard. The learned Accountant Member held that the assessee had reasonable cause for not filing the return of his own wealth in his individual capacity. That finding on the point was affirmed by the AAC in the appeals. There was, however, difference of opinion between the two Members of the Tribunal in this regard. The learned Accountant Member held that the assessee had reasonable cause for not filing the return of his own wealth in his individual capacity. The learned Judicial Member on the other hand was not convinced that there was any reasonable cause for the assessee is not doing so. 10. In case of difference of opinion between the two Members on a point, reference is to be made to the President of a third Member and then the opinion of the two out of such three Members is taken to be final. 11. In the present case as the two Members viz. the Accountant Member and the Judicial Member were in agreement regarding the procedure to be followed for the imposition of penalty and held allowed the appeals on that point they did not find it recessary to refer the point of difference to the President of the Tribunal. 12. The answer to question No. 1 in such circumstances would depend on the answer of question No. 2 If the answer is that obtaining the previous approval of I A C to proceed u/s. 18 (1) (a) was necessary even after amending Act No. 46 of 1964 came into force, for levying penalty after April 1, 1965, then there would be no necessity for any reference to a third Member. But, in case the answer would be in the negative, to the effect that previous approval of IAC was not necessary after the amendment of Sec. 18, then there would be necessity of having the opinion of the third Member regarding the assesses plea about existence or reasonable cause for not filing the Wealth-tax returns within the allowed time. 13. By Act No. 46 of 1964, Sec. 18 of the Act was amended as regards the procedure as well as the quatntom of penalty to be imposed in case of default in filing the return in time. This Act was made applicable from April 1, 1965. 13. By Act No. 46 of 1964, Sec. 18 of the Act was amended as regards the procedure as well as the quatntom of penalty to be imposed in case of default in filing the return in time. This Act was made applicable from April 1, 1965. Sec. 18 (4) prior to the amendment reads as under : Sec. 18(4)— "The Wealth-tax Officer shall not impose any penalty under this section without the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax." After the amendment of this provision, previous approval of the IAC for imposing penalty by the WTO was done away with. The partinent question involved in the matter is whether the amendment in the procedure would apply retrospectively or prospectively. 14. Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the provisions contained in Sec. 18 (4) created a vested right in the assessee. Its intention was to impose restriction on the powers of the WTO and as such the subsequent amendment could not have vested in the WTO jurisdiction which, he did not have at the time of the infringement of the provisions of the Act regarding the filing of the return of his assets. According to Mr. Singhvi, the due date for filing the returns in all the cases in response to the notice u/s 17 and 14(2) fall prior to the amended Sec. 18 coming into effect and, therefore, infringement was to be considered from that time. Hence the date of the completion of the assessment would not be material. 15. Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand urged that the penalty proceedings were initiated subsequent to the amendment of Sec. 18 and therefore, there was no necessity of seeking previous approval of the IAC. 16. Mr. Singhvi referred to the case of Continantal Commercial Corporation vs. Income Tax Officer (1) wherein the question regarding the jurisdiction of the asseessing authority subsequent to the amendment of the provisions of imposition of penalty under the Income-tax Act came for consideration. The amendment of sec. 274(2) of the Tncome-tax Act by Act No. 42 of 1970 enlarged the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer with effect from April 1. 1971. Prior to the amendment the Income tax Officer had to refer the case to the IAC if the minimum penalty imposable exceeded a sum of Rs. The amendment of sec. 274(2) of the Tncome-tax Act by Act No. 42 of 1970 enlarged the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer with effect from April 1. 1971. Prior to the amendment the Income tax Officer had to refer the case to the IAC if the minimum penalty imposable exceeded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- The amendment enlarged the jurisdiction of ITC up to 25000/- Their Lordships were pleased to hold that the provisions of Sec 274(2) as it stood on April 1, 1971 were the relevant provisions which were applicable to the case. 17. In order to substantiate his case, regarding the jurisdiction of the Taxing Authority, Mr. Singhvi also placed reliance on the principles enunciated in the case of Commissioner of Income tax vs. Royal Motor Car Co.(2), Commissioner of Income tax. Guiarat-III vs. Manu Engineering Works (3) and Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala I vs. Raman Industries (4). In all these three cases, the question of enlargment of jurisdiction regarding the cases referr-red to TAC u/s 274 of the Income tax Act was involved. 