JUDGMENT - Dhabe J:.-The short question that arises for consideration in this peti-tion is whether the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, has jurisdic-tion to decide whether the alleged resignation given by an Assistant Teacher in the school is a resignation according to law or is a forced resignation. The respondent No, 2 is an Assistant Teacher in the school run by Shriram Swami Shikshan Sanstha, which has filed the instant petition. The respondent No. 2 made a complaint on September 22, 1982 to the Education Officer, Zill Parishad, Nagpur, i.e. the respondent No. 1, that her resigna- tion was forcibly obtained from her by the President of the petitioner-society, who incidentally happens to be the father-in-law of the respondent No. 2. On November 23, 1982, the Head Master of the school in question was called by the Additional Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, to make an enquiry into the question of the alleged forced resignation of the respondent No. 2. He, thereafter, by his order dated December 3, 1982, held that the resignation of the respondent No. 2 is not according to rules. He, therefore, directed the petitioner management to reinstate her in service and give a compliance report to that effect to his office. 2. The petitioner management has challenged this order of the Addi- tional Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain such a complaint about the forced resignation. It is also pointed out in the petition that if at all such a grievance about the forced resignation can be made, it is only under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, the Act). It is at this stage also pointed out that in the applica- tion for vacation of stay, filed by the respondent No. 2, she had complained that initially she had moved the Tribunal under section 9 of the Act, but the Tribunal returned her complaint back. 3. The principal question in this petition is whether the respondent No. 1, i.e. the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the respondent No. 2 regarding her forced resigna- tion. We have perused the provisions of the Act and we find that there is no provision in the Act which confers any jurisdiction upon the Education Officer in regard to this matter. We have perused the provisions of the Act and we find that there is no provision in the Act which confers any jurisdiction upon the Education Officer in regard to this matter. Section 7 of the Act read with rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) -Rules, 1981, deals with the procedure for tendering resignation but no pro- vision is made creating a forum for adjudication upon such resignations tendered by the employees. The respondents 1 and 2 have not been able to bring to our notice any provision of law which confers jurisdiction upon the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, in such matters, it is, therefore, clear that the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, erred and acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the complaint of the respondent No. 2 about the forced resignation. His impugned order dated December 3, 1982, is, there- fore, liable to be set aside on this short ground. 4. However, since an important question as regards the remedy to the employee in such matters is raised before us, both by the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 2, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Act to see whether there is a remedy provided in the Act in such matters. This brings us to section 9 of the Act, which creates a forum for adjudica- tion in regard to removal, dismissal or termination of service of the em- ployees covered under the Act. The provisions of section 9(1) are reproduc- ed below for ready reference : “9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the Management and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order to the Tribunal constituted under section 8 : ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...... 5. We have, therefore, to consider the question whether the employee can move the Tribunal under section 9 of the Act in the case of an alleged forced resignation. The language used in section 9 of the Act covers not only dismissal and removal but all forms of termination of service. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...... 5. We have, therefore, to consider the question whether the employee can move the Tribunal under section 9 of the Act in the case of an alleged forced resignation. The language used in section 9 of the Act covers not only dismissal and removal but all forms of termination of service. On behalf of the petitioner, a decision of the Karnataka High Court in (M/s Southern Roadways Ltd., Bangalore v. Padmanabhan and another)1 arising under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is relied upon to show that the phraseology “or otherwise terminates the services” covers the case of forced resignation and, therefore, a reference under section 2-A read with section 10 of the Act is maintainable in the case of a forced resignation. We feel that it is a well settled proposition of law that a forced resignation, which means a resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the act of the employer. In substance the contract of service comes to an end in such case” by the action on the part of the employer. It, therefore, amounts to termination of Service by the employer. In the decision of the Karnataka High Court (cited supra), the Court was considering the phraseo-logy “otherwise terminates the services” used in section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A similar phraseology is used in section 9(1) of the Act. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the decision cited supra. We are supported in this view also by an old “decision by the Additional Judicial Commissioner in (Abraham Reuben v. The Karachi Municipality)2, which has relied upon an English decision in (Stephenson v. London Joint Stock Bank Ltd).3 We, therefore, hold that the phraseology “whose services are otherwise terminated” used in section 9(1) of the Act covers cases of forced resignation and, therefore, in such matters, an employee can move the Tribunal under section 9(1) of the Act. In the circumstances, we allow this petition and set aside the impugned order of the Additional Education Officer dated December 3, 1982 and the memo dated December 30, 1982 issued by him pursuant to his aforesaid impugned order dated December 3, 1982. In the circumstances, we allow this petition and set aside the impugned order of the Additional Education Officer dated December 3, 1982 and the memo dated December 30, 1982 issued by him pursuant to his aforesaid impugned order dated December 3, 1982. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----