JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - In execution of a decree passed in favour of M/s. Trilok Chand Prahlad Rai, respondent No. 4 certain properties belonging to the petitioner were put up for sale. 15th December, 1980, was the date fixed for sale. The Amin of the Court concerned, who was deputed in this behalf, conducted the sale on that date. The bid of Smt. Shakuntala Devi Burman, respondent No. 3, for Rs. 11,000/- was the highest bid and after the bidding was over respondent No. 3 deposited 25% of the purchase money. The Amin submitted the papers to the court concerned for necessary orders. The balance of the purchase money was deposited by respondent No. 3 in court on 1st January, 1981. Due to winter vacations in the court this deposit was within 15 days of 15th December, 1980, namely, the date on which the sale was held. On 13th January, 1981, an order was passed by the court accepting the bid and requiring the decree- holder to deposit the poundage fee by 15th January, 1981. An application was made by the petitioner judgment-debtor on 16th March, 1981, for setting aside the sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. The requisite amount contemplated by the said rule was also deposited by the petitioner on that date. The application was contested by respondent No. 3, the auction purchaser, on the ground that it was barred by time. This objection found (did not find?) favour with the court executing the decree and the sale was set aside on 29th January, 1982. Aggrieved by that order respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal, before the District Judge. The appeal came up for hearing before the VIth Additional District Judge. Aligarh and was allowed on 16th August, 1982. It was held that the application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. was barred by time. It is this order of the VIth Addl. District Judge. Aligarh, dated 16th August, 1982 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. Aligarh and was allowed on 16th August, 1982. It was held that the application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. was barred by time. It is this order of the VIth Addl. District Judge. Aligarh, dated 16th August, 1982 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the application made by the petitioner under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. for setting aside the sale was within time and was rightly allowed by the trial court and the VIth Additional District Judge has committed a manifest error of law in reversing the order of the trial court and dismissing the petitioner's application. According to counsel for the petitioner in view of the amendment made in Article 127 of the Limitation Act by Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Act No. 104 of 1976) the period of 30 days limitation for filing an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. stood substituted by 60 days and since the date of sale within the meaning of Article 127 of the Limitation Act was 13th January, 1981, when the bid of respondent No. .3 was accepted by the court and not 15th December, 1980, when the sale was actually held the application for setting aside the sale as filed on 16th March, 1981. was well within limitation, 14th and 15th March, 1981, being holidays. For the respondent No. 3 oil the other hand it has been submitted by her counsel that the date of sale in the instant case was not 13th January. 1981, but 15th December, 1980 inasmuch as on that date the highest bid of respondent No. 3 was accepted, she was declared the purchaser and was required to deposit 25% of the purchase money which she did. It has also been submitted by hint that even if for the sake of argument 13th January, 1981, and not 15th December. 1981). 1981, but 15th December, 1980 inasmuch as on that date the highest bid of respondent No. 3 was accepted, she was declared the purchaser and was required to deposit 25% of the purchase money which she did. It has also been submitted by hint that even if for the sake of argument 13th January, 1981, and not 15th December. 1981). may be taken as the date of sale, notwithstanding the fact that the application filed by the petitioner under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. being within 60 days from 13th January, 1981, was still liable to be dismissed inasmuch as the petitioner had failed to deposit the requisite amount contemplated by the said rule within 30 days as enjoined by sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. even from 13th January, 1981. 3. Two questions, therefore, arise for consideration in the present writ petition- (1) whether the date of sale in the instant case was 15th December, 1980, or 13th January, 1981, and (2) whether the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. was liable to be dismissed inasmuch as the requisite deposit contemplated by the said rule had not been made within 30 days even from 13th January, 1981. We propose to consider the second question first. 4. We propose to consider the second question first. 4. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that since the period of limitation to file an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. was extended from 30 days to 60 days by Section 98 of Act No. 104 of 1976 but the words "thirty days" remain unaltered in sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. and since an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. could be filed only on the requisite amount contemplated by the said sub-rule being deposited an anomalous and inconsistent situation had been created and a harmonious construction deserves to be placed on the two provisions, namely, sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. contemplating deposit of the requisite amount within 30 days on the one hand and Article 127 of the Limitation Act prescribing 60 days as period of limitation for filing an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. on the other, in a manner which may serve the purpose of extending the period of limitation under Article 127 of the Limitation Act from 30 days to 60 days and not defeat it. Counsel for respondent No. 3 on the other hand has pointed out that the language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. was plain and unambiguous and has submitted as a proposition of law that unless there is any ambiguity and anomaly in the provision which conies up for consideration or unless that provision is inconsistent with some other provision recourse to external aids of interpretation cannot be taken and the said provision has to be interpreted according to its plain grammatical meaning. He has cited various decided cases in support of this submission. Since the legal position in this behalf is' well settled and is as has been submitted by counsel for the respondent we find it unnecessary to refer to those cases. 5. The question which, therefore has to be considered is as to what is the position of the relevant provisions which fall for consideration in the instant case. Since the legal position in this behalf is' well settled and is as has been submitted by counsel for the respondent we find it unnecessary to refer to those cases. 5. The question which, therefore has to be considered is as to what is the position of the relevant provisions which fall for consideration in the instant case. When for allowing an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. the only fact which is to be ascertained is whether the amount contemplated by the said rule has or has not been deposited and the application for setting aside the sale under this rule can he filed only on such deposit being made any provision which has the effect of prescribing the period within which this deposit is to be made prescribes the limitation not only for making the deposit but virtually and for all intents and purposes also for filing the application to set aside the sale on deposit of the requisite amount. The reason for taking this view is obvious. Prescribing a period of 60 days for filing an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. and retaining 30 days as the period of limitation for making the deposit virtually amounts to cutting down the period of limitation to the period within which the deposit is to be made, namely, 30 days, inasmuch as if the deposit had not been made within 30 days the application for setting aside the sale even if filed within 60 days, the period prescribed in this behalf, will have to be dismissed on the ground that the deposit had not been made within 30 days. The enlargement of the limitation for making an application to set aside the sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. from 30 days to 60 days will thus be rendered nugatory. There can be no manner of doubt that in order to find out the true legal position in this behalf the two provisions referred to above cannot be read in isolation and have to be considered together. There can be no manner of doubt that in order to find out the true legal position in this behalf the two provisions referred to above cannot be read in isolation and have to be considered together. In view of what has been pointed out above it is, therefore, apparent that when the two provisions referred to above are read together a situation comes into existence which not only creates an anomaly and ambiguity but also has the effect of Virtually prescribing two inconsistent sets of limitation for filing an application for setting aside a sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 C. P. C. one of 30 days in view of sub- rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. and the other of 60 days as prescribed in Article 127 of the Limitation Act. In this view of the matter a case has been made out for taking recourse to external aides of interpretation. 6. In Madan Lal v. S. Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. ( AIR 1962 SC 1543 ) it was held that the words used in a section must he given their plain grammatical meaning. Where the court is dealing with two sub- sections of a section it is necessary that the two sub-sections must be construed as a whole "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest". The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. In our opinion the principle enunciated above will apply even to a case where not two sub-sections of a section but two different provisions having bearing on a particular point, as in the instant case, fall for interpretation. In view of the plain language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. using the words "thirty days" and of Article 127 of the Limitation Act unequivocally using the words sixty days, it is apparent that the repugnancy cannot be avoided and the question which, therefore, arises is as to which of the two should prevail. In Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1962 SC 955 ) it was held that it is well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1958 SC 468 ) where it was held that in order to understand the true nature and scope of an Act it is necessary to ascertain what the evils were which were intended to he redressed by it. Likewise in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar. ( AIR 1955 SC 661 ) it was held in paragraph 22 of the report : "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when - 'Heydon's case'. (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a (V) was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st:- What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd:- What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd:- What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the common law, and 4th:- The true reason of the remedy: and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and 'pro private commodo', and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act. 