JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and perused the impugned orders. The impugned order challenged is dated 24-6-1983 passed by the Board of Revenue rejecting the revision filed by the Petitioner, who was judgment-debtor and had raised objection that the delivery of possession was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the execution application was also barred by limitation. 2. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 12-2-1974. The execution application was moved on 14th March 1975 and as such it was barred by limitation, having been filed after the prescribed period of one year. This contention was rejected by the Board of Revenue saying that the limitation for execution of a decree is to be accounted from the date of the final decree and not from the date of the decree passed by the trial Court. Admittedly in this case an appeal was filed against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. This appeal was dismissed on 13th August 1974. The execution application was thus filed within one year from the date of decree passed in appeal. On these facts the Board of Revenue held that the execution application was well within time as the limitation is to be counted for the execution of decree from the date of final decree as is provided at Serial No. 53 of Appendix III made under Rule 338 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the limitation is to be counted from the date of the trial Court's decree and in this connection he referred to Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act which provides that in computing the period of limitation for execution of decree, the execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, that time of continuance of injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded. The learned Counsel contended that since in the present case after filing the appeal the execution of the decree was not stayed, and as such the execution of the decree was to be carried out within one year, the execution application was thus, time barred as it was not filed within one year from the date of decree of the trial Court. I am unable to agree with this contention especially in view of specific provision contained in Appendix III of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules, wherein, as provided at serial No. 53 the limitation for filing an execution application would be counted from the date of the final decree, which in the present case is 13th August 1974 when the appeal filed against the trial Court decree was dismissed'. The trial Court's decree merged in the appellate Court decree, and the appellate Court decree was a final decree as no appeal was filed against it. Thus, in my opinion the execution application was well within limitation. 4. Learned Counsel next contended that the delivery of possession in this case was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure, inasmuch as no notice was given to the judgment debtor regarding execution of the decree by the Amin. He thus urged that the execution of decree was invalid and deserved to be quashed. In support of his argument he referred to Rule 154 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules which requires the Kurk Amin to send notice to the person to be ejected on his arrival in the village to execute the decree. I have given my careful consideration to this argument but I do not find any substance in it. 5. Similar question cropped up for consideration before this Court in Chandra Bhan and Others Vs. State, AIR 1954 All 39 where in a question arose with regard to validity of delivery of possession over a piece of land in connection with a criminal case. One of the parties, in the said case claimed to be in possession over certain agricultural land in persuance of execution of the decree for possession. The other party contended that the possession had not been delivered to said party in accordance with Rule 104 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, inasmuch as no notice had been given to the judgment debtor before delivering possession as required by that Rule. The other party contended that the possession had not been delivered to said party in accordance with Rule 104 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, inasmuch as no notice had been given to the judgment debtor before delivering possession as required by that Rule. The provisions of Rule 104 are in pari materia with the provision of Rule 154 of the Rules framed under the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. On these facts it was observed by this Court that "even if such notice was not sent to the judgment debtor before delivering possession as required by Rule 104 of the U.P. Tenancy Act that would not invalidate the delivery of possession made by the Amin. The rules framed u/s 104 (to be correctly read as Section 293) of the aforesaid Act are merely for the guidance to the Amin and not mandatory provisions the omission of which would invalidate delivery of possession effected by the Amin in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure...." 6. In an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Rex v. Horam 1949 AWR 364 it was observed that where the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 36 CPC was followed, the mere fact that the Kurk Amin failed to give notice to the tenant and to deliver possession in his presence would not vitiate the delivery of possession. It was further observed that "the rule framed by the Board of Revenue u/s 293(k) of the U.P. Tenancy Act to the effect that at the time of ejectment of a tenant, the tenant if present in the village must be called and delivery of possession must be made in his presence, is a rule for the guidance of the Kurk Amin, and the rule is not intended to effect the rights of the decree holder in case the Kurk Amin fails to follow the procedure prescribed." 7. Similar view was taken in Bir Singh v. Kesho Ram 1971 ALJ 539, wherein, it was held that merely specifide notice was not given to the judgment-debtor before delivering possession in accordance with Order 21, Rule 36, delivery of possession was not vitiated and legally the decree-holder came into possession over the plot even though the Defendant may have retained certain rights to land and harvest the crop which had already been sown by him. 8. 8. In view of these decisions I find no substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the delivery of possession was vitiated and the execution of the decree deserves to be quashed merely because specific notice as was required under Rule 154 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules was not given to the judgment-debtor before delivering possession to the decree-holder in execution of the decree. 9. The report of the Kurk Amin, which was on record, indicated that delivery of possession was made by beat of drum, which would amount to a notice to the judgment debtor as well. The execution would thus not become invalid on account of non service of notice on the judgment debtor. In the instant case the revisionist is also said to present at the time of execution as has been observed by Board of Revenue in the impugned order. He had therefore, knowledge about the execution of decree. Apart from it, in my opinion, the delivery of possession in execution of decree will not become invalid merely because of the non-issuance of notice to the judgment debtor by the Kurk Amin or his arrival in the village for the execution of decree. It is no doubt correct to say that the provision contained in Rule 154 to that effect is a salutory provision and provides a guideline to Kurk Amin to be l followed by him, but its non-compliance, in my opinion, would not make the delivery of possession to the decree-holder over the property in suit in execution of decree illegal and invalid merely on that ground. 10. In this view of the matter I find that the execution of the decree in the present case does not suffer from any material irregularity or illegality so as to make the execution and delivery of possession to the decree holder invalid or illegal. 11. In the result, I find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed.