B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal at the instance of the original applicant firm who are the building contractors is directed against the order of the learned Civil Judge (S. D) Mehsana dated 31/03/1981 dismissing the application of the appellant to set aside the award made by one Shri G. T. Panchigar Superintending Engineer Gandhinagar Panchayat dated 16/10/1976 It appears that the appellant had filed a suit being Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1973 for recovery of Rs. 11 0 against Mehsana District Panchayat-respondent No. 1 The said Panchayat had tiled a Cross Regular Civil Suit No. 281 of 1973 against the present appellant for recovery of Rs. 8 29 Ps. after giving credit or the amount claimed by the appellant in their suit. It appears that the learned Civil Judge was moved jointly by the parties of the aforesaid two suits by their application dated 19/07/1915 (vide Exhibit 30) to refer the entire dispute to the arbitration of one Shri B. K. Engineer Superintending Engineer Gandhinagar District Panchayat. Accordingly a reference was made to said Shri B. K. Engineer by the learned Civil Judge by his order of 30/07/1975 Unfortunately however before the said Arbitrator could decide the matter he was transferred and the Civil Court was accordingly informed by him by his letter of 25/03/1976 (vide Exhibit 40 ). The learned Civil Judge therefore heard the parties and appointed Shri G. T. Panchigar who succeeded Shri B. K. Engineer as Superintending Engineer Gandhinagar Panchayat. It is common ground that this order was made by the learned Civil Judge in August 1976 I he said Arbitrator fixed 14/10/1976 as the date of hearing and informed the parties accordingly. Nobody remained present on behalf of the appellant firm on the said date with the result that the Arbitrator made the award on 16/10/1976 It is not clear from the order of the learned Civil Judge as to whether the Arbitrator had served the notice to the parties as required under sec. 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act. The learned Civil Judge with respect to him confused the obligation of service of notice by the Arbitrator under sec. 14 (1) and by the Court under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act. While discussing the point No. G for determination as to whether notice under sec. 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act. The learned Civil Judge with respect to him confused the obligation of service of notice by the Arbitrator under sec. 14 (1) and by the Court under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act. While discussing the point No. G for determination as to whether notice under sec. 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act is returned and if yes what is its effect for its noncompliance the learned Judge has recorded that the Arbitrator had informed by registered post A/d on or about 23/10/1976 about the making of the award to the present appellant. It appears that the Arbitrator had filed the award as required under sec. 14 (2) in the Court on 26/10/1976 ( 2 ) THE appellant firm had filed an application being Application No. 63 of 1976 before the Civil Judge (S. D.) Mehsana praying for setting aside the award of the Arbitrator. The award vas assailed broadly on about four grounds. In the first place it was assailed on the ground that there was no valid reference to Shri G. T. Panchigar. In the second place the award was vitiated since it was not made within the time originally stipulated by the learned Civil Judge. In the third place the award was also challenged of the ground that it was bad in law inasmuch as no notice as required under sec. 14 (3) was served on the appellant and lastly it was assailed on the ground that the Arbitrator misconducted himself in not affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the opulent. ( 3 ) NONE of these objections impressed the learned Judge Who was also of the opinion that the application for setting aside the award was time barred. He therefore by his order of 31/03/1981 dismissed the application for setting aside the award. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal from order under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. ( 4 ) BROADLY two questions arise for my determination. In the first place whether the application to set aside the as and was beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal from order under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. ( 4 ) BROADLY two questions arise for my determination. In the first place whether the application to set aside the as and was beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. Secondly the award is vitiated inasmuch as there was no valid reference and because the award was made beyond the stipulated time and in any case the Arbitrator misconducted himself in failing to give notice as required under sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act and failed to furnish adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellant applicant. ( 5 ) SO far as the first question is concerned I am of the opinion that the learned Judge was clearly in error in holding that the application of the appellant to set aside the award of the Arbitrator was time barred. The relevant article which would be attracted in the present case would be Article 119 of the Limitation Act 1963 The material part of Article 119 reads as under: - Description of Period of Time from which suit. limitation period begins to run. - 119 Under the Arbitration Act 1940 of 1940) (a) xx xx xx xx xx xx (b) for setting aside an Thirty days The date of service of the award or getting an notice of the filing of the award remitted for award. reconsideration. THE period of limitation prescribed for making an application for setting aside an award or getting the award remitted for reconsideration is 30 days and the time from which the period begins to run is the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. It should be noted that sec. 14 provides for the award to be signed and filed in the Court. Sec. 14 (1) enjoins the Arbitrator or Umpire to sign the award and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. It should be noted that sec. 14 provides for the award to be signed and filed in the Court. Sec. 14 (1) enjoins the Arbitrator or Umpire to sign the award and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Sec. 14 (2) provides that the Arbitrator or Umpire shall at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award cause the award or a signed copy of it to be filed in Court alongwith the depositions and document which may have beer taken and proved before him and upon such filing the court is enjoined to give a notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Now these two obligations of service of notice operate in different fields. Sec. 14 (1) obliges the Arbitrator or the Umpire to sign the award and give notice in writing to the parties of making and signing of the award. Sec. 14 (2) provides for the two obligations one for the Arbitrator or the Umpire and another for the Court. The Arbitrator or the Umpire has to file the award if so required by the parties or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved in the course of the arbitration proceedings. The Court in also equally obliged after such filing of the award together with the depositions and documents to serve notice on the parties about the factum of filing of the award and the accompanying documents. Art. 119 (a) of the Limitation Act provides a limitation for filing in the Court of an award while clause (b) of Art. 119 provides limitation for setting aside an award or getting an award remitted for reconsideration. The present case is pertaining to an application made by a