'pro bono publico". In Lala Bal Mukund v. Lajwanti, (AIR 147.5 SC 1089) it was held that the Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. 'pro bono publico". In Lala Bal Mukund v. Lajwanti, (AIR 147.5 SC 1089) it was held that the Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. It is again a settled law that although the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute but may be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time the bill was introduced and the purpose for which the amendment was made (see Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala ( AIR 1960 SC 1080 ). In this state of legal position we have considered it expedient to refer lo the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the bill in pursuance 'whereof Act No. 104 of 1976 was passed by the Parliament. This bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 8th April, 1974, and is published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary), Part 11, Section 2, dated April 8, 1974, Clause 102 was the corresponding provision in the bill of Section 9-B of Act 104 of 1976. The Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of clause 102 of the bill reads as follows : "Clause 102 (Amendment of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 1963)- An application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree on deposit under Rule 89 of Order XXI is required to be made within thirty days from the date of the sale. Experience shows that this period is too short and often causes hardship because the judgment- debtors usually fail to arrange for moneys within that time. Banks usually take more than thirty days to sanction loans and advances. In the circumstances, entry 127 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is being amended to increase the period of limitation to sixty days in respect of an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree. This increase in the period of limitation will not affect the purchaser because five per cent of the purchase money is required to be paid to him. This increase in the period of limitation will not affect the purchaser because five per cent of the purchase money is required to be paid to him. The advantage of the increased period of limitation will also be available to an application under Rule 90 or Rule 91 of Order XXI to set aside a sale in execution of a decree. In view of the increase in the period of limitation, confirmation of a sale will have to await the expiry of the increased period of limitation." 7. It is not a case where after discussion of the bill, the Objects and Reasons for introducing clause 102 in the bill aforesaid did not find favour with the Parliament while enacting Act 104 of 1976 but is a case where the amendment proposed by clause 102 was accepted in the manner provided therein. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons in regard to Clause 102 of the bill there seems to be,;no manner of doubt that 30 days period of limitation as prescribed in Article 127 of the Limitation Act was extended to 60 days on the ground that the period of 31) days fixed for making the deposit contemplated by R. 89 of O. 21 C. P. C. was inadequate. It was plainly stated that experience showed that the period so fixed was too short and often caused hardship because the judgment-debtors usually failed to arrange for moneys within that time and the banks usually took more than 30 days to sanction loans and advances. If that was the purpose of the bill for proposing amendment in Article 127 of the Limitation Act by extending the period of limitation prescribed therein from 30 days to 60 days, that purpose would clearly be frustrated if an application made under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC for setting aside a sale even within the sixty days period of limitation prescribed by the amended Article 127 of the Limitation Act is dismissed only on the ,ground that the deposit contemplated by the said rule had not been made within 30 days. When the difficulty in making the requisite deposit within 30 days by the judgment-debtors was precisely the purpose of extending the period of limitation from 30 days to 60 days it cannot be said that an application made for setting aside a sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC within the extended period of limitation of 60 days was yet intended to be dismissed because of non- deposit of the requisite amount under the said rule within 30 days as contemplated by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 CPC'. 8. The matter can be looked into from another angle. Article 127 of the Limitation Act prescribing 60 days from the date of sale as the limitation for making an application to set aside the sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC is a specific provision specially enacted to provide the limitation for an application as aforesaid. In case sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 CPC is also taken to be a provision virtually prescribing a limitation for the same purpose it would in view of what has been already pointed out above fall within the purview of a general enactment in this behalf. On the principle contained in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant Article 127 of the Limitation Act would prevail over sub-rule (2) Rule 92 of Order 21 CPC. In Thangammal v. K. Dhanalakshmi, AIR 1981 Mad 254 ) it was held : "Even assuming that Rule 92 is a provision fixing the period of limitation for making a deposit which is a condition precedent for filing an application under Rule 89, still, in so far