AVADH BEHARI ROHATGI ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this case is a company, M/s. Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. The company has brought this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order of the Additional District Judge dated 19-1-1979. ( 2 ) THESE are the facts. The petitioner company occupies premises No. 12 (1/26-28) in a building known as Sunlight Building at Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. This building belongs to the respondent, Life Insurance Corporation (LIC ). After the take over of the Life Insurance business by the Government this Sunlight Building which belonged previously to Sunlight of India Insurance Company vested in the LIC on the passing of the Life Insurance Corporation Act in 1956. ( 3 ) LIC issued a notice dated 27-11-1975 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy of the company with effect from 29-12-1975. The company did not vacate the premises. Proceedings were taken before the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (the Act ). The Estate Officer ordered eviction of the company on 14-9-1978. ( 4 ) FROM the order of the Estate Officer the company appealed to the Additional District Judge under Section 9 (2) of the Act. Only one question was raised in appeal before the appellate officer. It was this: that the company even after the termination of the lease by the LIC was entitled to the protection of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (Rent Act) and that it could not be evicted under the Premises Act of 1971. The Additional District Judge rejected this contention. He dismissed the appeal. He affirmed the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer. No other point was taken before him. ( 5 ) PROM the order of the Additional Distrial Judge this writ petition has been filed. ( 6 ) THE principal argument of Mr. R. L. Roshan, learned counsel for the company, is the same as was raised before the Additional District Judge. He says that the Rent Control Act of 1958 applies to the tenancy of the company and notwithstanding the termination of the tenancy by notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act the company will continue to be protected by the Rent Act This question has now been authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in Jain Ink Mfg. Co. He says that the Rent Control Act of 1958 applies to the tenancy of the company and notwithstanding the termination of the tenancy by notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act the company will continue to be protected by the Rent Act This question has now been authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L. I. C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 against the company. The Supreme Court has held that once the Public Premises Act of 1971 applies the Rent Act stands superseded. ( 7 ) THAT was a case where the appellant continued to occupy the property even after the Public Premises Act came into force and had in effect accepted the LIC as his landlord. In April 1977 the LIC gave notice under S. 106 directing the appellant to vacate the premises before May 31, 1977. The appellant did not vacate. The LIC filed a complaint before the Estate Officer under the Premises Act. On the complaint the Estate Officer issued notice to the appellant. The appellant appeared before the Estate Officer. He raised certain preliminary objections to his jurisdiction to act in the matter. These objections the Estate Officer decided against him. Thereupon the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court against the order of the Estate Officer rejecting his preliminary objections. This Court dismissed the writ petition in limine though by a reasoned order. From the older of this Court an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Estate Officer was competent to proceed against the appellant under the Premises Act of 1971 and that the Rent Act did not apply. ( 9 ) IT appears to me that Mr. Roshan is advancing substantially the same argument as was raised before the Supreme Court. He is presenting old wine in new bottles. This staple argument has again and again been raised. The theory that the Rent Act applies to public premises has now been finally exploded by "the Supreme Court. After the premises are declared "public premises" by the Public Premises Act of 1971, that Act alone will apply. The application of the Rent Act is entirely excluded. The reason is that Section 15 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter of eviction or recovery of rent in respect of public premises. After the premises are declared "public premises" by the Public Premises Act of 1971, that Act alone will apply. The application of the Rent Act is entirely excluded. The reason is that Section 15 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter of eviction or recovery of rent in respect of public premises. Section 15 says : "no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under sub-section (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the Central Government or the corporate authority under sub-section (5) of Section 9 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs. " ( 9 ) THIS shows that the Premises Act is a complete Code and provides the principles and machinery for dealing with those persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises. The definition of the term unauthorised occupation given in S. 2 (g) affords a key to the understanding of tbe Act. That definition says : " unauthorised occupation , in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises with. out authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. " ( 10 ) THE term public premises is defined in Sec. 2 (e) of the Act. It is not disputed before me that the premises in question are "public premises". Now an occupant of a public premises will be deemed to be in authorised occupation thereof until and unless he is a person who is in occupation of the public premises : (1) without authority for such occupation, such as a rank trespasser, or (2) one who was continuing in occupation of the public premises under some authority, whether that authority was by way of grant or any other mode of transfer, and that authority has either expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. From the very beginning the trespasser will be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation because be had no authority to occupy the premises. But we are mainly concerned in this case with an occupant who was in occupation of the premises with authority on the date