party who is aggrieved by the award for setting aside such award. It is therefore Art. 119 (b) which would be applicable. The limitation prescribed is 30 days which commences to run from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. The present case is pertaining to an application made by a party who is aggrieved by the award for setting aside such award. It is therefore Art. 119 (b) which would be applicable. The limitation prescribed is 30 days which commences to run from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. It is therefore clear that the limitation prescribed under clause (b) would commence to run from the date of the service of the notice of filing of the award by the Court under sec. 14 (2) though such a notice can be oral and not necessarily to be in writing as required under sec. 14 (1) (vide: NILKANTHA SIDRAMAPPA V. KASHINATH A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 666 AT PAGE 667 ). It is though not clear as to when the Court served the notice on the appellant about the filing of the award. It is an admitted position that the Arbitrator had filed the award in the Court on 25/10/1976 and the application was moved by the appellant for setting aside the award on 26/11/1976 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that in no case this application could be said to be time barrel. The learned Judge has while discussing the point No. 6 for his determination recorded that the Arbitrator informed by registered post A/d on or about 24/10/1976 about the making of the award to the present appellant and therefore there is a clear compliance under with sec. 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act in the present case. The grievance of the appellant was that he was neither served by the Court with the notice as required under sec. 14 (2) nor by the Arbitrator as required under section 14 (1 ). The learned Judge has held that notice under sec. 14 (1) is good enough and therefore it cannot be urged that the award is vitiated on that court. The learned Judge appears to be of the view that the obligation cast under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act is only when the award has been filed by the Arbitrator himself without the intervention of the Court on the part of the parties. It is no doubt true that the present arbitration reference was in suits but sec. The learned Judge appears to be of the view that the obligation cast under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act is only when the award has been filed by the Arbitrator himself without the intervention of the Court on the part of the parties. It is no doubt true that the present arbitration reference was in suits but sec. 25 of the Arbitration Act lays down that the provisions of other Chapter shall so far as they can be made applicable apply to the arbitration under Chapter IV dealing with arbitration in suits. The necessity of notice by the Court where the arbitration award has been filed in the Court is with a view to enable the party to file objections against the award or to enable him to make an appropriate application if he is so advised for setting aside the award or for remitting the award for further consideration. The essence of the notice is with a view to ensure that the party aggrieved by the award may take appropriate proceedings for section aside the award within the limitation prescribed. If therefore notice is not served under sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act the question of limitation would be irrelevant since the limitation is not commenced to run. In the present case in so far as the appellant had filed application on the 30th day from the date of the filing of the award I do not think that the learned Judge was right in holding that the application for setting aside the award was time barred. ( 6 ) SO far as the challenge to the award is concerned I do not think there is any merit in it. A; far as the first limb of the challenge is concerned viz. there was no valid reference to Shri G. T. Panchigar I do not think there is any substance in it since after the Civil Court was informed by Shri S. K. Engineer that he has been transferred from the post of Superintending Engineer Gandhinagar Panchayat the learned Judge heard the parties and made a fresh order of appointment of Shri G. T. Panchigar in place of Shri B. K. Engineer somewhere in August 1976 The first ground of attack should therefore be rejected. ( 7 ) AS regards the award having beyond the time originally stipulated I do not think that the objection is well founded Sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act empowers the Court if it thinks fit whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not to enlarge from time to time the time for making the award. In other words the Court has power to enlarge the period of making the award from time to time and this power can be exercised before or after the time originally fixed has expired and before or after the award has been made. though beyond time. It is no doubt true that the original order appointing Shri B. K. Engineer provided for three months period for making the award below Ex. 39 dated 30/07/1975 The said Engineer informed the Civil Court somewhere on 23/03/1976 that he was transferred and would therefore not he able to complete the arbitration proceedings It is in August 1976 that Shri G. T. Panchigar was appointed in place of Mr. Engineer and he was required to make the award as expeditiously as possible. He made the award on 16/10/1976 and filed it in the Court on 26/10/1976 An order directing TAKID to be issued to the Arbitrator and fixing the date for hearing has been held to be extending the time for filing the award (vide: DABIRUDDIN V. AMINA BIBI A. I. R. 1975 CAL. 475 AND RADHA KISHAN V. MADHU KRISHNA A. I. R. 1952 ALL. 856 ). Similarly where the award is filed date in the Court and the Court instead of taking notice of the delay directs the party to file objections within prescribed time the Court is impliedly held to have extended the time (vide: M/s BOKARO AND RAMGUR LTD. V. DR. PRASUN KUMAR A. I. R. 1968 PATNA 150 ). In the present case therefore I do not think that the learned Judge was in any way in error in holding that the time was impliedly extended. ( 8 ) THE third ground of attack that since no notice was served under sec. 14 (1) or sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act the award was vitiated. has no substance since the obligation prescribed under secs. ( 8 ) THE third ground of attack that since no notice was served under sec. 14 (1) or sec. 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act the award was vitiated. has no substance since the obligation prescribed under secs. 14 and (2) is for purposes of enabling the parties to file their objections or to move the Court for setting aside the award. They are therefore not mandatory provisions of law. Assuming them to be mandatory it cannot be urged that the breach of mandatory provision would render the award non est if the provision is not in public interest and one which can be waived by the parties (vide: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX GUJARAT V. SMT. VIMLABEN BHAGWANDAS PATEL (1979) 118 ITR 134 ). ( 9 ) THE last ground of objection was that the appellant was not given sufficient opportunity of hearing. I do not think that this ground can be successfully pressed into service since it was the appellant who defaulted itself in appearing before the Arbitrator inspite of service of notice of hearing to them. It therefore cannot be said that the Arbitrator had not given an opportunity to the appellant. It is on the contrary the appellant had itself not availed of the opportunity. ( 10 ) THE result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. .