as it is inconsistent with the provision in Article 127 of the Limitation Act, it should give way. Generalia, spceialibus non-derogant general provisions do not derogate from special provisions). What is a general statute and what is a special statute is often a question of difficulty to solve in most cases, but the classification has to be made with reference to the context in each case and the subject matter dealt with by each statute. For most Acts can be classed as general Acts from one point of view and special Acts from another. For most Acts can be classed as general Acts from one point of view and special Acts from another. Having regard to the preambles to the two Acts, namely the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act, it may be taken that in the particular context the provision of the Limitation Act should be taken as a special enactment and the provision in the Civil Procedure Code should be taken to be general. The Civil Procedure Code deals with the procedure of the courts and the Limitation Act deals with the periods of limitation for suits and other proceedings. Hence in the matters of limitation, the Limitation Act is to be taken as a special Act and the Civil Procedure Code can only be taken to be a general Act. It is it well established rule of construction that when there is repugnance or inconsistency between a general enactment and a special enactment, the latter must prevail over the former and the former must yield in favour of the latter to the extent of repugnancy. Here admittedly there is a conflict between Article 127 of the Limitation Act and Rule 92(2) of Order 21, C.P. Code. Article 127 is a special later law while Rule 92(2) is the earlier general law and therefore former must prevail over the latter, and the latter must give way to the former. Therefore, the view taken by the court below that Article 127 of the Limitation Act is a general provision and therefore it should he subject to the special provision in order 21, Rule 92(2) cannot he sustained." In this connection it may be pointed out that reliance has been placed by counsel for respondent No. 3 on it decision of Kerala High Court in Dakshayini v. Madhavan, ( AIR 1982 Ker 126 ). In that case after construing the provisions contained in sub- rule (2) of Rule 92 of Order 21 CPC and Article 127 of the Limitation Act as amended by Act 104 of 1976 it was held that it appeared to be a clear case of omission on the part of the legislature to notice that a period corresponding to the period specified in Article 127 had to be stipulated as it period within which deposit was to he made in the provision in Order 21, Rule 92(2) of the Code. It was pointed out that since the language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 921 of Order 21 CPC was clear the courts were helpless in the matter, and the only thing which was possible was to call the attention of the Government to the need for moving immediately for amending the rule. 9. In view of our foregoing discussion we respectfully find it difficult to subscribe to this view. The proper construction of the two provisions referred to above, in our opinion, would, therefore, be that since all application under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC for setting aside a sale is maintainable only on the amount contemplated by the said rule being deposited, such an application would be maintainable even if the deposit contemplated by the said rule is made not within 30 days but is made on or at any time before the date on which the application for setting aside the sale is made under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC provided, of course, that the said application is made within 60 days of the date of sale. 10. Coming to the second question it would be relevant to refer to the report of the Amin who conducted the sale on 15th December, 1980. This report stands quoted in the certified copy of the impugned order dated 16th August, 1982, and the relevant portion thereof reads as follows : "............ Sayam 4 baje tak boli bolee gai. Antim bolee Shri Manik Chandra Burman putra Gulab Chandra Burman ki 11000 rupaye ki rahee jisko unhone apani mata Shrimati Shakuntala Devi ke waste bola. Akhiri bolee ka -/4 bhag ka rupaya lekar raseed dee gai. Fard bolee nilam par report likhee. Bolee sampatti ke dekhte huye tatha decree ka mutalba dekhte huye kafee kam hai. Fard bolee nilam mai report mauqa waste uchit adesh Shriman Ji ki sewa me prastut hai." Translated into English it would read as follows : "........ Bids were offered till 4 0' clock in the evening. The last bid for Rs. 11000 was of Shri Manik Chandra Burman, son of Gulab Chandra Burman, who had made this bid for his mother Smt. Shakuntala Devi. After taking the th amount of the last bid a receipt was given. Report was written out on the sheets containing the bid. Keeping in view the property and the decretal amount the bid was highly inadequate. 11000 was of Shri Manik Chandra Burman, son of Gulab Chandra Burman, who had made this bid for his mother Smt. Shakuntala Devi. After taking the th amount of the last bid a receipt was given. Report was written out on the sheets containing the bid. Keeping in view the property and the decretal amount the bid was highly inadequate. The sheets containing the bid along with the report of the spot is submitted to your honour for necessary orders." Copy of the sheets containing the various bids has been attached as Annexure CA 3 to the counter-affidavit of Manik Chandra Burman filed in this writ petition on 23rd September, 1982. The contents of the report as quoted above are to be found in the sheets of the bid almost in the same terms except that the sentence as translated in English, namely "keeping in view the property and the decretal amount the bid was highly inadequate" is not