the premises were declared public premises by the Act. He was an authorised occupant at that time. But if the authority under which that person was occupying the premises has either expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever by the LIC, the person in occupation becomes an unauthorised occupant. ( 11 ) THE mode of determining authority adopted in this case was the mode of determining the tenancy by a notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act. Here lease is synonymous with authority to occupy the premises which are public premises. After the lease has been determined by notice under S. 106 it is difficult to accept the contention that the Rent Act will continue to protect the person who is now an unauthorised occupant , to use the terminology of the Act. On the application of the Premises Act to a particular premises the Rent Act is superseded, as the Supreme Court has said. The man who was a tenant previously becomes an authorised occupant till his authority is determined in the manner prescribed by the Act. ( 12 ) THE use of the expression "authority" "to occupy the premises" is very significant. The Act does not use the term tenancy or lease. So the tenant becomes an occupant with authority. If he has no authority to occupy the premises either because he never had any, or though he had authority, such as a lease, his authority to occupy the premises has expired or has since been determined for any reason whatsoever, be can be evicted from the public premises. But the premises must be public premises before all this can happen. The words that authority can be "determined for any reason whatsoever" are very ample words of conferment. They give power in the most ample terms. They are clearly suggestive of the banishment of the Rent Act. ( 13 ) EVEN in the matter of rent and damages the LIC has not to resort to any Civil Court or Rent Controller. Because under Section 15 the jurisdiction of Courts is ousted. They give power in the most ample terms. They are clearly suggestive of the banishment of the Rent Act. ( 13 ) EVEN in the matter of rent and damages the LIC has not to resort to any Civil Court or Rent Controller. Because under Section 15 the jurisdiction of Courts is ousted. The Estate Officer under S. 7 has the power to make an order to the occupant of a public premises to pay rent payable in respect of the premises within such time and in such instalments as he may specify in his order. Under the same section be has power to make an order of damages against the occupant if he is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. The Premises Act takes away the protection of the Rent Act which the man enjoyed prior to its enactment. ( 14 ) UNDER the Premises Act of 1971 a man who was once a tenant ceases to be so. He becomes an authorised occupant. The manner of his eviction, the manner of recovery of rent from him, they are all governed by the Premises Act, The Estate Officer has been substituted in place of the Civil Courts. In place of the dilatory procedure of the Civil Courts a summary procedure of eviction and recovery of rent has been prescribed. This, in my opinion, is the scheme of the Act. The provisions of the Act clearly show that the protection of the Rent Act has been taken away by the legislature. An occupant of public premises cannot claim the protection of the Rent Act. This is what the Supreme Court has said in Jain Ink case. ( 15 ) THE Rent Act gives protection to the tenant. That is its avowed object. The Premises Act deals with public property, e. g. premises belonging to the Government or a corporate authority such as LIC. These are public premises . The first thing that the Premises Act does is to banish the Rent Act from the public premises. The occupant of a public premises does not wear the armour of protection of the Rent Act. The occupant is not a tenant. The Rent Act clothes the tenant with rights and confers a measure of protection to those who have to rent their homes from private landlords. The Rent Acts are banished. The occupant of a public premises does not wear the armour of protection of the Rent Act. The occupant is not a tenant. The Rent Act clothes the tenant with rights and confers a measure of protection to those who have to rent their homes from private landlords. The Rent Acts are banished. The Courts are ousted Now an order of ouster can be made against the occupant of a public premises by determining his authority. ( 16 ) THE Act adopts this simple and swift procedure as compared to the slow motion justice of Courts. More and more the legislature has displayed its solicitude for expedition in justice. An impatient legislature has done away with the Courts. It has done away with the Rent Act. It has taken away the protective umbrella of S. 14 of the Rent Act from the occupant of public premises. This is a clear indication that the Rent Act has been outlawed from public premises. An occupant of public premises is outside the pale of the Rent Act. ( 17 ) THE Premises Act excludes the benefit of the Rent Act. This is the type of legislation which outlaws the Rent Act. The legislature has signified its displeasure of the Court procedures which are long, cumbersome and expensive, by banishing the Rent Act from the public premises. Public premises are the property of the public. Therefore for the common weal the legislature has set up an administrative Tribunal manned by a quasi-judicial officer. The procedure adopted is different from the law Courts. The new vocabulary used in the Act such as authority , unauthorised occupant , public premises and the like conclusively show that the occupant of public premises is deprived of the benefit and protection of the rent laws. ( 18 ) THE Act applies a method characteristically administrative. It is unlike the common law. The Anglo-Saxon common law is a law of the Courts. Its oracles are Judges. Common law is characteristically judicial. In England, America and Commonwealth characteristically the prestige of the Judge is very great. (See Roscoe Pound : Article on the Development of American Law (1951) 67 LQR 49 ). The Act adopts a mixed method of doing justice. Something of administrative and something of judicial. The Estate Officer is an administrative Tribunal. The appellate officer is a judicial authority. In England, America and Commonwealth characteristically the prestige of the Judge is very great. (See Roscoe Pound : Article on the Development of American Law (1951) 67 LQR 49 ). The Act adopts a mixed method of doing justice. Something of administrative and something of judicial. The Estate Officer is an administrative Tribunal. The appellate officer is a judicial authority. The "administrative process", Dean Landis has told us, "is essentially our generation s answer to the inadequacy of the judicial processes". The Premises Act illustrates the truth of this profound observation. ( 19 ) FOLLOWING the decision of Jain Ink ( AIR 1981 SC 670 ) (supra) I reject the argument that the Rent Act applied to the company. I reject the argument that the Estate Officer had no jurisdiction to make an order of eviction against it under the Premises Act. The learned Additional District Judge substantially reached the same conclusion. He did it in 1979 without the aid of the Supreme Court decision. Now the Supreme Court in 1981 has authoritatively laid down the law. The Supreme Court has held that the Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act (Jain Ink at p. 673 ). There can be no question of the application of the Rent Act to the present case. These are public premises. Only the Premises Act applies. Under this Premises Act the Estate Officer ordered eviction. His order was affirmed by the appellate officer. I do not find any fault with the eviction order. ( 20 ) ON behalf of the company Mr. Roshan has raised four arguments before me. In the first place he said that the tenancy of the Company was not lawfully determined. He contended that the notice to quit did not expire with the last date of tenancy. Secondly, he argued that the exercise of power by the Estate Officer in this case was mala fide and dishonest. He referred me to the previous proceedings which the LIC had taken against the company for its eviction before the Rent Controller and the appeal that was taken by the company to the Rent Control Tribunal from the order of eviction made by the Rent Controller. He referred me to the previous proceedings which the LIC had taken against the company for its eviction before the Rent Controller and the appeal that was taken by the company to the Rent Control Tribunal from the order of eviction made by the Rent Controller. He also invited my attention to the proceedings taken by the company for the fixation of standard rent under the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958. At one stage interim rent was fixed. But finally the application of standard rent was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that the Rent Act did not apply. Thirdly he has argued on the basis of a letter dated 30-3-1977 that the company has been accepted as a tenant under LIC. Lastly he said that the Estate Officer was not validly appointed. I have not allowed him to raise these other pleas for the simple reason that none of these points was raised in appeal before the appellate officer constituted under the Act. ( 21 ) THE order of the Additional District Judge shows that only one question was raised before him, namely the question of the application of Rent Act. In these proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution it will not be possible to deal with questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact, such as the valid determination of tenancy under Section 106. Similarly the question whether, the petitioner was accepted as a tenant is a pure question of fact. Facts cannot be ascertained for the first time in these proceedings. The Act provides a statutory remedy of appeal to the District Judge. The question of mala fide exercise of power, will raise a host of, other questions. It will necessitate an inquiry into the previous , proceedings which the parties took before the Rent Controller and the Tribunal. Nor was the question of appointment of the Estate Officer taken before the appellate authority. ( 22 ) I am not hearing an appeal from the order of the Additional District Judge. The question before me is limited to jurisdiction. All that I have to see is that the Estate Officer is not overstepping the limits of his authority conferred by the Act. And that his order is in conformity with the provisions of the Premises Act. The company claims certiorari. The question before me is limited to jurisdiction. All that I have to see is that the Estate Officer is not overstepping the limits of his authority conferred by the Act. And that his order is in conformity with the provisions of the Premises Act. The company claims certiorari. For that there must be an error apparent on the face of the order. There must be an error which goes to the very root of the determination. (R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, (1965) 2 All ER 836 (842) per Lord Denning M. R. ). The Estate Officer has a duty to act judicially. He must not disregard the law. The order of the Additional District Judge does not show any error on its face. Except one question no other point was raised before him. ( 23 ) I have come to the conclusion that the appellate officer under the Act is the only proper forum for an occupant of public premises to raise such questions as have been raised before me. Because the statutory remedy of appeal to the appellate officer from every order of the Estate Officer under Ss. 5 and 7 is provided by the Act (see Section 9 ). In writ proceedings only the question of jurisdiction can be raised. No other question ought to be allowed to be raised in these proceedings. This is why I have declined to hear the company on those other questions. ( 24 ) THERE is one other reason why I have not allowed the company to raise these issues. The company has not paid any rent to the LIC from August, 1972 till today. When this writ petition was brought in 1979 S. S. Chadha, J. on 19-2-1969 passed a conditional order staying the eviction of the company on these terms. He directed the company to pay Rs. 37,516. 47 within one month and also furnish a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 for payment of the rent/damages for use and occupation of the public premises. The company, of course, has complied with this order. But this shows that from 30-8-1972 it did not pay any rent except under the orders of the Court. Now after the payment of Rs. 37,516. 47 a large amount of rent has again fallen due to the Corporation. The company, of course, has complied with this order. But this shows that from 30-8-1972 it did not pay any rent except under the orders of the Court. Now after the payment of Rs. 37,516. 47 a large amount of rent has again fallen due to the Corporation. But as this is not a claim before me I will not say anything more on this question. ( 25 ) FOR these reasons the writ petition is dismissed With costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. 00.