18. In the first case, their Lordships were pleased to observe that as regards the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to pass the order of assessment, in view of the amendment in Sec. 274 by the Amendment Act, it is well settled law that, every litigant has a vested right in the proced-dural law, so far as substance is concerned. If the substantive question of jurisdiction is to be effected by a new amendment, the Legislature must say so either in express terms or by necessary implication Their Lordships referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. vs. Irving (5) wherein, the well recognised principle that though the right of appaal is a procedural right, it is a vested right, was relied upon. In view of that principle, their Lordships were pleased to hold that the IAC, whose power was affected by the Amendment Act, would continue to have the jurisdiction in matters which were then pending before him, since the Amendment Act of 1979 neither in express words nor by implication has indicated that the jurisdiction of the IAC, even in pending matters, that is, matters which were already referred to him, was to be affected. 19. The same principle was enunciated in the second case. 19. The same principle was enunciated in the second case. It was held that the jurisdiction of the IAC under the unamended Sec. 274 continued and he could dispose of the penalty proceedings. It was also observed that the IAC would continue to have jurisdiction in matters pending before him despite the Amendment Act of 1970, as there is no intention either by express words or necessary implication that the IAC will not have jurisdiction even in pending matters. In other words, the matters which were already referred to him remained unaffected. 20. The third case relied on by Mr. Singhvi is also on the same line. Their Lordships were pleased to observe that there is no provision in Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 1970 to indicate that the amendment of S. 274 is retrospective. The section deals with vested rights and, therefore, the amendment is prospective in operation. Their Lordships were further pleased to observe that the jurisdiction of the IAC to deal with a matter of penalty is to be looked at as on the date of the initiation of proceedings and no with reference to subsequent events and such jurisdiction cannot be divested by what has subsequently happened. If during the time when the matter of penalty had been referred to and was pending before the IAC the law was changed and the minimum penalty for the purpose of making a reference to the IAC was raised from Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 25,000/-, it does not mean that the jurisdiction of the IAC has been taken away. In such a case, the IAC would have the jurisdiction to impose the penalty. 21. The principle propunded in all the above referred three cases was that the law prevailing at the time of initiation of penalty proceedings shall be applicable to such proceedings and subsequent amendment would not have the effect of taking away a vested right of an assessee. Thus if the case had already been referred to IAC under the old provision, he shall have jurisdiction to dispose of those cases. It has nowhere been laid down that if the cases of infrin-geement of the provisions of the Income-tax Act are still pending with the ITO, he would have to refer them to the IAC for approval regarding the imposition of penalty. 22. It has nowhere been laid down that if the cases of infrin-geement of the provisions of the Income-tax Act are still pending with the ITO, he would have to refer them to the IAC for approval regarding the imposition of penalty. 22. In the instant case, at the time of the amendment of Sec. 18 of the Act the matter was with the WTO and even assessment proceedings were not completed. With the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the WTO, under the amended Sec. 18(1) (a), he was not required to refer the matter to the IAC for approval for imposition of penalty. 23. Mr. Singhvi next argued that the matter is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar vs. Suresh Seth (6). That case related to the computation of the penalty to be imposed on the defaulter assessee and their Lordships were pleased to observe as under :- "Where the default complained of is one falling u/s.18(1) (a) of the W.T. Act (e.g., failure to file the return of wealth before the due date without reasonable cause), the penalty has to be computed in accordance with the law in force on the last day on which the return in question had to be filed. Neither the amendment made in 1964 nor the one made in 1980 to Cl. (i) of s. i 8(1) has retrospective effect." 24. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrong door continuously liable for penalty, A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. The words "for every month during which the default continued," according to their Lordships indicate only the multiplier to be adopted in determining the question of penalty and do not have the effect of making the default in question a continuing one. Nor do they make the amended provisions modifying the penalty applicable to earlier defaults in the absence of necessary provisions in the amending Acts. The principle to be inferred and penalty to be imposed would be as provided in the relevant provisions at the time of committing the default. Nor do they make the amended provisions modifying the penalty applicable to earlier defaults in the absence of necessary provisions in the amending Acts. The principle to be inferred and penalty to be imposed would be as provided in the relevant provisions at the time of committing the default. If the default continues subsequent to the Amendment Act, the amount would be multiplied in accordance with the provisions prior to the Amendment. The reason is simple. A person cannot be subjected to greater penalty or punishment than what he could be liable for when the offence was committed. The subsequent amendment would not change the position unless it is specifically provided for. That safeguard is also available for penal provisions under taxation legislation. In this regard reference may again be made to the case of C.W.T., Amritsar vs. Suresh Seth (Supra). Their Lordships were pleased to observe as under:— "In the case of acts amounting to crimes the punishment to be imposed cannot be enhanced at all under our Constitution by any subsequent legislation by reason of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution which declares that no person shall be subject to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. In other cases, however, even though the liability may be enhanced it can only be done by a subsequent law (of course subject to the Constitution) which either by express words or by necessary implication provides for such enhancement." 25. In the case of Thakur Mandhatta Singh vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (7) the principle enunciated in the above referred Supreme Court decision was followed. Following question was referred by the Tribunal : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the law, under which penalty is to be computed in the present case for the default u/s. 18(1) (a) is the one which prevailed on the date when the assessment order was completed, i e., on 10.10.72, and not as per law prevailing on 1.7.68, when the default of not furnishing the return had commenced." 26. It is evident from the question itself that the guidance was sought for the computation of penalty and not for the procedure to be followed. It is evident from the question itself that the guidance was sought for the computation of penalty and not for the procedure to be followed. In view of the principle enunciated in the Supreme Court decision of C.W.T., Amritsar Vs. Suresh Seth (supra) with reference to Art. 20 of the Constitution of India (quoted above) the question was answered in the negative, 27. The imposition of penalty being penal provision, there cannot be any dispute on the point that the computation of amount of penalty would be in accordance with the provisions of law prevailing at the time of infringement of any provisions of the relevant Act. 28. The question before us is regarding the procedure to be followed in initiating penalty proceedings subsequent to the Amendment Act. 29.Mr. Singhvis contention is that the amount of penalty to be imposed is to be computed as per provisions in force prior to the Amendment Act and the procedure for referring the case to the 1AC should also be followed. 30. There is no dispute for the first proposition that the computation of the penalty to be imposed should be as per the law effective at the time of infringement. The position of law stands settled by the above referred Supreme Court decision. However, we find ourselves unable to agree with the second proposition regarding the procedure to be followed for imposing the penalty. In our view, Sec 18 (4) only provided the procedure to be adopted regarding the imposition of penalty and not the rate of penalty. Thus, the procedure to be followed subsequent to the amendment of that section would not put the petitioner in any disadvantageous position regarding the quantum of penalty to be imposed. Assuming for a moment that the post of IAC would have been abolished, then would it mean that all the cases in which imposition of penalty have been proper, would be dropped automatically. It would be profitable to refer to some cases which lay down the general proposition regarding the retrospectivity of a law relating to procedure. 31. In the case of Anant Gopal Sheoroy vs. The State of Bombay (8) the question regarding the retrospective effect of the change in law of procedure came for consideration and their Lordships were pleased to lay down the following principles : "No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. 31. In the case of Anant Gopal Sheoroy vs. The State of Bombay (8) the question regarding the retrospective effect of the change in law of procedure came for consideration and their Lordships were pleased to lay down the following principles : "No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective." 32. In the case of Memon Abdul Karim Haji Tayab, Central Cutelory Stores, Veraval Vs. Deputy Custodian General, New Delhi (9) the question before their Lordships was about the applicability of amended provisions of Sec. 48 (1) and (2) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (1950). It was held that sub-section (1) and (2) are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22,1956 even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. Their Lordships were further pleased to observe that, it is well-settled that procedural amendments to a law apply in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an anterior date. 33. Mr. Joshi also referred to the case of Nani Gopal Mitra vs. State of Bihar (10) dealing with the retrospective operation of an amendment in the procedural law. The case was under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. When an appeal was pending Sec. 5(3) of the Act was repealed. It was held that the appellate Court could invoke the presumption u/s. 5(3) of the Act. Their Lordships were pleased to observe as under : — "It is true that as a general rule alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be." 34. It was held that the appellate Court could invoke the presumption u/s. 5(3) of the Act. Their Lordships were pleased to observe as under : — "It is true that as a general rule alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be." 34. Referring to the principle embodied in Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, their Lordships were further pleased to hold that even though pending appeal against conviction u/s, 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, S.5(3) was repealed by Anti Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, (Act No. 40 of 1964), it is open to the High Court invoke the presumption contained in s. 5(3) in considering the case of the appellant, since the conviction of the appellant was pronounced by trial Judge long before the amendment. 35. It is on this principle that the first three cases referred to were based and cases pending before the IAC were not disturbed by applying the amended provisions retrospectively. The position, therefore, is that the amendment in the procedural law would ordinarily operate retrospectively in the absence of anything contrary. In respect of cases pending before the IAC at the time of amendment of Sec. 18 (4) of the Act, he had authority to grant or refuse permission. But cases which were not so referred to him by that time u/s. 18 (4) of the Act, the provisions of amended section 18 (1) (a) would be applicable. 36. In view of the above discussion, the Tribunal was not right in giving benefit of doubt to the assessee, on the ground that the question whether after the amendment of sec. 18 (1)a) of the Act by the Act No. 46 of 1964, the Wealth Tax Officer should obtain the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax for leying penalty under that section was not free from doubt. The procedure provided in the amended provisions of Sec. 18 (1) (a) of the Act had retrospective effect and was applicable to the proceedings for imposition of penalty which were initiated after the Amending Act came into force. 37. The question No. 2 is answered accordingly. 38. The procedure provided in the amended provisions of Sec. 18 (1) (a) of the Act had retrospective effect and was applicable to the proceedings for imposition of penalty which were initiated after the Amending Act came into force. 37. The question No. 2 is answered accordingly. 38. Regarding question No. 1, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the assessee was not liable for penalties u/s. 18 (1) (a) of the Act for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. We would, however make it clear that this much answer only would not set the matter at rest so far as the alleged default of the assessee and the imposition of penalty in consequence thereof is concerned. The reason is, that, sec. 18(1)(a) of the Act is retrospective only for procedural purpose. So far as the computation of the amount of penalty is concerned, guidance is to be taken from the principles enunciated in the case of C.W.T., Amritsar vs. Suresh Seth (supra). To put it in other words, the authorities concerned will have to take into consideration the rate of penalty as provided in Sec. 18 prior to the amendment of 1964, so far as the computation of the quantum of penalty to be imposed is concerned. Despite the answer regarding the retrospective operation of the procedural law contained in amended Sec.l8(1) (a) an important question would still remain to be decided by the Tribunal, before considering the question of liability of the assessee for penalty. The assessee had taken the plea of reasonable cause in not filing the returns in time. His plea found favour with the Accountant Member on this point. In the case of difference of opinion between the two Members, the matter should have been referred to the President of the Tribunal who could either hear it himself or refer the case to a third Member. The appeals were accepted because of the learned Members giving benefit of the doubt lingering in their minds regarding the retrospective operation of amended Sec. 18(1) (a) of the Act. As such the question of existence of reasonable cause for not filing the return in time still remains undetermined. The appeals were accepted because of the learned Members giving benefit of the doubt lingering in their minds regarding the retrospective operation of amended Sec. 18(1) (a) of the Act. As such the question of existence of reasonable cause for not filing the return in time still remains undetermined. Now that we have held that the operation of Sec 18 (1)(a) is retrospective so far as the procedure to be followed is concerned, but prospective regarding the computation of the rate and quantum of penalty to be imposed, the plea of the assessee that he had reasonalbe cause for not filing the return in the time, will have to be considered before proceedings to impose penalty for the years in question. There being difference of opinion in this regard between the Accountant Member and the Judicial Member, the matter will have to be referred to the President of the Tribunal for final decision of that question in accordance with law. 39. With these observations, the reference is answered as stated earlier.