to be found in the sheets of the bid. The case of the auction-purchaser respondent No. 3 before the courts below was that the aforesaid sentence had subsequently been interpolated by the Amin in this report but it has been found not to have been substantiated. The finding in this behalf being essentially a finding of fact cannot be challenged in the present writ petition. However, in regard to its merits the Additional District Judge in the impugned order has recorded a finding in favour of respondent No. 3. It has been held that the report of the Amin about inadequacy of price is not substantiated particularly when the Amin himself has in his deposition stated that he was unable to give the approximate value of the property which was sold on 15-12-1980. In this connection it may further be pointed out that, as is apparent from the sheets of the bid, the property which was sold stood mortgaged with the Central Bank of India for a sum of rupees sixteen lacs and the amount of the said loan together with the interest as on the date of the sale was about rupees twenty six lacs. It was the mortgagor's right which was put up for sale in the auction held on 15th December, 1981) and the valuation of the mortgagor's right was put at about rupees ten thousand. It was the mortgagor's right which was put up for sale in the auction held on 15th December, 1981) and the valuation of the mortgagor's right was put at about rupees ten thousand. It is, therefore, apparent that the property in respect of which respondent No. 3 made a bid for Rs. 11000/- was subject to a charge of the Central Bank of India in the sum of about rupees twenty six lacs on the date of sale. 11. Coming to the question as to what was the date of sale in the instant case it may be pointed out that it has not been disputed by either party before us that it was open to the officer conducting the sale, namely, the Amin, to accept the highest bid and declare such bidder as the purchaser and to accept 25% of the purchase money and that if it was established that the Amin did so the date of the sale would be 15th December, 1980. What has been argued before us by counsel for the petitioner is that a perusal of the report of the Amin made it clear that he had not accepted the highest bid of respondent No. 3 nor declared her to be the purchaser and consequently 15th December, 1980, would not be the date of the sale but the date of sale would be 13th January, 1981, when the court accepted the bid of respondent No. 3 and required her to deposit the poundage fee. Applying the principles of law enunciated in certain decided cases, to be referred to shortly, to the facts of the instant case emanating from the report of the Amin we are of opinion that the view taken by the Additional District Judge in the impugned order that 15th December, 1980, was the date of sale does not suffer either from any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction which may justify interference under Article 220 of the Constitution. 12. In Lala Ram v. Bhajani ( AIR 1970 All 398 ) almost a similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court. In that case an auction was held by the Amin on 14th September, 1963. The highest bid of one Girraj was accepted by the Amin and on the same date Girraj deposited with the Amin 25% of the purchase money. In that case an auction was held by the Amin on 14th September, 1963. The highest bid of one Girraj was accepted by the Amin and on the same date Girraj deposited with the Amin 25% of the purchase money. Thereafter the Amin returned the warrant of sale together with his report to the Munsif on 16th September, 1963, and on the same date the Munsif passed an order "bid is approved". On 15th October, 1963, the judgment-debtor filed an application for setting aside the sale. The Munsif dismissed the said application on 6th November, 1963, as time barred holding that it had been filed beyond the period of limitation of 30 days from 14th September, 1963, the date of the sale. The contention of the judgment-debtor that the date of sale was not 14th September, 1963, on which date the sale was held but 16th September, 1963, when the bid was approved by the Munsif was repelled. On appeal by the judgment debtor the District Judge reversed the order of the Munsif holding that since the bid had been approved by the Munsif on 16th September, 1963, the date of sale was not - 14th September, 1963. but 16th September, 1963 and directed the Munsif to decide the application on merits. In doing so the District Judge on a perusal of the report of the Amin held that the Amin had not accepted the bid but he had mentioned in the bid list that a certain bid was the highest bid and then submitted the papers to the Munsif who ultimately accepted the bid on 16th September, 1963. A revision was filed against the order of the District Judge before this Court and while reversing his order it was held that the Amin had accepted the highest bid of Girraj and had taken the deposit of 25% of the sale price and the District Judge was nest right in taking a contrary view. A revision was filed against the order of the District Judge before this Court and while reversing his order it was held that the Amin had accepted the highest bid of Girraj and had taken the deposit of 25% of the sale price and the District Judge was nest right in taking a contrary view. After taking into consideration, inter alia, the provisions contained in Order 21, Rules 64, 66, 84, 85 and 86 CPC and the conditions prescribed in Form No. 29 of Appendix 'E' to the 1st Schedule of the Code as also Form No. 27 of the said Appendix and on a conspectus of various decided cases on the point it was further held that the sale officer had a discretion to refuse to accept the highest bid if the price offered was inadequate and there was nothing to