ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - Shorn of unnecessary details the petitioner claimed the disputed property as adopted son of Baldeo whereas the contesting opposite party Ram Briksha claimed the disputed property as the nephew of Baldeo and asserted that Ram Chandra was not adopted son of Baldeo. The following pedigree is necessary for appreciation of the claims of the parties. 2. The consolidation officer through his judgment D/- 25-5-1976 accepted the claim of the petitioner (See Annexure II). 3. The appellate authority and the revisional court have given judgments against the petitioner. Aggrieved by their judgments the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. At the time of admission the learned counsel for the petitioner had contended that the consolidation authorities had acted illegally in deciding the claim of the parties when the same question between the parties was pending in a civil litigation. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the consolidation authorities should have stayed the hearing of the proceedings till the decision of the question by the civil court. I had not agreed with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and had referred the question to a larger bench due to a ruling in his favour and the Division Bench has decided against the petitioner through its judgment D/- 23-11-1982. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the finding recorded by the Munsif in a Civil litigation between the parties and confirmed by the appellate court due to dismissal of the appeal in default would operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of adoption and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in recording findings to the contrary. 6. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to cancel the adoption deed in favour of the petitioner and to record contrary findings against the deed. It has been emphasised that the adoption deed would be a voidable document which cannot be cancelled by the consolidation authorities in view of a large number of decisions, such as AIR 1973 SC 2345 (2451?), 1976 Rev. Dec. 220 : 1976 All WC 412 (FB) : 1980 All LJ 25 and 1982 All WC 748: (2) (1982 All LJ NOC 122). 7. Dec. 220 : 1976 All WC 412 (FB) : 1980 All LJ 25 and 1982 All WC 748: (2) (1982 All LJ NOC 122). 7. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the adoption deed being a registered one, a presumption should have been raised in favour of the petitioner about the validity of his adoption. 8. The fourth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question of parentage in dispute between the parties. 9. Lastly, it has been contended that the higher consolidation authorities have failed to consider the entire evidence on record hence their findings deserve to be quashed. 10. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. According to him the finding recorded by the learned Munsif would not operate as res judicata in the circumstances of the present case. He has emphasised that the finding has not become final and the proceedings for recalling the order in appeal are going on, hence the consolidation authorities have not committed patent error in recording findings against the petitioner. He has also submitted that the litigation between the parties regarding agricultural plots was abated in a civil suit hence the consolidation authorities had full jurisdiction to decide the validity of the adoption deed and in giving findings against the petitioner, they have committed no error of law much less error apparent on the face of the record. He has also submitted that for proving a valid adoption it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the necessary ceremonies concerning adoption which he had failed in the circumstances of the present case, hence on the basis of `a registered adoption deed, the petitioner cannot claim any better right and the petitioner is not entitled to any presumption in law about the validity of the adoption due to a registered document. He has also stressed that the consolidation authorities are quite competent to decide the question of parentage when raised before them. He has asserted that the contention about non- examination of question of parentage by the consolidation authorities should be repelled. He has also submitted that the impugned judgments do not suffer from any patent error of law due to non-examination of any material evidence on the question involved. 11. He has asserted that the contention about non- examination of question of parentage by the consolidation authorities should be repelled. He has also submitted that the impugned judgments do not suffer from any patent error of law due to non-examination of any material evidence on the question involved. 11. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. As regards the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is sufficient to indicate that the learned counsel has not been able to point out any material evidence ignored by the higher consolidation authorities on the question of adoption, hence I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment suffered from any patent error of law due to non-consideration of any material evidence. 12. In support of his fourth contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon 1977 All WC 394, Noor Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad. No doubt the learned Single Judge has made too wide observations in that case but in different context. The relevant extract from the aforesaid ruling is as under :- "............If a person's name is shown as a tenure-holder of the land, he can possibly have no grievance in that proceeding. The details about parentage, residence etc. are not material in that proceeding. Moreover, the consolidation authorities are concerned with regard to rights of a person as a tenure holder and this alone they are competent to adjudicate upon. The question of parentage of a person does not relate to any right in the land. Such a matter can be adjudicated upon only by regular courts. Even if such a dispute is raised before the consolidation authorities, they would not be competent to decide it.". 13. To my mind the aforesaid case is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Here the parties are claiming right in the land and in that connection a question has arisen as to whether the petitioner is the adopted son of Baldeo, admitted tenure holder of the disputed land. I think that the consolidation authorities have full jurisdiction to decide the question of parentage when they are called upon to decide the claims of the parties in the disputed land. I think that the consolidation authorities have full jurisdiction to decide the question of parentage when they are called upon to decide the claims of the parties in the disputed land. I am not prepared to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of parentage cannot be decided by the consolidation authorities when the dispute arises between contestants in relation to agricultural land. The wide observations made by the learned single judge in the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner might be correct in relation to the facts of that case but as a matter of law it cannot be stressed that the consolidation authorities are debarred from examining the question of parentage when the question arises before them in relation to agricultural land. I think that the 4th contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is not correct in the circumstances of this case. 14. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner also does not help him because the adoption deed in the present case is of the year 1950. At that time one could not claim validity of his adoption merely because a registered document was executed and no presumption in law about the validity of adoption arose according to the then prevalent law. The registered document regarding adoption has assumed significance after the enforcement of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. 1956. Therefore, in my opinion the third contention also fails. 15. In answer to second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is to be emphasised that in the earlier civil litigation the suit stood abated regarding agricultural land. hence the consolidation authorities have ample jurisdiction to decide the question of validity of adoption in the present case. The order of abatement of the suit regarding agricultural land between the parties would be final between them, hence the question of validity of the adoption deed could be examined by the consolidation authorities and the higher consolidation authorities have acted within their jurisdiction to examine the validity of the adoption deed in favour of the petitioner. A large number of cases cited on behalf of the petitioner are not relevant to be examined in the present case because the question of abatement of the suit at the earlier stage between the parties was not involved in those cases. A large number of cases cited on behalf of the petitioner are not relevant to be examined in the present case because the question of abatement of the suit at the earlier stage between the parties was not involved in those cases. A Division Bench of this Court in the ruling reported in 1976 All WC 112 : AIR 1976 All 433 Dalip Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Moradahad has observed as below : (vide para 6) : "It has been seen that the suit filed by the respondents covered both the sale deeds. The suit was for cancellation. It was abated under S. S of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. S. aforesaid applies when a court finds that in view of S. 49 of the Act, a regular suit is not maintainable because the points for adjudication can be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities. The necessary effect of this order of abatement was that subject-matter of the suit namely, the validity of the two sale deeds, could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities. It is well settled that a decree or order which has become final operates as res judicata even though it may proceed upon an erroneous decision of a question of law. In view of the doctrine of Res Judicata, none of the parties could object to the consolidation authorities going into the validity of the two sale deeds. They were entitled to adjudicate upon their validity." From the above extract I think that it is amply clear in the present case that the consolidation authorities had jurisdiction to decide the question of validity of adoption deed in favour of the petitioner. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not relevant and are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the second contention of the petitioner also fails. 16. Now, I consider the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The relevant. facts regarding the first contention are that in the civil litigation the petitioner was held as adopted son of Baldeo in relation to the house property etc. The contesting opposite party in the present writ petition filed an appeal which was dismissed by the appellate court in default. The relevant. facts regarding the first contention are that in the civil litigation the petitioner was held as adopted son of Baldeo in relation to the house property etc. The contesting opposite party in the present writ petition filed an appeal which was dismissed by the appellate court in default. An application for restoring the appeal to its original number has also failed and the First Appeal From Order rejecting the restoration application is pending in this Hon'ble Court. In view of the aforesaid facts the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the finding recorded by the learned Munsif holding the petitioner as adopted son of Baldeo should be treated as final between the parties and should operate as res judicata between them. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that because the contesting opposite party is agitating his claim and the miscellaneous proceeding is pending regarding the dismissal of the appeal against the judgment of the Munsif, the finding recorded by him should not be treated as final. From common sense view the learned counsel for the opposite party may be justified in his contention but all common sense is not law. In the present case so long as the contesting opposite party does not succeed in getting the order dismissing his appeal set aside, it cannot legitimately be contended that in law the effect of the judgment of the appellate Court dismissing the appeal in default shall remain in abeyance. In 1973 All LJ 695 Khudai v. Ram Phal a learned single judge of this Court has observed as below vide para 4 :- ".......The mere filing of an application for setting aside an ex parte decree or for restoration of the appeal does not render the appeal sub judice." 17. In para 5 of the above-mentioned ruling it has been observed as below :- "In the case of B. Jitendra Mohan Singh v. Bindbaseni Kuer there was a decision of a Special Judge under S. 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act against which the aggrieved party had filed an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. It was held that the mere fact that the landlord had filed an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in the case would not deprive the decision of its finality and would not render it sub judice..........". 18. It was held that the mere fact that the landlord had filed an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in the case would not deprive the decision of its finality and would not render it sub judice..........". 18. Hence, in the circumstances of the present case I think that the higher consolidation authorities, namely the appellate and the revisional authorities have patently- erred in not giving due weight to the finding recorded by the learned Munsif and confirmed in appeal whereby the petitioner was held as adopted son of Baldeo. Since the petitioner's claim has been negatived by the higher consolidation authorities, I think that the ends of justice would be met if the impugned judgment of the revisional authority is hereby quashed and the case is sent back to the revisional authority for examining the claim of the petitioner and giving due weight to the finding recorded by the learned Munsif in the earlier civil litigation. It is made clear that if the opposite party gets the order dismissing his appeal in default set aside in the pending first appeal from order between the parties in this Court, the revisional authority shall take into account the subsequent events which might come to its knowledge on the date of decision. 19. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional authority dated 21-2-1981 is hereby quashed and the revisional authority is directed to re-examine the claim of the petitioner in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.