indicate that the sale officer had no power to accept the highest bid or to declare the purchaser. It was pointed out that the conferment of the discretion to reject necessarily implied a power in the sale officer to accept the highest bid but the court had an overriding discretion to reject the acceptance of the highest bid if the price was inadequate. After pointing out this legal position it was further held (Paras 9 and 10) : "This does not mean that the sale cannot he concluded by the sale officer, but only that the Court had the power to reject the sale concluded by the sale officer if it finds that the price is inadequate. It is only in one case, namely, when the purchase price is inadequate, that the Court can override the decision of the sale officer accepting the highest bid. But if the Court does not find that the highest bid is inadequate or does not consider it advisable to override its acceptance by the sale officer, the sale stands and the date of the sale will be the date on which the sale officer accepted the highest hid and declared the purchaser. All that is necessary for a sale to be complete under Order 21, Rule 84 is that the sale officer should accept the highest bid and declare the purchaser and the purchaser should deposit 25 per cent of the purchase price. All that is necessary for a sale to be complete under Order 21, Rule 84 is that the sale officer should accept the highest bid and declare the purchaser and the purchaser should deposit 25 per cent of the purchase price. If the Court has the power to set aside the sale and does so, then the sale will be wiped out; but, if the Court approves of the sale, then the sale by the sale officer stands. If the sale stands, then the date of the sale cannot be any other date but the date on which the sale officer accepted the highest bid and declared the purchaser." 13. Coming to the facts of the instant case it would be seen that respondent No. 3 was declared by the Amin to be the highest bidder who on being required to do so deposited 25% of the purchase money and the Amin after taking the said money granted a receipt to the said respondent. The statement made in the report by the Amin that the price offered by respondent No. 3 was highly inadequate, as held by the Additional District Judge in the impugned order, was not proved and was not substantiated even by the Amin himself. Not only that, the court executing the decree also did not reject the sale conducted by the Amin on the finding that the price was inadequate. It, on the other hand, purported to accept the highest bid of respondent No. 3 on 13th January, 1981. The facts of the instant case being almost identical to the facts of the case of Lala Ram (supra) there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that on the approval of the sale held by the Amin on 15th December, 1980, by the court on 13th January, 1981, the sale by the Amin stands and as held in the case of Lala Ram (supra) if the sale stands then the date of the sale cannot be any other date but the date on which the sale officer accepted the highest bid and declared the purchaser. In Ratan Lal v. Kali Das (1957 All WR (HC) 102) it was held by a learned single Judge of this Court : "Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the order dated 26-7-1945 passed by the S. D. O. directing the auction-purchaser to deposit 25 per cent immediately cannot be construed as anything other than a declaration that such person is the purchaser within the meaning of O. 21, R. 84 of the Code........." In Siddappa v. Lakshmanuna, (AIR 1965 Mys 313) it was argued that since the officer conducting the sale did not expressly state that he accepted the highest bid or that he knocked down the property in favour of the highest bidder it could not be said that there was a concluded sale. This submission was repelled and it was pointed out that Rule 84 of Order 21 CPC did not require that the declaration of accepting the bid should take place in a particular form or should be made in any selected or prescribed words. It was held that when the officer conducting the sale accepts the deposit of th of the bid amount and closes the auction the inevitable conclusion is that the said officer declared such bidder to he the purchaser. 14. In this view of the matter the mere fact that the Amin in his report dated 15th December, 1980, in the instant case has not stated in so many words that respondent No. 3 was declared the purchaser is of no consequence and the sale has rightly been held by the Additional District Judge in the impugned order to have been concluded on 15th December. 1980. Consequently this would be the date constituting the starting point of the limitation to file an application for setting aside the sale under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC. The said application, however, having admittedly not been filed within 60 days therefrom was rightly dismissed by the Additional District Judge as barred by time by the impugned order. 15. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Munshi Lal v. Ram Narain (1913) ILR 35 All 65) and Jaibhadar v. Matukohari (AIR 1923 Pat 325). The said application, however, having admittedly not been filed within 60 days therefrom was rightly dismissed by the Additional District Judge as barred by time by the impugned order. 15. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Munshi Lal v. Ram Narain (1913) ILR 35 All 65) and Jaibhadar v. Matukohari (AIR 1923 Pat 325). These decisions have been considered by this Court in the case of Lala Ram ( AIR 1970 All 398 ) (supra) and have been distinguished and for the reasons already stated therein, with which we respectfully agree, we are of opinion that these cases are clearly distinguishable. 16. In the result we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.